The Soviet Union, Finland and the Cold War : The Finnish Card in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1956-1959

From the Soviet point of view the actual substance of Soviet-Finnish relations in the second half of 1950s clearly differed from the contemporary and later public image, based on friendship and confidence rhetoric. As the polarization between the right and the left became more underlined in Finland in the latter half of the 1950s, the criticism towards the Soviet Union became stronger, and the USSR feared that this development would have influence on Finnish foreign policy. From the Soviet point of view, the security commitments of FCMA-treaty needed additional guarantees through control of Finnish domestic politics and economic relations, especially during international crises. In relation to Scandinavia, Finland was, from the Soviet point of view, the model country of friendship or neutrality policy. The influence of the Second Berlin Crisis or the Soviet-Finnish Night Frost Crisis in 1958-1959 to Soviet policy towards Scandinavia needs to be observed from this point of view. The Soviet Union used Finland as a tool, in agreement with Finnish highest political leadership, for weakening of the NATO membership of Norway and Denmark, and for maintaining Swedish non-alliance. The Finnish interest to EFTA membership in the summer of 1959, at the same time with the Scandinavian countries, seems to have caused a panic reaction in the USSR, as the Soviets feared that these economic arrangements would reverse the political advantages the country had received in Finland after the Night Frost Crisis. Together with history of events, this study observes the interaction of practical interests and ideologies, both in individuals and in decision-making organizations. The necessary social and ideological reforms in the Soviet Union after 1956 had influence both on the legitimacy of the regime, and led to contradictions in the argumentation of Soviet foreign policy. This was observed both in the own camp as well as in the West. Also, in Finland a breakthrough took place in the late 1950's: as the so-called counter reaction lost to the K-line, "a special relationship" developed with the Soviet Union. As a consequence of the Night Frost Crisis the Soviet relationship became a factor decisively defining the limits of domestic politics in Finland, a part of Finnish domestic political argumentation. Understood from this basis, finlandization is not, even from the viewpoint of international relations, a special case, but a domestic political culture formed by the relationship between a dominant state, a superpower, and a subordinate state, Finland.

State Agent, Identity and the "New World Order" : Reconstructing Polish Defence Identity after the Cold War Era

National identity signifies and makes state s defence- and foreign policy behaviour meaningful. National consciousness is narrated into existence by narratives upon one s own exceptionalism and Otherness of the other nations. While national identity may be understood merely as a self-image of a nation, defence identity refers to the borders of Otherness and issues that have been considered as worth defending for. As national identities and all the world order models are human constructions, they may be changed by the human efforts as well; states and nations may deliberately promote communitarian or even cosmopolitan equality and tolerance without borders of Otherness. The main research question of the thesis is: How does Poland constitute herself as a nation and a state agent in the current world order and to what extent have contextual foreign and defence policy interactions changed the Polish defence identity during the post-Cold War era? The main empirical argument of the thesis is: Poland is a narrated idea of a Christian Catholic nation-state, which the Polish State, the Catholic Church of Poland, the Armed Forces of Poland as well as a majority of the Polish nation share. Polish defence identity has been almost impenetrable to contextual foreign and defence policy interactions during the post-Cold War era. While Christian religious ontology binds corporate Poland together, allowing her to survive any number of military and political catastrophes, it simultaneously brings her closer to the USA, raises tensions in the infidel EU-context, and restrains corporate Poland s pursuit of communitarian, or even cosmopolitan, global equality and tolerance. It is not the case that corporate Poland s foreign and defence policy orientation is instinctively Atlanticist by nature, as has been argued. Rather, it has been the State s rational project to overcome a habituated and reified fear of becoming geopolitically sandwiched between Russian and German Others by leaning on the USA; among the Polish nation, support for the USA has been declining since 2004. It is not corporate Poland either that has turned into a constructive European , as has been argued, but rather the Polish nation that has, at least partly, managed to emancipate itself from its habituation to a betrayal by Europe narrative, since it favours the EU as much as it favours NATO. It seems that in the Polish case a truly common European CFSP vis-à-vis Russia may offer a solution that will emancipate the Polish State from its habituated EU-sceptic role identity and corporate Poland from its narrated borders of Otherness towards Russia and Germany, but even then one cannot be sure whether any other perspective than the Polish one on a common stand towards Russia would satisfy the Poles themselves.

