Ethics in a Technological World : Framing the Questions and Three Approaches

This study addresses the following question: How to think about ethics in a technological world? The question is treated first thematically by framing central issues in the relationship between ethics and technology. This relationship has three distinct facets: i) technological advance poses new challenges for ethics, ii) traditional ethics may become poorly applicable in a technologically transformed world, and iii) the progress in science and technology has altered the concept of rationality in ways that undermine ethical thinking itself. The thematic treatment is followed by the description and analysis of three approaches to the questions framed. First, Hans Jonas s thinking on the ontology of life and the imperative of responsibility is studied. In Jonas s analysis modern culture is found to be nihilistic because it is unable to understand organic life, to find meaning in reality, and to justify morals. At the root of nihilism Jonas finds dualism, the traditional Western way of seeing consciousness as radically separate from the material world. Jonas attempts to create a metaphysical grounding for an ethic that would take the technologically increased human powers into account and make the responsibility for future generations meaningful and justified. The second approach is Albert Borgmann s philosophy of technology that mainly assesses the ways in which technological development has affected everyday life. Borgmann admits that modern technology has liberated humans from toil, disease, danger, and sickness. Furthermore, liberal democracy, possibilities for self-realization, and many of the freedoms we now enjoy would not be possible on a large scale without technology. Borgmann, however, argues that modern technology in itself does not provide a whole and meaningful life. In fact, technological conditions are often detrimental to the good life. Integrity in life, according to him, is to be sought among things and practices that evade technoscientific objectification and commodification. Larry Hickman s Deweyan philosophy of technology is the third approach under scrutiny. Central in Hickman s thinking is a broad definition of technology that is nearly equal to Deweyan inquiry. Inquiry refers to the reflective and experiential way humans adapt to their environment by modifying their habits and beliefs. In Hickman s work, technology consists of all kinds of activities that through experimentation and/or reflection aim at improving human techniques and habits. Thus, in addition to research and development, many arts and political reforms are technological for Hickman. He argues for recasting such distinctions as fact/value, poiesis/praxis/theoria, and individual/society. Finally, Hickman does not admit a categorical difference between ethics and technology: moral values and norms need to be submitted to experiential inquiry as well as all the other notions. This study mainly argues for an interdisciplinary approach to the ethics of technology. This approach should make use of the potentialities of the research traditions in applied ethics, the philosophy of technology, and the social studies on science and technology and attempt to overcome their limitations. This study also advocates an endorsement of mid-level ethics that concentrate on the practices, institutions, and policies of temporal human life. Mid-level describes the realm between the instantaneous and individualistic micro-level and the universal and global macro level.

Despairing Justice and the Ethics of Legal Interpretation

This study discusses legal interpretation. The question is how legal texts, for instance laws, statutes and regulations, can and do have meaning. Language makes interpretation difficult as it holds no definite meanings. When the theoretical connection between semantics and legal meaning is loosened and we realise that language cannot be a means of justifying legal decisions, the responsibility inherent in legal interpretation can be seen in full. We are thus compelled to search for ways to analyse this responsibility. The main argument of the book is that the responsibility of legal interpretation contains a responsibility towards the text that is interpreted (and through the mediation of the text also towards the legal system), but not only this. It is not simply a responsibility to read and read well, but it transcends on a broader scale. It includes responsibility for the effects of the interpretation in a particular situation and with regard to the people whose case is decided. Ultimately, it is a responsibility to do justice. These two aspects of responsibility are conceptualised here as the two dimensions of the ethics of legal interpretation: the textual and the situational. The basic conception of language presented here is provided by Ludwig Wittgenstein s later philosophy, but the argument is not committed to only one philosophical tradition. Wittgenstein can be counterpointed in interesting ways by Jacques Derrida s ideas on language and meaning. Derrida s work also functions as a contrast to hermeneutic theories. It is argued that the seed to an answer to the question of meaning lies in the inter-personal and situated activity of interpretation and communication, an idea that can be discerned in different ways in the works of Wittgenstein, Derrida and Hans-Georg Gadamer. This way the question of meaning naturally leads us to think about ethics, which is approached here through the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. His thinking, focusing on topics such as otherness, friendship and hospitality, provides possibilities for answering some of the questions posed in this book. However, at the same time we move inside a normativity where ethics and politics come together in many ways. The responsibility of legal interpretation is connected to the political and this has to be acknowledged lest we forget that law always implies force. But it is argued here that the political can be explored in positive terms as it does not have to mean only power or violence.

