Ethics and Aesthetics : Intersections in Iris Murdoch's Philosophy

The study addresses the question concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in the philosophy of Iris Murdoch. The main argument is that Murdoch s philosophy cannot be accurately understood without an understanding of the relationship she sees between the aesthetic experience and morality. Reading Murdoch s philosophy with this relationship in mind shows that it must be considered as a relevant alternative to the main forms of aesthetic-ethical theories. The study consists of seven previously published articles and a summary. It shows that Murdoch belongs to a tradition of philosophers who seek to broaden the scope of ethics by reference to aesthetic value and aesthetic experience. She sees an attitude responsible for aesthetic experiences as relevant for morality. However, she does not collapse morality into aesthetic experience. The two meet on the level of the subject s attitude towards its object, but there is a distinction between the experiences that accompany the attitudes. Aesthetic experiences can function as a clue to morals in that they present in a pleasing manner moral truths which otherwise might be psychologically too difficult to face. Murdoch equates the aesthetic attitude with virtuous love characterized by unselfish attention to its object. The primary object of such love is in Murdoch s account another human individual in her particularity. She compares the recognition of the other person as a particular existence to the experience of the Kantian sublime and offers her own version of the true sublime which is the experience of awe in the face of the infinity of the task of understanding others. One of the most central claims in Murdoch s philosophy is that human consciousness is evaluatively structured. This claim challenges the distinction between facts and values which has had an immense influence on modern moral philosophy. One argument with which Murdoch supports her claim is the nature of great literature. According to her, the standard of greatness in literature is the authors awareness of the independent existence of individuals in the particularity of their evaluative consciousnesses. The analysis of the standard of greatness in literature is also Murdoch s only argument for the claim that the primary object of the loving unselfish attention is the other particular individual. She is convinced that great literature reveals a deep truth about the human condition with its capacity to capture the particular. Abstract philo¬sophical discourse cannot compete with this capacity but it should take truths revealed by literature seriously in its theorising. Recognising this as Murdoch s stand on the question of the relation between philosophy and literature as forms of human discourse settles whether she is part of what has been called philosophy s turn to literature. The answer is yes.

Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.

Given and News : Media discourse and the construction of community on national days

National anniversaries such as independence days demand precise coordination in order to make citizens change their routines to forego work and spend the day at rest or at festivities that provide social focus and spectacle. The complex social construction of national days is taken for granted and operates as a given in the news media, which are the main agents responsible for coordinating these planned disruptions of normal routines. This study examines the language used in the news to construct the rather unnatural idea of national days and to align people in observing them. The data for the study consist of news stories about the Fourth of July in the New York Times, sampled over 150 years and are supplemented by material from other sources and other countries. The study is multidimensional, applying concepts from pragmatics (speech acts, politeness, information structure), systemic functional linguistics (the interpersonal metafunction and the Appraisal framework) and cognitive linguistics (frames, metaphor) as well as journalism and communications to arrive at an interdisciplinary understanding of how resources for meaning are used by writers and readers of the news stories. The analysis shows that on national anniversaries, nations tend to be metaphorized as persons having birthdays, to whom politeness should be shown. The face of the nation is to be respected in the sense of identifying the nation's interests as one's own (positive face) and speaking of citizen responsibilities rather than rights (negative face). Resources are available for both positive and negative evaluations of events and participants and the newspaper deftly changes footings (Goffman 1981) to demonstrate the required politeness while also heteroglossically allowing for a certain amount of disattention and even protest - within limits, for state holidays are almost never construed as Bakhtinian festivals, as they tend to reaffirm the hierarchy rather than invert it. Celebrations are evaluated mainly for impressiveness, and for the essentially contested quality of appropriateness, which covers norms of predictability, size, audience response, aesthetics, and explicit reference to the past. Events may also be negatively evaluated as dull ("banal") or inauthentic ("hoopla"). Audiences are evaluated chiefly in terms of their enthusiasm, or production of appropriate displays for emotional response, for national days are supposed to be occasions of flooding-out of nationalistic feeling. By making these evaluations, the newspaper reinforces its powerful position as an independent critic, while at the same time playing an active role in the construction and reproduction of emotional order embodied in "the nation's birthday." As an occasion for mobilization and demonstrations of power, national days may be seen to stand to war in the relation of play to fighting (Bateson 1955). Evidence from the newspaper's coverage of recent conflicts is adduced to support this analysis. In the course of the investigation, methods are developed for analyzing large collections of newspaper content, particularly topical soft news and feature materials that have hitherto been considered less influential and worthy of study than so-called hard news. In his work on evaluation in newspaper stories, White (1998) proposed that the classic hard news story is focused on an event that threatens the social order, but news of holidays and celebrations in general does not fit this pattern, in fact its central event is a reproduction of the social order. Thus in the system of news values (Galtung and Ruge 1965), national holiday news draws on "ground" news values such as continuity and predictability rather than "figure" news values such as negativity and surprise. It is argued that this ground helps form a necessary space for hard news to be seen as important, similar to the way in which the information structure of language is seen to rely on the regular alternation of given and new information (Chafe 1994).