Between West and East: A Social History of Business Journalism in Cold War Finland

The Cold War era was characterized by ideological struggles that had a major impact on economic decision-making, and also on management practice. To date, however, these ideological struggles have received little attention from management and organizational scholars. To partially fill this research gap, we focus on the role of the media in these ideological struggles. Our starting point is that the media both reflect more general societal debates but also act as an agency promoting specific kinds of ideas and ideologies. In this sense, the media exercise significant power in society; this influece, however, is often subtle and easily dismissed in historical analyses focusing on political and corporate decision-making. In this article, we focus on the role of business journalism in the ideological struggles of the Cold War era. Our case in point is Finland, which is arguably a particularly interesting example due to its geo-political position between East and West. Our approach is socio-historical: we focus on the emergence and development of business journalism in the context of the specific struggles in the Finnish political and economic fields. Our analysis shows how the business journalists struggled between nationalist, pro-Soviet and pro-West political forces, but gradually developed into an increasingly influential force promoting neo-liberal ideology.

Nationalism Circumscribed : Transnational Governance of Minority Rights in Post-Cold War Europe

For the past two centuries, nationalism has been among the most influential legitimizing principles of political organization. According to its simple definition, nationalism is a principle or a way of thinking and acting which holds that the world is divided into nations, and that national and political units should be congruent. Nationalism can thus be divided into two aspects: internal and external. Internally, the political units, i.e., states, should be made up of only one nation. Externally each nation-state should be sovereign. Transnational national governance of rights of national minorities violates both these principles. This study explores the formation, operation, and effectiveness of the European post-Cold War minorities system. The study identifies two basic approaches to minority rights: security and justice. These approaches have been used to legitimize international minority politics and they also inform the practice of transnational governance. The security approach is based on the recognition that the norm of national self-determination cannot be fulfilled in all relevant cases, and so minority rights are offered as a compensation to the dissatisfied national groups, reducing their aspiration to challenge the status quo. From the justice perspective, minority rights are justified as a compensatory strategy against discrimination caused by majority nation-building. The research concludes that the post-Cold War minorities system was justified on the basis of a particular version of the security approach, according to which only Eastern European minority situations are threatening because of the ethnic variant of nationalism that exists in that region. This security frame was essential in internationalising minority issues and justifying the swift development of norms and institutions to deal with these issues. However, from the justice perspective this approach is problematic, since it justified double standards in European minority politics. Even though majority nation-building is often detrimental to minorities also in Western Europe, Western countries can treat their minorities more or less however they choose. One of the main contributions of this thesis is the detailed investigation of the operation of the post-Cold War minorities system. For the first decade since its creation in the early 1990s, the system operated mainly through its security track, which is based on the field activities of the OSCE that are supported by the EU. The study shows how the effectiveness of this track was based on inter-organizational cooperation in which various transnational actors compensate for each other s weaknesses. After the enlargement of the EU and dissolution of the membership conditionality this track, which was limited to Eastern Europe from the start, has become increasingly ineffective. Since the EU enlargement, the focus minorities system has shifted more and more towards its legal track, which is based on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Council of Europe). The study presents in detail how a network of like-minded representatives of governments, international organizations, and independent experts was able strengthen the framework convention s (originally weak) monitoring system considerably. The development of the legal track allows for a more universal and consistent, justice-based approach to minority rights in contemporary Europe, but the nationalist principle of organization still severely hinders the materialization of this possibility.

