Beatific Enjoyment in Scholastic Philosophy and Theology: 1240-1335

This dissertation examines the concept of beatific enjoyment (fruitio beatifica) in scholastic theology and philosophy in the thirteenth and early fourteenth century. The aim of the study is to explain what is enjoyment and to show why scholastic thinkers were interested in discussing it. The dissertation consists of five chapters. The first chapter deals with Aurelius Augustine's distinction between enjoyment and use and the place of enjoyment in the framework of Augustine's view of the passions and the human will. The first chapter also focuses upon the importance of Peter Lombard's Sentences for the transmission of Augustine's treatment of enjoyment in scholastic thought as well as upon Lombard's understanding of enjoyment. The second chapter treats thirteenth-century conceptions of the object and psychology of enjoyment. Material for this chapter is provided by the writings - mostly Sentences commentaries - of Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise, Robert Kilwardby, William de la Mare, Giles of Rome, and Richard of Middleton. The third chapter inspects early fourteenth-century views of the object and psychology of enjoyment. The fourth chapter focuses upon discussions of the enjoyment of the Holy Trinity. The fifth chapter discusses the contingency of beatific enjoyment. The main writers studied in the third, fourth and fifth chapters are John Duns Scotus, Peter Aureoli, Durandus of Saint Pourçain, William of Ockham, Walter Chatton, Robert Holcot, and Adam Wodeham. Historians of medieval intellectual history have emphasized the significance of the concept of beatific enjoyment for understanding the character and aims of scholastic theology and philosophy. The concept of beatific enjoyment was developed by Augustine on the basis of the insight that only God can satisfy our heart's desire. The possibility of satisfying this desire requires a right ordering of the human mind and a detachment of the will from the relative goals of earthly existence. Augustine placed this insight at the very foundation of the notion of Christian learning and education in his treatise On Christian Doctrine. Following Augustine, the twelfth-century scholastic theologian Peter Lombard made the concept of enjoyment the first topic in his plan of systematic theology. The official inclusion of Lombard's Sentences in the curriculum of theological studies in the early universities stimulated vigorous discussions of enjoyment. Enjoyment was understood as a volition and was analyzed in relation to cognition and other psychic features such as rest and pleasure. This study shows that early fourteenth-century authors deepened the analysis of enjoyment by concentrating upon the relationship between enjoyment and mental pleasure, the relationship between cognition and volition, and the relationship between the will and the beatific object (i.e., the Holy Trinity). The study also demonstrates the way in which the idea of enjoyment was affected by changes in the method of theological analysis - the application of Aristotelian logic in a Trinitarian context and the shift from virtue ethics to normative ethics.

Imagination and diversity in the philosophy of Hobbes

This dissertation is a study of some aspects of theoretical philosophy of the early modern thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The focal point of the work is Hobbes s conception of imagination, which is discussed from both a systematic and a historical point of view, as well as in the light of contemporary scholarship. I argue that though there are significant similarities between the view of Hobbes and that of his predecessors, he gives a novel theory of imagination, which clarifies not only early modern discussions on human nature, knowledge, science, and literary criticism, but above all his own versatile philosophy. The prologue of the dissertation introduces methodological principles and gives critical remarks on the standard view of Hobbes. In Chapter II, I discuss the prominent theories of imagination before Hobbes and link them to his account. I argue that though Hobbes adopted the Aristotelian framework, his view is not reduced to it, as he borrows from various sources, for instance, from the Stoics and from Renaissance thought. Chapters III and IV form the psychological part of the work. In the Chapter III I argue that imagination, not sense, is central in the basic cognitive operations of the mind and that imagination has a decisive role in Hobbes s theory of motivation. The Chapter IV concentrates on various questions of Hobbes s philosophy of language. The chapter ends with a defence of a less naturalistic reading of Hobbes s theory of human nature. Chapters V and VI form the epistemological part of the work. I suggest, contrary to what has been recently claimed, that though Hobbes s ideas of good literary style do have a point of contact with his philosophy (e.g. the psychology of creative process), his ideas in the field are independent of his project of demonstrative political science. Instead I argue that the novelty of his major political work, Leviathan (1651), is based on a new theory of knowledge which he continued to develop in the post-Leviathan works. Chapter VII seeks to connect the more theoretical conclusions of Chapters V and VI to Hobbes's idea(l) of science as well as to his philosophical practice. On the basis of Hobbes s own writings as well as some historical examinations, I argue that method is not an apt way to conceptualise Hobbes s philosophical practice. Contemporary readings of Hobbes s theory of science are critically discussed and the chapter ends with an analysis of Hobbes s actual argumentation. In addition to the concluding remarks, the epilogue suggest three things: first, imagination is central when trying to understand Hobbes s versatile philosophy; second, that it is misleading to depict Hobbes as a simple materialist, mechanist, and empiricist; and, third, that in terms of imagination his influence on early modern thought has not been fully appreciated.

