39 resultados para Political parties
Resumo:
This study explores the EMU stand taken by the major Finnish political parties from 1994 to 1999. The starting point is the empirical evidence showing that party responses to European integration are shaped by a mix of national and cross-national factors, with national factors having more explanatory value. The study is the first to produce evidence that classified party documents such as protocols, manifestos and authoritative policy summaries may describe the EMU policy emphasis. In fact, as the literature review demonstrates, it has been unclear so far what kind of stand the three major Finnish political parties took during 1994–1999. Consequently, this study makes a substantive contribution to understanding the factors that shaped EMU party policies, and eventually, the national EMU policy during the 1990s. The research questions addressed are the following: What are the main factors that shaped partisan standpoints on EMU during 1994–1999? To what extent did the policy debate and themes change in the political parties? How far were the policies of the Social Democratic Party, the Centre Party and the National Coalition Party shaped by factors unique to their own national contexts? Furthermore, to what extent were they determined by cross-national influences from abroad, and especially from countries with which Finland has a special relationship, such as Sweden? The theoretical background of the study is in the area of party politics and approaches to EU policies, and party change, developed mainly by Kevin Featherstone, Peter Mair and Richard Katz. At the same time, it puts forward generic hypotheses that help to explain party standpoints on EMU. It incorporates a large quantity of classified new material based on primary research through content analysis and interviews. Quantitative and qualitative methods are used sequentially in order to overcome possible limitations. Established content-analysis techniques improve the reliability of the data. The coding frame is based on the salience theory of party competition. Interviews with eight party leaders and one independent expert civil servant provided additional insights and improve the validity of the data. Public-opinion surveys and media coverage are also used to complete the research path. Four major conclusions are drawn from the research findings. First, the quantitative and the interview data reveal the importance of the internal influences within the parties that most noticeably shaped their EMU policies during the 1990s. In contrast, international events play a minor role. The most striking feature turned out to be the strong emphasis by all of the parties on economic goals. However, it is important to note that the factors manifest differences between economic, democratic and international issues across the three major parties. Secondly, it seems that the parties have transformed into centralised and professional organisations in terms of their EMU policy-making. The weight and direction of party EMU strategy rests within the leadership and a few administrative elites. This could imply changes in their institutional environment. Eventually, parties may appear generally less differentiated and more standardised in their policy-making. Thirdly, the case of the Social Democratic Party shows that traditional organisational links continue to exist between the left and the trade unions in terms of their EMU policy-making. Hence, it could be that the parties have not yet moved beyond their conventional affiliate organisations. Fourthly, parties tend to neglect citizen opinion and demands with regard to EMU, which could imply conflict between the changes in their strategic environment. They seem to give more attention to the demands of political competition (party-party relationships) than to public attitudes (party-voter relationships), which would imply that they have had to learn to be more flexible and responsive. Finally, three suggestions for institutional reform are offered, which could contribute to the emergence of legitimised policy-making: measures to bring more party members and voter groups into the policy-making process; measures to adopt new technologies in order to open up the policy-formation process in the early phase; and measures to involve all interest groups in the policy-making process.
