Complicated Presence : The Unity of Being in Parmenides and Heidegger

The attempt to refer meaningful reality as a whole to a unifying ultimate principle - the quest for the unity of Being - was one of the basic tendencies of Western philosophy from its beginnings in ancient Greece up to Hegel's absolute idealism. However, the different trends of contemporary philosophy tend to regard such a speculative metaphysical quest for unity as obsolete. This study addresses this contemporary situation on the basis of the work of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Its methodological framework is Heidegger's phenomenological and hermeneutical approach to the history of philosophy. It seeks to understand, in terms of the metaphysical quest for unity, Heidegger's contrast between the first (Greek) beginning or "onset" (Anfang) of philosophy and another onset of thinking. This other onset is a possibility inherent in the contemporary situation in which, according to Heidegger, the metaphysical tradition has developed to its utmost limits and thereby come to an end. Part I is a detailed interpretation of the surviving fragments of the Poem of Parmenides of Elea (fl. c. 500 BC), an outstanding representative of the first philosophical beginning in Heidegger's sense. It is argued that the Poem is not a simple denial of apparent plurality and difference ("mortal acceptances," doxai) in favor of an extreme monism. Parmenides' point is rather to show in what sense the different instances of Being can be reduced to an absolute level of truth or evidence (aletheia), which is the unity of Being as such (to eon). What in prephilosophical human experience is accepted as being is referred to the source of its acceptability: intelligibility as such, the simple and undifferentiated presence to thinking that ultimately excludes unpresence and otherness. Part II interprets selected key texts from different stages in Heidegger's thinking in terms of the unity of Being. It argues that one aspect of Heidegger's sustained and gradually deepening philosophical quest was to think the unity of Being as singularity, as the instantaneous, context-specific, and differential unity of a temporally meaningful situation. In Being and Time (1927) Heidegger articulates the temporal situatedness of the human awareness of meaningful presence. His later work moves on to study the situational correlation between presence and the human awareness. Heidegger's "postmetaphysical" articulation seeks to show how presence becomes meaningful precisely as situated, in an event of differentiation from a multidimensional context of unpresence. In resigning itself to this irreducibly complicated and singular character of meaningful presence, philosophy also faces its own historically situated finitude. This resignation is an essential feature of Heidegger's "other onset" of thinking.

Society by Numbers : Studies on Model-Based Explanations in the Social Sciences

The aim of this dissertation is to provide conceptual tools for the social scientist for clarifying, evaluating and comparing explanations of social phenomena based on formal mathematical models. The focus is on relatively simple theoretical models and simulations, not statistical models. These studies apply a theory of explanation according to which explanation is about tracing objective relations of dependence, knowledge of which enables answers to contrastive why and how-questions. This theory is developed further by delineating criteria for evaluating competing explanations and by applying the theory to social scientific modelling practices and to the key concepts of equilibrium and mechanism. The dissertation is comprised of an introductory essay and six published original research articles. The main theses about model-based explanations in the social sciences argued for in the articles are the following. 1) The concept of explanatory power, often used to argue for the superiority of one explanation over another, compasses five dimensions which are partially independent and involve some systematic trade-offs. 2) All equilibrium explanations do not causally explain the obtaining of the end equilibrium state with the multiple possible initial states. Instead, they often constitutively explain the macro property of the system with the micro properties of the parts (together with their organization). 3) There is an important ambivalence in the concept mechanism used in many model-based explanations and this difference corresponds to a difference between two alternative research heuristics. 4) Whether unrealistic assumptions in a model (such as a rational choice model) are detrimental to an explanation provided by the model depends on whether the representation of the explanatory dependency in the model is itself dependent on the particular unrealistic assumptions. Thus evaluating whether a literally false assumption in a model is problematic requires specifying exactly what is supposed to be explained and by what. 5) The question of whether an explanatory relationship depends on particular false assumptions can be explored with the process of derivational robustness analysis and the importance of robustness analysis accounts for some of the puzzling features of the tradition of model-building in economics. 6) The fact that economists have been relatively reluctant to use true agent-based simulations to formulate explanations can partially be explained by the specific ideal of scientific understanding implicit in the practise of orthodox economics.