Filosofins renässans eller modern mystik : Bergsondebatten i Finland

The study examines the debate in Finland at the beginning of the 20th century surrounding the philosophy of Henri Bergson. Both within as well as outside of academic philosophy Bergsonism was adapted to the philosophical and cultural landscape in Finland by a process of selective appropriation. The ambiguous relationship between the sender and the receiver is accentuated in reference to philosophical celebrities such as Bergson, whose reputations spread more quickly than the content of their philosophy and whose names are drawn into the political and social discourse. As a philosophical movement the aim of Bergsonism was to create a scientific philosophy of life as an alternative to both idealism and modern empirical and antimetaphysical currents, during a period when European philosophy was searching for new guidelines after the collapse of the idealistic system philosophies of the 19th century. This reorientation is examined from a Finnish viewpoint and in the light of the process of intellectual importation. The study examines how elements from an international discourse were appropriated within the philosophical field in Finland against a background of changes in the role of the university and the educated elites as well as the position of philosophy within the disciplinary hierarchy. Philosophical reception was guided by expectations that had arisen in a national context, for example when Bergsonism in Finland was adjusted to a moral and educational ideal of self-cultivation, and often served as a means for philosophers to internationalize their own views in order to strengthen their position on the national stage. The study begins with some introductory remarks on the international circulation of ideas from the point of view of the periphery. The second section presents an overview of the shaping of the philosophical field at the turn of the 20th century, the naturalism and positivism of the late 19th century that were the objects of Bergson s critique, and an introduction to the attempts of a philosophy of life to make its way between idealism and naturalism. The third and main section of the study begins with a brief presentation of the main features of the philosophy of Bergson, followed by a closer examination of the different comments and analyses that it gave rise to in Finland. The final section addresses the ideological implications of Bergsonism within the framework of a political annexation of the philosophy of life at the beginning of the 20th century.

Questions to Artificial Nature: A Philosophical Study of Interdisciplinary Models and their Functions in Scientific Practice

This thesis presents an interdisciplinary analysis of how models and simulations function in the production of scientific knowledge. The work is informed by three scholarly traditions: studies on models and simulations in philosophy of science, so-called micro-sociological laboratory studies within science and technology studies, and cultural-historical activity theory. Methodologically, I adopt a naturalist epistemology and combine philosophical analysis with a qualitative, empirical case study of infectious-disease modelling. This study has a dual perspective throughout the analysis: it specifies the modelling practices and examines the models as objects of research. The research questions addressed in this study are: 1) How are models constructed and what functions do they have in the production of scientific knowledge? 2) What is interdisciplinarity in model construction? 3) How do models become a general research tool and why is this process problematic? The core argument is that the mediating models as investigative instruments (cf. Morgan and Morrison 1999) take questions as a starting point, and hence their construction is intentionally guided. This argument applies the interrogative model of inquiry (e.g., Sintonen 2005; Hintikka 1981), which conceives of all knowledge acquisition as process of seeking answers to questions. The first question addresses simulation models as Artificial Nature, which is manipulated in order to answer questions that initiated the model building. This account develops further the "epistemology of simulation" (cf. Winsberg 2003) by showing the interrelatedness of researchers and their objects in the process of modelling. The second question clarifies why interdisciplinary research collaboration is demanding and difficult to maintain. The nature of the impediments to disciplinary interaction are examined by introducing the idea of object-oriented interdisciplinarity, which provides an analytical framework to study the changes in the degree of interdisciplinarity, the tools and research practices developed to support the collaboration, and the mode of collaboration in relation to the historically mutable object of research. As my interest is in the models as interdisciplinary objects, the third research problem seeks to answer my question of how we might characterise these objects, what is typical for them, and what kind of changes happen in the process of modelling. Here I examine the tension between specified, question-oriented models and more general models, and suggest that the specified models form a group of their own. I call these Tailor-made models, in opposition to the process of building a simulation platform that aims at generalisability and utility for health-policy. This tension also underlines the challenge of applying research results (or methods and tools) to discuss and solve problems in decision-making processes.

