Strike hard, strike sure - Operation Musketeer : British military planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

Operation Musketeer, a combined joint Anglo-French operation aimed at regaining control of the Suez Canal in 1956, has received much attention from scholars. The most common approach to the crisis has been to examine the political dimension. The political events that led Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s cabinet to decide to use military force against the wishes of their superior American ally and in the face of American economic pressure and a Soviet threat to attack Paris and London with rockets have been analysed thoroughly. This is particularly the case because the ceasefire and eventual withdrawal were an indisputable defeat of British policy in the Middle East. The military operation not only ruined Prime Minister Eden’s career, but it also diminished the prestige of Britain. It was the beginning of the end, some claim. The British Empire would never be the same. As the consequences of using force are generally considered more important than the military operations themselves, very little attention has been paid to the military planning of Operation Musketeer. The difference between the number of publications on Operation Corporate of the Falklands War and Operation Musketeer is striking. Not only has there been little previous research on the military aspects of Musketeer, the conclusions drawn in the existing works have not reached a consensus. Some historians, such as Correlli Barnett, compare Musketeer to the utter failures of the Tudor landings and Gallipoli. Among significant politicians, Winston Churchill, who had retired from the prime ministership only a year before the Suez Crisis, described the operation as “the most ill-conceived and ill-executed imaginable”. Colin McInnes, a well-known author on British defence policy, represents the middle view when he describes the execution as “far from failure”. Finally, some, like Julian Thompson, the Commander of 3 Commando Brigade during the Falklands War, rate the military action itself as being successful. The interpretation of how successful the handling of the Suez Crisis was from the military point of view depends very much on the approach taken and the areas emphasised in the subject. Frequently, military operations are analysed in isolation from other events. The action of a country’s armed forces is separated from the wider context and evaluated without a solid point of comparison. Political consequences are often used as validated criteria, and complicated factors contributing to military performance are ignored. The lack of comprehensive research on the military action has left room for an analysis concentrating on the military side of the crisis.

C⁴I handbook for integrated planning /

"8181/CISA"--Appendix C, cover.

Spitfirestä Bloodhoundiin : Kuninkaallisten Ilmavoimien hävittäjäilmavoimien kehitys 1945–1958

Tässä tutkielmassa käsitellään Kuninkaallisten Ilmavoimien hävittäjäilmavoimien kehitystä vuosina 1945 - 1958. Ison-Britannian hävittäjäilmavoimat kehittyi suurin harppauksin toisen maailmansodan jälkeisinä vuosina. Kehitys käsitti teknisiä, strategisia ja organisaatiota kos-kevia muutoksia. Suurvaltojen ilmavoimien pelikenttä laajentui yhä suuremmaksi nopeuksien kasvaessa ja asejärjestelmien kehittyessä. Kuninkaallisten Ilmavoimien oli tärkeä pysyä mu-kana tässä kehityksessä niin strategisella, kuin teknisellä tasolla. Kylmän sodan edetessä RAF tasapainoili myös sen faktan kanssa, että puolustusmäärärahoja leikattiin toisen maailmanso-dan jälkeen. Demobilisaatio käynnistyi heti sodan loputtua ja tärkeimmät investoinnit kohdis-tettiin sodan runteleman Ison-Britannian talouden elvyttämiseen. Politiikassa ja sotilasjoh-dossa oltiin yleisesti sitä mieltä, että laajamittaiset sotatoimet eivät olleet todennäköisiä aina-kaan seuraavaan kymmenen vuoden aikana. Lähdeaineistona tutkimuksessa on käytetty pääosin englanninkielisiä kirjallisuus- ja internet-lähteitä. Vertailussa on otettu huomioon teoksia mahdollisimman monelta eri aikakaudelta. Eri aikakausien lähteiden vertailu ja niiden avulla hävittäjäilmavoimien kehityksen selvittä-minen on tutkimuksen ydin. Tärkeimpänä aikalaislähteenä käytetään Ison-Britannian asevoi-mien vuosittaista julkaisusarjaa Brassey’s Annual: The Armed Forces Year-Book. Muut kir-jallisuusläheet jakautuvat tasaisesti eri vuosikymmenille vanhimpien ollessa 1950-luvulta ja uusimmat 2010-luvulta Tutkimuksessa on käytetty myös saatavilla olevia suomenkielisiä tut-kimuksia kuten Petteri Joukon väitöskirjaa Strike Hard, Strike Sure – Operation Musketeer: British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956. Tutkimuksen johtopäätöksissä todetaan hävittäjäilmavoimien roolin kasvaneen osana sodan-käyntiä toisen maailmansodan jälkeen. Hävittäjätoiminnan kehityksen suuntaan on vaikutta-nut etenkin toisessa maailmansodassa ensimmäisen kerran käytetty ydinase. Hävittäjäilma-voimien tehtävät muuttuivat vuosien 1945–1958 aikana sen moton mukaisesta hyökkäyksestä ja puolustuksesta (Offence, Defence) lähemmäs valvontaa ja turvaamista. Taustalla tärkeim-pänä säilyi kuitenkin aina Ison-Britannian ilmatilan puolustaminen. Hävittäjäilmavoimat ei osallistunut laajamittaisesti operaatioihin edellä mainittuina vuosina. Tämä ei kuitenkaan tar-koittanut, että se olisi ollut toimettomana. Ison-Britannian ilmatilaa oli valvottava idästä nousseen uhan takia vuoden jokaisena päivänä 24 tuntia vuorokaudessa sääolosuhteista riip-pumatta.

