Meillä ei ole ikuisia ystäviä eikä ikuisia vihollisia. Ikuisia ovat meidän omat etumme. : Suomen suhteet Kiinan kansantasavaltaan 1949 - 1989

"We have neither Eternal Friends nor Eternal Enemies. We have only Eternal Interests .Finland's Relations with China 1949-1989 The study focuses on the relations between Finland and the People s Republic of China from 1949-1989 and examines how a small country became embroiled in international politics, and how, at the same time, international politics affected Finnish-Chinese relations and Finland s China policy formulation. The study can be divided into three sections: relations during the early years, 1949-1960, before the Chinese and Soviet rift became public; the relations during the passive period during the 1960s and 1970s; and the impact of China s Open Door policy on Finland s China policy from 1978-1989. The diplomatically challenging events around Tiananmen Square and the reactions which followed in Finland bring the study to a close. Finland was among the first Western countries to recognise the People s Republic and to establish diplomatic relations with her, thereby giving Finland an excellent position from which to further develop good relations. Finland was also the first Western country to sign a trade agreement with China. These two factors meant that Finland was able to enjoy a special status with China during the 1950s. The special status was further strengthened by the systematic support of the government of Finland for China's UN membership. The solid reputation earned in the 1950s had to carry Finland all the way through to the 1980s. For the two decades in between, during the passive policy period of the 1960s and 1970s, relations between Finland and the Soviet Union also determined the state of foreign relations with China. Interestingly, however, it appeared that President Urho Kekkonen was encouraged by Ambassador Joel Toivola to envisage a more proactive policy towards China, but the Cultural Revolution cut short any such plan for nearly twenty years. Because of the Soviet Union, Finland held on to her passive China policy, even though no such message was ever received from the Soviet Union. In fact, closer relationships between Finland and China were encouraged through diplomatic channels. It was not until the presidency of Mauno Koivisto that the first high-level ministerial visit was made to China when, in 1984, Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen visited the People s Republic. Finnish-Chinese relations were lifted to a new level. Foreign Minister Väyrynen, however, was forced to remove the prejudices of the Chinese. In 1985, when the Speaker of the Finnish Parliament, Erkki Pystynen visited China he also discovered that Finland s passive China policy had caused misunderstandings amongst the Chinese politicians. The number of exchanges escalated in the wake of the ground-breaking visit by Foreign Minister Väyrynen: Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa visited China in 1986 and President Koivisto did so in 1988. President Koivisto stuck to practical, China-friendly policies: his correspondence with Li Peng, the attitude taken by the Finnish government after the Tiananmen Square events and the subsequent choices made by his administration all pointed to a new era in relations with China.

Nuori konservatiivi : Tuure Junnila ja hänen poliittinen toimintansa vuoteen 1956

Tuure Junnila, PhD (1910-1999) was one of Finland's most renowned conservative politicians of the post-war period. Junnila is remembered primarily as a persistent opponent of Urho Kekkonen, a long-term Member of Parliament, a conspicuous opposition member and a prolific political writer. Junnila's ideologies and political views were conservative, and he is one of the most outstanding figures in the history of the National Coalition Party. Junnila also made an extensive career outside of politics, first as an economist and then as an executive of Finland's leading commercial bank Kansallis-Osake-Pankki. The Young Conservative is a partial biography written using traditional historical research methods, which examines Junnila's personal history and his activity in public life up to 1956. The study begins by investigating Junnila's background through his childhood, school years, university studies and early professional career. It also looks at Junnila's work as an economist and practical banker. Particular attention is paid to Junnila's political work, constantly focusing on the following five often overlapping areas: (1) economic policy, (2) domestic policy, (3) foreign and security policy, (4) Junnila and Urho Kekkonen, (5) Junnila, the Coalition Party and Finnish conservatism. In his economic policy, Junnila emphasised the importance of economic stability, opposed socialisation and the growth of public expenditure, defended the free market system and private entrepreneurship, and demanded tax cuts. This policy was very popular within the Coalition Party during the early 1950s, making Junnila the leading conservative economic politician of the time. In terms of domestic policy, Junnila demanded as early as the 1940s that a "third force" should be established in Finland to counterbalance the agrarian and labour parties by uniting conservative and liberal ideologies under the same roof. Foreign and security policy is the area of Junnila's political activity which is most clearly situated after the mid-1950s. However, Junnila's early speeches and writings already show a striving towards the unconditional neutrality modelled by Switzerland and Sweden and a strong emphasis on Finland's right to internal self-determination. Junnila, as did the Coalition Party as a whole, adopted a consistently critical approach towards Urho Kekkonen between 1951 and 1956, but this attitude was not as bluntly negative and all-round antagonistic as many previous studies have implied. Junnila was one of the leading Finnish conservatives of the early 1950s and in all essence his views were analogous to the general alignment of the Coalition Party at the time: conservative in ideology and general policy, and liberal in economic policy.