Trade Blocs and the Cold War : The CMEA and the EC challenge, 1969-1976

The coherence of the Soviet bloc was seriously tested at the turn of the 1970s, as the Soviet Union and its allies engaged in intensive negotiations over their relations with the European Communities (EC). In an effort to secure their own national economic interests many East European countries began independent manoeuvres against the wishes of their bloc leader. However, much of the intra-bloc controversy was kept out of the public eye, as the battle largely took place behind the scenes, within the organisation for economic cooperation, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The CMEA policy-making process vis-à-vis the EC is described in this study with reference to primary archival materials. This study investigates the negotiating positions and powers of the CMEA member states in their efforts to deal with the economic challenge created by the progress of the EC, as it advanced towards the customs union. This entails an analysis of the functioning principles and performance of the CMEA machinery. The study traces the CMEA negotiations that began in 1970 over its policy toward the EC. The policy was finally adopted in 1974, and was followed by the first official meeting between the two organisations in early 1975. The story ends in 1976, when the CMEA s efforts to enter into working relations with the EC were seemingly frustrated by the latter. The first major finding of the study is that, contrary to much of the prior research, the Soviet Union was not in a hegemonic position vis-à-vis its allies. It had to use a lot of its resources to tame the independent manoeuvring of its smaller allies. Thus, the USSR was not the kind of bloc leader that the totalitarian literature has described. Because the Soviet Union had to spend so much attention on its own bloc-politics, it was not able to concentrate on formulating a policy vis-à-vis the EC. Thus, the Soviet leadership was dependent on its allies in those instances when the socialist countries needed to act as a bloc. This consequently opened up the possibility for the USSR s allies to manoeuvre. This study also argues that when the CMEA did manage to find a united position, it was a force that the EC had to reckon with in its policy-making. This was particularly the case in the implementation of the EC Common Commercial Policy. The other main finding of the study is that, although it has been largely neglected in the previous literature on the history of West European integration, the CMEA did in fact have an effect on EC decision-making. This study shows how for political and ideological reasons the CMEA members did not acknowledge the EC s supranational authority. Therefore the EC had no choice but to refrain from implementing its Common Commercial Policy in full.

Empire, Tourism, Nostalgia: Joseph Brodsky and Travel Writing

Joseph Brodsky, one of the most influential Russian intellectuals of the late Soviet period, was born in Leningrad in 1940, emigrated to the United States in 1972, received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1987, and died in New York City in 1996. Brodsky was one of the leading public figures of Soviet emigration in the Cold War period, and his role as a model for the constructing of Russian cultural identities in the last years of the Soviet Union was, and still is, extremely important. One of Joseph Brodsky’s great contributions to Russian culture of the latter half of the twentieth century is the wide geographical scope of his poetic and prose works. Brodsky was not a travel writer, but he was a traveling writer who wrote a considerable number of poems and essays which relate to his trips and travels in the Soviet empire and outside it. Travel writing offered for Brodsky a discursive space for negotiating his own transculturation, while it also offered him a discursive space for making powerful statements about displacement, culture, history and geography, time and space—all major themes of his poetry. In this study of Joseph Brodsky’s travel writing I focus on his travel texts in poetry and prose, which relate to his post-1972 trips to Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, and Venice. Questions of empire, tourism, and nostalgia are foregrounded in one way or another in Brodsky’s travel writing performed in emigration. I explore these concepts through the study of tropes, strategies of identity construction, and the politics of representation. The theoretical premises of my work draw on the literary and cultural criticism which has evolved around the study of travel and travel writing in recent years. These approaches have gained much from the scholarly experience provided by postcolonial critique. Shifting the focus away from the concept of exile, the traditional framework for scholarly discussions of Brodsky’s works, I propose to review Brodsky’s travel poetry and prose as a response not only to his exilic condition but to the postmodern and postcolonial landscape, which initially shaped the writing of these texts. Discussing Brodsky’s travel writing in this context offers previously unexplored perspectives for analyzing the geopolitical, philosophical, and linguistic premises of his poetic imagination. By situating Brodsky’s travel writing in the geopolitical landscape of postcolonial postmodernity, I attempt to show how Brodsky’s engagement with his contemporary cultural practices in the West was incorporated into his Russian-language travel poetry and prose and how this engagement thus contributed to these texts’ status as exceptional and unique literary events within late Soviet Russian cultural practices.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Ranskan rooli ja asema läntisessä liittoutumassa neljännen ja viidennen tasavallan vaihtumakohdassa 1956-1958

