Käytännöt ja ajattelu Michel Foucault'n filosofiassa

Practices and Thought in Michel Foucault s Philosophy The present thesis examines Michel Foucault s (1926-1984) notion of practice and argues that it is an essential concept in his philosophy, especially in his analysis of knowledge, power and ethics. The thesis reveals a previously neglected chronological and methodological unity in Foucault s work. The first chapter clarifies Foucault s philosophy by outlining it according to four central themes. First, the main philosophical goal of his historical studies is to analyse how human subjects have become objects of their own thinking. Second, this goal calls for methodological precaution to avoid all anthropological universals. Third, Foucault s studies are directed towards fields of practices. Fourth, the analysis of practices is executed along three axes: knowledge, power and ethics. The second chapter concerns the notion of practice in Foucault s archaeological method. Foucault s archaeological analysis is not directed towards objects and subjects as such, but to the way that the rules of discursive practice form them in the discourse. Many commentators have neglected Foucault s concept of practice when discussing his ideas concerning rules of discourse and limits of knowledge. I argue that Foucault s analysis concerning the limits of knowledge relates to local and contingent rules of discursive practice, not to transcendental rules of thinking in general. The third chapter deals with power relations and practices. I clarify Foucault s concept of dispositif by defining it as a functional ensemble of practices, and argue that this concept is crucial to his understanding of power relations. I stress a conceptual definition, which separates relations of power from the practices of government and show that the latter is based on the idea that power relations are integrated into practices. This conceptual clarification also helps in understanding Foucault s critique concerning modern practices of power. The fourth chapter examines Foucault s way of perceiving ethics as a practice. He separates three essential dimensions in morals: moral codes, moral behaviour and practices of self. His ethics concern practices of self and he studies how these practices have constituted different relations that subjects have to themselves, to others and to their societies. I argue that Foucault s own ethical views can be found in the ideas on the importance of practices of self in the modern world, and emphasize that these ideas should be connected to his views concerning the tradition of the Enlightenment, and to his own political action.

Ideological notions in public health care rationing : Case studies from Oregon, New Zealand and Finland

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze and explicate the ideological content, which is often implicit, in the health care rationing discussion. The phrase "ideological content" refers to viewpoints and assumptions expressed in the rationing discussion that may be widespread and accepted, but without clear evidential support. The study method is philosophical text analysis. The study begins by exploring the literature from the 1970s that affects the present-day rationing discussion. Since ideological contents may have different emphases in realm of health care, three representative cases were studied. The first was a case study of the first and best-known rationing experiment in the American state of Oregon, namely, an experimental rationing plan within the public health program Medicaid, which is designed to provide care for the poor and underprivileged. The second was a study of the only national-level public priority setting that has been conducted in New Zealand. The third examined the Finnish Care Guarantee plan introduced in March 2005. The findings show that several problematic and scientifically mostly unproven concepts have remained largely uncontested in the debate about public health care rationing. Some of these notions already originated decades ago in studies that relied on outdated data or research paradigms. The problematic ideological contents have also been taken up from one publication into another, thereby affecting the rationing debate. The study suggests that before any new public health care rationing experiments are undertaken, these ideological factors should be properly examined, especially in order to avoid repetitious research and perhaps erroneous rationing decisions.

Kuka on potilas? : Suomalaisen sikiöseulontakäytännön sosiaalieettistä tarkastelua