Mapinduzi Daima – Revolution Forever : Using the 1964 Revolution in Nationalistic Political Discourses in Zanzibar

This Master's thesis examines two opposite nationalistic discourses on the revolution of Zanzibar. Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the party in power since the 1964 revolution defends its revolutionary and "African" heritage in the current multi-party system. New nationalists, including among others the main opposition party Civic United Front (CUF), question both the 1964 revolution and the post-revolution period and blame CCM for empty promises, corruption and ethnic discrimination. This study analyzes the role of a significant historical event in the creation of nationalistic ideology and national identity. The 1964 revolution forms the nucleus of various debates related to the history of Zanzibar: slavery, colonialism, racial discrimination and political violence. Representations of these Social constructivist principles form the basis of this study, and central concepts in the theoretical framework are nationalism, national identity, ethnicity and race. I use critical discourse analysis as my research method, lean on the work by Teun A. van Dijk and Norman Fairclough as the most significant researchers in this field. I examine particularly the ways in which linguistic methods, such as stereotypes and metaphors are used to form in- and out-groups ("us" vs. "others"). My material, both in Swahili and English, was collected mainly in Tanzania in the fall of 2007 and from online sources in the spring of 2009. It includes publications by the Zanzibari government between the years of 1964-2000 (12), official speeches for the Revolution Day or the Union Day (12), articles from Tanzanian newspapers from the 1990s until the year of 2009 (15), memoirs and political pamphlets (10), blog posts and opinion pieces from four different websites (8), and interviews or personal communication in Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam and Uppsala (8). Nationalistic rhetoric often creates enemy images by using binary good-bad oppositions. Both discourses in this study build identities on the basis of "otherness" and exclusion, with the intent of emphasizing the particularity of the own group and excluding "evilness" outside the own reference group. These opposite views on the 1964 revolution as the main axis of the history of Zanzibar build different portraits of the nation and Zanzibari-ness (Uzanzibari). CCM still relies on the pre-revolutionary enemy images of Arabs as selfish rulers and cruel slave traders. For CCM, Zanzibar is primarily an "African" nation and a part of Tanzania which is threatened by "Arabs", the outsiders. In contrast, the new nationalists stress the long history of Zanzibar as multi-racial, cosmopolitan and formerly independent country which has its own, separate culture and identity from mainland Tanzanians. Heshima, honour/respect, one of the basic values of Swahili culture, occupies a central role in both discourses: the main party emphasizes that the revolution returned "heshima" to the Zanzibari Africans after centuries of humiliation, whereas the new nationalists claim that ever since the revolution all "non-Africans" have been humiliated and lost their "heshima". According to the new nationalists, true Zanzibari values which include tolerance and harmony between different "races" were lost when the "foreign" revolutionaries arrived from the mainland. Consequently, they see the 1964 revolution as Tanganyikan colonialism which began with the help of Western countries, and maintain that this "colonialism" still continues in the violent multi-party elections.