Resumo:
Väitöskirjatutkimuksessa tarkastellaan Taiwanin politiikkaa ensimmäisen vaalien kautta tapahtuneen vallanvaihdon jälkeen (2000) yhteiskunnan rakenteellisen politisoitumisen näkökulmasta. Koska Taiwanilla siirryttiin verettömästi autoritaarisesta yksipuoluejärjestelmästä monipuoluejärjestelmään sitä on pidetty poliittisen muodonmuutoksen mallioppilaana. Aiempi optimismi Taiwanin demokratisoitumisen suhteen on sittemmin vaihtunut pessimismiin, pitkälti yhteiskunnan voimakkaasta politisoitumisesta johtuen. Tutkimuksessa haetaan selitystä tälle politisoitumiselle. Yhteiskunnan rakenteellisella politisoitumisella tarkoitetaan tilannetta, jossa ”poliittisen” alue kasvaa varsinaisia poliittisia instituutioita laajemmaksi. Rakenteellinen politisoituminen muuttuu helposti yhteiskunnalliseksi ongelmaksi, koska siitä usein seuraa normaalin poliittisen toiminnan (esim. lainsäädännän) jähmettyminen, yhteiskunnan jyrkkä jakautuminen, alhainen kynnys poliittisille konflikteille ja yleisen yhteiskunnallisen luottamuksen alentuminen. Toisin kuin esimerkiksi Itä-Euroopassa, Taiwanissa entinen valtapuolue ei romahtanut poliittisen avautumisen myötä vaan säilytti vahvan rakenteellisen asemansa. Kun valta vaihtui ensimmäisen kerran vaalien kautta, vanha valtapuolue ei ollut valmis luovuttamaan poliittisen järjestelmän ohjaksia käsistään. Alkoi vuosia kestänyt taistelu järjestelmän hallinnasta vanhan ja uuden valtapuolueen välillä, jossa yhteiskunta politisoitui voimakkaasti. Tutkimuksessa Taiwanin yhteiskunnan politisoituminen selitetään useiden rakenteellisten piirteiden yhteisvaikutuksen tuloksena. Tällaisia politisoitumista edistäviä rakentellisia piirteitä ovat hidas poliittinen muutos, joka säilytti vanhat poliittiset jakolinjat ja niihin liittyvät vahvat edut ja intressit; sopimaton perustuslaki; Taiwanin epäselvä kansainvälinen asema ja jakautunut identiteetti; sekä sosiaalinen rakenne, joka helpottaa ihmisten nopeaa mobilisointia poliittiisiin mielenilmauksiin. Tutkimuksessa kiinnitetään huomiota toistaiseksi vähän tutkittuun poliittiseen ilmiöön, joidenkin demokratisoituvien yhteiskuntien voimakkaaseen rakenteelliseen politisoitumiseen. Tutkimuksen pääasiallinen havainto on, että yksipuoluejärjestelmän demokratisoituminen kantaa sisällään rakenteellisen politisoitumisen siemenen, jos entinen valtapuolue ei romahda demokratisoitumisen myötä.
Resumo:
The dissertation focuses on the recognition of the problems of uneven regional development in Finland in the 1950s, and the way the idea of controlling this development was introduced to Finnish politics. Since it is often stated that Finnish regional policy only began in the mid-1960s, the period at hand is considered to fall in the time before regional policy. However, various ideas, plans and projects of regional development as well as different aims of development were brought forward and discussed already in the 1950s. These give an interesting perspective to the ideas of later regional development. In the 1950s, many Finnish politicians became more conscious of the unavoidable societal change. The need for overall modernisation of the society made it reasonable to expect a growing level of unemployment and eagerness to migration. The uneven distribution of well-being was also feared to cause discontent and political changes. International experience proved interfering in the regional development possible when using the argument of public interest ; the measures taken increased the level of well-being, helped sustain societal balance, and supported national economy. Many of the development projects of the 1950s focused on Northern Finland, the natural resources of which were considered an important reserve and the political climate of which was regarded unstable. After the late 1940s, regional development was discussed frequently both on the national and the regional level. Direct and indirect support was given to less developed areas and the government outlined thorough investigations in order to relieve the regional problem. Towards the end of the decade, the measures taken were already often connected to the idea of equality. In the 1950s the conflicts within and between the largest Finnish political parties significantly affected the decisions of regional development. There are three case studies in this qualitative research based on the narrative method. The case studies clarify the characteristics of the 1950s regional development. In the first one, the representatives of the northern region and the state first discuss the location of a state-run nitrogen fertilizer factory and later the location of a new university. In the second, the aims and perspectives of private entrepreneurs and the state collide due to ideas of statist industrialisation projects and later due to an idea of a tax relief targeting northern industry. In the third case, the main role is given to the changing rural areas, in relation to which societal development and urbanisation were often measured. The regional development of the 1950s laid groundwork for the new, more established regional policy. The early problem solving actions were aimed both at the prevailing situation and the future and thus showed the way for the upcoming actions. Regional development policy existed already before regional policy.