The study discusses the position of France as the United States’ ally in NATO in 1956-1958. The concrete position of France and the role that it was envisioned to have are being treated from the point of view of three participants of the Cold War: France, the United States and the Soviet Union. How did these different parties perceive the question and did these views change when the French Fourth Republic turned into the Fifth in 1958? The study is based on published French and American documents of Foreign Affairs. Because of problems with accessibility to the Soviet archival sources, the study uses reports on France-NATO relations of Pravda newspaper, the official organ of the Communist Party of the USSR, to provide information about how the Soviet side saw the question. Due to the nature and use of source material, and the chronological structure of the work, the study belongs methodologically to the research field of History of International Relations. As distinct from political scientists’ field of research, more prone to theorize, the study is characteristically a historical research, a work based on qualitative method and original sources that aims at creating a coherent narrative of the views expressed during the period covered by the study. France’s road to a full membership of NATO is being treated on the basis of research literature, after which discussions about France’s position in the Western Alliance are being chronologically traced for the period of last years of the Fourth Republic and the immediate months of coming back to power of Charles de Gaulle. Right from the spring of 1956 there can be seen aspirations of France, on one hand, to maintain her freedom of action inside the Western Alliance and, on the other, to widen the dialogue between the allies. The decision on France’s own nuclear deterrent was made already during the Fourth Republic, when it was thought to become part of NATO’s common defence. This was to change with de Gaulle. The USA felt that France still fancied herself as a great power and that she could not participate in full in NATO’s common defence because of her colonies. The Soviet Union saw the concrete position of France in the Alliance as in complete dependence on the USA, but her desired role was expressed largely in “Gaullist” terms. The expressions used by the General and the Soviet propaganda were close to each other, but the Soviet Union could not support de Gaulle without endangering the position of the French Communist Party. Between the Fourth and Fifth Republics no great rupture in content took place concerning the views of France’s role and position in the Western Alliance. The questions posed by de Gaulle had been expressed during the whole period of Fourth Republic’s existence. Instead, along with the General the weight and rhetoric of these questions saw a great change. Already in the early phase the Americans saw it possible that with de Gaulle, France would try to change her role. The rupture took place in the form of expression, rather than in its content.

Voiko sota olla oikeutettu? : Kirkkojen maailmanneuvoston yleiskokousten kannanotot sotaan kriisien ratkaisuna

Can war be justified? Expressions of opinions by the general assemblies of the World Council of Churches on the question of war as a method of settling conflicts. The purpose of this study is to describe and analyse the expressions of opinions recorded in the documents of the general assemblies of the WCC during the Cold War period from 1948 to 1983 on the use of war as a method of settling international and national conflicts. The main sources are the official reports of the WCC´s assemblies during the years 1948 to 1983. This study divides the discussions into three periods. The first period (1949-1968) is dominated by the pressures arising from the Second World War. Experiences of the war led the assemblies of the WCC to the conclusion that modern warfare as a method of settling conflicts should be rejected. Modern war was contrary to God´s purposes and the whole meaning of creation, said the assembly. Although the WCC rejected modern war, it left open the possibility of conflict where principles of just war may be practised. The question of war was also linked to the state and its function, which led to the need to create a politically neutral doctrine for the socio-ethical thinking of churches and of the WCC itself. The doctrine was formulated using the words "responsible society". The question of war and socio-ethical thinking were on the WCC`s agenda throughout the first period. Another issue that had an influence on the first period was the increasing role of Third World countries. This new dimension also brought new aspects to the question of war and violence. The second period (1968-1975) presented greater challenges to the WCC, especially in traditional western countries. The Third World, political activity in the socialist world and ideas of revolution were discussed. The WCC`s fourth Assembly in Uppsala was challenged by these new ideas of revolution. The old doctrine of "responsible society" was seen by many participants as unsuitable in the modern world, especially for Third World countries. The situation of a world governed by armaments, causing social and economic disruption, was felt by churches to be problematic. The peace movement gathered pace and attention. There was pressure to see armed forces as an option on the way to a new world order. The idea of a just war was challenged by that of just revolution. These ideas of revolution did not receive support from the Uppsala Assembly, but they pressured the WCC to reconsider its socio-ethical thinking. Revolution was seen as a possibility, but only when it could be peaceful. In the Nairobi Assembly the theme of just, participatory and sustainable society provided yet another viewpoint, dealing with the life of the world and its problems as a whole. The third period (1975-1983) introduced a new, alternative doctrine the "JPIC Process", justice, peace and the integrity of creation for social thinking in the WCC. The WCC no longer wanted to discuss war or poverty as separate questions, but wanted to combine all aspects of life to see the impact of an arms-governed world on humankind. Thus, during the last period, discussions focused on socio-ethical questions, where war and violence were only parts of a larger problem. Through the new JPIC Process, the WCC`s Assembly in Vancouver looked for a new world, one without violence, in all aspects of life. Despite differing opinions in socio-ethical thinking, the churches in the WCC agreed that modern warfare cannot be regarded as acceptable or just. The old idea of a "just war" still had a place, but it was not seen by all as a valid principle. As a result the WCC viewed war as a final solution to be employed when all other methods had failed. Such a war would have to secure peace and justice for all. In the discussions there was a strong political east-west divide, and, during the last two decades, a north-south divide as well. The effect of the Cold War was obvious. In the background to the theological positions were two main concepts namely the idea of God´s activity in man´s history through the so-called regiments and, the concept of the Kingdom of God on Earth.

