Monetary and fiscal policies interactions in a monetary union with country-size asymmetry

Within a country-size asymmetric monetary union, idiosyncratic shocks and national fiscal stabilization policies cause asymmetric cross-border effects. These effects are a source of strategic interactions between noncoordinated fiscal and monetary policies: on the one hand, due to larger externalities imposed on the union, large countries face less incentives to develop free-riding fiscal policies; on the other hand, a larger strategic position vis-à-vis the central bank incentives the use of fiscal policy to, deliberately, influence monetary policy. Additionally, the existence of non-distortionary government financing may also shape policy interactions. As a result, optimal policy regimes may diverge not only across the union members, but also between the latter and the monetary union. In a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model for a monetary union, we consider two fiscal policy scenarios: (i) lump-sum taxes are raised to fully finance the government budget and (ii) lump-sum taxes do not ensure balanced budgets in each period; therefore, fiscal and monetary policies are expected to impinge on debt sustainability. For several degrees of country-size asymmetry, we compute optimal discretionary and dynamic non-cooperative policy games and compare their stabilization performance using a union-wide welfare measure. We also assess whether these outcomes could be improved, for the monetary union, through institutional policy arrangements. We find that, in the presence of government indebtedness, monetary policy optimally deviates from macroeconomic to debt stabilization. We also find that policy cooperation is always welfare increasing for the monetary union as a whole; however, indebted large countries may strongly oppose to this arrangement in favour of fiscal leadership. In this case, delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central bank proves to be fruitful to improve the union’s welfare.

Imparidade de ativos fixos tangíveis: aspetos contabilísticos, fiscais e de auditoria

Dissertação apresentada ao Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Auditoria Orientada por: Mestre Carlos Martins

Planeamento fiscal abusivo: exemplificação de alguns esquemas

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças sobre a orientação do Doutor José Campos Amorim.

O regime fiscal cooperativo – análise crítica e desafios

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças, sob orientação de Doutora Deolinda Meira e Doutora Nina Aguiar

A Influência da teoria da agência na estrutura de capital na indústria do calçado

apresentado ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a Dissertação de Mestrado para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças sob orientação do Mestre Adalmiro Álvaro Malheiro de Castro Andrade Pereira

Fiscal decentralisation and economic theory

There is no complete overview or discussion of the literature of the economics of federalism and fiscal decentralization, even though scholarly interest in the topic has been increasing significantly over recent years. This paper provides a general, brief but comprehensive overview of the main insights from the literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization. In doing so, literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization is grouped into two main approaches: “first generation of theories” and “second generation of theories”.

O Combate à fraude e evasão fiscais: a atuação da administração tributária e a avaliação dos resultados obtidos

Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Auditoria Orientação científica do Professor Coordenador Rodrigo Mário Oliveira Carvalho

Cournot competition between a non-profit firm and a for-profit firm with uncertainty

In this paper, we consider a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analyze the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Privatization and government preference in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue in a Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm.

Privatization and government preferences in a mixed duopoly: Stackelberg versus Cournot

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue, by considering a (sequential) Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm. Furthermore, we compare our results with the ones previously published by an other author obtained in a (simultaneous) Cournot duopoly.

(Des)vantagens do regime especial de tributação dos grupos de sociedades

Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças Orientador: Mestre, Gabriela Pinheiro

O recurso a procedimentos de auditoria financeira no combate à fraude e evasão fiscais

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Auditoria, sob orientação de Mestre Adalmiro Álvaro Malheiro de Castro Andrade Pereira

Smart Grid Market Using Joint Energy and Ancillary Services Bids

The power systems operation in the smart grid context increases significantly the complexity of their management. New approaches for ancillary services procurement are essential to ensure the operation of electric power systems with appropriate levels of stability, safety, quality, equity and competitiveness. These approaches should include market mechanisms which allow the participation of small and medium distributed energy resources players in a competitive market environment. In this paper, an energy and ancillary services joint market model used by an aggregator is proposed, considering bids of several types of distributed energy resources. In order to improve economic efficiency in the market, ancillary services cascading market mechanism is also considered in the model. The proposed model is included in MASCEM – a multi-agent system electricity market simulator. A case study considering a distribution network with high penetration of distributed energy resources is presented.