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This study in church history deals with the formation of aims in the church politics of the Centre Party during a period of extensive politicisation in Finnish society – 1966 to 1978. The focus is on the processes of creating political input within the party organisation. The most important source material consists of the records of the highest party organs as well as material from the party office and the party’s committee for church politics. In the late 1960s, at a time of leftist radicalism in Finnish society, issues concerning the Church were seldom dealt with in the highest party organs, even though informal discussion took place within the party. This phase was followed by a conservative reaction in society during the 1970s. The rightist trend as well as the ongoing politicisation process substantially strengthened the role of church politics in the party. An aim of great importance was to prevent those supporters who belonged to the Lutheran revival movements from moving into the Finnish Christian League. Therefore it became increasingly important to prove that the Centre Party was defending the Church as well as so-called Christian values in state politics, e.g., by advocating religious instruction in schools. The Centre Party also defended the independence and legal status of the Church, at the same time positioning itself against Finland’s Social Democratic Party. Many party members were of the opinion that the church politics should have been about defending the Church and Christian values in state politics instead of defending the proportional share of the party’s seats in the ecclesiastical decision-making system. Nevertheless, the struggle for hegemony between the Centre Party and the Social Democrats was reflected in the Evangelical Lutheran Church particularly since 1973. Thus the aims of church politics were increasingly directed towards ecclesiastical elections and appointments in the 1970s. To justify its activities in church elections, the party stressed that it was not politicising the Church. To the contrary, it was asserted that the church leaders themselves had politicised the Church by favouring the Social Democrats. These alleged efforts to affiliate the Church with one political party were strictly condemned in the Centre Party. But when it came to the political parties’ activity in church elections, opinions diverged. Generally, the issues of church politics resembled those of the party’s trade union politics in the 1970s.
Resumo:
The announcement of Turkey as a European Union (EU) candidate country in the Helsinki Summit (10, 11 December 1999) marked a distinct change of identity policy and attitudes towards its citizens. A result in the shift of mindset has been the launch of the first public service broadcasting TV channel for Kurdish people on the 1st of January 2009. TRT 6 (Şeş) broadcasting in unofficial Kurdish language is run by Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT). The thesis attempts to elaborate on the discussions surrounding the launch of TRT 6, Turkey’s first public service broadcasting TV channel for its Kurdish citizens. The research aims at finding the discourses of multiculturalism and public service broadcasting through the mainstream Turkish newspapers, Cumhuriyet, Hurriyet, Sabah, Taraf and Zaman. The method used for the research is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and the representative newspapers of the Turkish print media are under the question: How has the launch of TRT 6, as the first public service broadcasting channel of Turkey in Kurdish language, been discussed by Turkish daily newspapers in terms of multiculturalism and minority media? The most significant results of the research is that the concerning newspapers have mostly discussed the launch of TRT 6 in the same line with their political affiliation. Thus it is comprehensively concluded that the selected newspapers proved holding a high level of political parallelism, and low professionalism. However, it should be noted that Taraf differs itself from others while challenging the hegemonic discourses embedded in the articles of the other newspapers. Moreover, the study detected three types of discourses: Pro-multiculturalism discourse, Unification discourse, and Assimilation discourse. It can be concluded that in Turkey, media owners and even individual journalists have incentives to form ideological alliances with political parties, and media appears to be an instrument of power struggle. Today, Turkey seems to restore Kurdish identity in its identity policy and aims to proceed with the negotiation for membership of the European Union (EU). The country still strives to transform from the traditional nation-state to a multiethnic democratic state, with multiculturalism as a policy discussed throughout the two terms that the AKP government has been in power. However, this transformation is not an easy process because of the deep-rooted traditions of the nation-state structure that has also polarized the Turkish press.
