Ethics and Aesthetics : Intersections in Iris Murdoch's Philosophy

The study addresses the question concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in the philosophy of Iris Murdoch. The main argument is that Murdoch s philosophy cannot be accurately understood without an understanding of the relationship she sees between the aesthetic experience and morality. Reading Murdoch s philosophy with this relationship in mind shows that it must be considered as a relevant alternative to the main forms of aesthetic-ethical theories. The study consists of seven previously published articles and a summary. It shows that Murdoch belongs to a tradition of philosophers who seek to broaden the scope of ethics by reference to aesthetic value and aesthetic experience. She sees an attitude responsible for aesthetic experiences as relevant for morality. However, she does not collapse morality into aesthetic experience. The two meet on the level of the subject s attitude towards its object, but there is a distinction between the experiences that accompany the attitudes. Aesthetic experiences can function as a clue to morals in that they present in a pleasing manner moral truths which otherwise might be psychologically too difficult to face. Murdoch equates the aesthetic attitude with virtuous love characterized by unselfish attention to its object. The primary object of such love is in Murdoch s account another human individual in her particularity. She compares the recognition of the other person as a particular existence to the experience of the Kantian sublime and offers her own version of the true sublime which is the experience of awe in the face of the infinity of the task of understanding others. One of the most central claims in Murdoch s philosophy is that human consciousness is evaluatively structured. This claim challenges the distinction between facts and values which has had an immense influence on modern moral philosophy. One argument with which Murdoch supports her claim is the nature of great literature. According to her, the standard of greatness in literature is the authors awareness of the independent existence of individuals in the particularity of their evaluative consciousnesses. The analysis of the standard of greatness in literature is also Murdoch s only argument for the claim that the primary object of the loving unselfish attention is the other particular individual. She is convinced that great literature reveals a deep truth about the human condition with its capacity to capture the particular. Abstract philo¬sophical discourse cannot compete with this capacity but it should take truths revealed by literature seriously in its theorising. Recognising this as Murdoch s stand on the question of the relation between philosophy and literature as forms of human discourse settles whether she is part of what has been called philosophy s turn to literature. The answer is yes.

But if you desire God and His Messenger : The concept of choice in Sahih al-Bukhari

The aim of this dissertation is to discuss the concept of choice in the most important collection of Islamic traditions, Sahih al-Bukhari. The author of the collection, Muhammad ibn Isma'il al-Bukhari, lived between 810-870. My starting point is the collection of texts as it is now in its normative, established form. I read the hadiths as pieces of reality, not as statements about reality. The historicity of the texts has no role at all in my analysis. Part I sketches out the hagiography of the life and work of the author and provides a short history of the development of hadith literature and the processes of collecting and classifying the texts are discussed briefly. Part one ends with the presentation of my way of using rhetorical analysis as a methodological tool. Part II introduces my analysis of the concept of choice. It is divided into ten chapters, each concentrating on one hadith cluster. Part II ends with a discussion of the philosophy of free will and predestination in early Islam. Hadith literature is often considered as a representative of predestinarian theology compared to the Qur'an which emphasises the reponsibility of people of their own acts. In my conclusions I suggest that accoding to the texts in Sahih al-Bukhari, people do deal with real choices in their lives. The collection includes both strictly predestinarian texts but it also compises texts which claim that people are demanded to make real choices, even choices concerning life and death.

Incarnate Subjectivity : The Constitutive Significance of Embodiment in Husserlian Phenomenology