Kirkko, Kekkonen ja kommunismi poliittisina kriisivuosina 1958-1962

This study explores the relationship of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland to communism and political power during the period of crises in Finnish foreign relations with the Soviet Union from 1958 to 1962. During this period the USSR repeatedly interfered in Finland´s domestic affairs and limited her foreign political freedom of action. The research subjects for this dissertation are the bishops of the Church of Finland and the newspaper Kotimaa, which can be regarded as the unofficial organ of the church at the time. A typical characteristic of the Church of Finland from the beginning of the twentieth century was patriotism. During the interwar years the church was strongly anti-communist and against the Soviet Union. This tendency was also evident during the Second World War. After the war the Finnish Church feared that the rise of the extreme left would jeopardize its position. The church, however, succeeded in maintaining its status as a state church throughout the critical years immediately following the war. This study indicates that, although the manner of expression altered, the political attitude of the church did not substantially change during the postwar period. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the church was still patriotic and fear of the extreme left was also evident among the leaders of the church. The victory of the Finnish People's Democratic League in the general election of 1958 was an unwelcome surprise to the church. This generated fear in the church that, with Soviet support, the Finnish communists might return to governmental power and the nation could become a people's democracy. Accordingly, the church tried to encourage other parties to set aside their disagreements and act together against the extreme left throughout the period under study. The main characteristics of the church´s political agenda during this period of crisis were to support the Finnish foreign policy led by the president of the republic, Urho Kekkonen, and to resist Finnish communism. The attitude of Finnish bishops and the newspaper Kotimaa to the Cold War in general was generally in agreement with the majority of western Christians. They feared communism, were afraid of the USSR, but supported peaceful co-existence because they did not want an open conflict with the Soviets. Because of uncertainties in Finland's international position the Finnish Church regarded it as necessary to support the Finnish policy of friendship towards the USSR. The Finnish Church considerer it unwise to openly criticize the Soviet Union, tried resist the spread of communism in Finnish domestic policy. This period of foreign policy crises was principally seen by the church as a time when there was a need to strengthen Finland's unstable national position.

"Towards 'a real reunion'?" : Archbishop Aleksi Lehtonen's efforts for closer relations with the Church of England 1945–1951