Resumo:
Pro gradu-tutkielma tutkii demokratian ja turvallisuuden paradoksia Pakistanissa esitellen kuusi tekijää, jotka vaikuttavat kyseiseen paradoksiin. Näitä tekijöitä ovat historiallinen kehitys; eliittihallinto; taloudellinen kehitys; Pakistanin poliittisten tekijöiden demokratian eri määritelmät; opetuksen puuttuminen; ja valtataistelu hallituksen, armeijan, tiedustelupalvelun, oikeusjärjestelmän, poliittisten puolueiden sekä eri heimojen, uskonnollisten ja etnisten ryhmien välillä. Tutkimus tarkastelee myös sitä miten nämä tekijät vaikuttavat demokratian kehitykseen Pakistanissa. Keskeinen argumentti on, että länsimainen demokratia ei esiinny eikä toimi Pakistanissa vallitsevissa oloissa, etenkin historiallisen kehityksen ja ulkoisen turvallisuuden takia. Pro gradu-tutkielma käyttää sekundäärisiä lähteitä, kuten kirjoja, artikkeleita, maaraportteja, kommentaareja sekä omiin kokemuksiin perustuvia havaintoja Pakistanin matkalta 2010-2011. Keskeiset teoriat gradussa ovat Guillermo O’ Donnelin delegaattidemokratia sekä Duncan McCargon eliittihallintoteoria, jotka yhdessä selittävät historiallista kehitystä ja eliittihallinnon dynamiikkaa, mitkä johtavat paradoksiin. Kautta historian armeija on hallinnut Pakistania, ja siviilihallinto on ainoastaan neljä kertaa onnistunut olemaan vallassa, mutta silloinkin siviilihallinto päättyi korruptioväitteisiin tai armeijan vallankaappaukseen. Armeijahallinnoille on luonteenomaista hyvät suhteet USA:n, positiivinen taloudellinen kehitys ja vakaus, kun taas siviilihallinnot ovat epävakaita ja korruptoituneita. Tämä kehitys on paradoksin tausta, joka rakentuu turvallisuuspoliittisen tilanteen pohjalle eli hallitusten ja muiden tekijöiden yritykseen löytää vastapaino Intian uhalle. Tämä on ollut keskeinen huoli kelle tahansa poliittiselle päättäjälle itsenäisyydestä lähtien. Loputon valtataistelu eri poliittisten tekijöiden kesken sekä eliittihallinto pitävät yllä paradoksia, koska eliitit ovat kiinnostuneempia oman valtansa säilyttämisestä kuin kansan tahdon huomioonottamisesta. Koska valtaosa ihmisistä ei ole koulutettuja, he ovat paljolti kiinnostuneita omasta selviytymisestään, ja tämän takia sekä kansa että eliitit suosivat armeijahallintoa, koska se tuo vakautta ja taloudellista kehitystä. Sen vuoksi vallitsevissa oloissa demokratian tulevaisuus Pakistanissa näyttää huonolta, koska liberaalidemokratian vaatimukset eivät täyty puoliksi vapaan oikeussysteemin, puoliksi vapaan lehdistön, valtavan korruption ja monien ihmisoikeusloukkauksien takia unohtamatta armeijan ja tiedustelupalvelun sekaantumista siviilihallintoon.
Resumo:
This Master's thesis examines two opposite nationalistic discourses on the revolution of Zanzibar. Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the party in power since the 1964 revolution defends its revolutionary and "African" heritage in the current multi-party system. New nationalists, including among others the main opposition party Civic United Front (CUF), question both the 1964 revolution and the post-revolution period and blame CCM for empty promises, corruption and ethnic discrimination. This study analyzes the role of a significant historical event in the creation of nationalistic ideology and national identity. The 1964 revolution forms the nucleus of various debates related to the history of Zanzibar: slavery, colonialism, racial discrimination and political violence. Representations of these Social constructivist principles form the basis of this study, and central concepts in the theoretical framework are nationalism, national identity, ethnicity and race. I use critical discourse analysis as my research method, lean on the work by Teun A. van Dijk and Norman Fairclough as the most significant researchers in this field. I examine particularly the ways in which linguistic methods, such as stereotypes and metaphors are used to form in- and out-groups ("us" vs. "others"). My material, both in Swahili and English, was collected mainly in Tanzania in the fall of 2007 and from online sources in the spring of 2009. It includes publications by the Zanzibari government between the years of 1964-2000 (12), official speeches for the Revolution Day or the Union Day (12), articles from Tanzanian newspapers from the 1990s until the year of 2009 (15), memoirs and political pamphlets (10), blog posts and opinion pieces from four different websites (8), and interviews or personal communication in Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam and Uppsala (8). Nationalistic rhetoric often creates enemy images by using binary good-bad oppositions. Both discourses in this study build identities on the basis of "otherness" and exclusion, with the intent of emphasizing the particularity of the own group and excluding "evilness" outside the own reference group. These opposite views on the 1964 revolution as the main axis of the history of Zanzibar build different portraits of the nation and Zanzibari-ness (Uzanzibari). CCM still relies on the pre-revolutionary enemy images of Arabs as selfish rulers and cruel slave traders. For CCM, Zanzibar is primarily an "African" nation and a part of Tanzania which is threatened by "Arabs", the outsiders. In contrast, the new nationalists stress the long history of Zanzibar as multi-racial, cosmopolitan and formerly independent country which has its own, separate culture and identity from mainland Tanzanians. Heshima, honour/respect, one of the basic values of Swahili culture, occupies a central role in both discourses: the main party emphasizes that the revolution returned "heshima" to the Zanzibari Africans after centuries of humiliation, whereas the new nationalists claim that ever since the revolution all "non-Africans" have been humiliated and lost their "heshima". According to the new nationalists, true Zanzibari values which include tolerance and harmony between different "races" were lost when the "foreign" revolutionaries arrived from the mainland. Consequently, they see the 1964 revolution as Tanganyikan colonialism which began with the help of Western countries, and maintain that this "colonialism" still continues in the violent multi-party elections.
