Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods


Autoria(s): Ferreira, Fernanda A.; Ferreira, Flávio; Ferreira, Miguel; Pinto, Alberto A.
Data(s)

06/01/2014

06/01/2014

2015

Resumo

We study the effects of product differentiation in a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty for the first mover. We do an ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the profits of the leader and of the follower firms in terms of product differentiation and of the demand uncertainty. We show that even with small uncertainty about the demand, the follower firm can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their products are sufficiently differentiated. We also compute the probability of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm, subsequently showing the advantages and disadvantages of being either the leader or the follower firm.

This work is part-funded by the ERDF European Regional Development Fund through the COMPETE Programme (operational programme for competitiveness) and by National Funds through the FCT Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology)within project FCOMP – 01-0124-FEDER-022701.This work was partly funded by National Funds through the FCT Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology) within project PTDC/MAT/121107/2010. Fernanda Ferreira, Flávio Ferreira and Miguel Ferreira thank financial support from ESEIG/IPP. Alberto Pinto also thanks financial support from FCUP/UP. Miguel Ferreira also thanks financial support given by FCT in the form of a Pos-Doc grant with the reference SFRH/BPD/73357/2010.

Identificador

Fernanda A. Ferreira, Flávio Ferreira, Miguel Ferreira & Alberto A. Pinto (2015) Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods, Optimization, 64:4, 877-893, DOI: 10.1080/02331934.2013.836649

1029-4945

0233-1934

10.1080/02331934.2013.836649

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/3212

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

Taylor & Francis

Relação

Optimization: A Journal of Mathematical Programming and Operations Research

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02331934.2013.836649#.UsqPyNJdXTo

Direitos

openAccess

Palavras-Chave #Game theory #Stackelberg model #Demand uncertainty #Differentiation #Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Tipo

article