Who is the patient? A social-ethical study of the Finnish practice of prenatal screening. The aim of this study is to examine the Finnish practice of prenatal screening from a social-ethical perspective. Analyzing ethical problems in medicine and medical practice only on a general scale may conceal relevant ethical dilemmas. Previous studies have suggested that many pregnant women view the prenatal screening practices customary in the Finnish maternal care system as intimidating and oppressive. This study analyzes the ethical questions of prenatal screening by focusing on the experiences and decision-making of a pregnant woman. Finnish women s experiences of and decision-making on the most common prenatal screening methods are reflected in the basic principles of biomedical ethics described by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics. To concretize women s experiences I refer to studies of Finnish women s experiences of prenatal screenings. This study shows that the principles of autonomy, non-maleficence and beneficence seem to materialize rather poorly in the Finnish practice of prenatal screening. The main ethical problem with prenatal screening is that the likelihood of a foetal cure is very limited and, upon detection of an affected foetus, the choice is usually whether to continue with the pregnancy or to undergo an abortion. Although informed consent should be required, women s participation in prenatal testing is, in many cases at least, not based on their active decision. Many women experience severe anxiety when they receive a positive screening result and must wait for the final results. Medical studies indicate that long- term anxiety may negatively influence the foetus and the mother-child relationship. This study shows that the practice of prenatal screening as such may cause more harm than benefit to many pregnant women and their foetuses. This study examines the decision-making process of a pregnant woman by using the theory of medical casuistry described in Jonsen, Siegler and Winslade s Clinical Ethics. This study focuses on each of the four points of view recommended by the theory. The main problem seems to be the question of whom the patient of prenatal screening is and whom the practice is intended to benefit: the mother, the foetus, the family or society? This study shows that the concepts of health in Finnish maternal care in general, and of the prenatal screening system in particular, differ considerably. It also demonstrates that the purpose and the aims of prenatal screening, aside from the woman s right to choose, has been expressed neither in Finnish public health programmes nor in the public recommendations of prenatal screening. This study suggests that the practice of prenatal screening is a statement, though unexpressed, of public health policy and as such comprises part of the policy of disability. This study further demonstrates that through a single explicit aim (the woman s right to choose) society actually evades its obligation to women by saddling pregnant women with the entire moral responsibility as well as the possible negative consequences of her choice, such as sorrow, regrets and moral balancing. The study reveals several ethical problems in the Finnish practice of prenatal screening. Such problems should be dealt with as the Finnish practice of prenatal screening advances.

Ethics in a Technological World : Framing the Questions and Three Approaches

This study addresses the following question: How to think about ethics in a technological world? The question is treated first thematically by framing central issues in the relationship between ethics and technology. This relationship has three distinct facets: i) technological advance poses new challenges for ethics, ii) traditional ethics may become poorly applicable in a technologically transformed world, and iii) the progress in science and technology has altered the concept of rationality in ways that undermine ethical thinking itself. The thematic treatment is followed by the description and analysis of three approaches to the questions framed. First, Hans Jonas s thinking on the ontology of life and the imperative of responsibility is studied. In Jonas s analysis modern culture is found to be nihilistic because it is unable to understand organic life, to find meaning in reality, and to justify morals. At the root of nihilism Jonas finds dualism, the traditional Western way of seeing consciousness as radically separate from the material world. Jonas attempts to create a metaphysical grounding for an ethic that would take the technologically increased human powers into account and make the responsibility for future generations meaningful and justified. The second approach is Albert Borgmann s philosophy of technology that mainly assesses the ways in which technological development has affected everyday life. Borgmann admits that modern technology has liberated humans from toil, disease, danger, and sickness. Furthermore, liberal democracy, possibilities for self-realization, and many of the freedoms we now enjoy would not be possible on a large scale without technology. Borgmann, however, argues that modern technology in itself does not provide a whole and meaningful life. In fact, technological conditions are often detrimental to the good life. Integrity in life, according to him, is to be sought among things and practices that evade technoscientific objectification and commodification. Larry Hickman s Deweyan philosophy of technology is the third approach under scrutiny. Central in Hickman s thinking is a broad definition of technology that is nearly equal to Deweyan inquiry. Inquiry refers to the reflective and experiential way humans adapt to their environment by modifying their habits and beliefs. In Hickman s work, technology consists of all kinds of activities that through experimentation and/or reflection aim at improving human techniques and habits. Thus, in addition to research and development, many arts and political reforms are technological for Hickman. He argues for recasting such distinctions as fact/value, poiesis/praxis/theoria, and individual/society. Finally, Hickman does not admit a categorical difference between ethics and technology: moral values and norms need to be submitted to experiential inquiry as well as all the other notions. This study mainly argues for an interdisciplinary approach to the ethics of technology. This approach should make use of the potentialities of the research traditions in applied ethics, the philosophy of technology, and the social studies on science and technology and attempt to overcome their limitations. This study also advocates an endorsement of mid-level ethics that concentrate on the practices, institutions, and policies of temporal human life. Mid-level describes the realm between the instantaneous and individualistic micro-level and the universal and global macro level.

