Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade

We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade is realized through decentralized pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate inactive members for abstaining from trade. In a stable market outcome, cartels set Nash equilibrium quantities and cartel memberships are immune to defections. We prove that the set of stable market outcomes is non-empty and we provide its full characterization. Stable market outcomes are of two types: (i) at least one cartel actively restrains trade and the levels of market participation are balanced, or (ii) only one cartel, eventually the cartel that forms on the long side of the market, is active and it reduces trade slightly below the opponent's.

A foundation model for marxian breakdown theories based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism (Long version)

The paper presents a foundation model for Marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism. All of these theories are based on one or more of "the historical tendencies": a rising capital-wage bill ratio, a rising capitalist share and a falling rate of profit. The model is a foundation in the sense that it generates these tendencies in the context of a model with a constant subsistence wage. The newly discovered generating mechanism is based on neo-classical reasoning for a model with land. It is non-Ricardian in that land augmenting technical progress can be unboundedly rapid. Finally, since the model has no steady state, it is necessary to use a new technique, Chaplygin's method, to prove the result.

A foundation model for marxian breakdown theories based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism.

The paper presents a foundation model for Marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism. All of these theories are based on one or more of ?the historical tendencies?: a rising capital-wage bill ratio, a rising capitalist share and a falling rate of profit. The model is a foundation in the sense that it generates these tendencies in the context of a model with a constant subsistence wage. The newly discovered generating mechanism is based on neo-classical reasoning for a model with land. It is non-Ricardian in that land augmenting technical progress can be unboundedly rapid. Finally, since the model has no steady state, it is necessary to use a new technique, Chaplygin?s method, to prove the result.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme

This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game

Generalized property R and the Schoenflies Conjecture

There is a relation between the generalized Property R Conjecture and the Schoenflies Conjecture that suggests a new line of attack on the latter. The new approach gives a quick proof of the genus 2 Schoenflies Conjecture and suffices to prove the genus 3 case, even in the absence of new progress on the generalized Property R Conjecture.

Variables efectives de l'empowerment

Aquest treball que porta per títol variables efectives de l’empowerment es el treball investigació del programa de doctorat Interuniversitari en Organització i Administració d’Empreses. El treball està composat per tres parts diferenciades. La primera part del treball consisteix amb el comentari de vint articles relacionats amb la motivació, el downsizing i l’empowerment. Els resums exposats han servit per establir els fonaments teòrics previs al model proposat de variables efectives d’empowerment. La segona part consisteix amb l’elaboració d’un article que resumeix les principals fonts consultades i proposa un model de classificació de les variables que poden contribuir a aconseguir amb èxit un procés d’empowerment. Les variables efectives es poden dividir en variables recíproques, variables unidireccionals, variables compartides i variables reflexives. La tercera part i amb l’objectiu de comprovar la validesa de model s’ha desenvolupat un qüestionari per mesurar l’estat de les variables anomenades efectives d’empowerment i la seva contribució amb l’èxit del procés. Es descriu l’eina desenvolupada, el tractament i la representació de les dades obtingudes. Finalment es pot trobar els primers resultats de la prova pilot realitzada per provar el model conceptual proposat.

Inverse Problems for multiple invariant curves

Planar polynomial vector fields which admit invariant algebraic curves, Darboux integrating factors or Darboux first integrals are of special interest. In the present paper we solve the inverse problem for invariant algebraic curves with a given multiplicity and for integrating factors, under generic assumptions regarding the (multiple) invariant algebraic curves involved. In particular we prove, in this generic scenario, that the existence of a Darboux integrating factor implies Darboux integrability. Furthermore we construct examples where the genericity assumption does not hold and indicate that the situation is different for these.

Reflected Backward Stochastic Differential Equation with Jumps and RCLL Obstacle

In this paper we study one-dimensional reflected backward stochastic differential equation when the noise is driven by a Brownian motion and an independent Poisson point process when the solution is forced to stay above a right continuous left-hand limited obstacle. We prove existence and uniqueness of the solution by using a penalization method combined with a monotonic limit theorem.

Lp-solutions to BSDEs with super-linear growth coefficient. Application to degenerate semilinear PDEs.

We consider multidimensional backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). We prove the existence and uniqueness of solutions when the coefficient grow super-linearly, and moreover, can be neither locally Lipschitz in the variable y nor in the variable z. This is done with super-linear growth coefficient and a p-integrable terminal condition (p & 1). As application, we establish the existence and uniqueness of solutions to degenerate semilinear PDEs with superlinear growth generator and an Lp-terminal data, p & 1. Our result cover, for instance, the case of PDEs with logarithmic nonlinearities.

The third order Melnikov function of a quadratic center under quadratic perturbation

We study quadratic perturbations of the integrable system (1+x)dH; where H =(x²+y²)=2: We prove that the first three Melnikov functions associated to the perturbed system give rise at most to three limit cycles.

Large deviation for BSDE with subdifferential operator

In this paper we prove that the solution of a backward stochastic differential equation, which involves a subdifferential operator and associated to a family of reflecting diffusion processes, converges to the solution of a deterministic backward equation and satisfes a large deviation principle.

The Cuntz semigroup, the Elliott conjecture, and dimension functions on C*-Algebras

We prove that the Cuntz semigroup is recovered functorially from the Elliott invariant for a large class of C¤-algebras. In particular, our results apply to the largest class of simple C¤-algebras for which K-theoretic classification can be hoped for. This work has three significant consequences. First, it provides new conceptual insight into Elliott's classification program, proving that the usual form of the Elliott conjecture is equivalent, among Z-stable algebras, to a conjecture which is in general substantially weaker and for which there are no known counterexamples. Second and third, it resolves, for the class of algebras above, two conjectures of Blackadar and Handelman concerning the basic structure of dimension functions on C¤-algebras. We also prove in passing that the Kuntz-Pedersen semigroup is recovered functorially from the Elliott invariant for all simple unital C¤-algebras of interest.

Real rank zero algebras have the corona factorization property

The purpose of this short note is to prove that a stable separable C*-algebra with real rank zero has the so-called corona factorization property, that is, all the full multiplier projections are properly in finite. Enroute to our result, we consider conditions under which a real rank zero C*-algebra admits an injection of the compact operators (a question already considered in [21]).