Constructive Perspectives on Inductive Logic

Constructive (intuitionist, anti-realist) semantics has thus far been lacking an adequate concept of truth in infinity concerning factual (i.e., empirical, non-mathematical) sentences. One consequence of this problem is the difficulty of incorporating inductive reasoning in constructive semantics. It is not possible to formulate a notion for probable truth in infinity if there is no adequate notion of what truth in infinity is. One needs a notion of a constructive possible world based on sensory experience. Moreover, a constructive probability measure must be defined over these constructively possible empirical worlds. This study defines a particular kind of approach to the concept of truth in infinity for Rudolf Carnap's inductive logic. The new approach is based on truth in the consecutive finite domains of individuals. This concept will be given a constructive interpretation. What can be verifiably said about an empirical statement with respect to this concept of truth, will be explained, for which purpose a constructive notion of epistemic probability will be introduced. The aim of this study is also to improve Carnap's inductive logic. The study addresses the problem of justifying the use of an "inductivist" method in Carnap's lambda-continuum. A correction rule for adjusting the inductive method itself in the course of obtaining evidence will be introduced. Together with the constructive interpretation of probability, the correction rule yields positive prior probabilities for universal generalizations in infinite domains.

Leibniz on Rational Decision-Making

In this study I discuss G. W. Leibniz's (1646-1716) views on rational decision-making from the standpoint of both God and man. The Divine decision takes place within creation, as God freely chooses the best from an infinite number of possible worlds. While God's choice is based on absolutely certain knowledge, human decisions on practical matters are mostly based on uncertain knowledge. However, in many respects they could be regarded as analogous in more complicated situations. In addition to giving an overview of the divine decision-making and discussing critically the criteria God favours in his choice, I provide an account of Leibniz's views on human deliberation, which includes some new ideas. One of these concerns is the importance of estimating probabilities in making decisions one estimates both the goodness of the act itself and its consequences as far as the desired good is concerned. Another idea is related to the plurality of goods in complicated decisions and the competition this may provoke. Thirdly, heuristic models are used to sketch situations under deliberation in order to help in making the decision. Combining the views of Marcelo Dascal, Jaakko Hintikka and Simo Knuuttila, I argue that Leibniz applied two kinds of models of rational decision-making to practical controversies, often without explicating the details. The more simple, traditional pair of scales model is best suited to cases in which one has to decide for or against some option, or to distribute goods among parties and strive for a compromise. What may be of more help in more complicated deliberations is the novel vectorial model, which is an instance of the general mathematical doctrine of the calculus of variations. To illustrate this distinction, I discuss some cases in which he apparently applied these models in different kinds of situation. These examples support the view that the models had a systematic value in his theory of practical rationality.

Talousmetafysiikan kritiikkiä

Jakke Holvas: A Critique of the Metaphysics of Economy The research problem of this dissertation is the commonly held opinion according to which everything has become a question of economy in the present day. Economy legitimates and justifies. In this study, the pattern of thinking and conceptualizing in which economy figures as the ultimate reason is called the metaphysics of economy. The defining characteristic of the metaphysics of economy is its failure to recognize non-economic rules, ethics, or ways of existence. The sources included in the study cover certain classics of philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Friedrich Nietzsche) and sociology (Karl Marx, Max Weber, Marcel Mauss), as well as the more recent French social theory (Jean Baudrillard, Michel Foucault). The research methods used are textual analysis and evaluation of concepts by means of historical comparison. The background to the study is given by the views of historians and sociologists according to whom traditional forms have ceased to exist and the market economy become established as the western system of values. The study identifies points of transition from the traditional forms to economic values. In addition, the dissertation focuses on the modern non-economic forms. The study examines the economic and ethical meanings of gift in antiquity in Homer, Plato, and Aristotle. Following Marcel Mauss, the study analyzes the forms and principles of gift exchange. The study also applies Nietzsche’s philosophy to evaluate under what conditions giving a gift becomes an act of exercising power that puts its receiver into debt. The conclusion of the study is that the classics of philosophy and sociology can rightly be interpreted in terms of the metaphysics of economy, but they also offer grounds for criticizing this metaphysics, even alternatives. One such alternative is non-economic archaic ethic. The study delineates a duality between economy and non-economy as well as creating concepts which could be used in the future to critically analyze economy from a position external to the economic system of concepts.