Self-love and self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume
Resumo:
This work offers a novel interpretation of David Hume’s (1711–1776) conception of the conjectural development of civil society and artificial moral institutions. It focuses on the social elements of Hume’s Treatise of human nature (1739–40) and the necessary connection between science of man and politeness, civilised monarchies, social distance and hierarchical structure of civil society. The study incorporates aspects of intellectual history, history of philosophy and book history. In order to understand David Hume’s thinking, the intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733) needs to be accounted for. When put into a historical perspective, the moral, political and social components of Treatise of human nature can be read in the context of a philosophical tradition, in which Mandeville plays a pivotal role. A distinctive character of Mandeville and Hume’s account of human nature and moral institutions was the introduction of a simple distinction between self-love and self-liking. The symmetric passions of self-interest and pride can only be controlled by the corresponding moral institutions. This is also the way in which we can say that moral institutions are drawn from human nature. In the case of self-love or self-interest, the corresponding moral institution is justice. Respectively, concerning self-liking or pride the moral institution is politeness. There is an explicit analogy between these moral institutions. If we do not understand this analogy, we do not understand the nature of either justice or politeness. The present work is divided into two parts. In the first part, ‘Intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville’, it is argued that the relevance of the paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thinking has been missed. It draws a picture of Mandeville turning from the Hobbism of The Fable of the Bees to an original theory of civil society put forward in his later works. In order to make this change more apparent, Mandeville’s career and the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees are examined comprehensively. This interpretation, based partly on previously unknown sources, challenges F. B. Kaye’s influential decision to publish the two parts of The Fable of the Bees as a uniform work of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the ‘Intellectual development of Mandeville’ is to function as the context for the young Hume. The second part of the work, ‘David Hume and Greatness of mind’, explores in philosophical detail the social theory of the Treatise and politics and the science of man in his Essays. This part will also reveal the relevance of Greatness of mind as a general concept for David Hume’s moral and political philosophy.
Resumo:
Tuure Junnila, PhD (1910-1999) was one of Finland's most renowned conservative politicians of the post-war period. Junnila is remembered primarily as a persistent opponent of Urho Kekkonen, a long-term Member of Parliament, a conspicuous opposition member and a prolific political writer. Junnila's ideologies and political views were conservative, and he is one of the most outstanding figures in the history of the National Coalition Party. Junnila also made an extensive career outside of politics, first as an economist and then as an executive of Finland's leading commercial bank Kansallis-Osake-Pankki. The Young Conservative is a partial biography written using traditional historical research methods, which examines Junnila's personal history and his activity in public life up to 1956. The study begins by investigating Junnila's background through his childhood, school years, university studies and early professional career. It also looks at Junnila's work as an economist and practical banker. Particular attention is paid to Junnila's political work, constantly focusing on the following five often overlapping areas: (1) economic policy, (2) domestic policy, (3) foreign and security policy, (4) Junnila and Urho Kekkonen, (5) Junnila, the Coalition Party and Finnish conservatism. In his economic policy, Junnila emphasised the importance of economic stability, opposed socialisation and the growth of public expenditure, defended the free market system and private entrepreneurship, and demanded tax cuts. This policy was very popular within the Coalition Party during the early 1950s, making Junnila the leading conservative economic politician of the time. In terms of domestic policy, Junnila demanded as early as the 1940s that a "third force" should be established in Finland to counterbalance the agrarian and labour parties by uniting conservative and liberal ideologies under the same roof. Foreign and security policy is the area of Junnila's political activity which is most clearly situated after the mid-1950s. However, Junnila's early speeches and writings already show a striving towards the unconditional neutrality modelled by Switzerland and Sweden and a strong emphasis on Finland's right to internal self-determination. Junnila, as did the Coalition Party as a whole, adopted a consistently critical approach towards Urho Kekkonen between 1951 and 1956, but this attitude was not as bluntly negative and all-round antagonistic as many previous studies have implied. Junnila was one of the leading Finnish conservatives of the early 1950s and in all essence his views were analogous to the general alignment of the Coalition Party at the time: conservative in ideology and general policy, and liberal in economic policy.