Tutkimusetiikka ja tutkimusympäristön normit

According to some scientists it is not useful to integrate ethics into research practices. Their claim is that only unethical persons have ethical problems and because of this we must accept ethical misbehaviour as a phenomenon typical of human society. In the present study the argument that the moral personality of scientists explains ethical problems in science is questioned; in addition, the focus is shifted from individuals to the level of the research environment. The question asked is whether the research environment somehow contributes to research ethics violations. To answer this question the focus was turned towards the research environment norms. The aim of the study was to investigate whether or not these norms are consistent with the norms of research ethics, so that it would be possible to evaluate if the research environment supports scientists in their task of meeting the ethical standards of scientific research. In the study the research environment was examined in three parts. The first deals with society especially Finnish society as a research environment. The second deals with the autonomous science institution as a research environment, while the third deals with scientific society (working according to scientific criteria) as a research environment. The conceptual analysis method was used. This means that various normative arguments were analysed, the primary assumptions behind them were recognized, and the acceptability of normative claims was evaluated according to their consistency. The results of the study do not support the claim that ethical violations in science could be satisfactorily explained by referring only to the personal qualities of scientists. The research environment can limit the freedom to follow the ethical principles of science, it can prevent scientists from handling ethical problems openly and from integrating ethical norms effectively into research practices. The norms of research environment are often implicit but nevertheless influence scientific practices. Further, the results indicate that handling ethical questions should be a part of scientific training.

Tiede ja tutkijan sosiaalinen vastuu : Joseph Ben-Davidin, Roger Sperryn ja Knut Erik Tranøyn käsitykset tieteestä ja tutkijan sosiaalisesta vastuusta

Science and the Scientist's Social Responsibility. Joseph Ben-David's, Roger Sperry's and Knut Erik Tranøy's Views of Science and the Scientist's Social Responsibility The aim of the study was to investigate, whether or not there is any connection between Jewish sociologist Joseph Ben-David's, American neuroscientist Roger Sperry's and Norwegian philosopher Knut Erik Tranøy's views of science and views of the scientist's social responsibility. The sources of information were their writings concerning this topic. Ben-David has a classical view of science. He thinks that the Mertonian norms of scientific activity, first written in 1942, are still valid in modern science. With the help of these norms Ben-David defends the view that science is morally neutral. Ben-David thinks that a scientist has a limited social responsibility. A scientist only reports on the new results, but he is not responsible for applying the results. In any case Ben-David's ideas are no longer valid. Sperry has a scientistic view of science. According to Sperry, science is the source of moral norms and also the best guide for moral action. The methods of natural sciences "show" how to solve moral problems. A scientist's personal views of science and social responsibility are not important. However Sperry's view is very problematic on the ethical side. Tranøy stresses the scientist's social responsibility. A scientist has common norms with the society from with he or she comes. This is why a scientist has the right, and also the responsibility, to discuss social and ethical questions between science and society. Tranøy's view has some ethical and practical problems, but it is valid in principle. Finally, Ben-David's, Sperry's and Tranøy's views of both science and the scientist's social responsibility have a connection: the view of science corresponds to the certain view of scientist's social responsibility. The result of this study is: Ben-David's, Sperry's and Tranøy's view of science have an ethical starting point as its fundamental presupposition, which include certain views of scientific knowledge, good and the scientist's ethical responsibilities. The connection between Ben-David's, Sperry's and Tranøy's views of science and views of the scientist's social responsibility means that their views of epistemology, meta-ethics and the scientist's ethical responsibilities have a connection to their views of the scientist's social responsibility. The results of this study can help the scientific community to organize the social responsibility of a scientist and deepen the conversation concerning the scientist's social responsibility.