Mika KT Pajusen väitös "Towards 'a real reunion'?" – Archbishop Aleksi Lehtonen's efforts for closer relations with the Church of England 1945–1951 on yleiseen kirkkohistoriaan lukeutuva tutkimus Englannin kirkon ja Suomen evankelis-luterilaisen kirkon välisistä suhteista Aleksi Lehtosen arkkipiispakaudella 1945–1951. Suhteita on tutkittu kolmesta näkökulmasta: ekumeenisesta, poliittisesta ja kirkkopoliittisesta. Tutkimuskausi alkaa pastori H.M. Waddamsin joulukuussa 1944 Suomeen tekemän vierailun jälkimainingeista ja päättyy arkkipiispa Lehtosen kuolemaan pääsiäisenä 1951. Kirkollisten suhteiden kehitystä rytmittivät lukuisat vierailut, jotka osoittivat Englannin kirkon asenteen muuttumisen sodan aikaisesta neuvostomyönteisyydestä kylmän sodan aikaiseen täysin vastakkaiseen kantaan. Englantilaiset vieraat kohtasivat Suomessa sekä kirkon että yhteiskunnan ylimmän johdon. Molemmat maat olivat valmiita tukemaan hyviä kirkollisia suhteita tilanteen niin salliessa, joskaan eivät kovin suunnitelmallisesti. Suomen evankelis-luterilainen kirkko käytti hyviä suhteita Englannin kirkkoon saadakseen tukea ja ymmärrystä omalle kirkolleen ja yhteiskunnalleen kokemaansa Neuvostoliiton uhkaa vastaan erityisesti vaaran vuosina 1944–1948. Englannin kirkko halusi tukea suomalaista sisarkirkkoaan, mutta varoi, ettei tuottaisi tuellaan enemmän haittaa kuin hyötyä suhteessa Neuvostoliittoon. Sodan jälkeinen ekumeeninen jälleenrakentaminen lähensi kirkkoja toisiinsa. Lehtonen pyrki jatkamaan 1930-luvun kirkkojen välisiä, ehtoollisvieraanvaraisuuden saavuttaneita neuvotteluita kohti täyttä kirkollista yhteyttä. Häntä motivoi sekä evankelis-katolinen teologia että pyrkimys tukea oman maan ja kirkon läntisiä yhteyksiä. Tämä haastoi Englannin kirkon ekumeenisen linjan, joka Suomen kirkon sijasta pyrki jatkamaan neuvotteluja Tanskan, Norjan ja Islannin luterilaisten kirkkojen kanssa, joilla ei vielä ollut virallista ekumeenista sopimusta Englannin kirkon kanssa. Lehtosen pyrkimyksistä huolimatta Englannin kirkko päätyi jättämään Suomen tilanteen hautumaan. Sillä se tarkoitti suhteiden koetinkivenä olleen historiallisen piispuuden leviämistä läpi Suomen kirkon ennen kuin katsoi olevansa valmis jatkamaan kohti täyttä kirkollista yhteyttä. Molemmissa kirkoissa vaikutti pieni, innokkaiden, lähempiä suhteita toivoneiden kirkollisten vaikuttajien ydinjoukko. Englantilaisia Suomen-ystäviä motivoi tarve auttaa Suomea hankalassa poliittisessa tilanteessa. Suomessa arkkipiispa Lehtonen tuki korkeakirkollista liturgista liikettä, jolla oli läheinen yhteys anglikaanisuuteen, mutta joka sai vastaansa vanhoilliset pietistit. Suomen kirkon yleinen mielipide asettui etupäässä pietistiselle kannalle, jolle anglikaanisuus näyttäytyi teologisesti sekä liian katolisena että liian reformoituna. Kirkolliset suhteet tasaantuivat vuoden 1948 Lambeth-konferenssin jälkeen, joka rohkaisi anglikaanisia kirkkoja hyväksymään 1930-luvun neuvottelujen lähempiin kirkollisiin suhteisiin tähtäävät suositukset. Lehtonen näytti tyytyvän tähän. Samaan aikaan lähempää kirkollista kanssakäymistä tukenut ekumeeninen jälleenrakennus tuli tiensä päähän. Lehtonen jatkoi läheisempien suhteiden edistämistä, mutta hänen intonsa hiipui yhdessä heikkenevän terveydentilan kanssa. Osoituksena Lehtosen linjan kapeudesta Suomen evankelis-luterilaisen kirkon piispoista ei löytynyt hänen kuoltuaan ketään, joka olisi jatkanut hänen aktiivista anglikaanimyönteistä linjaansa.

Valoa itään? : Kansanlähetys ja Neuvostoliitto 1967-1973

Light to the East? The Finnish Lutheran Mission and the Soviet Union 1967 1973 The Cold War affected the lives of Christian churches, especially in Europe. Besides the official ecumenical relations between east and west, there existed unofficial activity from west to east, such as smuggling Bibles and distributing information about the severe condition of human rights in the USSR. This study examines this kind of unofficial activity originating in Finland. It especially concentrates on the missionary work to the Soviet Union done by the Finnish Lutheran Mission (FLM, Suomen Evankelisluterilainen Kansanlähetys) founded in 1967. The work for Eastern Europe was organised through the Department for the Slavic Missions. FLM was founded within the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, but it was not connected to the church on an organisational level. In addition to the strong emphasis on the Lutheran confession, FLM presented evangelical theology. The fundamental work of the Department for the Slavic Missions was to organise the smuggling of Bibles and other Christian literature to the Soviet Union and other countries behind the iron curtain. They also financed several Christian radio programmes produced and aired mainly by the international Trans World Radio. The Department diversified its activity to humanitarian help by distributing material help such as clothes and shoes to the unregistered evangelical and baptist groups, which were called the underground churches . In Finland the Department focused on information services. It published its own magazine, Valoa idässä (Light in the East), 5 to 6 times per year. Through the magazine and by distributing samizdat material received from the unregistered Christian groups, it discussed and reported the violations of human rights in the Soviet Union, especially when the unregistered Christian groups were considered the victims. The resistance against the Soviet Union was not as much political but religious: the staff of the Department were religious and revivalist young people who thought, for instance, that communism was in some way an apocalyptic world power revealed in the Bible. Smuggling Bibles was discussed widely in the Finnish media and even in parliament and the Finnish Security Police (SUPO, Suojelupoliisi) and in the Lutheran Church. From the church s point of view, this kind of missionary work was understandable but bothersome. Through their ecumenical connections, the bishops knew the critical situation of churches behind the iron curtain very well, but wanted to act diplomatically and cautiously to prevent causing harm to ecumenical or political relations. The leftist media and members of parliament especially accused the work of the Department of being illegal and endangering relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. SUPO did not consider the work of the Department as illegal activity or as a threat to Finnish national security.