Self-love and self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume

This work offers a novel interpretation of David Hume’s (1711–1776) conception of the conjectural development of civil society and artificial moral institutions. It focuses on the social elements of Hume’s Treatise of human nature (1739–40) and the necessary connection between science of man and politeness, civilised monarchies, social distance and hierarchical structure of civil society. The study incorporates aspects of intellectual history, history of philosophy and book history. In order to understand David Hume’s thinking, the intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733) needs to be accounted for. When put into a historical perspective, the moral, political and social components of Treatise of human nature can be read in the context of a philosophical tradition, in which Mandeville plays a pivotal role. A distinctive character of Mandeville and Hume’s account of human nature and moral institutions was the introduction of a simple distinction between self-love and self-liking. The symmetric passions of self-interest and pride can only be controlled by the corresponding moral institutions. This is also the way in which we can say that moral institutions are drawn from human nature. In the case of self-love or self-interest, the corresponding moral institution is justice. Respectively, concerning self-liking or pride the moral institution is politeness. There is an explicit analogy between these moral institutions. If we do not understand this analogy, we do not understand the nature of either justice or politeness. The present work is divided into two parts. In the first part, ‘Intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville’, it is argued that the relevance of the paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thinking has been missed. It draws a picture of Mandeville turning from the Hobbism of The Fable of the Bees to an original theory of civil society put forward in his later works. In order to make this change more apparent, Mandeville’s career and the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees are examined comprehensively. This interpretation, based partly on previously unknown sources, challenges F. B. Kaye’s influential decision to publish the two parts of The Fable of the Bees as a uniform work of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the ‘Intellectual development of Mandeville’ is to function as the context for the young Hume. The second part of the work, ‘David Hume and Greatness of mind’, explores in philosophical detail the social theory of the Treatise and politics and the science of man in his Essays. This part will also reveal the relevance of Greatness of mind as a general concept for David Hume’s moral and political philosophy.

Wipert von Blücher und Finnland : Alternativpolitik und Diplomatie im 'Dritten Reich'

This dissertation explores the role of the German minister to Helsinki, Wipert von Blücher (1883-1963), within the German-Finnish relations of the late 1930s and the Second World War. Blücher was a key figure – and certainly one of the constants – within German Finland policy and the complex international diplomacy surrounding Finland. Despite representing Hitler’s Germany, he was not a National Socialist in the narrower sense of the term, but a conservative civil servant in the Wilhelmine tradition of the German foreign service. Along with a significant number of career diplomats, Blücher attempted to restrict National Socialist influence on the exercise of German foreign policy, whilst successfully negotiating a modus vivendi with the new regime. The study of his political biography in the Third Reich hence provides a highly representative example of how the traditional élites of Germany were caught in an cycle of conformity and, albeit tacit, opposition. Above all, however, the biographical study of Blücher and his behaviour offers an hitherto unexplored approach to the history of the German-Finnish relations. His unusually long tenure in Helsinki covered the period leading up to the so-called Winter War, which left Blücher severely distraught by Berlin’s effectively pro-Soviet neutrality and brought him close to resigning his post. It further extended to the German-Finnish rapprochement of 1940/41 and the military cooperation of both countries from mid-1941 to 1944. Throughout, Blücher developed a diverse and ambitious set of policy schemes, largely rooted in the tradition of Wilhelmine foreign policy. In their moderation and commonsensical realism, his designs – indeed his entire conception of foreign policy – clashed with the foreign political and ideological premises of the National Socialist regime. In its theoretical grounding, the analysis of Blücher’s political schemes is built on the concept of alternative policy and indebted to A.J.P. Taylor’s definition of dissent in foreign policy. It furthermore rests upon the assumption, introduced by Wolfgang Michalka, that National Socialist foreign policy was dominated by a plurality of rival conceptions, players, and institutions competing for Hitler’s favour (‘Konzeptionen-Pluralismus’). Although primarily a study in the history of international relations, my research has substantially benefited from more recent developments within cultural history, particularly research on nobility and élites, and the renewed focus on autobiography and conceptions of the self. On an abstract level, the thesis touches upon some of the basic components of German politics, political culture, and foreign policy in the first half of the 20th century: national belonging and conflicting loyalties, self-perception and representation, élites and their management of power, the modern history of German conservatism, the nature and practice of diplomacy, and, finally, the intricate relationship between the ethics of the professional civil service and absolute moral principles. Against this backdrop, the examination of Blücher’s role both within Finnish politics and the foreign policy of the Third Reich highlights the biographical dimension of the German-Finnish relationships, while fathoming the determinants of individual human agency in the process.