Heidegger ja logos : Oleminen ja aika inhimillisen järjellisyyden uudelleentulkintana

Käsilläolevan tutkielman kohteena on Martin Heideggerin (1889–1976) tulkintatyö, jonka hän varhaisessa ajattelussaan (1919–1927) kohdisti kreikkalaisen filosofian keskeiseen käsitteeseen logos: ”järki”, ”puhekyky”. Tutkielman tavoitteena on selvittää, miten Heidegger tulkitsi tätä käsitettä ja mikä merkitys Heideggerin tulkintatyöllä oli hänen pääteoksensa Sein und Zeit (1927, suom. Oleminen ja aika) kannalta. Työn keskeinen näkemys on, että Heideggerin ajattelu on nähtävä kreikkalaisen järjellisyyskäsityksen kriittisenä arviointina ja uudelleentulkintana. Heideggerin filosofia pohjautui vahvasti näkemykselle, jonka mukaan ajattelumme on hyvin perustavassa mielessä kiinni perinteessä ja sen välittämissä käsityksissä ja tulkinnoissa. Heideggerin mukaan filosofinen tutkimus ei voi koskaan täysin ennakkoluulotonta ja tämän vuoksi kaiken ajattelun on päästävä selville oman tilanteensa historiallisuudesta ja satunnaisuudesta; tieteellinen filosofia ei voi valita systemaattisen ja historiallisen lähestymistavan välillä, vaan sen on oltava olemuksellisesti molempia. Vuosina 1919–1929 Heideggerin historiallisen tulkintatyön ensisijaisena kohteena oli kreikkalainen filosofia, erityisesti Aristoteleen ajattelu. Heideggerin mukaan Aristoteles ei ollut ensimmäinen filosofista ajattelua harjoittanut henkilö, mutta Heidegger näki Aristoteleen tuotannon tiivistävän yhteen länsimaisen ajattelun keskeisimmät ennakkokäsitykset. Tutkielmassa seurataan Heideggerin pyrkimystä tulkita inhimillisen järjellisyyden ilmiötä, jonka juuret Heidegger paikansi Aristoteleen ihmismääritelmään zōon logon ekhon (”järjellinen eläin”). Aristotelesta seurannut skolastinen filosofia omaksui tämän määritelmän muodossa animal rationale, mutta Heidegger painotti, että tällä käännöksellä oli taipumus sivuuttaa se perusta, joka oli vielä ominainen kreikkalaiselle järjen käsitteelle. Sillä Aristoteleelle ja kreikkalaiselle ajattelulle logos ei merkinnyt ainoastaan haluihin ja tunteisiin rinnastuvaa mielen sisäistä kykyä vaan ennen kaikkea yhteisöllisesti jaettua tulkintaa ympäröivästä todellisuudesta. Tämä tulkinta ilmenee jokapäiväisesti keskustelun ja kommunikaation yhteydessä, mutta se on myös olennainen osa tapaamme jäsentää ympäröivää todellisuutta merkitykselliseksi. Heidegger kuitenkin argumentoi, että kreikkalainen ajattelu näki tämän kielellis-diskursiivisen käsittämisen alisteisena inhimillisen kokemuksen perustaville tavoille olla suhteessa todellisuuteen: puhtaalle aistihavainnolle (aisthēsis) sekä intuitiiviselle tajuamiselle (noein). Tutkielma koostuu neljästä luvusta sekä lyhyestä johdannosta. Ensimmäinen luku käsittelee Heideggerin filosofian kantavaa teemaa, kysymystä olemisen mielestä – sekä tämän kysymyksen perustaa kreikkalaisessa ajattelussa. Tämän jälkeen luodaan katsaus Heideggerin fenomenologiseen metodiin, sen ensisijaiseen kohdealueeseen inhimillisessä kokemuksessa sekä fenomenologisen tutkimuksen historialliseen ulottuvuuteen. Toisessa luvussa esitetään puolestaan Heideggerin tulkinta käsitteestä logos. Tulkinnan ymmärtämiseksi on välttämätöntä esittää tiivistetysti Heideggerin tulkinta kreikkalaisesta totuuden käsitteestä. Heideggerin mukaan kreikkalainen ajattelu ymmärsi totuuden monitasoisena ilmiönä, jonka perustavin käyttöyhteys on löydettävissä todellisuuden ilmiöstä. Kolmannessa luvussa pureudutaan niihin piirteisiin, joiden valossa Aristoteles Heideggerin mukaan tulkitsi kielen ja kokemuksen välistä suhdetta. Neljännessä luvussa esitetään, mitä edellä esitetyt oivallukset merkitsivät Heideggerin oman filosofisen projektin kannalta, erityisesti inhimillistä olemassaoloa (Dasein) selvittäneen fundamentaaliontologian kannalta.

