Ancient Philosophers on Mental Illness

This dissertation is about ancient philosophers notions of mental illness, from Plato onwards. Mental illness here means disorders that, in ancient medical thought, were believed to originate in the body but to manifest themselves predominantly through mental symptoms. These illnesses were treated by physical means, which were believed to address the bodily cause of the illness, conceived of as an elemental imbalance or a state of cephalic stricture , for example. Sometimes the mental symptoms were addressed directly by psychotherapeutic means. The first and most important question explored concerns how the ancient philosophers responded to the medical notion of mental illness, and how they explained such illnesses in their theories of physiology and psychology. Although the illnesses are seldom discussed extensively, the philosophers were well aware of their existence and regarded their occurrence an indication of the soul s close dependence on the body. This called for a philosophical account. The second question addressed has to do with the ancient philosophers role as experts in mental problems of a non-medical kind, such as unwanted emotions. These problems were dubbed diseases of the soul , and the philosophers thus claimed to be doctors of the soul. Although the distinction between mental illnesses and diseases of the soul was often presented as rather obvious, there was some vagueness and overlap. There is still a third question that is explored, concerning the status of both mental illnesses and diseases of the soul as unnatural conditions, the role of the human body in the philosophical aetiologies of evil, and the medico-philosophical theories of psycho-physiological temperaments. This work consists of an introduction and five main chapters, focusing on Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Galen, and the Sceptics, the Epicureans and later Platonists. The sources drawn on are the original Greek and Latin philosophical and medical texts. It appears that the philosophers accepted the medical notion of mental illness, but interpreted it in various ways. The differences in interpretation were mostly attributable to differences in their theories of the soul. Although the distinction between mental illness and diseases of the soul was important, marking the boundary between the fields of expertise of medicine and philosophy, and of the individual s moral responsibilities, the problematic aspects of establishing it are discussed rather little in ancient philosophy. There may have been various reasons for this. The medical descriptions of mental illness are often extreme, symptoms of the psychotic type excluding the possibility of the condition being of the non-medical kind. In addition, the rigid normativeness of ancient philosophical anthropologies and their rigorous notion of human happiness decreased the need to assess the acceptability of individual variation in their emotional and intellectual lives and external behaviour.

La contextualisation du discours radiophonique par des moyens prosodiques. L’exemple de cinq grands philosophes français du XXe siècle

"Radiodiskurssin kontekstualisointi prosodisin keinoin. Esimerkkinä viisi suurta ranskalaista 1900-luvun filosofia" Väitöskirja käsittelee puheen kontekstualisointia prosodisin keinoin. Toisin sanottuna työssä käsitellään sitä, miten puheen prosodiset piirteet (kuten sävelkulku, intensiteetti, tauot, kesto ja rytmi) ohjaavat puheen tulkintaa vanhastaan enemmän tutkittujen sana- ja lausemerkitysten ohella. Työssä keskitytään seitsemään prosodisesti merkittyyn kuvioon, jotka koostuvat yhden tai usean parametrin silmiinpistävistä muutoksista. Ilmiöitä käsitellään sekä niiden akustisten muotojen että tyypillisten esiintymisyhteyksien ja diskursiivisten tehtävien näkökulmasta. Aineisto koostuu radio-ohjelmista, joissa puhuu viisi suurta ranskalaista 1900-luvun filosofia: Gaston Bachelard, Albert Camus, Michel Foucault, Maurice Merleau-Ponty ja Jean-Paul Sartre. Ohjelmat on lähetetty eri radiokanavilla Ranskassa vuosina 1948–1973. Väitöskirjan tulokset osoittavat, että prosodisesti merkityt kuviot ovat moniulotteisia puheen ilmiöitä, joilla on keskeinen rooli sanotun kontekstualisoinnissa: ne voivat esimerkiksi nostaa tai laskea sanotun informaatioarvoa, ilmaista puhujan voimakasta tai heikkoa sitoutumista sanomaansa, ilmaista rakenteellisen kokonaisuuden jatkumista tai päättymistä, jne. Väitöskirja sisältää myös kontrastiivisia osia, joissa ilmiöitä verrataan erääseen klassisessa pianomusiikissa esiintyvään melodiseen kuvioon sekä erääseen suomen kielen prosodiseen ilmiöön. Tulokset viittaavat siihen, että tietynlaista melodista kuviota käytetään samankaltaisena jäsentämiskeinona sekä puheessa että klassisessa musiikissa. Lisäksi tulokset antavat viitteitä siitä, että tiettyjä melodisia muotoja käytetään samankaltaisten implikaatioiden luomiseen kahdessa niinkin erilaisessa kielessä kuin suomessa ja ranskassa. Yksi väitöskirjan osa käsittelee pisteen ja pilkun prosodista merkitsemistä puheessa. Tulosten mukaan pisteellä ja pilkulla on kummallakin oma suullinen prototyyppinsä: piste merkitään tyypillisesti sävelkulun laskulla ja tauolla, ja pilkku puolestaan sävelkulun nousulla ja tauolla. Merkittävimmät tulokset koskevat kuitenkin tapauksia, joissa välimerkki tulkitaan prosodisesti epätyypillisellä tavalla: sekä pisteellä että pilkulla vaikuttaisi olevan useita eri suullisia vastaavuuksia, ja välimerkkien tehtävät voivat muotoutua hyvin erilaisiksi niiden prosodisesta tulkinnasta riippuen.