Luce Irigaray's Philosophy of Feminine Being : Body, Desire and Wisdom

Luce Irigaray is a Belgian-born philosopher, psychoanalyst and linguist. Irigaray s concept of woman is crucial for understanding her own work but also for examining and developing the theoretical and methodological basis of feminist theory. This thesis argues that, ultimately, Irigaray s exploration of woman s being challenges our traditional notion of philosophy as a neutral discourse and the traditional notion of ourselves as philosophizing persons or human beings. However, despite its crucial role, Irigaray s idea of woman still lacks a comprehensive explication. This is because the discourse of sexual difference is blurred by the ideas of essentialism and biologism. --- Irigaray s concept of woman has been interpreted and criticized from the perspectives of metaphysical essentialism, strategic essentialism, realist essentialism and deconstructionism. This thesis argues that a reinterpretation is necessary to account for Irigaray s claims about the the traditional woman , mimesis, the specificity of the feminine body, feminine expression and sexual difference. Moreover, any reading should account for the differences between women and avoid giving a prescriptive function to the essence of woman. --- My thesis develops a new interpretation of Irigaray s concept of woman on the basis of the phenomenology of the body. It argues that Irigaray s discourse on woman can and must be understood by an idea of existential style. Existential style is embodied, affective and spiritual and it is constituted in relation to oneself, to others and to the world. It is temporal, it evolves and changes but preserves its open unity in its transformations. Stylistic unities, such as femininity or philosophy, are constituted in and by the singulars. -- This study discusses and analyses feminine existential style as a central theme and topic of Irigaray s works and shows how her work operates as a primary and paradigmatic example of the feminine style. These tasks are performed by studying the mimetic positions available for women and by explicating the phenomenological background of Irigaray s conceptions of the philosophical method, and the lived, expressive and affective body. The critical occupation and transformation of these mimetic positions, the inquiry into the first-person pre-discursive experience, and the cultivation of feminine expressivity open up the possibility of becoming a woman writer, a woman lover and a woman philosopher. The appearance of these new feminine figures is a precondition for the realization of sexual difference. So Irigaray opens up the possibility of sexual difference by instituting and constituting a feminine subject of love and wisdom, and by problematizing the idea of a neutral and absolute subject.

Käytännöt ja ajattelu Michel Foucault'n filosofiassa

Practices and Thought in Michel Foucault s Philosophy The present thesis examines Michel Foucault s (1926-1984) notion of practice and argues that it is an essential concept in his philosophy, especially in his analysis of knowledge, power and ethics. The thesis reveals a previously neglected chronological and methodological unity in Foucault s work. The first chapter clarifies Foucault s philosophy by outlining it according to four central themes. First, the main philosophical goal of his historical studies is to analyse how human subjects have become objects of their own thinking. Second, this goal calls for methodological precaution to avoid all anthropological universals. Third, Foucault s studies are directed towards fields of practices. Fourth, the analysis of practices is executed along three axes: knowledge, power and ethics. The second chapter concerns the notion of practice in Foucault s archaeological method. Foucault s archaeological analysis is not directed towards objects and subjects as such, but to the way that the rules of discursive practice form them in the discourse. Many commentators have neglected Foucault s concept of practice when discussing his ideas concerning rules of discourse and limits of knowledge. I argue that Foucault s analysis concerning the limits of knowledge relates to local and contingent rules of discursive practice, not to transcendental rules of thinking in general. The third chapter deals with power relations and practices. I clarify Foucault s concept of dispositif by defining it as a functional ensemble of practices, and argue that this concept is crucial to his understanding of power relations. I stress a conceptual definition, which separates relations of power from the practices of government and show that the latter is based on the idea that power relations are integrated into practices. This conceptual clarification also helps in understanding Foucault s critique concerning modern practices of power. The fourth chapter examines Foucault s way of perceiving ethics as a practice. He separates three essential dimensions in morals: moral codes, moral behaviour and practices of self. His ethics concern practices of self and he studies how these practices have constituted different relations that subjects have to themselves, to others and to their societies. I argue that Foucault s own ethical views can be found in the ideas on the importance of practices of self in the modern world, and emphasize that these ideas should be connected to his views concerning the tradition of the Enlightenment, and to his own political action.

