Ligadura funcional num caso de entorse da acrómio-clavicolar, grau III: que resultados em termos de restabelecimento de força muscular?

Com o presente estudo pretendeu-se: (1) verificar se a ligadura funcional para a lesão da articulação Acrómio-Clavicular (AC), descrita por Chanussot e Danowski (2001), contribui para o restabelecimento da força muscular num paciente com lesão grau III; e, (2) observar se a ligadura funcional altera o padrão electromiográfico dos principais músculos superficiais do complexo articular do ombro: infra-espinhoso, deltóide anterior, grande peitoral, trapézio superior e trapézio inferior. Efectuou-se assim um estudo de caso do tipo observacional, descritivo transversal. Para avaliação da força muscular foi utilizado um dinamómetro isocinético e para a avaliação do nível de activação de fibras musculares foi utilizada a EMG de superfície. Os movimentos em análise foram os de rotação interna e externa, a 60º/s e 180º/s. Os resultados revelaram, na presença de ligadura, um aumento do Peak Torque dos rotadores internos, assim como da actividade do grande peitoral e trapézio inferior. Constatou-se ainda uma diminuição do Peak Torque e da percentagem do Root Mean Square do trapézio inferior, trapézio superior e grande peitoral, do ombro esquerdo, sem ligadura, quando comparado com o ombro contralateral. A ligadura funcional, numa entorse da acromio-clavicular grau III, poderá contribuir para a recuperação de força muscular e activação de fibras musculares.

Feiras e exposições internacionais: um estudo exploratório dos fatores de decisão e motivação de participação numa feira internacional

Dissertação apresentada ao Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Empreendedorismo e Internacionalização Orientada por Prof. Doutor José Freitas Santos

Family and non-family businesses on internal factors of entrepreneurship

Small firms are a major player in development. Thus, entrepreneurship is frequently attached to these rms and it must be present in daily management of factors such as planning and cooperation. We intend to analyze these factors, comparing familiar and non-familiar businesses. This study was conducted in a Portuguese region in the north of Portugal - Vale do Sousa . The results allow us to conclude that even with some managerial di erences it was not possible to identify distinct patterns between them. The main goal of this paper is to open research lines on important issues to distinguish familiar from non-familiar businesses.

Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods

We study the effects of product differentiation in a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty for the first mover. We do an ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the profits of the leader and of the follower firms in terms of product differentiation and of the demand uncertainty. We show that even with small uncertainty about the demand, the follower firm can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their products are sufficiently differentiated. We also compute the probability of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm, subsequently showing the advantages and disadvantages of being either the leader or the follower firm.

Maximum-revenue tariff under Bertrand duopoly with unknown costs

This paper considers an international trade under Bertrand model with differentiated products and with unknown production costs. The home government imposes a specific import tariff per unit of imports from the foreign firm. We prove that this tariff is decreasing in the expected production costs of the foreign firm and increasing in the production costs of the home firm. Furthermore, it is increasing in the degree of product substitutability. We also show that an increase in the tariff results in both firms increasing their prices, an increase in both expected sales and expected profits for the home firm, and a decrease in both expected sales and expected profits for the foreign firm.

Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Simultaneous decisions or leadership in an international competition

In this paper, we study an international market with demand uncertainty. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. The uncertainty is resolved between the decisions made by the home government and by the firms. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Uncertainty in a mixed duopoly with quadratic costs

In this paper, we consider a mixed market with uncertain demand, involving one private firm and one public firm with quadratic costs. The model is a two-stage game in which players choose to make their output decisions either in stage 1 or stage 2. We assume that the demand is unknown until the end of the first stage. We compute the output levels at equilibrium in each possible role. We also determine ex-ante and ex-post firms’ payoff functions.

Desirable role in a price-setting international mixed duopoly

In this paper, we study the order of moves in a mixed international duopoly for differentiated goods, where firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. We discuss the desirable role of the public firm by comparing welfare among three games. We find that, in the three possible roles, the domestic public firm put a lower price, and then produces more than the foreign private firm.

Desirable role in an international duopoly model with tariffs

In this paper, we study an international market model in which the home government imposes a tariff on the imported goods. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize a function that cares about the home firm’s profit and the total revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Environmental and international tariffs in a mixed duopoly

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets, in which the public firm maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and its profit. We also analyse the effects of privatization. The model has two stages. In the first stage, governments choose environmental taxes and import tariffs, simultaneously. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output levels for the domestic market and to export. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

International Stackelberg model with tariffs

This paper analyses the effects of tariffs on an international economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, located in two countries, each one producing a homogeneous good for both home consumption and export to the other identical country. We consider a game among governments and firms. First, the government imposes a tariff on imports and then we consider the two types of moving: simultaneous (Cournot-type model) and sequential (Stackelberg-type model) decisions by the firms. We also compare the results obtained in each model.

Privatization in a mixed duopoly with environmental taxes

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and privatization in a mixed duopoly, in which the public firm aims to maximize the social welfare. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.

Licensing in an international triopoly

We study the effects of entry of two foreign firms on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the incumbent is technologically superior to the entrants. We consider two different situations: (i) the cost-reducing innovation is licensed to both entrants; (ii) the cost- reducing innovation is licensed to just one of the entrants. We analyse three kind of license: (lump- sum) fixed-fee; (per-unit) royalty; and two-part tariff, that is a combination of a fixed-fee and a royalty. We prove that a two part tariff is never an optimal licensing scheme for the incumbent. Moreover, (i) when the technology is licensed to the two entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only output royalty; and (ii) when the technology is licensed to just one of the entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only a fixed-fee.

Business micro-location: factors, preferences and indicators to assess the influence factors

The paper presents a study on business micro-location behaviour as well as corresponding factors of influence, conducted in two metropolitan areas, Bucharest-Ilfov (Romania) and Greater Porto (Portugal). By business micro-location we refer to a specific site such as a building or facility, accommodating a business within a small, compact geographical area (e.g. metropolitan area). At this geographical scale, the macroeconomic layer factors were excluded, applicable when discern between regions or countries. The factors derived from location theory and previous empirical studies were surveyed, completing a cross-sectional analysis in order to find out the specific weights of the location factors and preferences, by region and by industry. Based on already established firms’ feedback on location, the specific weights were granted by each industry to the main location factors, types of areas, and types of accommodation facilities. The authors also suggested a model to integrate these results into a Geographical Information System (GIS).