Ethics and Aesthetics : Intersections in Iris Murdoch's Philosophy

The study addresses the question concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in the philosophy of Iris Murdoch. The main argument is that Murdoch s philosophy cannot be accurately understood without an understanding of the relationship she sees between the aesthetic experience and morality. Reading Murdoch s philosophy with this relationship in mind shows that it must be considered as a relevant alternative to the main forms of aesthetic-ethical theories. The study consists of seven previously published articles and a summary. It shows that Murdoch belongs to a tradition of philosophers who seek to broaden the scope of ethics by reference to aesthetic value and aesthetic experience. She sees an attitude responsible for aesthetic experiences as relevant for morality. However, she does not collapse morality into aesthetic experience. The two meet on the level of the subject s attitude towards its object, but there is a distinction between the experiences that accompany the attitudes. Aesthetic experiences can function as a clue to morals in that they present in a pleasing manner moral truths which otherwise might be psychologically too difficult to face. Murdoch equates the aesthetic attitude with virtuous love characterized by unselfish attention to its object. The primary object of such love is in Murdoch s account another human individual in her particularity. She compares the recognition of the other person as a particular existence to the experience of the Kantian sublime and offers her own version of the true sublime which is the experience of awe in the face of the infinity of the task of understanding others. One of the most central claims in Murdoch s philosophy is that human consciousness is evaluatively structured. This claim challenges the distinction between facts and values which has had an immense influence on modern moral philosophy. One argument with which Murdoch supports her claim is the nature of great literature. According to her, the standard of greatness in literature is the authors awareness of the independent existence of individuals in the particularity of their evaluative consciousnesses. The analysis of the standard of greatness in literature is also Murdoch s only argument for the claim that the primary object of the loving unselfish attention is the other particular individual. She is convinced that great literature reveals a deep truth about the human condition with its capacity to capture the particular. Abstract philo¬sophical discourse cannot compete with this capacity but it should take truths revealed by literature seriously in its theorising. Recognising this as Murdoch s stand on the question of the relation between philosophy and literature as forms of human discourse settles whether she is part of what has been called philosophy s turn to literature. The answer is yes.