Kansallisvaltion teräsmiehestä valtakunnan sovittelijaksi : Poliisikulttuurin psykohistorialliset solmukohdat 1930-1997

From Steely Nation-State Superman to Conciliator of Economical Global Empire – A Psychohistory of Finnish Police Culture 1930-1997 My study concerns the way police culture has changed within the societal changes in Finnish society between 1930 and 1997. The method of my study was psycho-historical and post-structural analysis. The research was conducted by examining the psycho-historical plateaus traceable within Finnish police culture. I made a social diagnosis of the autopoietic relationship between the power-holders of Finnish society and the police (at various levels of hierarchical organization). According to police researcher John P. Crank, police culture should be understood as the cognitive processes behind the actions of the police. Among these processes are the values, beliefs, rituals, customs and advice which standardize their work and the common sense of policemen. According to Crank, police culture is defined by a mindset which thinks, judges and acts according to its evaluations filtered by its own preliminary comprehension. Police culture consists of all the unsaid assumptions of being a policeman, the organizational structures of police, official policies, unofficial ways of behaviour, forms of arrest, procedures of practice and different kinds of training habits, attitudes towards suspects and citizens, and also possible corruption. Police culture channels its members’ feelings and emotions. Crank says that police culture can be seen in how policemen express their feelings. He advises police researchers to ask themselves how it feels to be a member of the police. Ethos has been described as a communal frame for thought that guides one’s actions. According to sociologist Martti Grönfors, the Finnish mentality of the Protestant ethic is accentuated among Finnish policemen. The concept of ethos expresses very well the self-made mentality as an ethical tension which prevails in police work between communal belonging and individual freedom of choice. However, it is significant that it is a matter of the quality of relationships, and that the relationship is always tied to the context of the cultural history of dealing with one’s anxiety. According to criminologist Clifford Shearing, the values of police culture act as subterranean processes of the maintenance of social power in society. Policemen have been called microcosmic mediators, or street corner politicians. Robert Reiner argues that at the level of self-comprehension, policemen disparage the dimension of politics in their work. Reiner points out that all relationships which hold a dimension of power are political. Police culture has also been called a canteen culture. This idea expresses the day-to-day basis of the mentality of taking care of business which policing produces as a necessity for dealing with everyday hardships. According to police researcher Timo Korander, this figurative expression embodies the nature of police culture as a crew culture which is partly hidden from police chiefs who are at a different level. This multitude of standpoints depicts the diversity of police cultures. According to Reiner, one should not see police culture as one monolithic whole; instead one should assess it as the interplay of individuals negotiating with their environment and societal power networks. The cases analyzed formed different plateaus of study. The first plateau was the so-called ‘Rovaniemi arson’ case in the summer of 1930. The second plateau consisted of the examinations of alleged police assaults towards the Communists during the Finnish Continuation War of 1941 to 1944 and the threats that societal change after the war posed to Finnish Society. The third plateau was thematic. Here I investigated how using force towards police clients has changed culturally from the 1930s to the 1980s. The fourth plateau concerned with the material produced by the Security Police detectives traced the interaction between Soviet KGB agents and Finnish politicians during the long 1970s. The fifth plateau of larger changes in Finnish police culture then occurred during the 1980s as an aftermath of the former decade. The last, sixth plateau of changing relationships between policing and the national logic of action can be seen in the murder of two policemen in the autumn of 1997. My study shows that police culture has transformed from a “stone cold” steely fixed identity towards a more relational identity that tries to solve problems by negotiating with clients instead of using excessive force. However, in this process of change there is a traceable paradox in Finnish policing and police culture. On the one hand, policemen have, at the practical level, constructed their policing identity by protecting their inner self in their organizational role at work against the projections of anger and fear in society. On the other hand, however, they have had to safeguard themselves at the emotional level against the predominance of this same organizational role. Because of this dilemma they must simultaneously construct both a distance from their own role as police officers and the role of the police itself. This makes the task of policing susceptible to the political pressures of society. In an era of globalization, and after the heyday of the welfare state, this can produce heightened challenges for Finnish police culture.

"Kirjailijoiden tapaus" Venäjällä vuonna 1997

In the autumn of 1997, Russian government was faced with media pressure when owners of the TV channels ORT and NTV joined forces against it. This study is based on media sources from October 1997 to December 1997. It shows clearly how the enormous power of the media was able to dictate what happened in Russia. In the mid-1990s Russians started to talk about political technology, which became a commonly used term by professionals, journalists, politicians and intelligence services. As a result of this action, two leading reformers in the government, Anatoliy Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, were dismissed from their highly influential posts as finance and energy ministers respectively, but retained their power as first deputy prime ministers. According to the correspondents, the real reason was to resolve a conflict within the parliament, which had demanded the dismissal of Mr. Chubais. This demand was presented after Chubais had accepted $90,000 as a reward for co-writing a book on privatization. Chubais was considered to be Russia’s “business card” towards the west – the"Authors’ case" (Delo avtorov) was only solved after President Boris Yeltsin took part in the public debate. According to the research, the media owned by powerful businessmen Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinski, was able to use its own security services to expose sensitive material (Russian term ‘kompromat’), if necessary, concerning any given person. The so-called Authors’ case can be considered as a part of the battle and the tip of the iceberg in arrangements designed to organize the funding of the Russian presidential election campaign in 2000. The reason why this particular incident was so widely covered on television was because several programs aimed to reveal to the public "hidden bribes" that, as they claimed, government officials had received. The political aspect, however, was quite mild, when the concrete issues of possible dismissals of Ministers were debated in the Parliament. Everything was dealt with as a “family matter” inside Kremlin. Yeltsin's "family" consisted of practically anybody from oligarch Berezovsky to Chubais, the father of Russia's privatization policy. Methods of critical history implementation analysis has been used in this research in determining the use of the source material. Literature and interviews have also provided a good base for the study. The study proves that any literature dealing with the subject has not paid enough attention to how the dismissal of Alexander Kazakov, deputy of President’s administration, was linked directly with Gazprom, the state gas monopoly. Kazakov had to leave Gazprom and lose his position as Chubais' ally when the influential ORT television company was deteriorated.