O gerenciamento de projetos e o planejamento de operações de guerra do Exército brasileiro

A presente pesquisa teve como objetivo verificar como a metodologia de gerenciamento de projetos, preconizada pelo Project Management Institute – PMI poderia contribuir para a modernização da metodologia de planejamento das operações de guerra do Exército Brasileiro. Para tanto, desenvolveu-se um estudo comparativo entre os processos dos grupos de iniciação e de planejamento definidos pelo PMI no seu Guia do Conhecimento em Gerenciamento de Projetos – PMBOK e o processo de planejamento de operações de guerra do Exército Brasileiro denominado Estudo de Situação. O trabalho foi desenvolvido com base em pesquisa bibliográfica e documental que contemplou renomados autores como Kerzner, Cleland, Vargas, Lima, Maximiano, Valeriano, Prado e Xavier, além dos manuais doutrinários do Exército Brasileiro pertinentes ao tema abordado e o próprio PMBOK. Contextualizando o trabalho foi feita a equiparação de uma operação militar de guerra a um projeto civil, e a caracterização do Estudo de Situação como um processo de planejamento e tomada de decisão equivalente ao conjunto de processos dos grupos de iniciação e de planejamento do gerenciamento de projetos. No estudo realizado verificou-se que as áreas de Custos, de Recursos Humanos e de Aquisições, em função das peculiaridades que envolvem uma operação de guerra são tratadas de forma tão diferenciadas do gerenciamento de projetos que não poderiam ser incluídas no estudo. Além disso, pôde-se constatar que o processo de planejamento militar é executado com uma grande parcela de intuição decorrente da aplicação de conhecimento tácito por parte dos seus executantes, o que não ocorre no gerenciamento de projetos onde o uso de um grande número de ferramentas de base lógica e matemática dá ao processo de planejamento dos projetos um maior grau de imparcialidade e precisão. Verificou-se também que o processo de planejamento militar produz um grande número de documentos gráficos que permitem uma “visão gráfica” de várias áreas ou aspectos do problema que, por sua vez, facilitam o uso da intuição na tomada de decisão. Enfim, depois de identificados os processos de gerenciamento de projetos que interessavam ao estudo e as peculiaridades da metodologia de planejamento em uso no Exército Brasileiro, chegou-se a conclusão, como se havia suposto, que a metodologia de gerenciamento de projetos efetivamente possui recursos que podem contribuir para a modernização do processo de planejamento de operações de guerra do Exército Brasileiro denominado Estudo de Situação. Esses recursos estão relacionados na conclusão do trabalho.