Religion Explained? : A Philosophical Appraisal of the Cognitive Science of Religion

This study examines philosophically the main theories and methodological assumptions of the field known as the cognitive science of religion (CSR). The study makes a philosophically informed reconstruction of the methodological principles of the CSR, indicates problems with them, and examines possible solutions to these problems. The study focuses on several different CSR writers, namely, Scott Atran, Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer and Dan Sperber. CSR theorising is done in the intersection between cognitive sciences, anthropology and evolutionary psychology. This multidisciplinary nature makes CSR a fertile ground for philosophical considerations coming from philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. The study begins by spelling out the methodological assumptions and auxiliary theories of CSR writers by situating these theories and assumptions in the nexus of existing approaches to religion. The distinctive feature of CSR is its emphasis on information processing: CSR writers claim that contemporary cognitive sciences can inform anthropological theorising about the human mind and offer tools for producing causal explanations. Further, they claim to explain the prevalence and persistence of religion by cognitive systems that undergird religious thinking. I also examine the core theoretical contributions of the field focusing mainly on the (1) “minimally counter-intuitiveness hypothesis” and (2) the different ways in which supernatural agent representations activate our cognitive systems. Generally speaking, CSR writers argue for the naturalness of religion: religious ideas and practices are widespread and pervasive because human cognition operates in such a way that religious ideas are easy to acquire and transmit. The study raises two philosophical problems, namely, the “problem of scope” and the “problem of religious relevance”. The problem of scope is created by the insistence of several critics of the CSR that CSR explanations are mostly irrelevant for explaining religion. Most CSR writers themselves hold that cognitive explanations can answer most of our questions about religion. I argue that the problem of scope is created by differences in explanation-begging questions: the former group is interested in explaining different things than the latter group. I propose that we should not stick too rigidly to one set of methodological assumptions, but rather acknowledge that different assumptions might help us to answer different questions about religion. Instead of adhering to some robust metaphysics as some strongly naturalistic writers argue, we should adopt a pragmatic and explanatory pluralist approach which would allow different kinds of methodological presuppositions in the study of religion provided that they attempt to answer different kinds of why-questions, since religion appears to be a multi-faceted phenomenon that spans over a variety of fields of special sciences. The problem of religious relevance is created by the insistence of some writers that CSR theories show religious beliefs to be false or irrational, whereas others invoke CSR theories to defend certain religious ideas. The problem is interesting because it reveals the more general philosophical assumptions of those who make such interpretations. CSR theories can (and have been) interpreted in terms of three different philosophical frameworks: strict naturalism, broad naturalism and theism. I argue that CSR theories can be interpreted inside all three frameworks without doing violence to the theories and that these frameworks give different kinds of results regarding the religious relevance of CSR theories.

Conrad Summenhart's theory of individual rights and its medieval background

This study focuses on the theory of individual rights that the German theologian Conrad Summenhart (1455-1502) explicated in his massive work Opus septipartitum de contractibus pro foro conscientiae et theologico. The central question to be studied is: How does Summenhart understand the concept of an individual right and its immediate implications? The basic premiss of this study is that in Opus septipartitum Summenhart composed a comprehensive theory of individual rights as a contribution to the on-going medieval discourse on rights. With this rationale, the first part of the study concentrates on earlier discussions on rights as the background for Summenhart s theory. Special attention is paid to language in which right was defined in terms of power . In the fourteenth century writers like Hervaeus Natalis and William Ockham maintained that right signifies power by which the right-holder can to use material things licitly. It will also be shown how the attempts to describe what is meant by the term right became more specified and cultivated. Gerson followed the implications that the term power had in natural philosophy and attributed rights to animals and other creatures. To secure right as a normative concept, Gerson utilized the ancient ius suum cuique-principle of justice and introduced a definition in which right was seen as derived from justice. The latter part of this study makes effort to reconstructing Summenhart s theory of individual rights in three sections. The first section clarifies Summenhart s discussion of the right of the individual or the concept of an individual right. Summenhart specified Gerson s description of right as power, taking further use of the language of natural philosophy. In this respect, Summenhart s theory managed to bring an end to a particular continuity of thought that was centered upon a view in which right was understood to signify power to licit action. Perhaps the most significant feature of Summenhart s discussion was the way he explicated the implication of liberty that was present in Gerson s language of rights. Summenhart assimilated libertas with the self-mastery or dominion that in the economic context of discussion took the form of (a moderate) self-ownership. Summenhart discussion also introduced two apparent extensions to Gerson s terminology. First, Summenhart classified right as relation, and second, he equated right with dominion. It is distinctive of Summenhart s view that he took action as the primary determinant of right: Everyone has as much rights or dominion in regard to a thing, as much actions it is licit for him to exercise in regard to the thing. The second section elaborates Summenhart s discussion of the species dominion, which delivered an answer to the question of what kind of rights exist, and clarified thereby the implications of the concept of an individual right. The central feature in Summenhart s discussion was his conscious effort to systematize Gerson s language by combining classifications of dominion into a coherent whole. In this respect, his treatement of the natural dominion is emblematic. Summenhart constructed the concept of natural dominion by making use of the concepts of foundation (founded on a natural gift) and law (according to the natural law). In defining natural dominion as dominion founded on a natural gift, Summenhart attributed natural dominion to animals and even to heavenly bodies. In discussing man s natural dominion, Summenhart pointed out that the natural dominion is not sufficiently identified by its foundation, but requires further specification, which Summenhart finds in the idea that natural dominion is appropriate to the subject according to the natural law. This characterization lead him to treat God s dominion as natural dominion. Partly, this was due to Summenhart s specific understanding of the natural law, which made reasonableness as the primary criterion for the natural dominion at the expense of any metaphysical considerations. The third section clarifies Summenhart s discussion of the property rights defined by the positive human law. By delivering an account on juridical property rights Summenhart connected his philosophical and theological theory on rights to the juridical language of his times, and demonstrated that his own language of rights was compatible with current juridical terminology. Summenhart prepared his discussion of property rights with an account of the justification for private property, which gave private property a direct and strong natural law-based justification. Summenhart s discussion of the four property rights usus, usufructus, proprietas, and possession aimed at delivering a detailed report of the usage of these concepts in juridical discourse. His discussion was characterized by extensive use of the juridical source texts, which was more direct and verbal the more his discussion became entangled with the details of juridical doctrine. At the same time he promoted his own language on rights, especially by applying the idea of right as relation. He also showed recognizable effort towards systematizing juridical language related to property rights.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

Kriitkko Einari J. Vehmas ja moderni taide

The doctoral dissertation Critic Einari J. Vehmas and Modern Art deals with one of the central figures of the Finnish art scene and his work as an art critic, art museum curator and cultural critic. The main body of research material consists of the writings of Einari J. Vehmas (1902 1980) from 1937 to the late 1960s. Vehmas wrote art reviews for magazines, and from the year 1945 he was a regular art critic for one of the major newspapers in Finland. Vehmas was heavily inclined towards French literature and visual arts. Marcel Proust and Charles Baudelaire influenced his views on the nature of art from the late 1920s onwards. Vehmas is commonly regarded as the most influential art critic of post-war Finland. His writings have been referred to and cited in numerous research papers on Finnish 20th-century art. A lesser known aspect of his work is his position as the deputy director of the Ateneum Art Museum, the Finnish national gallery. Through his art museum work, his opinions also shaped the canon of modern art considered particularly Finnish following the second world war. The main emphasis of the dissertation is on studying Vehmas s writings, but it also illustrates the diversity of his involvement in Finnish cultural life through biographical documents. The long chronological span of the dissertation emphasises how certain central themes accumulate in Vehmas s writings. The aim of the dissertation is also to show how strongly certain philosophical and theoretical concepts from the early 20th century, specifically Wassily Kandinsky s principle of inner necessity and Henri Bergson s epistemology highlighting intuition and instinct, continued to influence the Finnish art discourse even in the early 1960s, in part thanks to the writings of Vehmas. Throughout his production, Vehmas contemplated the state and future of modern art and humanity. Vehmas used a colourful, vitalistic rhetoric to emphasise the role of modern art as a building block of culture and humanity. At the same time, however, he was a cultural pessimist whose art views became infused with anxiety, a sense of loss, and a desire to turn his back on the world.