Kouluvalinta vai koulun valinta? : Oppilaiden valikoituminen yläkouluihin Espoossa keväällä 2006

Changes in governance in the public sector made it possible to give the power to the level of service production. In Finland schools were diversified. They wanted to be as attractive as possible. In her dissertation (2006) Piia Seppänen studied parental choice and schools choice policies in Espoo, in Kuopio, in Lahti, inTurku and in some levels in Helsinki too. After her study was done there has been some changes in school choise policy in Espoo. The catchments areas changed radically; earlier every school did have its own catchment area. But now three or even five school has the same catchment area. On the base of the Seppänen’s dissertation I wondered who’s choice it really were? Is the choice maker customer or producer of the service? In my study I tried to understand those processes where pupils were selected for the 7th grade in lower secondary schools in the spring in 2006. To make the picture clear, I have to study the history of pupil selection and the changes of it in the 21st century. I also have to study the geography of the town which is quite special in comparison with the normal cities with one central area. This has its own effects on the pupil selection system as well as in the whole study. In my study I try to present what kind of process the pupil selection is in Espoo and how it was done actually in the spring of 2006. The empirical data of my study were statistical data, documents of different kind, conversations with principals, local authorities and politicians. I also interviewed one politician and observed a few information meetings about the pupil selection process. Based on this large variety of data I tried to draw a picture of the way of speaking (writing) about the ability of the choice. Furthermore, how this pupil selection is done in reality. The ability to apply to special instruction in f. e. music, graphic arts or maths and sciences or to language based instruction (bilingual and immersion teaching) depends on the district you live. Because there is one catchment area which has no special or language based instruction available. Also the poor public transport system might have some effects on the parental choice. According to my study, 20 % of the 7th grade pupils were selected with criteria of different kind to special classes. Because the ability to get special or language based instruction depends on your district, there is a big risk for a selection based on the pupils' socio-economic background.

Understanding the organic chain : The framework of the interaction between the actors in organic chains in relation to ecological modernisation of food production

The sustainability of food production has increasingly attracted the attention of consumers, farmers, food and retailing companies, and politicians. One manifestation of such attention is the growing interest in organic foods. Organic agriculture has the potential to enhance the ecological modernisation of food production by implementing the organic method as a preventative innovation that simultaneously produces environmental and economic benefits. However, in addition to the challenges to organic farming, the small market share of organic products in many countries today and Finland in particular risks undermining the achievement of such benefits. The problems identified as hindrances to the increased consumption of organic food are the poor availability, limited variety and high prices of organic products, the complicated buying decisions and the difficulties in delivering the intangible value of organic foods. Small volumes and sporadic markets, high costs, lack of market information, as well as poor supply reliability are obstacles to increasing the volume of organic production and processing. These problems shift the focus from a single actor to the entire supply chain and require solutions that involve more interaction among the actors within the organic chain. As an entity, the organic food chain has received very little scholarly attention. Researchers have mainly approached the organic chain from the perspective of a single actor, or they have described its structure rather than the interaction between the actors. Consequently, interaction among the primary actors in organic chains, i.e. farmers, manufacturers, retailers and consumers, has largely gone unexamined. The purpose of this study is to shed light on the interaction of the primary actors within a whole organic chain in relation to the ecological modernisation of food production. This information is organised into a conceptual framework to help illuminate this complex field. This thesis integrates the theories and concepts of three approaches: food system studies, supply chain management and ecological modernisation. Through a case study, a conceptual system framework will be developed and applied to a real life-situation. The thesis is supported by research published in four articles. All examine the same organic chains through case studies, but each approaches the problem from a different, complementary perspective. The findings indicated that regardless of the coherent values emphasising responsibility, the organic chains were loosely integrated to operate as a system. The focus was on product flow, leaving other aspects of value creation largely aside. Communication with consumers was rare, and none of the actors had taken a leading role in enhancing the market for organic products. Such a situation presents unsuitable conditions for ecological modernisation of food production through organic food and calls for contributions from stakeholders other than those directly involved in the product chain. The findings inspired a revision of the original conceptual framework. The revised framework, the three-layer framework , distinguishes the different layers of interaction. By gradually enlarging the chain orientation the different but interrelated layers become visible. A framework is thus provided for further research and for understanding practical implications of the performance of organic food chains. The revised framework provides both an ideal model for organic chains in relation to ecological modernisation and demonstrates a situation consistent with the empirical evidence.

Aika ennen aluepolitiikkaa. Pohjoisen kehityshankkeet ja alueiden kehittämisen idea 1950-luvun Suomessa