Käytännöt ja ajattelu Michel Foucault'n filosofiassa

Practices and Thought in Michel Foucault s Philosophy The present thesis examines Michel Foucault s (1926-1984) notion of practice and argues that it is an essential concept in his philosophy, especially in his analysis of knowledge, power and ethics. The thesis reveals a previously neglected chronological and methodological unity in Foucault s work. The first chapter clarifies Foucault s philosophy by outlining it according to four central themes. First, the main philosophical goal of his historical studies is to analyse how human subjects have become objects of their own thinking. Second, this goal calls for methodological precaution to avoid all anthropological universals. Third, Foucault s studies are directed towards fields of practices. Fourth, the analysis of practices is executed along three axes: knowledge, power and ethics. The second chapter concerns the notion of practice in Foucault s archaeological method. Foucault s archaeological analysis is not directed towards objects and subjects as such, but to the way that the rules of discursive practice form them in the discourse. Many commentators have neglected Foucault s concept of practice when discussing his ideas concerning rules of discourse and limits of knowledge. I argue that Foucault s analysis concerning the limits of knowledge relates to local and contingent rules of discursive practice, not to transcendental rules of thinking in general. The third chapter deals with power relations and practices. I clarify Foucault s concept of dispositif by defining it as a functional ensemble of practices, and argue that this concept is crucial to his understanding of power relations. I stress a conceptual definition, which separates relations of power from the practices of government and show that the latter is based on the idea that power relations are integrated into practices. This conceptual clarification also helps in understanding Foucault s critique concerning modern practices of power. The fourth chapter examines Foucault s way of perceiving ethics as a practice. He separates three essential dimensions in morals: moral codes, moral behaviour and practices of self. His ethics concern practices of self and he studies how these practices have constituted different relations that subjects have to themselves, to others and to their societies. I argue that Foucault s own ethical views can be found in the ideas on the importance of practices of self in the modern world, and emphasize that these ideas should be connected to his views concerning the tradition of the Enlightenment, and to his own political action.

Constructing Ethical Patterns in Times of Globalization : Hans Küng's Global Ethic Project and Beyond

The purpose of this study is to evaluate contemporary philosophical models for global ethics in light of the Catholic theologian Hans Küng s Global Ethic Project (Projekt Weltethos). Küng s project starts with the motto, No survival without world ethos. No global peace without peace between religions. I will use the philosophically multidimensional potential of Projekt Weltethos in terms of its possible philosophical interpretations to evaluate the general discussion of global ethics within political philosophy today. This is important in its own right, but also because through it, opportunities will emerge to articulate Küng s relatively general argument in a way that leaves less room for mutually contradictory concretizations of what global ethics ultimately should be like. The most important question in this study is the problem of religious and ideological exclusivism and its relation to the ethically consistent articulation of global ethics. I will first explore the question of the role of religion as the basis for ethics in general and what Küng may mean by his claim that only the unconditional can oblige unconditionally. I will reconstruct two different overall philosophical interpretations of the relationship between religious faith and human rationality, each having two different sub-divisions: a liberal interpretation amounts to either a Kantian-Scheiermacherian or a Jaspersian view, whereas what I call postliberal interpretation amounts to either an Aristotelian-Thomistic or an Augustinian view. Thereafter, I will further clarify how Küng views the nature of ethics beyond the question of its principal foundation in religious faith: Küng searches for a middle way between consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethics, a way in which the latter dimension has the final stake. I will then set out to concretize further this more or less general notion of the theoretical potential of Projekt Weltethos in terms of certain precise philosophico-political models. I categorize these models according to their liberal or postliberal orientation. The liberal concretization leads me to consider a wide spectrum of post-Kantian and post-Hegelian models from Rawls to Derrida, while the alternative concretization opens up my ultimate argument in favor of a postliberal type of modus vivendi. I will suggest that the only theoretically and practically plausible way to promote global ethics, in itself a major imperative today, is the recognition of a fundamental and necessary contest between mutually exclusive ideologies in the public sphere. On this basis I will proceed to my postliberal proposal, namely, that a constructive and peaceful encountering of exclusive difference as an ethical vantage point for an intercultural and inter-religious peace dialogue is the most acute challenge for global ethics today.

