Cournot competition between a non-profit firm and a for-profit firm with uncertainty
| Data(s) |
27/05/2014
27/05/2014
2010
|
|---|---|
| Resumo |
In this paper, we consider a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analyze the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes. |
| Identificador |
978-0-7354-0766-4 doi: 10.1063/1.3366514 |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Publicador |
AIP Publishing |
| Relação |
http://scitation.aip.org/content/aip/proceeding/aipcp/10.1063/1.3366514 |
| Direitos |
openAccess |
| Palavras-Chave | #Industrial organization #Nonprofit #Asymmetric taxation #Stochastic demand #Bayesian-Nash equilibrium |
| Tipo |
conferenceObject |