The dissertation focuses on the recognition of the problems of uneven regional development in Finland in the 1950s, and the way the idea of controlling this development was introduced to Finnish politics. Since it is often stated that Finnish regional policy only began in the mid-1960s, the period at hand is considered to fall in the time before regional policy. However, various ideas, plans and projects of regional development as well as different aims of development were brought forward and discussed already in the 1950s. These give an interesting perspective to the ideas of later regional development. In the 1950s, many Finnish politicians became more conscious of the unavoidable societal change. The need for overall modernisation of the society made it reasonable to expect a growing level of unemployment and eagerness to migration. The uneven distribution of well-being was also feared to cause discontent and political changes. International experience proved interfering in the regional development possible when using the argument of public interest ; the measures taken increased the level of well-being, helped sustain societal balance, and supported national economy. Many of the development projects of the 1950s focused on Northern Finland, the natural resources of which were considered an important reserve and the political climate of which was regarded unstable. After the late 1940s, regional development was discussed frequently both on the national and the regional level. Direct and indirect support was given to less developed areas and the government outlined thorough investigations in order to relieve the regional problem. Towards the end of the decade, the measures taken were already often connected to the idea of equality. In the 1950s the conflicts within and between the largest Finnish political parties significantly affected the decisions of regional development. There are three case studies in this qualitative research based on the narrative method. The case studies clarify the characteristics of the 1950s regional development. In the first one, the representatives of the northern region and the state first discuss the location of a state-run nitrogen fertilizer factory and later the location of a new university. In the second, the aims and perspectives of private entrepreneurs and the state collide due to ideas of statist industrialisation projects and later due to an idea of a tax relief targeting northern industry. In the third case, the main role is given to the changing rural areas, in relation to which societal development and urbanisation were often measured. The regional development of the 1950s laid groundwork for the new, more established regional policy. The early problem solving actions were aimed both at the prevailing situation and the future and thus showed the way for the upcoming actions. Regional development policy existed already before regional policy.

Ministers as strategic political leaders? : Strategic political steering after NPM reforms in Finland

This study explores strategic political steering after the New Public Management (NPM) reforms, with emphasis on the new role assigned to Government ministers in Finland. In the NPM model, politicians concentrate on broad, principal issues, while agencies have discretion within the limits set by politicians. In Finland, strategic steering was introduced with Management by Results (MBR), but the actual tools for strategic political steering have been the Government Programme, the Government Strategy Portfolio (GSP) and Frame Budgeting. This study addresses these tools as means of strategic steering conducted by the Cabinet and individual ministers within their respective ministries. The time frame of the study includes the two Lipponen Cabinets between 1995 and 2003. Interviews with fourteen ministers as well as with fourteen top officials were conducted. In addition, administrative reform documents and documents related to strategic steering tools were analysed. The empirical conclusions of the study can be summarised as follows: There were few signs of strategic political steering in the Lipponen Cabinets. Although the Government Programmes of both Cabinets introduced strategic thinking, the strategic guidelines set forth at the beginning of the Programme were not linked to the GSP or to Frame Budgeting. The GSP could be characterised as the collected strategic agendas of each ministry, while there was neither the will nor the courage among Cabinet members to prioritise the projects and to make selections. The Cabinet used Frame Budgeting mainly in the sense of spending limits, not in making strategic allocation decisions. As for the GSP at the departmental level, projects were suggested by top officials, and ministers only approved the suggested list. Frame Budgeting at the departmental level proved to be the most interesting strategic steering tool from ministers viewpoint: they actively participated in defining which issues would need extra financing. Because the chances for extra financing were minimal, ministers had an effect only on a marginal share of the budget. At the departmental level, the study shows that strategic plans were considered the domain of officials. As for strategies concerning specific substances, there was variation in the interest shown by the ministers. A few ministers emphasised the importance of strategic work and led strategy processes. In most cases, however, officials led the process while ministers offered comments on the drafts of strategy documents. The results of this study together with experiences reported in other countries and local politics show that political decision-makers have difficulty operating at the strategic level. The conclusion is that politicians do not have sufficient incentive to perform the strategic role implied by the NPM type of reforms. Overall, the empirical results of the study indicate the power of politics over management reforms.

Calm or storm? : Wind power actors perceptions of Finnish wind power and its future

Wind power has grown fast internationally. It can reduce the environmental impact of energy production and increase energy security. Finland has turbine industry but wind electricity production has been slow, and nationally set capacity targets have not been met. I explored social factors that have affected the slow development of wind power in Finland by studying the perceptions of Finnish national level wind power actors. By that I refer to people who affect the development of wind power sector, such as officials, politicians, and representatives of wind industries and various organisations. The material consisted of interviews, a questionnaire, and written sources. The perceptions of wind power, its future, and methods to promote it were divided. They were studied through discourse analysis, content analysis, and scenario construction. Definition struggles affect views of the significance and potential of wind power in Finland, and also affect investments in wind power and wind power policy choices. Views of the future were demonstrated through scenarios. The views included scenarios of fast growth, but in the most pessimistic views, wind power was not thought to be competitive without support measures even in 2025, and the wind power capacity was correspondingly low. In such a scenario, policy tool choices were expected to remain similar to ones in use at the time of the interviews. So far, the development in Finland has followed closely this pessimistic scenario. Despite the scepticism about wind electricity production, wind turbine industry was seen as a credible industry. For many wind power actors as well as for the Finnish wind power policy, the turbine industry is a significant motive to promote wind power. Domestic electricity production and the export turbine industry are linked in discourse through so-called home market argumentation. Finnish policy tools have included subsidies, research and development funding, and information policies. The criteria used to evaluate policy measures were both process-oriented and value-based. Feed-in tariffs and green certificates that are common elsewhere have not been taken to use in Finland. Some interviewees considered such tools unsuitable for free electricity markets and for the Finnish policy style, dictatorial, and being against western values. Other interviewees supported their use because of their effectiveness. The current Finnish policy tools are not sufficiently effective to increase wind power production significantly. Marginalisation of wind power in discourses, pessimistic views of the future, and the view that the small consumer demand for wind electricity represents the political views of citizens towards promoting wind power, make it more difficult to take stronger policy measures to use. Wind power has not yet significantly contributed to the ecological modernisation of the energy sector in Finland, but the situation may change as the need to reduce emissions from energy production continues.