Pour une éthique du traducteur poéticien

This doctoral thesis starts with a comprehensive introduction seeking to anchor the problematics of the ethics of the poetician translator (a translator of literary and similar texts) in a theoretical framework drawing on moral philosophy. This introductory section is followed by six published papers (four journal articles and two papers from conference proceedings), forming the main body of the thesis, which progressively develop a possible application of this theoretical framework. Starting from the acknowledgement that one of the ethical stakes in translation is constructed around the relation to the foreign and to the other , the translation process is scrutinized through the prism of the philosophies of Dialogue , focusing on how the translating actors relate to their task. The central notions around which philosophies of Dialogue are built are introduced and applied to translation. The question of intersubjective relations, addressed from a philosophical perspective, is developed with the help of the works of Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel, Emmanuel Levinas and Paul Ric ur. The introductory section presents and explicates the thought of each of these philosophers and extracts the concepts that are then developed in the articles and conference papers collected here. Each paper concentrates on the notions of one of the philosophers referred to above and places these notions in perspective with other philosophies of Dialogue. All the papers contribute to explicating the relationship between the multiple philosophical notions that address the problematics of alterity and the condition of the translator. The work as a whole leads to the idea that the task of the poetician translator is not only to translate a text properly but above all to rouse and increase the desire of linguistic communities to live together.

Learning from Venice : What a unique city can teach about the aesthetic

Learning from Venice is a philosophical learning diary on what a highly original city can teach urban aesthetics. Throughout history, classical cities have been interpreted and experienced in various ways. But aesthetics has never been accentuated as much as today. Venice has been an important center of commerce, a naval power, and it has had a lot of influence in arts and culture. But in our days it is a tourist trap and a cluster of so called world heritage. The development of tourism is the main reason for the fact that many old cities have become venues for leisure and entertainment, sometimes so that everyday life itself has been pushed to the margins. There is a lot one can learn by studying the history of the aesthetic appreciation of a city. Sometimes the way a city has been enjoyed has changed following the development of traffic. In Venice water buses have replaced the slow and silent gondolas, and since the building of the railway tourists have been approaching the city from a new direction, so that her façade which was built for seafarers has almost become forgotten. There are also themes of change and mobility which are peculiarly Venetian. What is the nature of a city where there are more tourists than inhabitants? And how does one experience a city where water dominates? These questions, and many more, are discussed in Learning from Venice, and side by side with applied aesthetics, the work of philosophers like Walter Benjamin, Gianni Vattimo, and John Dewey, among many others, enter a dialogue with this extraordinary city. Themes discussed include also e.g. walking, surface and depth, Venice as kitsch, and Venice as a museum.