The Restless Love of Thinking : The Concept Liebe in Hegel's Philosophy

The German philosopher G.W.F.Hegel (1770–1831) is best known for his idealistic system philosophy, his concept of spirit [Geist] and for his dictum that the existing and the rational overlap. This thesis offers a new perspective: it examines the working of the concept ‘love’ in Hegel’s philosophy by looking at the contexts and function he puts it to, from his earliest writings to the very last lectures he gave. The starting point of the inquiry is that he applied the concept Liebe to different contexts for different purposes, but each time to provide an answer to a specific philosophical problem. His formulation, reformulation and use of ‘love’ give possible solutions to problems the solving of which was crucial to the development of his thought as a whole. The study is divided into three parts, each analysing the different problems and solutions to which Hegel applied the concept of love. The first part, "Love, morality and ethical life", examines these interconnected themes in Hegel’s early work. The main questions he addressed during this period concerned how to unite Kant’s philosophy and the Greek ideal of the good life. In this context, the concept ‘love’ did three things. First, it served to formulate his grounding idea of the relation between unity and difference, or the manifold. Secondly, it was the key to his attempt to base an ideal folk religion on Christianity interpreted as a religion of love. Finally, it provided the means to criticise Kant’s moral philosophy. The question of the moral value of love helped Hegel to break away from Kant’s thought and develop his own theory about love and ethical life. The second part of the study, "Love and the political realm", considers the way 'Liebe' functions in connection with questions concerning the community and political life in Hegel’s work. In addition to questioning the universal applicability of the concept of recognition as a key to his theory of social relations, the chapters focus on gender politics and the way he conceptualised the gender category ‘woman’ through the concept ‘love’. Another line of inquiry is the way the figure of Antigone was used to conceptualise the differentiated spheres of action for men and women, and the part ‘love’ played in Hegel’s description of Antigone’s motives. Thirdly, Hegel’s analogy of the family and the state and the way ‘love’ functions in an attempt to promote understanding of the relation between citizens and the state are examined. The third and final part of the study, "Love as absolute spirit", focuses on ‘love’ within Hegel’s systemic thought and the way he continued to characterise Geist through the language of Liebe up until and including his very last works. It is shown how Liebe functions in his hierarchical organisation of the domains of art, religion and philosophy, and how both art and religion end up in similar structural positions with regard to philosophy. One recurrent theme in the third part is Hegel’s complex relation to Romantic thought. Another line of investigation is how he reconstructed Christianity as a religion of love in his mature work. In striking contrast to his early thought, in his last works Hegel introduced a new concept of love that incorporated negativity, and that could also function as the root of political action.

The Problem of Implementation and its Relation to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science

According to certain arguments, computation is observer-relative either in the sense that many physical systems implement many computations (Hilary Putnam), or in the sense that almost all physical systems implement all computations (John Searle). If sound, these arguments have a potentially devastating consequence for the computational theory of mind: if arbitrary physical systems can be seen to implement arbitrary computations, the notion of computation seems to lose all explanatory power as far as brains and minds are concerned. David Chalmers and B. Jack Copeland have attempted to counter these relativist arguments by placing certain constraints on the definition of implementation. In this thesis, I examine their proposals and find both wanting in some respects. During the course of this examination, I give a formal definition of the class of combinatorial-state automata , upon which Chalmers s account of implementation is based. I show that this definition implies two theorems (one an observation due to Curtis Brown) concerning the computational power of combinatorial-state automata, theorems which speak against founding the theory of implementation upon this formalism. Toward the end of the thesis, I sketch a definition of the implementation of Turing machines in dynamical systems, and offer this as an alternative to Chalmers s and Copeland s accounts of implementation. I demonstrate that the definition does not imply Searle s claim for the universal implementation of computations. However, the definition may support claims that are weaker than Searle s, yet still troubling to the computationalist. There remains a kernel of relativity in implementation at any rate, since the interpretation of physical systems seems itself to be an observer-relative matter, to some degree at least. This observation helps clarify the role the notion of computation can play in cognitive science. Specifically, I will argue that the notion should be conceived as an instrumental rather than as a fundamental or foundational one.

Philosophy as a Path to Happiness : Attainment of Happiness in Arabic Peripatetic and Ismaili Philosophy