Viestintää valtuustossa : Valtuutettujen viestintätyyli ja käsitys Helsingin kaupunginvaltuuston kokouksien viestinnästä

The goal of the study was to determine the kind of communication used in the meetings of the City Council. Councillors' addresses were studied by observing their communication styles. A questionnaire was used to study councillors' perception of communication in council meetings as perceived communication climate. A second goal of the study was to develop a method for analysing communication style. The nature of the study was a longitudinal case study. Studies of speech communication at the individual level and those of organisational communication at the community level served as the theoretical frame of reference. Due to the chosen object of study, political research and communication context shaped the frame of reference for the study. Verbal, nonverbal and paraverbal characteristics form the communication style. The perceived communication climate is dynamic in nature and consists of characteristics. The research material was gathered from the meetings of the Helsinki City Council held from 1993 to 1996. The communication style was analysed from meeting addresses (N=1271) given by the permanent members (N=95) of the council. The perceived communication climate was studied using a questionnaire modified from Wiio's OCD2 questionnaire. The questionnaire survey was carried out twice. The first time, 58 questionnaires (68%) were returned and, the second time, 49 questionnaires (58%) were returned. The method of analysis used for communication style was classification and cross tabulation. Based on the subset of material for the first year, five communication style categories were defined Communication style was examined using gender, length of council membership, and political party as subgroups. The results related to the perceived communication climate were analysed as averages and percentages. A comparison of the results from two different measuring times revealed how the perceived communication climate changed during a council term. The finding of the study was that the municipal politicians could be placed in all five communication style categories in each year of their four-year council term. The sizes of the style categories varied only little in the different years. A relatively stable - rather than changing - communication style was more characteristic of individuals during a council term. Gender did not explain an individual's communication style. On the other hand, the length of service in the council and, to some extent, the political party were connected with a certain communication style. Changes in style mainly manifested themselves as variation in communication activity so that activity was highest at the beginning and at the end of the council term. The method of researching communication style developed for this study proved to be functional, though labour-consuming. The perceived communication climate in the Helsinki City Council was good. Women's and men's satisfaction with the communication in the council differed; women's perception became considerably more positive at the end of the council term. Satisfaction with the communication in the council was characteristic of the Coalition Party and the Social Democrat councillors and dissatisfaction was characteristics of the Green councillors. Long council experience increased satisfaction with communication in the council. Only in the case of a few style categories was it possible to show any connection between the communication style and the perceived communication climate. The study confirmed the perception that an individual's communication style in the same communication context was relatively stable in the long term as well.

Politiikan paluu : Globalisaatioliike ja julkisuus

The struggle over globalization has arguably been the most important debate in world politics of the 2000 s. This study maps the origins of this debate, its most important actors and its results so far. The focus is on the Global Justice Movement which launched the globalization debate to the mass media spotlight. Particular attention is given to the World Social Forum, the movement s global gathering, analyzed as a new form of global publics. The mediation of the debates initiated by these publics to the Finnish national context is analyzed at two levels: First, through forums for policy debate such as the Helsinki Process on Globalization and Democracy and second, through the public debate in the Finnish mass media. The study proves many common assumptions about the Global Justice Movement wrong. Rather than being a marginal actor, the movement is the initiator of the whole debate. Combining expert knowledge to carnevalistic demonstrations rarely seen in Finland, the movement gains more public attention and more members in Finland than in many other European countries. The political and economic elites are not just adversaries of the movement. Rather, the Finnish elite is divided in two. Some top politicians starting from the president and the minister for foreign affairs adopt many of the movement s claims. Later, the business elite, with support from the nation s largest newspaper, begins a counterattack to challenge the movement and its allies. The return of politics staged by the movement is, first and foremost, a phenomenon in the public sphere. Two downward trends, the decline of party politics and the traditionally strong Finnish field of politically oriented civic associations remain unchanged. This allows for the conclusion that we are witnessing a move from organizational politics towards politics in the public sphere. The study develops a theoretical perspective on social movements as actors in the public sphere. It argues that movements have, in fact, played an important role in the very development of the democratic public sphere as we know it. In the light of this observation, the study assesses the potentials and the pitfalls of social movements and their related publics to global democracy. Methodologically, the most important contribution is the development of Public Justifications Analysis, a method for analyzing political claims in media debates and the ways in which these claims are justified.

