Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

C⁴I handbook for integrated planning /

"8181/CISA"--Appendix C, cover.

Ajatuksista operaatioiksi : Suomen armeijan hyökkäysoperaatioiden suunnittelu jatkosodassa

In the research on the Continuation War, interest in the events themselves had exceeded the interest in military planning. Careful consideration has not been given to the planning process and the options that were available. This study shows how the planning of these operations was carried out and identifies the persons responsible. Contrary to earlier research this study shows that persons other than Field-Marshal Carl Gustaf Mannerheim and Quartermaster-General Aksel Airo took part in the planning. Furthermore, the plan was to carry out the operations further east than was ultimately done. The operation plans were coordinated by the Operations Department of Headquarters, which had the opportunity to influence on both Mannerheim and Airo. Part of the actual planning was made outside Headquarters, but final decisions were taken at Headquarters. It is worth observing that many times Mannerheim asked President Risto Ryti for his opinion concerning these operations. The Germans tried to influence the Finnish plans, but the Finns took their decisions independently, although they took German requests into account. It is well-known that the attack by the Finnish forces was stopped at the end of the year 1941. It is less well-known that the Finns planned new attacks until the autumn of 1942. At that point the Finns were convinced that the Germans would lose the war. The Finns were thus prepared to keep advancing should the Germans progress in the direction of Leningrad. This study shows that the Finnish military leaders worked for Finland s own plans and their cooperation with the Germans was directed to achieving this goal. In other words, Finland tried expand eastward with the help of the Germans. This purpose was particularly evident in the planning of the operations in the Hanko district and the Karelian Isthmus in the summer and autumn of 1941, in the Sorokka district in the spring of 1942 and around Lake Ladoga in the summer and autumn of 1942. The Finns reduced their activities when Germans took over responsibility for the operations. However, at the same time the Finns tried to support Germans in passive ways. The Finns justified the decrease in their activities with lack of Finnish forces and numerous defeats. Earlier research has shown that Finland was an active operator in the Continuation War and tried to take back the areas lost in the Winter War. In this study that view becomes more precise and clear especially with regard to Field-Marshal Mannerheim and other high military leaders. There is clear indication that the Finns would have attacked much further east had a German success made such an attack possible.

'A responsible nuclear weapons power' : Nuclear Weapons and Indian Foreign Policy

This thesis examines the interrelationship and dynamics between the Indian United Progressive Alliance government’s foreign policy and its nuclear weapons policy. The purpose of the study is to situate nuclear policy within a foreign policy framework, and the fundamental research problem is thus how does the Indian nuclear policy reflect and respond to the Indian foreign policy? The study examines the intentions in the Indian foreign and nuclear policies, and asks whether these intentions are commensurable or incommensurable. Moreover, the thesis asks whether the UPA government differs from its predecessors, most notably the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance government in its foreign and nuclear policies. Answers to these questions are based on the interpretation of political texts and speeches as suggested by Quentin Skinner’s notion of meaning3, what does a writer or speaker mean by what he or she says in a given text, and by J.L. Austin’s speech act theory. This linguistic perspective and the approach of intertextualizing, place the political acts within their contingent intellectual and political contexts. The notion of strategic culture is therefore introduced to provide context for these juxtapositions. The thesis firstly analyses the societal, historical and intellectual context of India’s foreign and nuclear policy. Following from this analysis the thesis then examines the foreign and nuclear policies of Prime Minister Manmo-han Singh’s UPA government. This analysis focuses on the texts, speeches and statements of Indian authorities between 2004 and 2008. This study forwards the following claims: firstly, the UPA Government conducts a foreign policy that is mainly and explicitly inclusive, open and enhancing, and it conducts a nuclear policy that is mainly and implicitly excluding, closed and protective. Secondly, despite the fact that the notion of military security is widely appreciated and does not, as such, necessarily collide with foreign policy, the UPA Government conducts a nuclear policy that is incommensurable with its foreign policy. Thirdly, the UPA Gov-ernment foreign and nuclear policies are, nevertheless, commensurable re-garding their internal intentions. Finally, the UPA Government is conduct-ing a nuclear policy that is gradually leading India towards having a triad of nuclear weapons with various platforms and device designs and a function-ing and robust command and control system encompassing political and military planning, decision-making and execution. Regarding the question of the possible differences between the UPA and NDA governments this thesis claims that, despite their different ideological roots and orientations in domestic affairs, the Indian National Congress Party conducts, perhaps surprisingly, quite a similar foreign and nuclear policy to the Bharatiya Janata Party.

