Strike hard, strike sure - Operation Musketeer : British military planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956


Autoria(s): Jouko, Petteri
Data(s)

16/03/2012

16/03/2012

2007

Resumo

Operation Musketeer, a combined joint Anglo-French operation aimed at regaining control of the Suez Canal in 1956, has received much attention from scholars. The most common approach to the crisis has been to examine the political dimension. The political events that led Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s cabinet to decide to use military force against the wishes of their superior American ally and in the face of American economic pressure and a Soviet threat to attack Paris and London with rockets have been analysed thoroughly. This is particularly the case because the ceasefire and eventual withdrawal were an indisputable defeat of British policy in the Middle East. The military operation not only ruined Prime Minister Eden’s career, but it also diminished the prestige of Britain. It was the beginning of the end, some claim. The British Empire would never be the same. As the consequences of using force are generally considered more important than the military operations themselves, very little attention has been paid to the military planning of Operation Musketeer. The difference between the number of publications on Operation Corporate of the Falklands War and Operation Musketeer is striking. Not only has there been little previous research on the military aspects of Musketeer, the conclusions drawn in the existing works have not reached a consensus. Some historians, such as Correlli Barnett, compare Musketeer to the utter failures of the Tudor landings and Gallipoli. Among significant politicians, Winston Churchill, who had retired from the prime ministership only a year before the Suez Crisis, described the operation as “the most ill-conceived and ill-executed imaginable”. Colin McInnes, a well-known author on British defence policy, represents the middle view when he describes the execution as “far from failure”. Finally, some, like Julian Thompson, the Commander of 3 Commando Brigade during the Falklands War, rate the military action itself as being successful. The interpretation of how successful the handling of the Suez Crisis was from the military point of view depends very much on the approach taken and the areas emphasised in the subject. Frequently, military operations are analysed in isolation from other events. The action of a country’s armed forces is separated from the wider context and evaluated without a solid point of comparison. Political consequences are often used as validated criteria, and complicated factors contributing to military performance are ignored. The lack of comprehensive research on the military action has left room for an analysis concentrating on the military side of the crisis.

Identificador

1238-2744

http://www.doria.fi/handle/10024/74703

URN:NBN:fi-fe201203161572

Idioma(s)

fi

Publicador

Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu

Relação

978-951- 25-1817-3

Julkaisusarja / Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, taktiikan laitos. 1, Taktiikan tutkimuksia, 1238-2744; n:o 1/2007

Direitos

Julkinen

Palavras-Chave #Iso-Britannia
Tipo

Tohtoriopiskelijan väitöskirja

G4 Monografiaväitöskirja