This work offers a systematic phenomenological investigation of the constitutive significance of embodiment. It provides detailed analyses of subjectivity in relation to itself, to others, and to objective reality, and it argues that these basic structures cannot be made intelligible unless one takes into account how they are correlated with an embodied subject. The methodological and conceptual starting point of the treatise is the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. The investigation employs the phenomenological method and uses the descriptions and analyses provided by Husserl and his successors. The treatise is motivated and outlined systematically, and textual exegesis serves as a means for the systematic phenomenological investigation. The structure of the work conforms to the basic relations of subjectivity. The first part of the thesis explores the intimate relation between lived-body and selfhood, analyzes the phenomena of localization, and argues that self-awareness is necessarily and fundamentally embodied self-awareness. The second part examines the intersubjective dimensions of embodiment, investigates the corporal foundations of empathy, and unravels the bodily aspects of transcendental intersubjectivity. The third part scrutinizes the role of embodiment in the constitution of the surrounding objective reality: it focuses on the complex relationship between transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity, carefully examines the normative aspects of genetic and generative self-constitution, and argues eventually that what Husserl calls the paradox of subjectivity originates in a tension between primordial and intersubjective normativity. The work thus reinterprets the paradox of subjectivity in terms of a normative tension, and claims that the paradox is ultimately rooted in the structures of embodiment. In this manner, as a whole, the work discloses the constitutive significance of embodiment, and argues that transcendental subjectivity must be fundamentally embodied.

Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.

Truth, Proof and Gödelian Arguments : A Defence of Tarskian Truth in Mathematics

One of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the relation between truth and formal proof. The position according to which the two concepts are the same is called deflationism, and the opposing viewpoint substantialism. In an important result of mathematical logic, Kurt Gödel proved in his first incompleteness theorem that all consistent formal systems containing arithmetic include sentences that can neither be proved nor disproved within that system. However, such undecidable Gödel sentences can be established to be true once we expand the formal system with Alfred Tarski s semantical theory of truth, as shown by Stewart Shapiro and Jeffrey Ketland in their semantical arguments for the substantiality of truth. According to them, in Gödel sentences we have an explicit case of true but unprovable sentences, and hence deflationism is refuted. Against that, Neil Tennant has shown that instead of Tarskian truth we can expand the formal system with a soundness principle, according to which all provable sentences are assertable, and the assertability of Gödel sentences follows. This way, the relevant question is not whether we can establish the truth of Gödel sentences, but whether Tarskian truth is a more plausible expansion than a soundness principle. In this work I will argue that this problem is best approached once we think of mathematics as the full human phenomenon, and not just consisting of formal systems. When pre-formal mathematical thinking is included in our account, we see that Tarskian truth is in fact not an expansion at all. I claim that what proof is to formal mathematics, truth is to pre-formal thinking, and the Tarskian account of semantical truth mirrors this relation accurately. However, the introduction of pre-formal mathematics is vulnerable to the deflationist counterargument that while existing in practice, pre-formal thinking could still be philosophically superfluous if it does not refer to anything objective. Against this, I argue that all truly deflationist philosophical theories lead to arbitrariness of mathematics. In all other philosophical accounts of mathematics there is room for a reference of the pre-formal mathematics, and the expansion of Tarkian truth can be made naturally. Hence, if we reject the arbitrariness of mathematics, I argue in this work, we must accept the substantiality of truth. Related subjects such as neo-Fregeanism will also be covered, and shown not to change the need for Tarskian truth. The only remaining route for the deflationist is to change the underlying logic so that our formal languages can include their own truth predicates, which Tarski showed to be impossible for classical first-order languages. With such logics we would have no need to expand the formal systems, and the above argument would fail. From the alternative approaches, in this work I focus mostly on the Independence Friendly (IF) logic of Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu. Hintikka has claimed that an IF language can include its own adequate truth predicate. I argue that while this is indeed the case, we cannot recognize the truth predicate as such within the same IF language, and the need for Tarskian truth remains. In addition to IF logic, also second-order logic and Saul Kripke s approach using Kleenean logic will be shown to fail in a similar fashion.

Tiedettä Pohjantähden alla : Pohjoisen tutkimus ja Ruotsin tiedeseurojen suhteet Ranskaan 1700-luvulla

In the eighteenth century, the birth of scientific societies in Europe created a new framework for scientific cooperation. Through a new contextualist study of the contacts between the first scientific societies in Sweden and the most important science academy in Europe at the time, l Académie des Sciences in Paris, this dissertation aims to shed light on the role taken by the Swedish learned men in the new networks. It seeks to show that the academy model was related to a new idea of specialisation in science. In the course of the eighteenth century, it is argued, the study of the northern phenomena and regions offered the Swedes an important field of speciality with regard to their foreign colleagues. Although historical studies have often underlined the economic, practical undertone of eighteenth-century Swedish science, participation in fashionable scientific pursuits had also become an important scene for representation. However, the views prevailing in Europe tied civilisation and learning closely to the sunnier, southern climates, which had lead to the difficulty of portraying Sweden as a learned country. The image of the scientific North, as well as the Swedish strategies to polish the image of the North as a place for science, are analysed as seen from France. While sixteenth-century historians had preferred to put down the effects of the cold and claim a similarity of northern conditions to the others, the scientific exchange between Swedish and French researchers shows a new tendency to underline the difference of the North and its harsh climate. An explanation is sought by analysing how information about northern phenomena was used in France. In the European academies, new empirical methods had lead to a need for direct observations on different phenomena and circumstances. Rather than curiosities or objects for exoticism, the eighteenth-century depictions of the northern periphery tell about an emerging interest in the most extreme, and often most telling, examples of the workings of the invariable laws of nature. Whereas the idea of accumulating knowledge through cooperation was most manifest in joint astronomical projects, the idea of gathering and comparing data from differing places of observation appears also in other fields, from experimental philosophy to natural studies or medicine. The effects of these developments are studied and explained in connection to the Montesquieuan climate theories and the emerging pre-romantic ideas of man and society.

Luonto, tiede ja teknologia : Kansanvalistuksen Suomi-kuva 1870-1920

Nature, science and technology. The image of Finland through popular enlightenment texts 1870-1920 This doctoral thesis looks at how Finnish popular enlightenment texts published between 1870 and 1920 took part in the process of forming a genuine Finnish national identity. The same process was occurring in other Nordic countries at the time and the process in Finland was in many ways influenced by them, particularly Sweden. In Finland the political realities under Russian rule especially during the Russification years, and the fact that its history was considered to be short compared to other European countries, made this nation-building process unique. The undertaking was led by members of the national elite, influential in the cultural, academic as well as political arenas, who were keen to support the foundation of a modern Finnish identity. The political realities and national philosophy of history necessitated a search for elements of identity in nature and the Finnish landscape, which were considered to have special national importance: Finland was very much determined as a political entity on the basis of its geography and nature. Nature was also used as means of taking a cultural or political view in terms of, for example, geographical facts such as the nation s borders or the country s geographical connections to Western Europe. In the building of a proper national identity the concept of nature was not, however, static, but was more or less affected by political and economic progress in society. This meant that nature, or the image of the national landscape, was no longer seen only as a visual image of the national identity, but also as a source of science, technology and a prosperous future. The role of technology in this process was very much connected to the ability to harness natural resources to serve national interests. The major change in this respect had occurred by the early 20th century, when indisputable scientific progress altered the relationship between nature and technology. Concerning technology, the thesis is mainly interested in the large and at the time modern technological manifestations, such as railways, factories and industrial areas in Finland. Despite the fact that the symbiosis between national nature and international but successfully localized technology was in Finnish popular enlightenment literature depicted mostly as a national success story, concerns began to arise already in last years of the 19th century. It was argued that the emerging technology would eventually destroy Finland s natural environment, and therefore the basis of its national identity. The question was not how to preserve nature through natural science, but more how to conserve such natural resources and images that were considered to be the basis of national identity and thus of the national history. National parks, isolated from technology, and distant enough so as to have no economic value, were considered the solution to the problem. Methodologically the thesis belongs to the genre of science and technology studies, and offers new viewpoints with regard to both the study of Finnish popular enlightenment literature and the national development process as a whole.

Aristotle on the Perception of Perception : Seeing, Remembering, and Sleeping

This study is an inquiry into three related topics in Aristotle’s psychology: the perception of seeing, the perception of past perception, and the perception of sleeping. Over the past decades, Aristotle’s account of the perception of perception has been studied in numerous articles and chapters of books. However, there is no monograph that attempts to give a comprehensive analysis of this account and to assess its relation and significance to Aristotle’s psychological theory in general as well as to other theories pertaining to the topics (e.g. theories of consciousness), be they ancient, medieval, modern, or contemporary. This study intends to fill this gap and to further the research into Aristotle’s philosophy and into the philosophy of mind. The present study is based on an accurate analysis of the sources, on their Platonic background, and on later interpretations within the commentary tradition up to the present. From a methodological point of view, this study represents systematically orientated research into the history of philosophy, in which special attention is paid to the philosophical problems inherent in the sources, to the distinctions drawn, and to the arguments put forward as well as to their philosophical assessment. In addition to contributing many new findings concerning the topics under discussion, this study shows that Aristotle’s account of the perception of perception substantially differs from many later theories of consciousness. This study also suggests that Aristotle be regarded as a consistent direct realist, not only in respect of sense perception, but also in respect of memory.

Scheffleriläinen rationaalisuus ja kasvatustodellisuuden monikerroksisuus : Jännitteitä ja ratkaisuja Israel Schefflerin kasvatusfilosofiassa

The study is a philosophical analysis of Israel Scheffler’s philosophy of education, focusing on three crucial conceptions in his philosophy: the conception of rationality, the conception of human nature, and the conception of reality. The interrelations of these three concepts as well as their relations to educational theorizing are analysed and elaborated. A conceptual problem concerning Scheffler’s ideal of rationality derives from Scheffler’s supposition of the strong analogy between science education and moral education in terms of the ideal of rationality. This analogy is argued to be conceptually problematic, since the interconnections of rationality, objectivity, and truth, appear to differ from each other in the realms of ethics and science, given the presuppositions of ontological realism and ethical naturalism, to which Scheffler explicitly subscribes. This study considers two philosophical alternatives for solving this problem. The first alternative relates the analogy to the normative concept of personhood deriving from the teleological understanding of human nature. Nevertheless, this position turns out to be problematic for Scheffler, since he rejects all teleological thinking in his philosophy. The problem can be solved, as it is argued, by limiting Scheffler’s rejection of teleology – in light of his philosophical outlook on the whole – in a manner that allows a modest version of a teleological conception of human nature. The second alternative, based especially on Scheffler’s later contributions, is to suggest that reality is actually more complex and manifold than it appears to be in light of a contemporary naturalist worldview. This idea of plurealism – Scheffler’s synthesis of pluralism and realism – is represented especially in Scheffler’s contributions related to his debate with Nelson Goodman dealing with both constructivism and realism. The idea of plurealism is not only related to the ethics-science-distinction, but is more widely related to the relationship between ontological realism and the incommensurable systems of description in diverse realms of human understanding. The Scheffler-Goodman debate is also analysed in relation to the contemporary constructivism-realism debate in educational philosophy. In terms of educational questions, Scheffler’s plurealism is argued as offering a fruitful perspective. Scheffler’s philosophy of education can be interpreted as searching for solutions to the problems deriving from the tension between the tradition of analytical philosophy and the complexity and multiplicity of educational reality. The complexity of reality combined with the supposition of the limitedness of human knowledge does not lead Scheffler to relativism or particularism, but, in contrast, Schefflerian formulations of rationality and objectivity preserve the possibility for critical inquiry in all realms of educational reality. In light of this study, Scheffler’s philosophy of education provides an exceptional example of combining ontological realism, epistemological fallibilism, and the defence of the ideal of rationality, combined with a wide-ranging understanding of educational reality.

Kotitaloustaidon ulottuvuuksia : Analyysi kotitaloustaidosta eksistentialistis-hermeneuttisen fenomenologian valossa