Lahjoittamiseen rohkaisevat motivaatiotekijät Yhteisvastuukeräyksen keräysesitteissä

Tutkimuksen tehtävänä on tarkastella niitä keinoja, joita Yhteisvastuukeräys on käyttänyt keräysesitteissään houkutellakseen ihmisiä osallistumaan keräykseen. Lisäksi tutkimuksessa pohditaan käytettyjen keinojen yhteensopivuutta luterilaisen sosiaalietiikan kanssa. Tutkielman näkökulma on eettinen. Tutkittava aineisto on koottu Kirkkopalveluiden arkistosta ja se sisältää Yhteisvastuukeräyksestä vuosittain julkaistut keräysesitteet vuosilta 1959, 1960, 1974 sekä vuodesta 1979 vuoteen 2003. Luterilaisen sosiaalietiikan osalta tutkimuksessa tukeudutaan erityisesti suomalaiseen tutkimustraditioon, jota edustavat Antti Raunio, Tuomo Mannermaa sekä Jaana Hallamaa. Tutkimus on toteutettu referoimalla ja analysoimalla aineistoa sekä erilaisia tekstikokonaisuuksia ja pyrkimällä muodostamaan niiden pohjalta tutkimustehtävän kannalta mielekkäitä temaattisia kokonaisuuksia. Tutkielma sisältää neljä päälukua, joista ensimmäisessä käsitellään Yhteisvastuukeräyksen historiaa. Katsauksen tarkoituksena on esitellä keräyksen taitekohtia, jotka ovat vaikuttaneet sen toimintaan sekä keräysorganisaation diakonisen itseymmärryksen muodostumiseen. Seuraavat kolme päälukua käsittelevät aineiston pohjalta muodostettuja temaattisia kokonaisuuksia. Ensimmäinen kokonaisuus esittelee palkitsemisen yhtenä lahjoittamiseen rohkaisevana motivaatiotekijänä. Tutkimuksessa esitetään, että palkitseminen on osoitus pyrkimyksestä hyödyntää ihmisen luontaista itsekkyyttä. Käyttämällä hyväksi tätä ominaisuutta Yhteivastuu-keräys jättää huomioimatta sen, että luterilaisesta näkökulmasta katsottuna sisäinen motivaatio on teon arvioinnin kannalta olennainen tekijä ja moraalin tehtävänä on pyrkiä paljastamaan väärät ja itsekkäät motiivit. Toisaalta palkitseminen näyttää olevan myös vastoin Antti Raunion esittämää tulkintaa kristillisen avustutyön perusteista. Kristillisen avustustyön tulisi pohjautua lahjan-ajatukseen eikä sillä tulisi pyrkiä tavoittelemaan ulkopuolisia päämääriä tai palkintoja. Toinen temaattinen kokonaisuus käsittelee lähimmäisyyttä ja lähimmäisen tarpeisiin vastaamista motivaatioon vaikuttavana tekijänä. Yhteisvastsuukeräyksen esitteissä lähimmäinen on kuvattu kahdella tavalla: avun tarvitsijana ja avun vastaanottajana. Esitystavoilla on pyritty vakuuttamaan lahjoittaja siitä, että apu on tarpeen ja että avun vastaanottaja kykenee hyödyntämään saamansa tuen. Lähimmäinen avun tarvitsijana ja lähimmäisen tarve näyttävät olevan laupiaaseen samarialaiseen liitetyn vertauksen ja Kultaisen säännön mukaan myös luterilaisen tarkestelutavan keskiössä. Toisaalta nykyinen hyvinvointiyhteikunnan malli, jota myös luterilainen sosiaalietiikka korostaa, edellyttää ihmisiltä taloudellista itsenäisyyttä sekä halua toimia tuottavalla tavalla yhteisön hyväksi. Nämä näkökulmat yhdessä näyttävät tukevan Yhteisvastuukeräyksen käyttämää esitystapaa. Kolmas temaattinen kokonaisuus esittelee auttamisen päämääriin ja tavoitteisiin viittavat tavat motivoida lahjoittajaa. Löydetyt keinot jakaantuvat kahteen ryhmään sen mukaan onko niissä pyritty viittaamaan auttamisella konkreettisesti saavutettuihin tuloksiin vai arvoihin. Molemmat lähestymistavat kutsuvat lahjoittajaa vastustamaan epäoikeudenmukaisuutta ja köyhyyttä. Lutherin käsitys omaisuudesta, sen käytöstä sekä oppi pelatuksesta, joka on ihmisen omista teoista riippumaton, vaikuttivat yhdessä siihen, että luterilaiseen sosiaalieettiseen ajatteluun voitiin luontevasti yhdistää ajatus köyhyydestä yhteiskunnallisena epäkohtana. Toisaalta valtiolle siirtynyt päävastuu huolehtia köyhistä ja huonompiosaisista, on vaikuttanut kirkon mahdollisuuksiin toimia aktiivisena auttajana. Konkreettisen auttamistyön sijaan kirkon köyhyyden vastainen työ painottuu yhteiskunnalliseen ja poliittiseen vaikuttamiseen. Yhteisvatuukeräyksen esitteissä kantaaottavuuden ja yhteiskunnallisen kritiikin sijaan on panostettu avustustyön konkreettisuuteen ja yksilön vastuuseen ja vaikutusmahdollisuuksiin. Avainsanat: Yhteisvastuukeräys, lahjoittaminen, motivaatio, sosiaalietiikka - luterilaisuus

The Feminist Transformation of Bioethics : An Analysis of Theoretical Perspectives and Practical Applications in Feminist Bioethics

The purpose of this study is to examine how transformation is defining feminist bioethics and to determine the nature of this transformation. Behind the quest for transformation is core feminism and its political implications, namely, that women and other marginalized groups have been given unequal consideration in society and the sciences and that this situation is unacceptable and should be remedied. The goal of the dissertation is to determine how feminist bioethicists integrate the transformation into their respective fields and how they apply the potential of feminism to bioethical theories and practice. On a theoretical level, feminist bioethicists wish to reveal how current ways of knowing are based on inequality. Feminists pay special attention especially to communal and political contexts and to the power relations endorsed by each community. In addition, feminist bioethicists endorse relational ethics, a relational account of the self in which the interconnectedness of persons is important. On the conceptual level, feminist bioethicists work with beliefs, concepts, and practices that give us our world. As an example, I examine how feminist bioethicists have criticized and redefined the concept of autonomy. Feminist bioethicists emphasize relational autonomy, which is based on the conviction that social relationships shape moral identities and values. On the practical level, I discuss stem cell research as a test case for feminist bioethics and its ability to employ its methodologies. Analyzing these perspectives allowed me first, to compare non-feminist and feminist accounts of stem cell ethics and, second, to analyze feminist perspectives on the novel biotechnology. Along with offering a critical evaluation of the stem cell debate, the study shows that sustainable stem cell policies should be grounded on empirical knowledge about how donors perceive stem cell research and the donation process. The study indicates that feminist bioethics should develop the use of empirical bioethics, which takes the nature of ethics seriously: ethical decisions are provisional and open for further consideration. In addition, the study shows that there is another area of development in feminist bioethics: the understanding of (moral) agency. I argue that agency should be understood to mean that actions create desires.