Christian-Muslim Dialogue : Perspectives of Four Lebanese Thinkers

This study describes and analyses two Lebanese Muslims and two Lebanese Christians ideas about Christian-Muslim dialogue, its nature, aims, and methods and its different dimensions, which include doctrinal, ethical, and social dimensions. On the basis of the analysis, the four thinkers contributions for promoting constructive dialogue are evaluated. The persons studied are two religious authorities, the Shiite Great Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (b. 1935) and the Eastern Orthodox Metropolitan of Mount Lebanon, Georges Khodr (b. 1923), and two academic scholars, Doctor Mahmoud Ayoub (b. 1935) and Doctor, Father Mouchir Aoun (b. 1964), from the Shiite and Greek Catholic communities, respectively. The method of the study is systematic analysis. The sources consist of the four thinkers writings on Christian-Muslim relations, the most of which have been published in Lebanon in the 1990s and 2000s in the Arabic language. In their general guidelines for Christian-Muslim dialogue, the four authors do not offer any novel or unusual insights. However, their dialogue visions are multi-faceted, motivating interreligious encounter both on religious and practical grounds and clarifying the theological grounds and socio-political conditions of this endeavour. The major challenge appears to be the tension between loyalty to one s own convictions and taking into account the particular self-understanding of the other. While this tension may be ultimately unsolvable, it is obvious that linking dialogue tightly to missionary motivations or certain theological agenda imposed on the others is not conducive for better mutual understanding. As for how diverse theologies of religions affect interreligious dialogue, narrow exclusivism hardly promotes mutual knowledge and appreciation, but also inclusive and pluralistic positions have their particular dilemmas. In the end, dialogue is possible from diverse positions on theology of religions. All the authors discuss the theological themes of divine revelation, concept of God, and human condition and ultimate destiny. The two religions particular views on these issues cannot be reconciled, but the authors offer diverse means to facilitate mutual understanding on them, such as increasing mutual knowledge, questioning certain traditional condemnations, showing theological parallels between the two religions, and transcending doctrinal disagreements by stressing common religious experience or ethical concerns. Among the theological themes, especially the concept of God seems to offer possibilities for better understanding than has traditionally been the case. Significantly, all the four authors maintain that Christians and Muslims share the faith in the one God, irrespective of their disagreements about the nature of his oneness. Basic ethical principles are not discussed as widely by the four authors as might be expected, which may reflect the shared cultural background and common ethical values of the Lebanese Muslims and Christians. On this level, Christians alienation from the Islamic law appears as the most significant challenge to mutual understanding, while neighbourly love and the golden rule of ethics offer a fruitful basis for further dialogue. As for the issue of political power-sharing in Lebanon, it is clear that the proposal of an Islamic state is problematic in a country with a sizable Christian minority and a heterogeneous Muslim population. Some form of democracy seems more viable for a multireligious country, but the question remains how to retain religion as a vital force in society, which is felt to be important by all the four Lebanese authors.

Ethics of Justification : A Defence of Contractualism

In What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon formulated a new version of the ethical theory called contractualism. This theory took reasons considerations that count in favour of judgment-sensitive attitudes to be the fundamental normative notion. It then used normative reasons to first account for evaluative properties. For an object to be valuable, on this view, is for it to have properties that provide reasons to have favourable attitudes towards the bearer of value. Scanlon also used reasons to account for moral wrongness. His contractualism claims that an act is morally wrong if it is forbidden by any set of moral principles that no one could reasonably reject. My thesis consists of five previously published articles which attempt to clarify Scanlon s theory and to defend it against its critics. The first article defends the idea that normative reason-relations are fundamental against Joshua Gert. Gert argues that rationality is a more basic notion than reasons and that reasons can be analysed in terms of their rationally requiring and justifying dimensions. The second article explores the relationship between value and reasons. It defends Scanlon s view according to which reasons are the more basic than value against those who think that reasons are based on the evaluative realm. The last three articles defend Scanlon s views about moral wrongness. The first one of them discusses a classic objection to contractualist theories. This objection is that principles which no one could reasonably reject are redundant in accounting for wrongness. This is because we need a prior notion of wrongness to select those principles and because such principles are not required to make actions wrong or to provide reasons against wrong actions. The fourth article explores the distinctive reasons which contractualists claim there are for avoiding the wrong actions. The last article argues against the critics of contractualism who claim that contractualism has implausible normative consequences for situations related to the treatment of different-sized groups of people.