DOMESTIC SKILLS AS THE ART OF EVERYDAY LIFE. An inquiry about domestic skills as a way of being-in-the-world in the light of existentialist-hermeneutics phenomenology. This study focuses on analyzing domestic skills in a phenomenological manner. The description phenomenological emerges from the interpretation process, which originates from the ontological question of domestic skills. The ontological question of how domestic skills are directs one s phenomenological gaze to the experiencing of domestic skills, rather than merely viewing their action or technical aspects. Along with the ontological question, the axiological question of what the meaning of domestic skills is drives the analysis. This study is both theoretical and philosophical. Phenomenology is the guiding philosophy, theory and methodology of the inquiry. Existentialist-hermeneutics is the emphasis which most appropriately describes the phenomenological attitude adopted within the analysis. Martin Heidegger s philosophy of being and Maurice Merleau-Ponty s philosophy of the lived body essentially form the theoretical base for the inquiry. The analysis reveals domestic skills within a core of Care and the Other. Care and the Other are anchored both in Heidegger s analysis of Dasein and in Merleau-Ponty s analysis of the reversible being-in-the-world. The social nature of being and the action-oriented intentionality of the lived body are embodied in Care and the Other. This ontological base of domestic skills enables us to see the extensions that inhabit in it. These extensions are redoing, emotional experiencing, adapting and emancipating. The analysis connects ability and action, which is why domestic skills and household activity must be seen as a united whole. This united whole is not the matter of the two components of the phenomenon, but is rather the matter of domestic skills as a way of being-in-the-world. Domestic skills are a channel for the phenomenon Home Economics to manifest in our lives. This is the gaze that presents domestic skills as to be like the poetry of everyday life. The main result of the study is the elucidation of the ontology of domestic skills and the naming of its extensions. This growth of philosophical understanding makes it possible to strengthen the science of home economics.

Mikä on ihme ja mitä ihmeistä voidaan tietää? : Keskustelu ihmeistä uusimmassa englanninkielisessä uskonnonfilosofiassa

What is a miracle and what can we know about miracles? A discussion of miracles in anglophone philosophy of religion literature since the late 1960s. The aim of this study is to systematically describe and philosophically examine the anglophone discussion on the subject of miracles since the latter half of the 1960s. The study focuses on two salient questions: firstly, what I will term the conceptual-ontological question of the extent to which we can understand miracles and, secondly, the epistemological question of what we can know about miracles. My main purpose in this study is to examine the various viewpoints that have been submitted in relation to these questions, how they have been argued and on what presuppositions these arguments have been based. In conducting the study, the most salient dimension of the various discussions was found to relate to epistemological questions. In this regard, there was a notable confrontation between those scholars who accept miracles and those who are sceptical of them. On the conceptual-ontological side I recognised several different ways of expressing the concept of miracle . I systematised the discussion by demonstrating the philosophical boundaries between these various opinions. The first and main boundary was related to ontological knowledge. On one side of this boundary I placed the views which were based on realism and objectivism. The proponents of this view assumed that miraculousness is a real property of a miraculous event regardless of how we can perceive it. On the other side I put the views which tried to define miraculousness in terms of subjectivity, contextuality and epistemicity. Another essential boundary which shed light on the conceptual-ontological discussion was drawn in relation to two main views of nature. The realistic-particularistic view regards nature as a certain part of reality. The adherents of this presupposition postulate a supernatural sphere alongside nature. Alternatively, the nominalist-universalist view understands nature without this kind of division. Nature is understood as the entire and infinite universe; the whole of reality. Other, less important boundaries which shed light on the conceptual-ontological discussion were noted in relation to views regarding the laws of nature, for example. I recognised that the most important differences between the epistemological approaches were in the different views of justification, rationality, truth and science. The epistemological discussion was divided into two sides, distinguished by their differing assumptions in relation to the need for evidence. Adherents of the first (and noticeably smaller) group did not see any epistemological need to reach a universal and common opinion about miracles. I discovered that these kinds of views, which I called non-objectivist, had subjectivist and so-called collectivist views of justification and a contextualist view of rationality. The second (and larger) group was mainly interested in discerning the grounds upon which to establish an objective and conclusive common view in relation to the epistemology of miracles. I called this kind of discussion an objectivist discussion and this kind of approach an evidentialist approach. Most of the evidentialists tried to defend miracles and the others attempted to offer evidence against miracles. Amongst both sides, there were many different variations according to emphasis and assumption over how they saw the possibilities to prove their own view. The common characteristic in all forms of evidentialism was a commitment to an objectivist notion of rationality and a universalistic notion of justification. Most evidentialists put their confidence in science in one way or another. Only a couple of philosophers represented the most moderate version of evidentialism; they tried to remove themselves from the apparent controversy and contextualised the different opinions in order to make some critical comments on them. I called this kind of approach a contextualising form of evidentialism. In the final part of the epistemological chapter, I examined the discussion about the evidential value of miracles, but nothing substantially new was discovered concerning the epistemological views of the authors.

