Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts

We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms rely on implicit incentive contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual accountability, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and assumes full responsibility for its outcome; and (ii) team accountability, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. The key trade-off is that team accountability mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cut-off rule: firms with high reputation concerns opt for team accountability, whereas firms with low reputation concerns opt for individual accountability. Team accountability is more likely the more acute the multitasking problem is. However, the cut-off rule need not hold if the firm combines implicit incentives with explicit pay-per-performance contracts.

Automatic information retrieval through text-mining

The dissertation presented for obtaining the Master’s Degree in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, at Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia

Tax policy stance over the business cycle: evidence from Europe

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Auto industry bailout: too big to fail. To big for whom?

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The politics of growth: Can lobbying raise growth and welfare?

This paper aims at analyzing the effects of lobbying over economic growth and primarily welfare. We model explicitly the interaction between policy-makers and firms in a setup where the latter undertakes political contributions to the former in exchange for more restrictive market regulations which induce exit and enhance the profitability of the market. In a sectorial equilibrium, despite stimulating growth, lobbying restricts the market structure and reduces welfare when compared to the free-entry outcome. However, once general equilibrium considerations are taken into account, we find that lobbying may improve welfare over a welfare maximizing free-entry equilibrium, by means of an expansion in aggregate demand. This introduces a new paradigm in the literature about the effects of lobbying over economic performance.

Share the fame or share the blame? The reputational implications of partnerships

We use an adverse selection model to study the dynamics of firms' reputations when firms implement joint projects. We show that in contrast with projects implemented by a single firm, in the case of joint projects a firm's reputation does not necessarily increase following a success and does not necessarily decrease following a failure. We also study how reputation considerations affect firms ' decisions to participate in joint projects. We show that a high quality partner may not be preferable to a low quality partner, and that a high reputation partner is not necessarily preferable to a low reputation partner.

Business plan analysis of a Brazilian software company

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Italian interlocking directorates: structure, evolution and cross-country comparisons

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Business plan for the brand My Tea Break

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Business development in Siemens global shared services delivery center Portugal

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

A gestão centrada no cliente: avaliação do nível de preparação organizacional e proposta de segmentação em ambiente business-to-business

Dissertação apresentada como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Estatística e Gestão de Informação

Sistema de business intelligence aplicado aos grupos de diagnóstico homogéneos

Dissertação apresentada como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Estatística e Gestão de Informação

Business model: What should be the strategy used by Smart Galp to implement and potentiate its value proposition in the Portuguese market?

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

How to potentiate the business model of Mobitto for B2B?

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Business model analysis of Mobitto: How to solve the chicken and egg problem of a multi-sided platform?

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics