Uncertainty in a mixed duopoly with quadratic costs


Autoria(s): Ferreira, Fernanda A.; Ferreira, Flávio
Data(s)

29/08/2014

29/08/2014

2011

Resumo

In this paper, we consider a mixed market with uncertain demand, involving one private firm and one public firm with quadratic costs. The model is a two-stage game in which players choose to make their output decisions either in stage 1 or stage 2. We assume that the demand is unknown until the end of the first stage. We compute the output levels at equilibrium in each possible role. We also determine ex-ante and ex-post firms’ payoff functions.

Identificador

Ferreira, F. A., & Ferreira, F. (2011). Uncertainty in a mixed duopoly with quadratic costs. Proceedings of the World Congress on Engineering, I, 216-219

978-988-18210-6-5

2078-0958

E-ISSN 2078-0966

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4884

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

AIP Publishing

Relação

http://www.iaeng.org/publication/WCE2011/WCE2011_pp216-219.pdf

Direitos

openAccess

Palavras-Chave #Game theory #Optimization problems #Uncertainty #Cournot model #Leadership
Tipo

conferenceObject