Striving for the Impossible : The Hegelian background of Judith Butler

This study analyses the Hegelian roots of the subject-theory and the political theory of Judith Butler. Butler can be seen as the author of "gender performativity". Butler claims that subject's identities are linquistic "terms". Linquistic identities are performative and normative: they produce, according to cultural rules, the identities which they just claim to describe. Butler's theory of the performativity of identities is based on her theory of identities as "ek-static" constructions. This means that there is a relation between the self and the Other in the heart of identities. It is claimed in this study that Butler's theory of the relation between the self and the Other, or, between the subject and the constitutive outside, is based on G.W.F. Hegel's theory of the dialectics of recognition in The Phenomenology of Spirit. Especially the sections dealing with the relation between "Lord" and "Bondsman" set the theoretical base for Butler's theory. Further, it is claimed that Hegel's own solution for the enslaving and instrumentalizing relation between the self and the Other, reciprocal recognition, remains an important alternative to the postmodernist conception supported by political theorists like Butler. Chapter 2, on Hegel, goes through the dialectics of recognition between the self and the Other in The Phenomenology of Spirit up until the ideal of reciprocal recognition and absolute knowledge. Chapter 3 introduces two French interpretations of Hegel, by Alexandre Kojéve and Louis Althusser. Both of these interpretations, especially the Kojevian one, have deeply influenced the contemporary understanding of Hegel as well as the contemporary thought - presented e.g. in the postmodern political thought - on the relations between the self and the Other. The Kojévian Marxist utopia with its notion of "the End of History" as well as the Althusserian theory of the Interpellative formation of subjects have influenced how Hegel's theory of the self and the Other have travelled into Butler's thought. In chapter 5 these influences are analyzed in detail. According to the analysis, Butler, like numerous other poststructuralist theorists, accepts Kojéve's interpretation as basically correct, but rejects his vision of "the End of History" as static and totalitarian. Kojéve's utopian philosophy of history is replaced by the paradoxical idea of an endless striving towards emancipation which, however, could not and should not be reached. In chapter 6 Butler's theory is linked to another postmodern political theory, that of Chantal Mouffe. It is argued that Mouffe's theory is based on a similar view of the relation of the self and the other as Butler's theory. The former, however, deals explicitly with politics. Therefore, it makes the central paradox of striving for the impossible more visible; such a theory is unable to guide political action. Hegel actually anticipated this kind of theorizing in his critique of "Unhappy Consciousness" in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Keywords: Judith Butler, G.W.F. Hegel, Chantal Mouffe, Alexandre Kojéve, Postmodernism, Politics, Identities, Performativity, Self-consciousness, Other

Temporality of the Face-to-Face in Levinas' Ethics

This thesis focuses on a connection between temporality and ethics in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. I argue that Levinas understanding of temporality is rooted in the function of pra-impression which in its turn does not belong to the intentional consciousness but reveals a subject as being open to the Other. In the face-to-face situation with the Other the pra-impression is an essential and constitutive force: it fractures the moment of the present, questions subjectivity and generates a new meaning of temporality. As a result a responsible subject is revealed; responsibility for the Other marks a latent birth of the subject which is prior to any origin of subjectivity, it discloses a meaning of time that does not belong to the subject but is found in the Other. In this study I suggest that pra-impression finds its productive force in language, the function of the feminine, and what Levinas calls the other in the same .

A Historical Approach to Children s Physics Education : Modelling of DC-circuit Phenomena in a Small Group