Local Politicizations : A Comparison of Finns and French Practicing Democracy

This study examines how do the processes of politicization differ in the Finnish and the French local contexts, and what kinds of consequences do these processes have on the local civic practices, the definitions and redefinitions of democracy and citizenship, the dynamics of power and resistance, and the ways of solving controversies in the public sphere. By means of comparative anthropology of the state , focusing on how democracy actually is practiced in different contexts, politicizations the processes of opening political arenas and recognizing controversy are analyzed. The focus of the study is on local activists engaged in different struggles on various levels of the local public spheres, and local politicians and civil servants participating in these struggles from their respective positions, in two middle-size European cities, Helsinki and Lyon. The empirical analyses of the book compare different political actors and levels of practicing democracy simultaneously. The study is empirically based on four different bodies of material: Ethnographic notes taken during a fieldwork among the activities of several local activist groups; 47 interviews of local activists and politicians; images representing different levels of public portrayals from activist websites (Helsinki N=274, Lyon N=232) and from city information magazines (Helsinki-info N=208, Lyon Citoyen N= 357); and finally, newspaper articles concerning local conflict issues, and reporting on the encounters between local citizens and representatives of the cities (January-June in 2005; Helsingin Sanomat N=96 and Le Progrès N= 102). The study makes three distinctive contributions to the study of current democratic societies: (1) a conceptual one by bringing politicization at the center of a comparison of political cultures, and by considering in parallel the ethnographic group styles theory by Nina Eliasoph and Paul Lichterman, the theory on counter-democracy by Pierre Rosanvallon and the pragmatist justification theory by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot; (2) an empirical one through the triangulation of ethnographic, thematic interview, visual, and newspaper data through which the different aspects of democratic practices are examined; and (3) a methodological one by developing new ways of analyzing comparative cases an application of Frame Analysis to visual material and the creation of Public Justification Analysis for analyzing morally loaded claims in newspaper reports thus building bridges between cultural, political, and pragmatic sociology. The results of the study indicate that the cultural tools the Finnish civic actors had at their disposal were prone to hinder more than support politicization, whereas the tools the French actors mainly relied on were frequently apt for making politicization possible. This crystallization is defined and detailed in many ways in the analyses of the book. Its consequences to the understanding and future research on the current developments of democracy are multiple, as politicization, while not assuring good results as such, is central to a functioning and vibrant democracy in which injustices can be fixed and new directions and solutions sought collectively.

Gender, Politics and Democratisation in Cameroon

Gender perceptions, religious belief systems, and political thought have excluded women from politics, for ages, around the world. Combining feminist and modernisation theorists in my theoretical framework, I examine the trends in patriarchal Europe and I highlight the gender-sensitive model of the Nordic countries. Retracing local gender patterns from precolonial to postcolonial eras in sub-Saharan Africa, I explore the links between perceptions, needs, resources, education and women's political participation in Cameroon. Democratisation is supposed to open up political participation, to grant equal opportunities to all adults. One ironic feature of the liberalisation process in Cameroon has been the decrease of women in parliamentarian representation (14% in 1988, 6% in 1992, 5% in 1997 and 10% in 2002). What social, cultural and institutional mechanisms produced this paradoxical outcome, the exclusion of half the population? The gender complementarity of the indigenous context has been lost to male prevalence privileged by education, church, law, employment, economy and politics in the public sphere; most women are marginalised in the private sphere. Nation building and development have failed; ethnicism and individualism are growing. Some hope lies in the growing civil society. From two surveys and 21 focus groups across Cameroon, in 2000 and 2002, some significant results of the processed empirical data reveal low electoral registration (34.5% women and 65.9% men), contrasted by the willingness to run for municipal elections (33.3 % women and 45.2% men). The co-existence of customary and statutory laws, the corrupt political system and fraudulent practices, contribute to the marginalisation of women and men who are interested in politics. A large majority of female respondents consider female politicians more trustworthy and capable than their male counterparts; they even foresee the appointment of a female Prime Minister. The Nordic countries have institutionalised gender equality in their legislation, policies and practices. France has improved women's political inclusion with the parity laws; Rwanda is another model of women's representation, thanks to its post-conflict constitution. From my analysis, Cameroonian institutions, men and more so women, may learn and borrow from these experiences, in order to design and implement a sustainable and gender-balanced democracy. Keywords: democratisation, politics, gender equality, feminism, citizenship, Cameroon, Nordic countries, Finland, France, United Kingdom, quotas, societal social psychology.

Itämafia : Uhkakuvapolitiikka, rikosilmiöt ja kulttuuriset merkitykset

The Eastern Mafia Threat policy, crime phenomena, and cultural meanings An interdisciplinary research on the crime phenomena and the threat policy relating to the organized crime and the mafia of Russia and Estonia is based on 151 expert interviews, statistics, documents, research literature, and press material. The main part of the material consists of interviews of the Finnish, Estonian and Russian police authorities specialized in the problem of organized crime, and the reports on the crime situation drawn up in the Finnish diplomatic representations in Tallinn and St Petersburg. The interviews have been gathered in the years 1996-2001. The main theoretical tools of the research are constructivist research on social problems, and political psychology. Definitional processes of social problems and cultural semantic structures behind them are identified in the analysis and connected to the analysis of the crime cases. Both in the Anglo-American and Russian cultural frames there appears an inflated and exaggerated talk, according to which the mafia rules everything in Russia and is spreading everywhere. There is the traditional anti-Semitic paranoia in the core of this cultural symbiosis produced by Russian legal nihilism, the theory of totalitarianism of Sovietology, and the inertia of Russian anti-capitalism. To equate the Sicilian Mafia with Russia is an anachronism, since no empirical proof of systematic uncontrolled violence or absolute power vacuum in Russia can be found. In the Anglo-American policy of threat images, "the Russian mafia" was seen as a commodified conspiracy theory, which the police, the media, and the research took advantage of, blurring the line between fact and fiction. In Finland, the evolution of the policy of threat images proceeded in three phases: Initially, extensive rolling of refugees and criminals from Russia to Finland was emphasized in the beginning of the 1990's. In the second phase, the eastern mafia was said to infiltrate all over Finnish society and administration. Finland was, however, found immune to this kind of spreading. In the third phase, in the 21st century, the organized crime of Finland was said to be lead from abroad. In Finland, the policy of threat images was especially canalised to moral panics connected to "eastern prostitution". In Estonia, the policy of threat images emphasized the crime organized by the Russian authorities and politicians in order to weaken Estonia. In Russia, the policy of threat images emphasized the total criminalizing of society caused by criminal capitalism. In every country, the policy of threat images was affected by a so-called large-group identity, a term by Vamik Volkan, in which a so-called chosen trauma caused a political paranoia of an outer and inner danger. In Finland, procuring, car theft, and narcotics crimes were at their widest arranged by the Finnish often with the help of the Estonians. The Russians had no influence in the most serious violent crimes in Finland, although the number of assassinations were at least 5, 000 in Russia in the 1990's. In Russia, the assassinations were on one hand connected to marital problems, on the other hand to the pursuit of public attention and a hoped-for effect by the aid of the murder of an influential person. In the white-collar crime phenomena between Finland and Russia, the Finnish state and Finnish corporations gained remarkable benefit of the frauds aimed at the states of the Soviet Union and Russia in 1980's-21st century. The situation of Estonia was very difficult compared to that of Russia in the 1990's, which was manifested in the stagnation of the Estonian police and judicial authorities, the crimes of the police and the voluntary paramilitary organization, bomb explosions, the rebellion called "the jaeger crisis" in the voluntary paramilitary organization, and the "blood autumn" of Eastern Virumaa, in other words terror. The situation of Estonia had a powerful effect on the crime situation of Finland and on the security of the Finnish diplomats. In the continuum of the Finnish policy of threat images, Russia and the Russians were, however, presented as a source of a marked danger.