Regimes Militares e a Segurança Nacional no Cone Sul

The implantation of military regimes in South America, from the mid-1960s, happened in the context of the Cold War. As a result, both the occurrence of military coups and the plans and actions for the national defense of the Southern Cone States occurred following the logic of that period and the concept of hemispheric defense preached by the United States, with priority in combating the so-called internal subversion. Thus, the need to combat the “internal enemy” has led these countries to participate in hemispheric mechanisms or create his own arrangements for coordination. The article starts from the conflict hypothesis used by the military governments in their military planning to analyze the actions carried out against leftist movements, including coordination between the governments of the Southern Cone. The understanding of the defense concepts against Soviet communism allows us to understand that the groups placed against the military governments were seen as a danger to the State and, in that “state of war”, the means justified the ends.

EU Naval Force EUNAVFOR MED sets sail in troubled waters. CEPS Commentary, 26 June 2015

Apprehending pirates in the Indian Ocean is one thing. Defeating the networks through which smugglers traffic migrants through North Africa is quite another. The European Union’s new naval force deployment in the Mediterranean - EUNAVFOR MED - drew criticism from international partners and the general public alike when plans for a “boat-sinking” operation were unveiled, raising fears about unacceptable levels of violence and collateral damage; a European version of Mexico’s drug war. Yet the problems of EUNAVFOR MED lie less in clumsy public diplomacy than in the perilous mismatch between its stated objectives and the absence of a clear strategy and mandate, and this creates both operational and political risks for member states. Phase 1 of the operation: surveillance and assessment, has begun with no legal mandate to carry out the crucial phases 2 and 3: seek and destroy, whose military planning and outcomes are undetermined. Despite these limitations, the naval force could nevertheless mark a turning point in the EU’s security narrative, because it means that the Union is finally addressing the threats to security and the humanitarian tragedies in its southern neighbourhood.

Loran-C signal analysis : final report /

"Report no. CG-D-4-80."

Just Cause : Marine operations in Panama, 1988-1990 /

Includes index.

A Quest for excellence : appendix : final report /

"June 1986."

[Food for the Armed Forces.]

Includes bibliographies.

Quadrennial defense review : hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Fifth Congress, first session, May 20 and 21, 1997.

Shipping list no.: 98-0056-P.

Absorption of fat in various nutritional states; a bibliography and review of the literature,

Processed.

Towards a U.S. Army officer corps strategy for success : retaining talent /

Over the last 3 decades, dramatic labor market changes and well-intentioned but uninformed policies have created significant officer talent flight. Poor retention engenders substantial risk for the Army as it directly affects accessions, development, and employment of talent. The Army cannot make thoughtful policy decisions if its officer talent pipeline continues to leak at current rates. Since the Army cannot insulate itself from labor market forces as it tries to retain talent, the retention component of its officer strategy must rest upon sound market principles. It must be continuously resourced, executed, measured, and adjusted across time and budget cycles. Absent these steps, systemic policy, and decisionmaking failures will continue to confound Army efforts to create a talent-focused officer corps strategy.

Towards a U.S. Army officer corps strategy for success : developing talent /

Developing leaders through experience, formal training, and education is a long-standing hallmark of the U.S. Army. Maintaining its excellence as a developmental organization requires vigilance, however. Authorized strength and inventory mismatches, an inverse relationship between responsibility and formal developmental time, and sparse nonoperational development opportunities are serious challenges the Army must address. Doing so requires a talent development strategy firmly rooted in human capital theory. Such a strategy will recognize the value of continuing higher education, genuinely useful evaluations, and the signals associated with professional credentials.

Accessing talent : the foundation of a U.S. Army Officer Corps strategy /

This is the fourth of six monographs focused upon officer talent management in the U.S. Army. In it, the authors continue their examination of how the U.S. Army accesses, develops, retains, and employs officer talent. In particular, they focus upon the ways in which dynamic labor market conditions and generational preferences have shaped service propensity among potential officer prospects.