Ethics in a Technological World : Framing the Questions and Three Approaches

This study addresses the following question: How to think about ethics in a technological world? The question is treated first thematically by framing central issues in the relationship between ethics and technology. This relationship has three distinct facets: i) technological advance poses new challenges for ethics, ii) traditional ethics may become poorly applicable in a technologically transformed world, and iii) the progress in science and technology has altered the concept of rationality in ways that undermine ethical thinking itself. The thematic treatment is followed by the description and analysis of three approaches to the questions framed. First, Hans Jonas s thinking on the ontology of life and the imperative of responsibility is studied. In Jonas s analysis modern culture is found to be nihilistic because it is unable to understand organic life, to find meaning in reality, and to justify morals. At the root of nihilism Jonas finds dualism, the traditional Western way of seeing consciousness as radically separate from the material world. Jonas attempts to create a metaphysical grounding for an ethic that would take the technologically increased human powers into account and make the responsibility for future generations meaningful and justified. The second approach is Albert Borgmann s philosophy of technology that mainly assesses the ways in which technological development has affected everyday life. Borgmann admits that modern technology has liberated humans from toil, disease, danger, and sickness. Furthermore, liberal democracy, possibilities for self-realization, and many of the freedoms we now enjoy would not be possible on a large scale without technology. Borgmann, however, argues that modern technology in itself does not provide a whole and meaningful life. In fact, technological conditions are often detrimental to the good life. Integrity in life, according to him, is to be sought among things and practices that evade technoscientific objectification and commodification. Larry Hickman s Deweyan philosophy of technology is the third approach under scrutiny. Central in Hickman s thinking is a broad definition of technology that is nearly equal to Deweyan inquiry. Inquiry refers to the reflective and experiential way humans adapt to their environment by modifying their habits and beliefs. In Hickman s work, technology consists of all kinds of activities that through experimentation and/or reflection aim at improving human techniques and habits. Thus, in addition to research and development, many arts and political reforms are technological for Hickman. He argues for recasting such distinctions as fact/value, poiesis/praxis/theoria, and individual/society. Finally, Hickman does not admit a categorical difference between ethics and technology: moral values and norms need to be submitted to experiential inquiry as well as all the other notions. This study mainly argues for an interdisciplinary approach to the ethics of technology. This approach should make use of the potentialities of the research traditions in applied ethics, the philosophy of technology, and the social studies on science and technology and attempt to overcome their limitations. This study also advocates an endorsement of mid-level ethics that concentrate on the practices, institutions, and policies of temporal human life. Mid-level describes the realm between the instantaneous and individualistic micro-level and the universal and global macro level.