This three-phase design research describes the modelling processes for DC-circuit phenomena. The first phase presents an analysis of the development of the DC-circuit historical models in the context of constructing Volta s pile at the turn of the 18th century. The second phase involves the designing of a teaching experiment for comprehensive school third graders. Among other considerations, the design work utilises the results of the first phase and research literature of pupils mental models for DC-circuit phenomena. The third phase of the research was concerned with the realisation of the planned teaching experiment. The aim of this phase was to study the development of the external representations of DC-circuit phenomena in a small group of third graders. The aim of the study has been to search for new ways to guide pupils to learn DC-circuit phenomena while emphasing understanding at the qualitative level. Thus, electricity, which has been perceived as a difficult and abstract subject, could be learnt more comprehensively. Especially, the research of younger pupils learning of electricity concepts has not been of great interest at the international level, although DC-circuit phenomena are also taught in the lower classes of comprehensive schools. The results of this study are important, because there has tended to be more teaching of natural sciences in the lower classes of comprehensive schools, and attempts are being made to develop this trend in Finland. In the theoretical part of the research an Experimental-centred representation approach, which emphasises the role of experimentalism in the development of pupil s representations, is created. According to this approach learning at the qualitative level consists of empirical operations like experimenting, observations, perception, and prequantification of nature phenomena, and modelling operations like explaining and reasoning. Besides planning teaching, the new approach can be used as an analysis tool in describing both historical modelling and the development of pupils representations. In the first phase of the study, the research question was: How did the historical models of DC-circuit phenomena develop in Volta s time? The analysis uncovered three qualitative historical models associated with the historical concept formation process. The models include conceptions of the electric circuit as a scene in the DC-circuit phenomena, the comparative electric-current phenomenon as a cause of different observable effect phenomena, and the strength of the battery as a cause of the electric-current phenomenon. These models describe the concept formation process and its phases in Volta s time. The models are portrayed in the analysis using fragments of the models, where observation-based fragments and theoretical fragements are distinguished from each other. The results emphasise the significance of the qualitative concept formation and the meaning of language in the historical modelling of DC-circuit phenomena. For this reason these viewpoints are stressed in planning the teaching experiment in the second phase of the research. In addition, the design process utilised the experimentation behind the historical models of DC-circuit phenomena In the third phase of the study the research question is as follows: How will the small group s external representations of DC-circuit phenomena develop during the teaching experiment? The main question is divided into the following two sub questions: What kind of talk exists in the small group s learning? What kinds of external representations for DC-circuit phenomena exist in the small group discourse during the teaching experiment? The analysis revealed that the teaching experiment of the small group succeeded in its aim to activate talk in the small group. The designed connection cards proved especially successful in activating talk. The connection cards are cards that represent the components of the electric circuit. In the teaching experiment the pupils constructed different connections with the connection cards and discussed, what kinds of DC-circuit phenomena would take place in the corresponding real connections. The talk of the small group was analysed by comparing two situations, firstly, when the small group discussed using connections made with the connection cards and secondly with the same connections using real components. According to the results the talk of the small group included more higher-order thinking when using the connection cards than with similar real components. In order to answer the second sub question concerning the small group s external representations that appeared in the talk during the teaching experiment; student talk was visualised by the fragment maps which incorporate the electric circuit, the electric current and the source voltage. The fragment maps represent the gradual development of the external representations of DC-circuit phenomena in the small group during the teaching experiment. The results of the study challenge the results of previous research into the abstractness and difficulty of electricity concepts. According to this research, the external representations of DC-circuit phenomena clearly developed in the small group of third graders. Furthermore, the fragment maps uncover that although the theoretical explanations of DC-circuit phenomena, which have been obtained as results of typical mental model studies, remain undeveloped, learning at the qualitative level of understanding does take place.

Reconciling Opposites in Organisation Studies: An Aristotelian Approach to Modernism and Post-modernism

In view of the current fragmentation in management and organisation studies, we argue that there is a need to elaborate techniques that help reconcile contradictory and superficially incommensurable standpoints. For this purpose, we draw on ‘pre-modern’ Aristotelian epistemological and methodological sources, particularly the idea of ‘saving the appearances’ (SA), not previously introduced into organisation studies. Using SA as our starting point, we outline a methodology that helps to develop reasonable and acceptable intermediary positions in contemporary debates between ‘modernism’ and ‘post-modernism’. We illustrate the functioning of SA in the case of three issues in the philosophy of science where ‘modernist’ and ‘post-modernist’ scholars seem to have incommensurable standpoints: the nature of scientific knowledge; the conception of causality; and the epistemology of practice. We show in particular how to use the logics of ‘qualification’, ‘new conception’, and ‘complementary combination’ to form the basis for mediating positions which could then be accepted by less extreme proponents of both ‘modernism’ and ‘postmodernism’.