Political transition and structural politicisation : The long shadow of Taiwan's one-party legacy

Väitöskirjatutkimuksessa tarkastellaan Taiwanin politiikkaa ensimmäisen vaalien kautta tapahtuneen vallanvaihdon jälkeen (2000) yhteiskunnan rakenteellisen politisoitumisen näkökulmasta. Koska Taiwanilla siirryttiin verettömästi autoritaarisesta yksipuoluejärjestelmästä monipuoluejärjestelmään sitä on pidetty poliittisen muodonmuutoksen mallioppilaana. Aiempi optimismi Taiwanin demokratisoitumisen suhteen on sittemmin vaihtunut pessimismiin, pitkälti yhteiskunnan voimakkaasta politisoitumisesta johtuen. Tutkimuksessa haetaan selitystä tälle politisoitumiselle. Yhteiskunnan rakenteellisella politisoitumisella tarkoitetaan tilannetta, jossa ”poliittisen” alue kasvaa varsinaisia poliittisia instituutioita laajemmaksi. Rakenteellinen politisoituminen muuttuu helposti yhteiskunnalliseksi ongelmaksi, koska siitä usein seuraa normaalin poliittisen toiminnan (esim. lainsäädännän) jähmettyminen, yhteiskunnan jyrkkä jakautuminen, alhainen kynnys poliittisille konflikteille ja yleisen yhteiskunnallisen luottamuksen alentuminen. Toisin kuin esimerkiksi Itä-Euroopassa, Taiwanissa entinen valtapuolue ei romahtanut poliittisen avautumisen myötä vaan säilytti vahvan rakenteellisen asemansa. Kun valta vaihtui ensimmäisen kerran vaalien kautta, vanha valtapuolue ei ollut valmis luovuttamaan poliittisen järjestelmän ohjaksia käsistään. Alkoi vuosia kestänyt taistelu järjestelmän hallinnasta vanhan ja uuden valtapuolueen välillä, jossa yhteiskunta politisoitui voimakkaasti. Tutkimuksessa Taiwanin yhteiskunnan politisoituminen selitetään useiden rakenteellisten piirteiden yhteisvaikutuksen tuloksena. Tällaisia politisoitumista edistäviä rakentellisia piirteitä ovat hidas poliittinen muutos, joka säilytti vanhat poliittiset jakolinjat ja niihin liittyvät vahvat edut ja intressit; sopimaton perustuslaki; Taiwanin epäselvä kansainvälinen asema ja jakautunut identiteetti; sekä sosiaalinen rakenne, joka helpottaa ihmisten nopeaa mobilisointia poliittiisiin mielenilmauksiin. Tutkimuksessa kiinnitetään huomiota toistaiseksi vähän tutkittuun poliittiseen ilmiöön, joidenkin demokratisoituvien yhteiskuntien voimakkaaseen rakenteelliseen politisoitumiseen. Tutkimuksen pääasiallinen havainto on, että yksipuoluejärjestelmän demokratisoituminen kantaa sisällään rakenteellisen politisoitumisen siemenen, jos entinen valtapuolue ei romahda demokratisoitumisen myötä.