Kategoriat oppaina Jumalan olemuksen ilmaisuun Lutherin teologiassa

Tutkielmassa selvitetään, miten Luther käyttää kategoriaoppia oppaana Jumalan olemuksen ilmaisuun. Päälähteenä on Genesis-kommentaari (1535-1545) mutta muitakin Lutherin tekstejä käytetään soveltuvin osin käsitteiden ja ajatusrakenteiden selventäjinä. Tutkielma jakautuu johdannon jälkeen taustalukuun ja kolmeen analyysilukuun ja loppukatsaukseen, jossa esitetään tutkimuksen tulokset. Taustaluvussa luodaan katsaus filosofisen kategoriaopin sisältöön ja historiaan uskonpuhdistukseen saakka. Aristoteleen luoma olemista määrittävä kategoriaoppi substansseista ja niiden satunnaisista ominaispiirteistä, aksidensseista, tulkitaan aina uudelleen jokaisessa filosofianhistoriallisessa kontekstissa. Länsimaisen teologian ja Lutherin ajattelun kannalta merkittävimmät kategoriaopin tulkisijat ovat Augustinus ja Tuomas Akvinolainen. Luvussa kolme selvitetään Lutherin suhdetta filosofiaan yleensä ja hänen kategoriaopin käyttöään. Luther yhtyy Augustinukseen siinä, että Jumalaa olemuksessaan ei voida tavoittaa kategorioiden avulla, mutta niitä voidaan käyttää oppaana sen ilmaisussa. Lutherin kritisoi skolastista kategoriaoppia, jossa kaikki muut kategoriat predikoidaan ensimmäisistä substansseista, ja käyttää itse Quintilianuksen tapaa, jossa mikä tahansa asia voidaan ottaa tarkasteluun kaikissa siihen soveltuvissa kategorioissa sen ymmärtämiseksi paremmin kokonaisuutena. Neljännessä luvussa analysoidaan substanssi-käsitettä ja substanssin kategoriaa ja viidennessä relaatiota ja relaation kategoriaa Lutherin jumalakäsityksessä ottaen huomioon myös skolastinen tausta. Substanssin Luther ymmärtää sekä raamatullisesti, että filosofisesti. Kategoriaopissa on kysymys filosofisesta substanssi-käsitteestä kokonaisyhteyden ollessa kuitenkin teologinen. Jumala substanssin kategoriassa on tavoittamaton ja absoluuttinen filosofian Jumala, johon ei liity Jumalan ristinteologista ja vastakohtiinsa kätkeytyvää ilmoitusta itsestään.Tällä tavalla ymmärretty Jumala ei ole tekemisissä ihmisten kanssa ja hänen tuntemisensa tavoitteleminen tällaisena on ihmisen omista lähtökohdista tapahtuvaa kunnian teologiaa. Relaation käsitteessä Luther liittyy Aristoteleen määritelmään: Relatiivit ovat subjektissaan ja suhteessa toisiinsa. Relationaalisuus kuuluu Lutherin teologiaan, sekä luotuisuuden että uskon relaationa. Jumalan ja ihmisen suhteessa on kaksi reaalista relaatiota, Jumalan relaatio ihmiseen ja ihmisen relaatio Jumalaan. Edellistä Luther kutsuu ilmoitukseksi ja jälkimmäistä uskoksi tai jumalanpalvelukseksi. Luther hyödyntää myös relatiivien käänteisyyttä ja yhtä aikaa olemassa olemista teologiassaan: Ihmisen käänteisjäsenenä voi olla vain hänelle ilmoitettu Jumala, joka antaa osallisuuden omasta ikuisesta elämästään ja itsestään tässä relaatiossa. Näin relaatiolla on myös ontologinen sisältö. Se tulee näkyviin myös jumalanpalveluksen nimityksessä ”Herran nimen avuksi huutamisena”, sillä Jumalan on nimessään olemuksellisesti läsnä. Tutkielman johdannossa esitetty hypoteesi filosofisen terminologian käytöstä teologisesti osoittautuu oikeaksi: Luther pysyy alkuperäisissä Aristoteleen kategorioiden määritelmissä ja merkityksissä ja käyttää niitä teologiansa ilmaisuvälineenä viittaussuhteenaan teologinen totuus. Kategoriaoppiaan esittäessään Lutherin varsinainen vastustaja ei ole Aristoteles vaan skolastinen teologia, jossa aristoteelinen filosofia on saanut ylivallan ja sivuuttanut Jumalan oman ilmoituksen itsestään. Summa summarum: Luther asettaa Jumalan relaation kategoriaan ilmaistakseen Jumalan olemuksen ristinteologisen itseilmoituksen ihmisille. Avainsanat: aristotelismi - Jumala - kategoriat – Luther-tutkimus - relaatio – skolastiikka –ontologia