O gerenciamento de projetos e o planejamento de operações de guerra do Exército brasileiro

A presente pesquisa teve como objetivo verificar como a metodologia de gerenciamento de projetos, preconizada pelo Project Management Institute – PMI poderia contribuir para a modernização da metodologia de planejamento das operações de guerra do Exército Brasileiro. Para tanto, desenvolveu-se um estudo comparativo entre os processos dos grupos de iniciação e de planejamento definidos pelo PMI no seu Guia do Conhecimento em Gerenciamento de Projetos – PMBOK e o processo de planejamento de operações de guerra do Exército Brasileiro denominado Estudo de Situação. O trabalho foi desenvolvido com base em pesquisa bibliográfica e documental que contemplou renomados autores como Kerzner, Cleland, Vargas, Lima, Maximiano, Valeriano, Prado e Xavier, além dos manuais doutrinários do Exército Brasileiro pertinentes ao tema abordado e o próprio PMBOK. Contextualizando o trabalho foi feita a equiparação de uma operação militar de guerra a um projeto civil, e a caracterização do Estudo de Situação como um processo de planejamento e tomada de decisão equivalente ao conjunto de processos dos grupos de iniciação e de planejamento do gerenciamento de projetos. No estudo realizado verificou-se que as áreas de Custos, de Recursos Humanos e de Aquisições, em função das peculiaridades que envolvem uma operação de guerra são tratadas de forma tão diferenciadas do gerenciamento de projetos que não poderiam ser incluídas no estudo. Além disso, pôde-se constatar que o processo de planejamento militar é executado com uma grande parcela de intuição decorrente da aplicação de conhecimento tácito por parte dos seus executantes, o que não ocorre no gerenciamento de projetos onde o uso de um grande número de ferramentas de base lógica e matemática dá ao processo de planejamento dos projetos um maior grau de imparcialidade e precisão. Verificou-se também que o processo de planejamento militar produz um grande número de documentos gráficos que permitem uma “visão gráfica” de várias áreas ou aspectos do problema que, por sua vez, facilitam o uso da intuição na tomada de decisão. Enfim, depois de identificados os processos de gerenciamento de projetos que interessavam ao estudo e as peculiaridades da metodologia de planejamento em uso no Exército Brasileiro, chegou-se a conclusão, como se havia suposto, que a metodologia de gerenciamento de projetos efetivamente possui recursos que podem contribuir para a modernização do processo de planejamento de operações de guerra do Exército Brasileiro denominado Estudo de Situação. Esses recursos estão relacionados na conclusão do trabalho.

Regimes Militares e a Segurança Nacional no Cone Sul

The implantation of military regimes in South America, from the mid-1960s, happened in the context of the Cold War. As a result, both the occurrence of military coups and the plans and actions for the national defense of the Southern Cone States occurred following the logic of that period and the concept of hemispheric defense preached by the United States, with priority in combating the so-called internal subversion. Thus, the need to combat the “internal enemy” has led these countries to participate in hemispheric mechanisms or create his own arrangements for coordination. The article starts from the conflict hypothesis used by the military governments in their military planning to analyze the actions carried out against leftist movements, including coordination between the governments of the Southern Cone. The understanding of the defense concepts against Soviet communism allows us to understand that the groups placed against the military governments were seen as a danger to the State and, in that “state of war”, the means justified the ends.

EU Naval Force EUNAVFOR MED sets sail in troubled waters. CEPS Commentary, 26 June 2015

Apprehending pirates in the Indian Ocean is one thing. Defeating the networks through which smugglers traffic migrants through North Africa is quite another. The European Union’s new naval force deployment in the Mediterranean - EUNAVFOR MED - drew criticism from international partners and the general public alike when plans for a “boat-sinking” operation were unveiled, raising fears about unacceptable levels of violence and collateral damage; a European version of Mexico’s drug war. Yet the problems of EUNAVFOR MED lie less in clumsy public diplomacy than in the perilous mismatch between its stated objectives and the absence of a clear strategy and mandate, and this creates both operational and political risks for member states. Phase 1 of the operation: surveillance and assessment, has begun with no legal mandate to carry out the crucial phases 2 and 3: seek and destroy, whose military planning and outcomes are undetermined. Despite these limitations, the naval force could nevertheless mark a turning point in the EU’s security narrative, because it means that the Union is finally addressing the threats to security and the humanitarian tragedies in its southern neighbourhood.

Loran-C signal analysis : final report /

"Report no. CG-D-4-80."

Just Cause : Marine operations in Panama, 1988-1990 /

Includes index.

A Quest for excellence : appendix : final report /

"June 1986."

[Food for the Armed Forces.]

Includes bibliographies.

Quadrennial defense review : hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Fifth Congress, first session, May 20 and 21, 1997.

Shipping list no.: 98-0056-P.

Absorption of fat in various nutritional states; a bibliography and review of the literature,

Processed.

Towards a U.S. Army officer corps strategy for success : retaining talent /

Over the last 3 decades, dramatic labor market changes and well-intentioned but uninformed policies have created significant officer talent flight. Poor retention engenders substantial risk for the Army as it directly affects accessions, development, and employment of talent. The Army cannot make thoughtful policy decisions if its officer talent pipeline continues to leak at current rates. Since the Army cannot insulate itself from labor market forces as it tries to retain talent, the retention component of its officer strategy must rest upon sound market principles. It must be continuously resourced, executed, measured, and adjusted across time and budget cycles. Absent these steps, systemic policy, and decisionmaking failures will continue to confound Army efforts to create a talent-focused officer corps strategy.

Towards a U.S. Army officer corps strategy for success : developing talent /

Developing leaders through experience, formal training, and education is a long-standing hallmark of the U.S. Army. Maintaining its excellence as a developmental organization requires vigilance, however. Authorized strength and inventory mismatches, an inverse relationship between responsibility and formal developmental time, and sparse nonoperational development opportunities are serious challenges the Army must address. Doing so requires a talent development strategy firmly rooted in human capital theory. Such a strategy will recognize the value of continuing higher education, genuinely useful evaluations, and the signals associated with professional credentials.