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The study discusses the position of France as the United States’ ally in NATO in 1956-1958. The concrete position of France and the role that it was envisioned to have are being treated from the point of view of three participants of the Cold War: France, the United States and the Soviet Union. How did these different parties perceive the question and did these views change when the French Fourth Republic turned into the Fifth in 1958? The study is based on published French and American documents of Foreign Affairs. Because of problems with accessibility to the Soviet archival sources, the study uses reports on France-NATO relations of Pravda newspaper, the official organ of the Communist Party of the USSR, to provide information about how the Soviet side saw the question. Due to the nature and use of source material, and the chronological structure of the work, the study belongs methodologically to the research field of History of International Relations. As distinct from political scientists’ field of research, more prone to theorize, the study is characteristically a historical research, a work based on qualitative method and original sources that aims at creating a coherent narrative of the views expressed during the period covered by the study. France’s road to a full membership of NATO is being treated on the basis of research literature, after which discussions about France’s position in the Western Alliance are being chronologically traced for the period of last years of the Fourth Republic and the immediate months of coming back to power of Charles de Gaulle. Right from the spring of 1956 there can be seen aspirations of France, on one hand, to maintain her freedom of action inside the Western Alliance and, on the other, to widen the dialogue between the allies. The decision on France’s own nuclear deterrent was made already during the Fourth Republic, when it was thought to become part of NATO’s common defence. This was to change with de Gaulle. The USA felt that France still fancied herself as a great power and that she could not participate in full in NATO’s common defence because of her colonies. The Soviet Union saw the concrete position of France in the Alliance as in complete dependence on the USA, but her desired role was expressed largely in “Gaullist” terms. The expressions used by the General and the Soviet propaganda were close to each other, but the Soviet Union could not support de Gaulle without endangering the position of the French Communist Party. Between the Fourth and Fifth Republics no great rupture in content took place concerning the views of France’s role and position in the Western Alliance. The questions posed by de Gaulle had been expressed during the whole period of Fourth Republic’s existence. Instead, along with the General the weight and rhetoric of these questions saw a great change. Already in the early phase the Americans saw it possible that with de Gaulle, France would try to change her role. The rupture took place in the form of expression, rather than in its content.