Living Poetically in the Modern Age : The Situational Aspects of Kierkegaard's Thought

How did Søren Kierkegaard (1813 1855) situate the human subject into historical and social actuality? How did he take into consideration his own situatedness? As key for understanding these questions the research takes the ideal of living poetically that Kierkegaard outlined in his dissertation. In The Concept of Irony (1841) Kierkegaard took up this ideal of the Romantic ironists and made it into an ethical-religious ideal. For him the ideal of living poetically came to mean 1) becoming brought up by God, while 2) assuming ethical-religiously one s role and place in the historical actuality. Through an exegesis of Kierkegaard s texts from 1843 to 1851 it is shown how this ideal governed Kierkegaard s thought and action throughout his work. The analysis of Kierkegaard s ideal of living poetically not only a) shows how the Kierkegaardian subject is situated in its historical context. It also b) sheds light on Kierkegaard s social and political thought, c) helps to understand Kierkegaard s character as a religious thinker, and d) pits his ethical-religious orientation in life against its scientific and commonsense alternatives. The research evaluates the rationality of the way of life championed by Kierkegaard by comparing it with ways of life dominated by reflection and reasoning. It uses Kierkegaard s ideal of living poetically in trying to understand the tensions between religious and unreligious ways of life.

Ethics of Justification : A Defence of Contractualism

In What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon formulated a new version of the ethical theory called contractualism. This theory took reasons considerations that count in favour of judgment-sensitive attitudes to be the fundamental normative notion. It then used normative reasons to first account for evaluative properties. For an object to be valuable, on this view, is for it to have properties that provide reasons to have favourable attitudes towards the bearer of value. Scanlon also used reasons to account for moral wrongness. His contractualism claims that an act is morally wrong if it is forbidden by any set of moral principles that no one could reasonably reject. My thesis consists of five previously published articles which attempt to clarify Scanlon s theory and to defend it against its critics. The first article defends the idea that normative reason-relations are fundamental against Joshua Gert. Gert argues that rationality is a more basic notion than reasons and that reasons can be analysed in terms of their rationally requiring and justifying dimensions. The second article explores the relationship between value and reasons. It defends Scanlon s view according to which reasons are the more basic than value against those who think that reasons are based on the evaluative realm. The last three articles defend Scanlon s views about moral wrongness. The first one of them discusses a classic objection to contractualist theories. This objection is that principles which no one could reasonably reject are redundant in accounting for wrongness. This is because we need a prior notion of wrongness to select those principles and because such principles are not required to make actions wrong or to provide reasons against wrong actions. The fourth article explores the distinctive reasons which contractualists claim there are for avoiding the wrong actions. The last article argues against the critics of contractualism who claim that contractualism has implausible normative consequences for situations related to the treatment of different-sized groups of people.

Kristallivalheita : Itsepetos filosofisen tulkinnan lähtökohtana eräissä draaman klassikoissa