Small State Cultures of Consensus : State Traditions and Consensus-Seeking in the Neo-Corporatist and Neutrality Policies in Post-1945 Austria and Finland

Austria and Finland are persistently referred to as the “success stories” of post-1945 European history. Notwithstanding their different points of departure, in the course of the Cold War both countries portrayed themselves as small and neutral border-states in the world dictated by superpower politics. By the 1970s, both countries frequently ranked at the top end in various international classifications regarding economic development and well-being in society. This trend continues today. The study takes under scrutiny the concept of consensus which figures centrally in the two national narratives of post-1945 success. Given that the two domestic contexts as such only share few direct links with one another and are more obviously different than similar in terms of their geographical location, historical experiences and politico-cultural traditions, the analogies and variations in the anatomies of the post-1945 “cultures of consensus” provide an interesting topic for a historical comparative and cross-national examination. The main research question concerns the identification and analysis of the conceptual and procedural convergence points of the concepts of the state and consensus. The thesis is divided into six main chapters. After the introduction, the second chapter presents the theoretical framework in more detail by focusing on the key concepts of the study – the state and consensus. Chapter two also introduces the comparative historical and cross-national research angles. Chapter three grounds the key concepts of the state and consensus in the historical contexts of Austria and Finland by discussing the state, the nation and democracy in a longer term comparative perspective. The fourth and fifth chapter present case studies on the two policy fields, the “pillars”, upon which the post-1945 Austrian and Finnish cultures of consensus are argued to have rested. Chapter four deals with neo-corporatist features in the economic policy making and chapter five discusses the building up of domestic consensus regarding the key concepts of neutrality policies in the 1950s and 1960s. The study concludes that it was not consensus as such but the strikingly intense preoccupation with the theme of domestic consensus that cross-cut, in a curiously analogous manner, the policy-making processes studied. The main challenge for the post-1945 architects of Austrian and Finnish cultures of consensus was to find strategies and concepts for consensus-building which would be compatible with the principles of democracy. Discussed at the level of procedures, the most important finding of the study concerns the triangular mechanism of coordination, consultation and cooperation that set into motion and facilitated a new type of search for consensus in both post-war societies. In this triangle, the agency of the state was central, though in varying ways. The new conceptions concerning a small state’s position in the Cold War world also prompted cross-nationally perceivable willingness to reconsider inherited concepts and procedures of the state and the nation. At the same time, the ways of understanding the role of the state and its relation to society remained profoundly different in Austria and Finland and this basic difference was in many ways reflected in the concepts and procedures deployed in the search for consensus and management of domestic conflicts. For more detailed information, please consult the author.