Uskonto ilman uskontoa : Radikaalin postmodernin uskonnonfilosofian haaste

Religion without religion. The challenge of radical postmodern philosophy of religion. The aim of this study is to examine the central ideas of Mark C. Taylor, Don Cupitt, and Grace Jantzen on the subject of the philosophy of religion. The method is a qualitative, systematic analysis of the works of the aforementioned philosophers. The purpose is to present, analyze, identify, find connections, and to gain an understanding of the original texts. This thesis shows that radical postmodern religion is “religion without religion”. God is “dead” and the concept of God is seen as “writing”, an ideal, a relationship of meanings or a language. In ethics, there are no objective values or principles. People must create their own morality. Reality is each person´s concept of reality. Language is universal in that language and reality cannot be considered separately. The human subject is contingent and formed in the linguistic and social context. According to postmodern feminism, the ideas that men present as facts are often degrading to women, distort reality and support the power of men. For this reason, we should create a new kind of philosophy of religion and a new language that takes women into consideration. Finally, we will study some philosophers, who have used postmodern ideas in a more moderate manner. In this way, we will look for a balanced solution between modernism and postmodernism. This study shows that the postmodern idea of religion is very different from classical Christianity. Ethics becomes subjective, anarchistic and nihilistic. Epistemology is relativistic and the human being becomes the measure of all things. Objective reality becomes blurry. Language is seen to be game-like, and it has no relation to reality. The moral responsibility of a subject becomes problematic. Science and rationality come into question without the permanent core provided by our consciousness. Women are not in an epistemologically privileged position. The truth claims by either men or women must each be evaluated one at a time. Many postmodern ideas can successfully be made of use if used in moderate manner.

Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

Filosofins renässans eller modern mystik : Bergsondebatten i Finland

The study examines the debate in Finland at the beginning of the 20th century surrounding the philosophy of Henri Bergson. Both within as well as outside of academic philosophy Bergsonism was adapted to the philosophical and cultural landscape in Finland by a process of selective appropriation. The ambiguous relationship between the sender and the receiver is accentuated in reference to philosophical celebrities such as Bergson, whose reputations spread more quickly than the content of their philosophy and whose names are drawn into the political and social discourse. As a philosophical movement the aim of Bergsonism was to create a scientific philosophy of life as an alternative to both idealism and modern empirical and antimetaphysical currents, during a period when European philosophy was searching for new guidelines after the collapse of the idealistic system philosophies of the 19th century. This reorientation is examined from a Finnish viewpoint and in the light of the process of intellectual importation. The study examines how elements from an international discourse were appropriated within the philosophical field in Finland against a background of changes in the role of the university and the educated elites as well as the position of philosophy within the disciplinary hierarchy. Philosophical reception was guided by expectations that had arisen in a national context, for example when Bergsonism in Finland was adjusted to a moral and educational ideal of self-cultivation, and often served as a means for philosophers to internationalize their own views in order to strengthen their position on the national stage. The study begins with some introductory remarks on the international circulation of ideas from the point of view of the periphery. The second section presents an overview of the shaping of the philosophical field at the turn of the 20th century, the naturalism and positivism of the late 19th century that were the objects of Bergson s critique, and an introduction to the attempts of a philosophy of life to make its way between idealism and naturalism. The third and main section of the study begins with a brief presentation of the main features of the philosophy of Bergson, followed by a closer examination of the different comments and analyses that it gave rise to in Finland. The final section addresses the ideological implications of Bergsonism within the framework of a political annexation of the philosophy of life at the beginning of the 20th century.