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This thesis is an empirical study of how two words in Icelandic, "nú" and "núna", are used in contemporary Icelandic conversation. My aims in this study are, first, to explain the differences between the temporal functions of "nú" and "núna", and, second, to describe the non-temporal functions of "nú". In the analysis, a focus is placed on comparing the sequential placement of the two words, on their syntactical distribution, and on their prosodic realization. The empirical data comprise 14 hours and 11 minutes of naturally occurring conversation recorded between 1996 and 2003. The selected conversations represent a wide range of interactional contexts including informal dinner parties, institutional and non-institutional telephone conversations, radio programs for teenagers, phone-in programs, and, finally, a political debate on television. The theoretical and methodological framework is interactional linguistics, which can be described as linguistically oriented conversation analysis (CA). A comparison of "nú" and "núna" shows that the two words have different syntactic distributions. "Nú" has a clear tendency to occur in the front field, before the finite verb, while "núna" typically occurs in the end field, after the object. It is argued that this syntactic difference reflects a functional difference between "nú" and "núna". A sequential analysis of "núna" shows that the word refers to an unspecified period of time which includes the utterance time as well as some time in the past and in the future. This temporal relation is referred to as reference time. "Nú", by contrast, is mainly used in three different environments: a) in temporal comparisons, 2) in transitions, and 3) when the speaker is taking an affective stance. The non-temporal functions of "nú" are divided into three categories: a) "nú" as a tone particle, 2) "nú" as an utterance particle, and 3) "nú" as a dialogue particle. "Nú" as a tone particle is syntactically integrated and can occur in two syntactic positions: pre-verbally and post-verbally. I argue that these instances are employed in utterances in which a speaker is foregrounding information or marking it as particularly important. The study shows that, although these instances are typically prosodically non-prominent and unstressed, they are in some cases delivered with stress and with a higher pitch than the surrounding talk. "Nú" as an utterance particle occurs turn-initially and is syntactically non-integrated. By using "nú", speakers show continuity between turns and link new turns to prior ones. These instances initiate either continuations by the same speaker or new turns after speaker shifts. "Nú" as a dialogue particle occurs as a turn of its own. The study shows that these instances register informings in prior turns as unexpected or as a departure from the normal state of affairs. "Nú" as a dialogue particle is often delivered with a prolonged vowel and a recognizable intonation contour. A comparative sequential and prosodic analysis shows that in these cases there is a correlation between the function of "nú" and the intonation contour by which it is delivered. Finally, I argue that despite the many functions of "nú", all the instances can be said to have a common denominator, which is to display attention towards the present moment and the utterances which are produced prior or after the production of "nú". Instead of anchoring the utterances in external time or reference time, these instances position the utterance in discourse internal time, or discourse time.
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Finnish education policy, educational legislation and the entire education system changed significantly during the 1990s as part of a general restructuring of public administration. There has been a clear divergence from the former tradition of a system of regulation, founded on detailed legislation and the principle of equality. The new governance, which is based more on individual choice, efficiency and evaluation, emphasizes that the development of a high standard of education is a necessity in the light of global competition. This study explores the legislative process regarding education policy in the Finnish Parliament during the 1990s, and highlights in particular how the international discourse on education policies was restructured in the context of Finnish legislation. The research material consists of all the public parliamentary documents relating to education, including government proposals, minutes from the discussions in the chamber and archive material (final protocols, reports and statements) for the Committee for Education and Culture. The discourse on the process of drafting and passing education legislation is modelled on three interrelated policy technologies (market, management and performance), which are understood here as mechanisms connecting general political ideas to normative legislation. The changes in the regulation of education were part of a general public administration reform instigated during the mid 1980s. The research results will prove that during the left-right coalition cabinet of PM Harri Holkeri, new policy technologies affected the parliamentary discourse on education policy. This was particularly influenced by a change in the preconditions for the management of education that was created as a result of the numerous demands to deregulate and delegate decision-making authority to the local and school levels while rendering the whole education system more effective. At the turn of the decade, market-type mechanisms were more indirectly manifested in the forms of individuality and freedom of choice, which were reflected, for example, in proposals to “lower the hurdles” by separating general from vocational secondary education with a view to encouraging students to select courses from other educational establishments, in addition to relaxing the requirements for establishing private schools and abolishing a hundred-year-old strict national catchment-area system. Later, in the course of the 1990s, after the subjects, players, and methods of evaluation had been more precisely defined, evaluation based on performance would result in the active measurement of the attainment of set objectives. In the spring of 1991, from the outset of PM Esko Aho's right-centre coalition cabinet, the education budget suffered cutbacks as a result of a global recession and this influenced the legislative work of, and discourses in, parliament. Representatives of the parties in power regarded the recession solely as an external factor that was remote from the political arena. In their view, the education system should rise to the challenge by ensuring the efficient and innovative use of the resources available and by developing new forms of indicators for evaluating