The aim of the dissertation is to explore the idea of philosophy as a path to happiness in classical Arabic philosophy. The starting point is in comparison of two distinct currents between the 10th and early 11th centuries, Peripatetic philosophy, represented by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, and Ismaili philosophy represented by al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity. They initially offer two contrasting views about philosophy in that the attitude of the Peripatetics is rationalistic and secular in spirit, whereas for the Ismailis philosophy represents the esoteric truth behind revelation. Still, they converge in their view that the ultimate purpose of philosophy lies in its ability to lead man towards happiness. Moreover, they share a common concept of happiness as a contemplative ideal of human perfection, which refers primarily to an otherworldly state of the soul s ascent to the spiritual world. For both the way to happiness consists of two parts: theory and practice. The practical part manifests itself in the idea of the purification of the rational soul from its bodily attachments in order for it to direct its attention fully to the contemplative life. Hence, there appears an ideal of philosophical life with the goal of relative detachment from the worldly life. The regulations of the religious law in this context appear as the primary means for the soul s purification, but for all but al-Kirmānī they are complemented by auxiliary philosophical practices. The ascent to happiness, however, takes place primarily through the acquisition of theoretical knowledge. The saving knowledge consists primarily of the conception of the hierarchy of physical and metaphysical reality, but all of philosophy forms a curriculum through which the soul gradually ascends towards a spiritual state of being along an order that is inverse to the Neoplatonic emanationist hierarchy of creation. For Ismaili philosophy the ascent takes place from the exoteric religious sciences towards the esoteric philosophical knowledge. For Peripatetic philosophers logic performs the function of an instrument enabling the ascent, mathematics is treated either as propaedeutic to philosophy or as a mediator between physical and metaphysical knowledge, whereas physics and metaphysics provide the core of knowledge necessary for the attainment of happiness.

Hyveiden harjoittaminen : edellytykset ja esteet

In the first half of the 20th century, most moral philosophers took the concept of virtue to be secondary to moral principles or emotions, though in various and mutually conflicting ways. In the early 1960s interest in the virtues was restored by the analytic philosophers Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, the younger colleagues and friends of the late Wittgenstein. Later, Alasdair MacIntyre became a leading virtue ethicist. In 1981, MacIntyre introduced in After Virtue the concept of practices, which he based on the Aristotelian distinction between praxis and poiesis. This dissertation examines MacIntyre s characterization of the interconnectedness between practices and virtues, especially in relation to skills, education, and certain emotions. The primary position of the virtues is defended against the tendency in modern moral philosophy to overemphasize the role either of principles and rules or of emotions. The view according to which rational action and acting according to the virtues is best conceptualized as following rules or principles is criticized by arguments that are grounded by some Wittgensteinian observations, and that can be characterized as transcendental. Even if the virtues cannot be defined by, and are not based entirely on, emotions, the role of certain emotions on the learning and education of skills and virtues are studied more carefully than by MacIntyre. In the cases of resentment, indignation, and shame, the analysis of Peter Strawson is utilized, and in the case of regret, the analysis of Bernard Williams. Williams analysis of regret and moral conflict concludes in a kind of antirealism, which this study criticizes. Where education of practices and skills and the related reactive emotions are examined as conditions of learning and practicing the virtues, institutions and ideologies are examined as obstacles and threats to the virtues. This theme is studied through Karl Marx s conception of alienation and Karl Polanyi s historical and sociological research concerning the great transformation . The study includes six Finnish-published articles carrying the titles Our negative attitudes towards other persons , Authority and upbringing , Moral conflicts, regret and ethical realism , Practices and institutions , Doing justice as condition to communal action: a transcendental argument for justice as virtue , and Alienation from practices in capitalist society: Alasdair MacIntyre s Marxist Aristotelianism . The introductory essay sums up the themes of the articles and presents some central issues of virtue ethics by relating the classical Socratic questions to Aristotelian practical philosophy, as well as to current controversies in metaethics and moral psychology.

Poetics of the Nameless Middle : Japan and the West in Philosophy and Music of the Twentieth Century

This study investigates the affinities between philosophy, aesthetics, and music of Japan and the West. The research is based on the structuralist notion (specifically, on that found in the narratology of Algirdas Julius Greimas), that the universal grammar functions as an abstract principle, underlying all kinds of discourse. The study thus aims to demonstrate how this grammar is manifested in philosophical, aesthetic, and musical texts and how the semiotic homogeneity of these texts can be explained on this basis. Totality and belongingness are the key philosophical concepts presented herein. As distinct from logocentrism manifested as substantializations of the world of ideas , god or mind, which was characteristic of previous Western paradigms, totality was defined as the coexistence of opposites. Thus Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Dōgen, and Nishida often illustrated it by identifying fundamental polarities, such as being and nothing, seer and seen, truth and illusion, etc. Accordingly, totality was schematically presented as an all-encompassing middle of the semiotic square. Similar values can be found in aesthetics and arts. Instead of dialectic syntagms, differentiated unity is considered as paradigmatic and the study demonstrates how this is manifested in traditional Japanese and Heideggerian aesthetics, as well as in the aspects of music of Claude Debussy and Tōru Takemitsu.