History, Transfer, Politics : Five studies on the legacy of Uppsala philosophy

The Uppsala school of Axel Hägerström can be said to have been the last genuinely Swedish philosophical movement. On the other hand, the Swedish analytic tradition is often said to have its roots in Hägerström s thought. This work examines the transformation from Uppsala philosophy to analytic philosophy from an actor-based historical perspective. The aim is to describe how a group of younger scholars (Ingemar Hedenius, Konrad Marc-Wogau, Anders Wedberg, Alf Ross, Herbert Tingsten, Gunnar Myrdal) colonised the legacy of Hägerström and Uppsala philosophy, and faced the challenges they met in trying to reconcile this legacy with the changing philosophical and political currents of the 1930s and 40s. Following Quentin Skinner, the texts are analysed as moves or speech acts in a particular historical context. The thesis consists of five previously published case studies and an introduction. The first study describes how the image of Hägerström as the father of the Swedish analytic tradition was created by a particular faction of younger Uppsala philosophers who (re-) presented the Hägerströmian philosophy as a parallel movement to logical empiricism. The second study examines the confrontations between Uppsala philosophy and logical empiricism in both the editorial board and in the pages of Sweden s leading philosophical journal Theoria. The third study focuses on how the younger generation redescribed Hägerströmian legal philosophical ideas (Scandinavian Legal Realism), while the fourth study discusses how they responded to the accusations of a connection between Hägerström s value nihilistic theory and totalitarianism. Finally, the fifth study examines how the Swedish social scientist and Social Democratic intellectual Gunnar Myrdal tried to reconcile value nihilism with a strong political programme for social reform. The contribution of this thesis to the field consists mainly in a re-evaluation of the role of Uppsala philosophy in the history of Swedish philosophy. From this perspective the Uppsala School was less a collection of certain definite philosophical ideas than an intellectual legacy that was the subject of fierce struggles. Its theories and ideas were redescribed in various ways by individual actors with different philosophical and political intentions.

Writing Otherwise than Seeing : Writing and Exteriority in Maurice Blanchot

Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003), the French writer and novelist, is one of the most important figures in post-war French literature and philosophy. The main intention of this study is to figure out his position and originality in the field of phenomenology. Since this thesis concentrates on the notion of vision in Blanchot s work, its primary context is the post-war discussion of the relation between seeing and thinking in France, and particularly the discussion of the conditions of non-violent vision and language. The focus will be on the philosophical conversation between Blanchot and his contemporary philosophers. The central premise is the following: Blanchot relates the criticism of vision to the criticism of the representative model of language. In this thesis, Blanchot s definition of literary language as the refusal to reveal anything is read as a reference pointing in two directions. First, to Hegel s idea of naming as negativity which reveals Being incrementally to man, and second, to Heidegger s idea of poetry as the simultaneity of revealing and withdrawal; the aim is to prove that eventually Blanchot opposes both Hegel s idea of naming as a gradual revelation of the totality of being and Heidegger s conception of poetry as a way of revealing the truth of Being. My other central hypothesis is that for Blanchot, the criticism of the privilege of vision is always related to the problematic of the exteriority. The principal intention is to trace how Blanchot s idea of language as infinity and exteriority challenges both the Hegelian idea of naming as conceptualizing things and Heidegger s concept of language as a way to truth (as aletheia). The intention is to show how Blanchot, with his concepts of fascination, resemblance and image, both affirms and challenges the central points of Heidegger s thinking on language. Blanchot s originality in, and contribution to, the discussion about the violence of vision and language is found in his answer to the question of how to approach the other by avoiding the worst violence . I claim that by criticizing the idea of language as naming both in Hegel and Heidegger, Blanchot generates an account of language which, since it neither negates nor creates Being, is beyond the metaphysical opposition between Being and non-Being.