Humanitaarisuuden varjossa : Poliittiset tekijät lastensiirroissa Ruotsiin sotiemme aikana ja niiden jälkeen

The evacuation of Finnish children to Sweden during WW II has often been called a small migration . Historical research on this subject is scarce, considering the great number of children involved. The present research has applied, apart from the traditional archive research, the framework of history-culture developed by Rüsen in order to have an all-inclusive approach to the impact of this historical event. The framework has three dimensions: political, aesthetic and cognitive. The collective memory of war children has also been discussed. The research looks for political factors involved in the evacuations during the Winter War and the Continuation War and the post-war period. The approach is wider than a purely humanitarian one. Political factors have had an impact in both Finland and Sweden, beginning from the decision-making process and ending with the discussion of the unexpected consequences of the evacuations in the Finnish Parliament in 1950. The Winter War (30.11.1939 13.3.1940) witnessed the first child transports. These were also the model for future decision making. The transports were begun on the initiative of Swedes Maja Sandler, the wife of the resigned minister of foreign affairs Rickard Sandler, and Hanna Rydh-Munck af Rosenschöld , but this activity was soon accepted by the Swedish government because the humanitarian help in the form of child transports lightened the political burden of Prime Minister Hansson, who was not willing to help Finland militarily. It was help that Finland never asked for and it was rejected at the beginning. The negative response of Minister Juho Koivisto was not taken very seriously. The political forces in Finland supporting child transports were stronger than those rejecting them. The major politicians in support belonged to Finland´s Swedish minority. In addition, close to 1 000 Finnish children remained in Sweden after the Winter War. No analysis was made of the reasons why these children did not return home. A committee set up to help Finland and Norway was established in Sweden in 1941. Its chairman was Torsten Nothin, an influential Swedish politician. In December 1941 he appealed to the Swedish government to provide help to Finnish children under the authority of The International Red Cross. This plea had no results. The delivery of great amounts of food to Finland, which was now at war with Great Britain, had automatically caused reactions among the allies against the Swedish imports through Gothenburg. This included the import of oil, which was essential for the Swedish navy and air force. Oil was later used successfully to force a reduction in commerce between Sweden and Finland. The contradiction between Sweden´s essential political interests and humanitarian help was solved in a way that did not harm the country´s vital political interests. Instead of delivering help to Finland, Finnish children were transported to Sweden through the organisations that had already been created. At the beginning of the Continuation War (25.6.1941 27.4.1945) negative opinion regarding child transports re-emerged in Finland. Karl-August Fagerholm implemented the transports in September 1941. In 1942, members of the conservative parties in the Finnish Parliament expressed their fear of losing the children to the Swedes. They suggested that Finland should withdraw from the inter-Nordic agreement, according to which the adoptions were approved by the court of the country where the child resided. This initiative failed. Paavo Virkkunen, an influential member of the conservative party Kokoomus in Finland, favoured the so-called good-father system, where help was delivered to Finland in the form of money and goods. Virkkunen was concerned about the consequences of a long stay in a Swedish family. The risk of losing the children was clear. The extreme conservative party (IKL, the Patriotic Movement of the Finnish People) wanted to alienate Finland from Sweden and bring Finland closer to Germany. Von Blücher, the German ambassador to Finland, had in his report to Berlin, mentioned the political consequences of the child transports. Among other things, they would bring Finland and Sweden closer to each other. He had also paid attention to the Nordic political orientation in Finland. He did not question or criticize the child transports. His main interest was to increase German political influence in Finland, and the Nordic political orientation was an obstacle. Fagerholm was politically ill-favoured by the Germans, because he had a strong Nordic political disposition and had criticised Germany´s activities in Norway. The criticism of child transports was at the same time criticism of Fagerholm. The official censorship organ of the Finnish government (VTL) denied the criticism of child transports in January 1942. The reasons were political. Statements made by members of the Finnish Parliament were also censored, because it was thought that they would offend the Swedes. In addition, the censorship organ used child transports as a means of active propaganda aimed at improving the relations between the two countries. The Finnish Parliament was informed in 1948 that about 15 000 Finnish children still remained in Sweden. These children would stay there permanently. In 1950 the members of the Agrarian Party in Finland stated that Finland should actively strive to get the children back. The party on the left (SKDL, the Democratic Movement of Finnish People) also focused on the unexpected consequences of the child transports. The Social Democrats, and largely Fagerholm, had been the main force in Finland behind the child transports. Members of the SKDL, controlled by Finland´s Communist Party, stated that the war time authorities were responsible for this war loss. Many of the Finnish parents could not get their children back despite repeated requests. The discussion of the problem became political, for example von Born, a member of the Swedish minority party RKP, related this problem to foreign policy by stating that the request to repatriate the Finnish children would have negative political consequences for the relations between Finland and Sweden. He emphasized expressing feelings of gratitude to the Swedes. After the war a new foreign policy was