Reinventing Nordic Openness : Transparency and State Information in Finland

The study explores new ideational changes in the information strategy of the Finnish state between 1998 and 2007, after a juncture in Finnish governing in the early 1990s. The study scrutinizes the economic reframing of institutional openness in Finland that comes with significant and often unintended institutional consequences of transparency. Most notably, the constitutional principle of publicity (julkisuusperiaate), a Nordic institutional peculiarity allowing public access to state information, is now becoming an instrument of economic performance and accountability through results. Finland has a long institutional history in the publicity of government information, acknowledged by law since 1951. Nevertheless, access to government information became a policy concern in the mid-1990s, involving a historical narrative of openness as a Nordic tradition of Finnish governing Nordic openness (pohjoismainen avoimuus). International interest in transparency of governance has also marked an opening for institutional re-descriptions in Nordic context. The essential added value, or contradictory term, that transparency has on the Finnish conceptualisation of governing is the innovation that public acts of governing can be economically efficient. This is most apparent in the new attempts at providing standardised information on government and expressing it in numbers. In Finland, the publicity of government information has been a concept of democratic connotations, but new internationally diffusing ideas of performance and national economic competitiveness are discussed under the notion of transparency and its peer concepts openness and public (sector) information, which are also newcomers to Finnish vocabulary of governing. The above concepts often conflict with one another, paving the way to unintended consequences for the reforms conducted in their name. Moreover, the study argues that the policy concerns over openness and public sector information are linked to the new drive for transparency. Drawing on theories of new institutionalism, political economy, and conceptual history, the study argues for a reinvention of Nordic openness in two senses. First, in referring to institutional history, the policy discourse of Nordic openness discovers an administrative tradition in response to new dilemmas of public governance. Moreover, this normatively appealing discourse also legitimizes the new ideational changes. Second, a former mechanism of democratic accountability is being reframed with market and performance ideas, mostly originating from the sphere of transnational governance and governance indices. Mobilizing different research techniques and data (public documents of the Finnish government and international organizations, some 30 interviews of Finnish civil servants, and statistical time series), the study asks how the above ideational changes have been possible, pointing to the importance of nationalistically appealing historical narratives and normative concepts of governing. Concerning institutional developments, the study analyses the ideational changes in central steering mechanisms (political, normative and financial steering) and the introduction of budget transparency and performance management in two cases: census data (Population Register Centre) and foreign political information (Ministry for Foreign Affairs). The new policy domain of governance indices is also explored as a type of transparency. The study further asks what institutional transformations are to be observed in the above cases and in the accountability system. The study concludes that while the information rights of citizens have been reinforced and recalibrated during the period under scrutiny, there has also been a conversion of institutional practices towards economic performance. As the discourse of Nordic openness has been rather unquestioned, the new internationally circulating ideas of transparency and the knowledge economy have entered this discourse without public notice. Since the mid 1990s, state registry data has been perceived as an exploitable economic resource in Finland and in the EU public sector information. This is a parallel development to the new drive for budget transparency in organisations as vital to the state as the Population Register Centre, which has led to marketization of census data in Finland, an international exceptionality. In the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the post-Cold War rhetorical shift from secrecy to performance-driven openness marked a conversion in institutional practices that now see information services with high regards. But this has not necessarily led to the increased publicity of foreign political information. In this context, openness is also defined as sharing information with select actors, as a trust based non-public activity, deemed necessary amid the global economic competition. Regarding accountability system, deliberation and performance now overlap, making it increasingly difficult to identify to whom and for what the public administration is accountable. These evolving institutional practices are characterised by unintended consequences and paradoxes. History is a paradoxical component in the above institutional change, as long-term institutional developments now justify short-term reforms.

Puolustuskykyinen valtio vai Ruotsin hälytyskello? : Suomen sotilasstrateginen asema kylmän sodan alkuvuosien asiantuntija-arvioissa

The doctoral thesis deals with Finnish and foreign expert s analyses of Finland s military strategic position and defence capability, dating back to the early years of the Cold War. Finland s military high command prepared assessments of the country s strategic position and of the capability of the Defence Forces as grounds for defence planning. Since Finland was located on the Cold War dividing line, the foreign powers were also monitoring the development of Finland s situation. The research carried out had access to the armed forces internal assessments, as well as to analyses prepared by the military intelligence services of Sweden, Britain and the United States. One of the working hypotheses was that after the WWII the ability military leadership to estimate the security political needs of the country and the organisation of its defence was severely weakened so that the dangers of the international development were not perceived and the gradual erosion of defence capability was partly unnoticed. This hypothesis proved to be wrong. Even if the Finnish military intelligence was much weaker than during the war, it was able to provide the military leadership with information of the international military development for the most part. The military leadership was also fully aware of the weakening of the defence capability of the country. They faced the difficult task of making the country s political leadership, i.e. President Paasikivi and the government, also understand the gravity of the situation. Only in the last years of his term in office Paasikivi started to believe the warnings of the military. According to another hypothesis, outside observers considered the Finnish armed forces to primarily act as reinforcements for the Soviet Red Army, and they believed that, in the event of a full-scale war, the Finns would not have been able or even willing to resist a Soviet invasion of Sweden and Norway through Finland. The study confirmed that this was approximately the view the Swedes, the British and the Americans had of the Finnish forces. Western and Swedish intelligence assessments did not show confidence in Finland s defence ability and the country was regarded almost as a Soviet satellite. Finland s strategic position was, however, considered slightly different from that of the Soviet-occupied Eastern European countries. Finland had been forced to become part of the Soviet sphere of interest and security system and this was sealed by the Finno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 1948. Finland had little importance to the military interests of the Western powers. In Sweden s defence planning, however, Finland played a significant role as an alarm bell of a possible Soviet surprise attack, as well as defensive frontline and buffer zone.