Certainty or Faith? Arendt's and Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Cartesian Foundationalism

Epistemological foundationalism has for centuries attempted to unify all scientific inquiry into the context of one grand science, the first philosophy. One of the most important tasks of this tradition has been to ground all knowledge on absolutely certain foundations. In this master s thesis I ask the following question: To what extent and under what conditions is it possible to achieve absolute certainty in the sense of the attempts of Cartesian foundationalism? By examining how the 20th century philosophers, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) interpret the epistemological methodology of René Descartes, I claim that the Cartesian achievement of absolute certainty rests on the implicit presupposition of an epistemologically prior form of faith in the world and trust (pistis) in other conscious beings. I show that knowledge is possible only within the context of a common world that is inhabited by several conscious beings that share a common linguistic system. This threefold element is shown to be the bedrock condition for any kind of philosophical inquiry. The main literature sources for this thesis are The Life of the Mind by Hannah Arendt, Le Visible et l invisible by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Meditationes de Prima Philosophiae by René Descartes and Erfahrung und Urteil by Edmund Husserl.

Mikä on ihme ja mitä ihmeistä voidaan tietää? : Keskustelu ihmeistä uusimmassa englanninkielisessä uskonnonfilosofiassa

What is a miracle and what can we know about miracles? A discussion of miracles in anglophone philosophy of religion literature since the late 1960s. The aim of this study is to systematically describe and philosophically examine the anglophone discussion on the subject of miracles since the latter half of the 1960s. The study focuses on two salient questions: firstly, what I will term the conceptual-ontological question of the extent to which we can understand miracles and, secondly, the epistemological question of what we can know about miracles. My main purpose in this study is to examine the various viewpoints that have been submitted in relation to these questions, how they have been argued and on what presuppositions these arguments have been based. In conducting the study, the most salient dimension of the various discussions was found to relate to epistemological questions. In this regard, there was a notable confrontation between those scholars who accept miracles and those who are sceptical of them. On the conceptual-ontological side I recognised several different ways of expressing the concept of miracle . I systematised the discussion by demonstrating the philosophical boundaries between these various opinions. The first and main boundary was related to ontological knowledge. On one side of this boundary I placed the views which were based on realism and objectivism. The proponents of this view assumed that miraculousness is a real property of a miraculous event regardless of how we can perceive it. On the other side I put the views which tried to define miraculousness in terms of subjectivity, contextuality and epistemicity. Another essential boundary which shed light on the conceptual-ontological discussion was drawn in relation to two main views of nature. The realistic-particularistic view regards nature as a certain part of reality. The adherents of this presupposition postulate a supernatural sphere alongside nature. Alternatively, the nominalist-universalist view understands nature without this kind of division. Nature is understood as the entire and infinite universe; the whole of reality. Other, less important boundaries which shed light on the conceptual-ontological discussion were noted in relation to views regarding the laws of nature, for example. I recognised that the most important differences between the epistemological approaches were in the different views of justification, rationality, truth and science. The epistemological discussion was divided into two sides, distinguished by their differing assumptions in relation to the need for evidence. Adherents of the first (and noticeably smaller) group did not see any epistemological need to reach a universal and common opinion about miracles. I discovered that these kinds of views, which I called non-objectivist, had subjectivist and so-called collectivist views of justification and a contextualist view of rationality. The second (and larger) group was mainly interested in discerning the grounds upon which to establish an objective and conclusive common view in relation to the epistemology of miracles. I called this kind of discussion an objectivist discussion and this kind of approach an evidentialist approach. Most of the evidentialists tried to defend miracles and the others attempted to offer evidence against miracles. Amongst both sides, there were many different variations according to emphasis and assumption over how they saw the possibilities to prove their own view. The common characteristic in all forms of evidentialism was a commitment to an objectivist notion of rationality and a universalistic notion of justification. Most evidentialists put their confidence in science in one way or another. Only a couple of philosophers represented the most moderate version of evidentialism; they tried to remove themselves from the apparent controversy and contextualised the different opinions in order to make some critical comments on them. I called this kind of approach a contextualising form of evidentialism. In the final part of the epistemological chapter, I examined the discussion about the evidential value of miracles, but nothing substantially new was discovered concerning the epistemological views of the authors.