results. Representatives of the opposition opposed the cabinet’s standpoint as a result of the recession, criticized the measures taken by pointing out the harmful effect of constantly cutting the budget and argued that the government had made political capital out of the recession by using it as an opportunity to give more room to market, management and performance technologies within the Finnish education system. Criticism of the new education policy became even stronger during PM Paavo Lipponen's first “rainbow” coalition cabinet with critical views being expressed not only from the opposition but also from representatives within the government. Representatives from the left demanded legislative restrictions and the instigation of measures to relieve the presumed negative effects of market, management and performance in the name of educational equality. The new management by results steering method within the university sector and the introduction of commercial education services in compulsory education were fiercely criticized. The argument over “setting outer limits” including, for example, the demands for more detailed legislation and earmarked state subsidies was characteristic of Parliament’s legislative discourse in the latter part of the 1990s. Keywords: education policy, education legislation, Parliament of Finland
Resumo:
In the early years of independence the Finnish school system went through a major change. Both the Compulsory school attendance act (1921) and the Religious freedom act (1923) were legislated almost simultaneously. Although the legislators were deciding on the whole content of the citizenship education given in the compulsory school, their attention was mainly concentrated on the issue of the religious education. The former study concerning the subject shows that this issue was strongly influenced by the political power struggle between the conservative and the socialist parties. One of the underlying factors was also the Church s decreased authority concerning the elementary school. The aim of this research was to study the Finnish evangelical movement s attitude and opinions on the issue of religious education and on its status and nature. Their opinions on the issue were especially investigated from the point of view of their own evangelical lower elementary school teachers seminar, which was deeply connected with the matter of confessionalism. The source material of this research of educational history consist of documents of the school administration and the Lutheran Evangelical Association as well as of vast collection of educational, Church s and evangelical movement s journals. According to the results of this study, the evangelical movement plead very strongly for denominational religious education. However, the confessionalism they were pursuing differed from the common understanding of the concept at that time. This became evident both because of their demands for increased education on the Christian doctrine and because of their sharp criticism against loosely confessional, generally Christian religious education. The evangelical movement s strict opinion was combined with their effort to emphasize the Lutherian doctrine in the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Finland. The founding of the Evangelical seminar for lower elementary school teachers in Karkku was a significant indication of the evangelical movement s dedication to strive towards school s Christianity. The objective of the evangelical seminar was to change the school by means of training evangelical minded teachers. The seminar was only a part of much larger plans of evangelical education and home missionary work. However, maintaining the seminar proved to be impossible, especially as the National Board of Education was absolutely against it, claiming that it would endanger the unity of the compulsory school. The National Board of Education indicated that the objectivity of citizenship education would be forfeit, if every marginal ideological movement could educate their own teachers.
Resumo:
This study explores the relationship of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland to communism and political power during the period of crises in Finnish foreign relations with the Soviet Union from 1958 to 1962. During this period the USSR repeatedly interfered in Finland´s domestic affairs and limited her foreign political freedom of action. The research subjects for this dissertation are the bishops of the Church of Finland and the newspaper Kotimaa, which can be regarded as the unofficial organ of the church at the time. A typical characteristic of the Church of Finland from the beginning of the twentieth century was patriotism. During the interwar years the church was strongly anti-communist and against the Soviet Union. This tendency was also evident during the Second World War. After the war the Finnish Church feared that the rise of the extreme left would jeopardize its position. The church, however, succeeded in maintaining its status as a state church throughout the critical years immediately following the war. This study indicates that, although the manner of expression altered, the political attitude of the church did not substantially change during the postwar period. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the church was still patriotic and fear of the extreme left was also evident among the leaders of the church. The victory of the Finnish People's Democratic League in the general election of 1958 was an unwelcome surprise to the church. This generated fear in the church that, with Soviet support, the Finnish communists might return to governmental power and the nation could become a people's democracy. Accordingly, the church tried to encourage other parties to set aside their disagreements and act together against the extreme left throughout the period under study. The main characteristics of the church´s political agenda during this period of crisis were to support the Finnish foreign policy led by the president of the republic, Urho Kekkonen, and to resist Finnish communism. The attitude of Finnish bishops and the newspaper Kotimaa to the Cold War in general was generally in agreement with the majority of western Christians. They feared communism, were afraid of the USSR, but supported peaceful co-existence because they did not want an open conflict with the Soviets. Because of uncertainties in Finland's international position the Finnish Church regarded it as necessary to support the Finnish policy of friendship towards the USSR. The Finnish Church considerer it unwise to openly criticize the Soviet Union, tried resist the spread of communism in Finnish domestic policy. This period of foreign policy crises was principally seen by the church as a time when there was a need to strengthen Finland's unstable national position.