Electricity markets modeling considering complex contracts and aggregators

All over the world, the liberalization of electricity markets, which follows different paradigms, has created new challenges for those involved in this sector. In order to respond to these challenges, electric power systems suffered a significant restructuring in its mode of operation and planning. This restructuring resulted in a considerable increase of the electric sector competitiveness. Particularly, the Ancillary Services (AS) market has been target of constant renovations in its operation mode as it is a targeted market for the trading of services, which have as main objective to ensure the operation of electric power systems with appropriate levels of stability, safety, quality, equity and competitiveness. In this way, with the increasing penetration of distributed energy resources including distributed generation, demand response, storage units and electric vehicles, it is essential to develop new smarter and hierarchical methods of operation of electric power systems. As these resources are mostly connected to the distribution network, it is important to consider the introduction of this kind of resources in AS delivery in order to achieve greater reliability and cost efficiency of electrical power systems operation. The main contribution of this work is the design and development of mechanisms and methodologies of AS market and for energy and AS joint market, considering different management entities of transmission and distribution networks. Several models developed in this work consider the most common AS in the liberalized market environment: Regulation Down; Regulation Up; Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve. The presented models consider different rules and ways of operation, such as the division of market by network areas, which allows the congestion management of interconnections between areas; or the ancillary service cascading process, which allows the replacement of AS of superior quality by lower quality of AS, ensuring a better economic performance of the market. A major contribution of this work is the development an innovative methodology of market clearing process to be used in the energy and AS joint market, able to ensure viable and feasible solutions in markets, where there are technical constraints in the transmission network involving its division into areas or regions. The proposed method is based on the determination of Bialek topological factors and considers the contribution of the dispatch for all services of increase of generation (energy, Regulation Up, Spinning and Non-Spinning reserves) in network congestion. The use of Bialek factors in each iteration of the proposed methodology allows limiting the bids in the market while ensuring that the solution is feasible in any context of system operation. Another important contribution of this work is the model of the contribution of distributed energy resources in the ancillary services. In this way, a Virtual Power Player (VPP) is considered in order to aggregate, manage and interact with distributed energy resources. The VPP manages all the agents aggregated, being able to supply AS to the system operator, with the main purpose of participation in electricity market. In order to ensure their participation in the AS, the VPP should have a set of contracts with the agents that include a set of diversified and adapted rules to each kind of distributed resource. All methodologies developed and implemented in this work have been integrated into the MASCEM simulator, which is a simulator based on a multi-agent system that allows to study complex operation of electricity markets. In this way, the developed methodologies allow the simulator to cover more operation contexts of the present and future of the electricity market. In this way, this dissertation offers a huge contribution to the AS market simulation, based on models and mechanisms currently used in several real markets, as well as the introduction of innovative methodologies of market clearing process on the energy and AS joint market. This dissertation presents five case studies; each one consists of multiple scenarios. The first case study illustrates the application of AS market simulation considering several bids of market players. The energy and ancillary services joint market simulation is exposed in the second case study. In the third case study it is developed a comparison between the simulation of the joint market methodology, in which the player bids to the ancillary services is considered by network areas and a reference methodology. The fourth case study presents the simulation of joint market methodology based on Bialek topological distribution factors applied to transmission network with 7 buses managed by a TSO. The last case study presents a joint market model simulation which considers the aggregation of small players to a VPP, as well as complex contracts related to these entities. The case study comprises a distribution network with 33 buses managed by VPP, which comprises several kinds of distributed resources, such as photovoltaic, CHP, fuel cells, wind turbines, biomass, small hydro, municipal solid waste, demand response, and storage units.

Incentivos ao investimento estrangeiro

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças, sob orientação de Doutor José de Campos Amorim