established by Prime Minister (1944 1946) and later President (1946 1956) Juho Kusti Paasikivi. The main cornerstone of this policy was to establish good relations with the Soviet Union. The other, often forgotten, cornerstone was to simultaneously establish good relations with other Nordic countries, especially Sweden, as a counterbalance. The unexpected results of the child evacuation, a Swedish initiative, had violated the good relations with Sweden. The motives of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People were much the same as those of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People. Only the ideology was different. The Nordic political orientation was an obstacle to both parties. The position of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People was much better than that of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People, because now one could clearly see the unexpected results, which included human tragedy for the many families who could not be re-united with their children despite their repeated requests. The Swedes questioned the figure given to the Finnish Parliament regarding the number of children permanently remaining in Sweden. This research agrees with the Swedes. In a calculation based on Swedish population registers, the number of these children is about 7 100. The reliability of this figure is increased by the fact that the child allowance programme began in Sweden in 1948. The prerequisite to have this allowance was that the child be in the Swedish population register. It was not necessary for the child to have Swedish nationality. The Finnish Parliament had false information about the number of Finnish children who remained in Sweden in 1942 and in 1950. There was no parliamentary control in Finland regarding child transports, because the decision was made by one cabinet member and speeches by MPs in the Finnish Parliament were censored, like all criticism regarding child transports to Sweden. In Great Britain parliamentary control worked better throughout the whole war, because the speeches regarding evacuation were not censored. At the beginning of the war certain members of the British Labour Party and the Welsh Nationalists were particularly outspoken about the scheme. Fagerholm does not discuss to any great extent the child transports in his memoirs. He does not evaluate the process and results as a whole. This research provides some possibilities for an evaluation of this sort. The Swedish medical reports give a clear picture of the physical condition of the Finnish children when arriving in Sweden. The transports actually revealed how bad the situation of the poorest children was. According to Titmuss, similar observations were made in Great Britain during the British evacuations. The child transports saved the lives of approximately 2 900 children. Most of these children were removed to Sweden to receive treatment for illnesses, but many among the healthy children were undernourished and some suffered from the effects of tuberculosis. The medical inspection in Finland was not thorough. If you compare the figure of 2 900 children saved and returned with the figure of about 7 100 children who remained permanently in Sweden, you may draw the conclusion that Finland as a country failed to benefit from the child transports, and that the whole operation was a political mistake with far-reaching consequenses. The basic goal of the operation was to save lives and have all the children return to Finland after the war. The difficulties with the repatriation of the children were mainly psychological. The level of child psychology in Finland at that time was low. One may question the report by Professor Martti Kaila regarding the adaptation of children to their families back in Finland. Anna Freud´s warnings concerning the difficulties that arise when child evacuees return are also valid in Finland. Freud viewed the emotional life of children in a way different from Kaila: the physical survival of a small child forces her to create strong emotional ties to the person who is looking after her. This, a characteristic of all small children, occurred with the Finnish children too, and it was something the political decision makers in Finland could not see during and after the war. It is a characteristic of all little children. Yet, such experiences were already evident during the Winter War. The best possible solution had been to limit the child transports only to children in need of medical treatment. Children from large and poor families had been helped by organising meals and by buying food from Denmark with Swedish money. Assisting Finland by all possible means should have been the basic goal of Fagerholm in September 1941, when the offer of child transports came from Sweden. Fagerholm felt gratitude towards the Swedes. The risks became clear to him only in 1943. The war children are today a rather scattered and diffuse group of people. Emotionally, part of these children remained in Sweden after the war. There is no clear collective memory, only individual memories; the collective memory of the war children has partly been shaped later through the activities of the war child associations. The main difference between the children evacuated in Finland (for example from Karelia to safer areas with their families) and the war children, who were sent abroad, is that the war children lack a shared story and experience with their families. They were outsiders . The whole matter is sensitive to many of such mothers and discussing the subject has often been avoided in families. The war-time censorship has continued in families through silence and avoidance and Finnish politicians and Finnish families had to face each other on this issue after the war. The lack of all-inclusive historical research has also prevented the formation of a collective awareness among war children returned to Finland or those remaining permanently abroad.. Knowledge of historical facts will help war-children by providing an opportunity to create an all-inclusive approach to the past. Personal experiences should be regarded as part of a large historical entity shadowed by war and where many political factors were at work in both Finland and Sweden. This means strengthening of the cognitive dimension discussed in Rüsen´s all-inclusive historical approach.