The philosophical problem of self-deception focuses the relation between desire, advantage, evidence and harm. A self-deceptive person is irrational because he or she belives or wants to belive contrary to the available evidence. The study focuses on different forms of self-deception that come out in certain classical Western dramas. The first self-deception forms are: "S knows that ~p but still belives that p because he wants that ~p", "S wants that p and therefore belives that p.", "S belives that p against evidence t because he wants to belive that p.", "S belives that p if t but S would belive that p even if ~t because S wants to belive that p.", "S belives that p (even if there is t that ~p) because S is ignorant of it." and "S belives that p (even if there is t that ~p) because of ignorant of t due to an internal deception." The main sources on self-deception are the views of contemporary researchers of the subject, such as Robert Audi, Marcia Baron, Bas C. van Fraassen, Mark Johnston, Mike W. Martin, Brian MaLaughlin, Alfred Mele, Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, William Ruddick and Stephen L. White. In this study it is claimed that Shakespeare´s Othello presents self-deception as a tragic phenomenom from witch it follows deceptions and murders. Moliére´s Tartuffe deals with a phony hypocrite´s attempts at cheating. Ibsen´s Wild Duck defends the necessity of vital lies. Beckett´s Waiting for Godot deals with the self-deception witch is related to the waiting of the supernatural rescuer. Miller´s The Death of a Salesman tells about a man who, while pursuing the American myth of success, winds both himself and his family into the skeins of self-deception. They are studied with a Barthesian method that emphasizes the autonomy of literary work and its interpretation independently of the author´s personal history and social conditions. Self-deception has been regarded as an immoral way of thinking or way of action. However, vital lies show the necessity or necessity of the self-deception when it brings joy and optimism to the human being and supports his or her self-esteem and does not cause a suffering or damage, either to self or others. In the study, the processual character of self-deception is brought out.

Imagination and diversity in the philosophy of Hobbes

This dissertation is a study of some aspects of theoretical philosophy of the early modern thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The focal point of the work is Hobbes s conception of imagination, which is discussed from both a systematic and a historical point of view, as well as in the light of contemporary scholarship. I argue that though there are significant similarities between the view of Hobbes and that of his predecessors, he gives a novel theory of imagination, which clarifies not only early modern discussions on human nature, knowledge, science, and literary criticism, but above all his own versatile philosophy. The prologue of the dissertation introduces methodological principles and gives critical remarks on the standard view of Hobbes. In Chapter II, I discuss the prominent theories of imagination before Hobbes and link them to his account. I argue that though Hobbes adopted the Aristotelian framework, his view is not reduced to it, as he borrows from various sources, for instance, from the Stoics and from Renaissance thought. Chapters III and IV form the psychological part of the work. In the Chapter III I argue that imagination, not sense, is central in the basic cognitive operations of the mind and that imagination has a decisive role in Hobbes s theory of motivation. The Chapter IV concentrates on various questions of Hobbes s philosophy of language. The chapter ends with a defence of a less naturalistic reading of Hobbes s theory of human nature. Chapters V and VI form the epistemological part of the work. I suggest, contrary to what has been recently claimed, that though Hobbes s ideas of good literary style do have a point of contact with his philosophy (e.g. the psychology of creative process), his ideas in the field are independent of his project of demonstrative political science. Instead I argue that the novelty of his major political work, Leviathan (1651), is based on a new theory of knowledge which he continued to develop in the post-Leviathan works. Chapter VII seeks to connect the more theoretical conclusions of Chapters V and VI to Hobbes's idea(l) of science as well as to his philosophical practice. On the basis of Hobbes s own writings as well as some historical examinations, I argue that method is not an apt way to conceptualise Hobbes s philosophical practice. Contemporary readings of Hobbes s theory of science are critically discussed and the chapter ends with an analysis of Hobbes s actual argumentation. In addition to the concluding remarks, the epilogue suggest three things: first, imagination is central when trying to understand Hobbes s versatile philosophy; second, that it is misleading to depict Hobbes as a simple materialist, mechanist, and empiricist; and, third, that in terms of imagination his influence on early modern thought has not been fully appreciated.

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights : A comparative analysis of the conceptual relationship between democracy and rights in contemporary political theories