Properties of Toeplitz operators on analytic function spaces : from function symbols to distributions

Toeplitz operators are among the most important classes of concrete operators with applications to several branches of pure and applied mathematics. This doctoral thesis deals with Toeplitz operators on analytic Bergman, Bloch and Fock spaces. Usually, a Toeplitz operator is a composition of multiplication by a function and a suitable projection. The present work deals with generalizing the notion to the case where the function is replaced by a distributional symbol. Fredholm theory for Toeplitz operators with matrix-valued symbols is also considered. The subject of this thesis belongs to the areas of complex analysis, functional analysis and operator theory. This work contains five research articles. The articles one, three and four deal with finding suitable distributional classes in Bergman, Fock and Bloch spaces, respectively. In each case the symbol class to be considered turns out to be a certain weighted Sobolev-type space of distributions. The Bergman space setting is the most straightforward. When dealing with Fock spaces, some difficulties arise due to unboundedness of the complex plane and the properties of the Gaussian measure in the definition. In the Bloch-type spaces an additional logarithmic weight must be introduced. Sufficient conditions for boundedness and compactness are derived. The article two contains a portion showing that under additional assumptions, the condition for Bergman spaces is also necessary. The fifth article deals with Fredholm theory for Toeplitz operators having matrix-valued symbols. The essential spectra and index theorems are obtained with the help of Hardy space factorization and the Berezin transform, for instance. The article two also has a part dealing with matrix-valued symbols in a non-reflexive Bergman space, in which case a condition on the oscillation of the symbol (a logarithmic VMO-condition) must be added.

Proofs, Paradoxes, and Probabilities : The Logical Turn of Philosophy in Finland

This monograph describes the emergence of independent research on logic in Finland. The emphasis is placed on three well-known students of Eino Kaila: Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003), Erik Stenius (1911-1990), and Oiva Ketonen (1913-2000), and their research between the early 1930s and the early 1950s. The early academic work of these scholars laid the foundations for today's strong tradition in logic in Finland and also became internationally recognized. However, due attention has not been given to these works later, nor have they been comprehensively presented together. Each chapter of the book focuses on the life and work of one of Kaila's aforementioned students, with a fourth chapter discussing works on logic by authors who would later become known within other disciplines. Through an extensive use of correspondence and other archived material, some insight has been gained into the persons behind the academic personae. Unique and unpublished biographical material has been available for this task. The chapter on Oiva Ketonen focuses primarily on his work on what is today known as proof theory, especially on his proof theoretical system with invertible rules that permits a terminating root-first proof search. The independency of the parallel postulate is proved as an example of the strength of root-first proof search. Ketonen was to our knowledge Gerhard Gentzen's (the 'father' of proof theory) only student. Correspondence and a hitherto unavailable autobiographic manuscript, in addition to an unpublished article on the relationship between logic and epistemology, is presented. The chapter on Erik Stenius discusses his work on paradoxes and set theory, more specifically on how a rigid theory of definitions is employed to avoid these paradoxes. A presentation by Paul Bernays on Stenius' attempt at a proof of the consistency of arithmetic is reconstructed based on Bernays' lecture notes. Stenius correspondence with Paul Bernays, Evert Beth, and Georg Kreisel is discussed. The chapter on Georg Henrik von Wright presents his early work on probability and epistemology, along with his later work on modal logic that made him internationally famous. Correspondence from various archives (especially with Kaila and Charlie Dunbar Broad) further discusses his academic achievements and his experiences during the challenging circumstances of the 1940s.