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights : A comparative analysis of the conceptual relationship between democracy and rights in contemporary political theories

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights is a research in normative political theory, based on comparative analysis of contemporary democratic theories, classified roughly as conventional liberal, deliberative democratic and radical democratic. Its focus is on the conceptual relationship between alternative sources of democratic legitimacy: democratic inclusion and liberal rights. The relationship between rights and democracy is studied through the following questions: are rights to be seen as external constraints to democracy or as objects of democratic decision making processes? Are individual rights threatened by public participation in politics; do constitutionally protected rights limit the inclusiveness of democratic processes? Are liberal values such as individuality, autonomy and liberty; and democratic values such as equality, inclusion and popular sovereignty mutually conflictual or supportive? Analyzing feminist critique of liberal discourse, the dissertation also raises the question about Enlightenment ideals in current political debates: are the universal norms of liberal democracy inherently dependent on the rationalist grand narratives of modernity and incompatible with the ideal of diversity? Part I of the thesis introduces the sources of democratic legitimacy as presented in the alternative democratic models. Part II analyses how the relationship between rights and democracy is theorized in them. Part III contains arguments by feminists and radical democrats against the tenets of universalist liberal democratic models and responds to that critique by partly endorsing, partly rejecting it. The central argument promoted in the thesis is that while the deconstruction of modern rationalism indicates that rights are political constructions as opposed to externally given moral constraints to politics, this insight does not delegitimize the politics of universal rights as an inherent part of democratic institutions. The research indicates that democracy and universal individual rights are mutually interdependent rather than oppositional; and that democracy is more dependent on an unconditional protection of universal individual rights when it is conceived as inclusive, participatory and plural; as opposed to robust majoritarian rule. The central concepts are: liberalism, democracy, legitimacy, deliberation, inclusion, equality, diversity, conflict, public sphere, rights, individualism, universalism and contextuality. The authors discussed are e.g. John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, Iris Young, Chantal Mouffe and Stephen Holmes. The research focuses on contemporary political theory, but the more classical work of John S. Mill, Benjamin Constant, Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt is also included.

Ethics and Aesthetics : Intersections in Iris Murdoch's Philosophy

The study addresses the question concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in the philosophy of Iris Murdoch. The main argument is that Murdoch s philosophy cannot be accurately understood without an understanding of the relationship she sees between the aesthetic experience and morality. Reading Murdoch s philosophy with this relationship in mind shows that it must be considered as a relevant alternative to the main forms of aesthetic-ethical theories. The study consists of seven previously published articles and a summary. It shows that Murdoch belongs to a tradition of philosophers who seek to broaden the scope of ethics by reference to aesthetic value and aesthetic experience. She sees an attitude responsible for aesthetic experiences as relevant for morality. However, she does not collapse morality into aesthetic experience. The two meet on the level of the subject s attitude towards its object, but there is a distinction between the experiences that accompany the attitudes. Aesthetic experiences can function as a clue to morals in that they present in a pleasing manner moral truths which otherwise might be psychologically too difficult to face. Murdoch equates the aesthetic attitude with virtuous love characterized by unselfish attention to its object. The primary object of such love is in Murdoch s account another human individual in her particularity. She compares the recognition of the other person as a particular existence to the experience of the Kantian sublime and offers her own version of the true sublime which is the experience of awe in the face of the infinity of the task of understanding others. One of the most central claims in Murdoch s philosophy is that human consciousness is evaluatively structured. This claim challenges the distinction between facts and values which has had an immense influence on modern moral philosophy. One argument with which Murdoch supports her claim is the nature of great literature. According to her, the standard of greatness in literature is the authors awareness of the independent existence of individuals in the particularity of their evaluative consciousnesses. The analysis of the standard of greatness in literature is also Murdoch s only argument for the claim that the primary object of the loving unselfish attention is the other particular individual. She is convinced that great literature reveals a deep truth about the human condition with its capacity to capture the particular. Abstract philo¬sophical discourse cannot compete with this capacity but it should take truths revealed by literature seriously in its theorising. Recognising this as Murdoch s stand on the question of the relation between philosophy and literature as forms of human discourse settles whether she is part of what has been called philosophy s turn to literature. The answer is yes.