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights is a research in normative political theory, based on comparative analysis of contemporary democratic theories, classified roughly as conventional liberal, deliberative democratic and radical democratic. Its focus is on the conceptual relationship between alternative sources of democratic legitimacy: democratic inclusion and liberal rights. The relationship between rights and democracy is studied through the following questions: are rights to be seen as external constraints to democracy or as objects of democratic decision making processes? Are individual rights threatened by public participation in politics; do constitutionally protected rights limit the inclusiveness of democratic processes? Are liberal values such as individuality, autonomy and liberty; and democratic values such as equality, inclusion and popular sovereignty mutually conflictual or supportive? Analyzing feminist critique of liberal discourse, the dissertation also raises the question about Enlightenment ideals in current political debates: are the universal norms of liberal democracy inherently dependent on the rationalist grand narratives of modernity and incompatible with the ideal of diversity? Part I of the thesis introduces the sources of democratic legitimacy as presented in the alternative democratic models. Part II analyses how the relationship between rights and democracy is theorized in them. Part III contains arguments by feminists and radical democrats against the tenets of universalist liberal democratic models and responds to that critique by partly endorsing, partly rejecting it. The central argument promoted in the thesis is that while the deconstruction of modern rationalism indicates that rights are political constructions as opposed to externally given moral constraints to politics, this insight does not delegitimize the politics of universal rights as an inherent part of democratic institutions. The research indicates that democracy and universal individual rights are mutually interdependent rather than oppositional; and that democracy is more dependent on an unconditional protection of universal individual rights when it is conceived as inclusive, participatory and plural; as opposed to robust majoritarian rule. The central concepts are: liberalism, democracy, legitimacy, deliberation, inclusion, equality, diversity, conflict, public sphere, rights, individualism, universalism and contextuality. The authors discussed are e.g. John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, Iris Young, Chantal Mouffe and Stephen Holmes. The research focuses on contemporary political theory, but the more classical work of John S. Mill, Benjamin Constant, Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt is also included.

Ethics and Aesthetics : Intersections in Iris Murdoch's Philosophy

The study addresses the question concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in the philosophy of Iris Murdoch. The main argument is that Murdoch s philosophy cannot be accurately understood without an understanding of the relationship she sees between the aesthetic experience and morality. Reading Murdoch s philosophy with this relationship in mind shows that it must be considered as a relevant alternative to the main forms of aesthetic-ethical theories. The study consists of seven previously published articles and a summary. It shows that Murdoch belongs to a tradition of philosophers who seek to broaden the scope of ethics by reference to aesthetic value and aesthetic experience. She sees an attitude responsible for aesthetic experiences as relevant for morality. However, she does not collapse morality into aesthetic experience. The two meet on the level of the subject s attitude towards its object, but there is a distinction between the experiences that accompany the attitudes. Aesthetic experiences can function as a clue to morals in that they present in a pleasing manner moral truths which otherwise might be psychologically too difficult to face. Murdoch equates the aesthetic attitude with virtuous love characterized by unselfish attention to its object. The primary object of such love is in Murdoch s account another human individual in her particularity. She compares the recognition of the other person as a particular existence to the experience of the Kantian sublime and offers her own version of the true sublime which is the experience of awe in the face of the infinity of the task of understanding others. One of the most central claims in Murdoch s philosophy is that human consciousness is evaluatively structured. This claim challenges the distinction between facts and values which has had an immense influence on modern moral philosophy. One argument with which Murdoch supports her claim is the nature of great literature. According to her, the standard of greatness in literature is the authors awareness of the independent existence of individuals in the particularity of their evaluative consciousnesses. The analysis of the standard of greatness in literature is also Murdoch s only argument for the claim that the primary object of the loving unselfish attention is the other particular individual. She is convinced that great literature reveals a deep truth about the human condition with its capacity to capture the particular. Abstract philo¬sophical discourse cannot compete with this capacity but it should take truths revealed by literature seriously in its theorising. Recognising this as Murdoch s stand on the question of the relation between philosophy and literature as forms of human discourse settles whether she is part of what has been called philosophy s turn to literature. The answer is yes.

Temporality of the Face-to-Face in Levinas' Ethics

This thesis focuses on a connection between temporality and ethics in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. I argue that Levinas understanding of temporality is rooted in the function of pra-impression which in its turn does not belong to the intentional consciousness but reveals a subject as being open to the Other. In the face-to-face situation with the Other the pra-impression is an essential and constitutive force: it fractures the moment of the present, questions subjectivity and generates a new meaning of temporality. As a result a responsible subject is revealed; responsibility for the Other marks a latent birth of the subject which is prior to any origin of subjectivity, it discloses a meaning of time that does not belong to the subject but is found in the Other. In this study I suggest that pra-impression finds its productive force in language, the function of the feminine, and what Levinas calls the other in the same .