Ethics and Aesthetics : Intersections in Iris Murdoch's Philosophy

The study addresses the question concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in the philosophy of Iris Murdoch. The main argument is that Murdoch s philosophy cannot be accurately understood without an understanding of the relationship she sees between the aesthetic experience and morality. Reading Murdoch s philosophy with this relationship in mind shows that it must be considered as a relevant alternative to the main forms of aesthetic-ethical theories. The study consists of seven previously published articles and a summary. It shows that Murdoch belongs to a tradition of philosophers who seek to broaden the scope of ethics by reference to aesthetic value and aesthetic experience. She sees an attitude responsible for aesthetic experiences as relevant for morality. However, she does not collapse morality into aesthetic experience. The two meet on the level of the subject s attitude towards its object, but there is a distinction between the experiences that accompany the attitudes. Aesthetic experiences can function as a clue to morals in that they present in a pleasing manner moral truths which otherwise might be psychologically too difficult to face. Murdoch equates the aesthetic attitude with virtuous love characterized by unselfish attention to its object. The primary object of such love is in Murdoch s account another human individual in her particularity. She compares the recognition of the other person as a particular existence to the experience of the Kantian sublime and offers her own version of the true sublime which is the experience of awe in the face of the infinity of the task of understanding others. One of the most central claims in Murdoch s philosophy is that human consciousness is evaluatively structured. This claim challenges the distinction between facts and values which has had an immense influence on modern moral philosophy. One argument with which Murdoch supports her claim is the nature of great literature. According to her, the standard of greatness in literature is the authors awareness of the independent existence of individuals in the particularity of their evaluative consciousnesses. The analysis of the standard of greatness in literature is also Murdoch s only argument for the claim that the primary object of the loving unselfish attention is the other particular individual. She is convinced that great literature reveals a deep truth about the human condition with its capacity to capture the particular. Abstract philo¬sophical discourse cannot compete with this capacity but it should take truths revealed by literature seriously in its theorising. Recognising this as Murdoch s stand on the question of the relation between philosophy and literature as forms of human discourse settles whether she is part of what has been called philosophy s turn to literature. The answer is yes.

Onko eläimillä oikeuksia? : Eläinkoelainsäädännön kehitys ja nykytila

The use of animals in scientific experiments tends to arouse strong emotional reactions among the general public, the most essential concern being the pain and suffering they cause. It is felt that suffering inflicted on other beings, including animals, is not morally acceptable. Is the function of a researcher who uses animals morally acceptable and beneficial for humans and animals? May such a researcher him/herself decide what animal experiments he/she can perform or should some outsider have the right to decide what kind of experiments a researcher can or cannot perform? The research material comprises the legislation of Finland and that of some member and non-member states of the European Union, together with European Union directives and pertinent preparatory parliamentary documents. The author has likewise studied the vast literature on animal rights, both pro and contra writings and opinions. The opinions of philosophers on the moral and legal rights of animals are markedly conflicting. Some strongly support the existence of rights, while others totally refute such an opinion, claiming that the question is only of the moral principles of man himself which imply that animals must be treated in a human manner. Speaking of animal rights only tends to muddle ideas on the one hand in philosophical considerations and in legal analyses on the other. The development of legislation in Finland and some other member states of the European Union has in principle been similar. In Finland, the positive laws on animal experiments nowadays comply with the EU directive 86/609/EEC. However, there are marked differences between member states in respect of the way they have in practice implemented the principles of the EU directive. No essential alterations have in practice been discernible in the actual performance of animal experiments during the decades when legislation has been developed in different countries. Self-regulation within the scientific community has been markedly more effectual than legislative procedures. Legal regulation has nevertheless clearly influenced the quality of breeding and life conditions of experimental laboratory animals, cages for example being nowadays larger than hitherto. EU parliament and council have now accepted in September 2010 a new directive on animal experiments which must be implemented in the national legislations by January 1, 2013.

