Maximum-revenue tariff under Bertrand duopoly with unknown costs


Autoria(s): Ferreira, Fernanda A.; Ferreira, Flávio
Data(s)

28/05/2014

28/05/2014

2009

Resumo

This paper considers an international trade under Bertrand model with differentiated products and with unknown production costs. The home government imposes a specific import tariff per unit of imports from the foreign firm. We prove that this tariff is decreasing in the expected production costs of the foreign firm and increasing in the production costs of the home firm. Furthermore, it is increasing in the degree of product substitutability. We also show that an increase in the tariff results in both firms increasing their prices, an increase in both expected sales and expected profits for the home firm, and a decrease in both expected sales and expected profits for the foreign firm.

Programs POCTI and POCI by FCT and Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e do Ensino Superior. ESEIG/IPP and Centro de Matemática da Universidade do Porto.

Identificador

1007-5704

doi:10.1016/j.cnsns.2009.01.026

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4397

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

Elsevier Science BV

Relação

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1007570409000677

Direitos

openAccess

Palavras-Chave #Game theory #Industrial organization #Optimization #Bertrand model #Tariffs #Uncertainty
Tipo

article