The EU and Institutional Twinning in Morocco - An inquiry into the motives of cooperation through discourse ethics

This study examines Institutional Twinning in Morocco as a case of EU cooperation through the pragmatic, ethical and moral logics of reason in Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics. As a former accession tool, Twinning was introduced in 2004 for legal approximation in the context of the European Neighborhood Policy. Twinning is a unique instrument in development cooperation from a legal perspective. With its long historical and cultural ties to Europe, Morocco presents an interesting case study of this new form of cooperation. We will analyse motives behind the Twinning projects on illegal immigration, environment legislation and customs reform. As Twinning is a new policy instrument within the ENP context, there is relatively little preceding research, which, in itself, constitutes a reason to inquire into the subject. While introducing useful categories, the approaches discussing “normative power Europe” do not offer methodological tools precise enough to analyse the motives of the Twinning cooperation from a broad ethical standpoint. Helene Sjursen as well as Esther Barbé and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués have elaborated on Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics in determining the extent of altruism in the ENP in general. Situating the analysis in the process-oriented framework of Critical Theory, discourse ethics provides the methodological framework for our research. The case studies reveal that the context in which they operate affects the pragmatic, ethical and moral aspirations of the actors. The utilitarian notion of profit maximization is quite pronounced both in terms of the number of Twinning projects in the economic sphere and the pragmatic logics of reason instrumental to security and trade-related issues. The historical background as well internal processes, however, contribute to defining areas of mutual interest to the actors as well as the motives Morocco and the EU sometimes described as the external projection of internal values. Through its different aspects, Twinning cooperation portrays the functioning of the pragmatic, ethical and moral logics of reason in international relations.

Captured by conventions : On objectivity and factuality in international news agency discourse

The thesis explores the discourse of two global news agencies, the Associated Press (AP) and Reuters, which together with the French AFP are generally regarded as the world s leading news distributors. A glance at the guidelines given by AP and Reuters to their journalists shows that these two news agencies make a lot of effort to strive for objectivity the well-known journalistic ideal, which, however, is an almost indefinable concept. In journalism textbooks definitions of objectivity often contain various components: detachment, nonpartisanship, facticity, balance, etc. AP and Reuters, too, in their guidelines, present several other ideals besides objectivity , viz., reliability, accuracy, balance, freedom from bias, precise sourcing, reporting the truth, and so on. Other central concepts connected to objectivity are neutrality and impartiality. However, objectivity is, undoubtedly, the term that is most often mentioned when the ethics of journalism is discussed, acting as a kind of umbrella term for several related journalistic ideals. It can even encompass the other concept that is relevant for this study, that of factuality. These two intertwined concepts are extremely complex; paradoxically, it is easier to show evidence of the lack of objectivity or factuality than of their existence. I argue that when journalists conform to the deep-rooted conventions of objective news reporting, facts may be blurred, and the language becomes vague and ambiguous. As global distributors of news, AP and Reuters have had an influential role in creating and reinforcing conventions of (at least English-language) news writing. These conventions can be seen to work at various levels of news reporting: the ideological (e.g., defining what is regarded as newsworthy, or who is responsible), structural (e.g., the well-known inverted pyramid model), and stylistic (e.g., presupposing that in hard news reports, the journalist s voice should be backgrounded). On the basis of my case studies, I have found four central conventions to be worthy of closer examination: the conventional structure of news reports, the importance of newsworthiness, the tactics of impersonalisation which tends to blur news actors responsibility, and the routines of presenting emotions. My linguistic analyses draw mainly on M.A.K. Halliday s Systemic Functional Grammar, on notions of transitivity, ergativity, nominalisation and grammatical metaphor. The Appraisal framework, too, has provided useful tools for my analyses. The thesis includes six case studies dealing with the following topics: metaphors in political reporting, terrorism discourse, terrorism fears, emotions more generally, unnamed sources as rhetorical constructs, and responsibility in the convention of attribution.