Philosophy as a Path to Happiness : Attainment of Happiness in Arabic Peripatetic and Ismaili Philosophy

The aim of the dissertation is to explore the idea of philosophy as a path to happiness in classical Arabic philosophy. The starting point is in comparison of two distinct currents between the 10th and early 11th centuries, Peripatetic philosophy, represented by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, and Ismaili philosophy represented by al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity. They initially offer two contrasting views about philosophy in that the attitude of the Peripatetics is rationalistic and secular in spirit, whereas for the Ismailis philosophy represents the esoteric truth behind revelation. Still, they converge in their view that the ultimate purpose of philosophy lies in its ability to lead man towards happiness. Moreover, they share a common concept of happiness as a contemplative ideal of human perfection, which refers primarily to an otherworldly state of the soul s ascent to the spiritual world. For both the way to happiness consists of two parts: theory and practice. The practical part manifests itself in the idea of the purification of the rational soul from its bodily attachments in order for it to direct its attention fully to the contemplative life. Hence, there appears an ideal of philosophical life with the goal of relative detachment from the worldly life. The regulations of the religious law in this context appear as the primary means for the soul s purification, but for all but al-Kirmānī they are complemented by auxiliary philosophical practices. The ascent to happiness, however, takes place primarily through the acquisition of theoretical knowledge. The saving knowledge consists primarily of the conception of the hierarchy of physical and metaphysical reality, but all of philosophy forms a curriculum through which the soul gradually ascends towards a spiritual state of being along an order that is inverse to the Neoplatonic emanationist hierarchy of creation. For Ismaili philosophy the ascent takes place from the exoteric religious sciences towards the esoteric philosophical knowledge. For Peripatetic philosophers logic performs the function of an instrument enabling the ascent, mathematics is treated either as propaedeutic to philosophy or as a mediator between physical and metaphysical knowledge, whereas physics and metaphysics provide the core of knowledge necessary for the attainment of happiness.

Hyveiden harjoittaminen : edellytykset ja esteet

In the first half of the 20th century, most moral philosophers took the concept of virtue to be secondary to moral principles or emotions, though in various and mutually conflicting ways. In the early 1960s interest in the virtues was restored by the analytic philosophers Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, the younger colleagues and friends of the late Wittgenstein. Later, Alasdair MacIntyre became a leading virtue ethicist. In 1981, MacIntyre introduced in After Virtue the concept of practices, which he based on the Aristotelian distinction between praxis and poiesis. This dissertation examines MacIntyre s characterization of the interconnectedness between practices and virtues, especially in relation to skills, education, and certain emotions. The primary position of the virtues is defended against the tendency in modern moral philosophy to overemphasize the role either of principles and rules or of emotions. The view according to which rational action and acting according to the virtues is best conceptualized as following rules or principles is criticized by arguments that are grounded by some Wittgensteinian observations, and that can be characterized as transcendental. Even if the virtues cannot be defined by, and are not based entirely on, emotions, the role of certain emotions on the learning and education of skills and virtues are studied more carefully than by MacIntyre. In the cases of resentment, indignation, and shame, the analysis of Peter Strawson is utilized, and in the case of regret, the analysis of Bernard Williams. Williams analysis of regret and moral conflict concludes in a kind of antirealism, which this study criticizes. Where education of practices and skills and the related reactive emotions are examined as conditions of learning and practicing the virtues, institutions and ideologies are examined as obstacles and threats to the virtues. This theme is studied through Karl Marx s conception of alienation and Karl Polanyi s historical and sociological research concerning the great transformation . The study includes six Finnish-published articles carrying the titles Our negative attitudes towards other persons , Authority and upbringing , Moral conflicts, regret and ethical realism , Practices and institutions , Doing justice as condition to communal action: a transcendental argument for justice as virtue , and Alienation from practices in capitalist society: Alasdair MacIntyre s Marxist Aristotelianism . The introductory essay sums up the themes of the articles and presents some central issues of virtue ethics by relating the classical Socratic questions to Aristotelian practical philosophy, as well as to current controversies in metaethics and moral psychology.