Privatization in a mixed duopoly with environmental taxes
| Data(s) |
30/06/2014
30/06/2014
2013
|
|---|---|
| Resumo |
In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and privatization in a mixed duopoly, in which the public firm aims to maximize the social welfare. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels. ESEIG and Polytechnic Institute of Porto |
| Identificador |
978-0-7354-1184-5 DOI 10.1063/1.4825822 |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Publicador |
AIP Publishing |
| Relação |
http://scitation.aip.org/content/aip/proceeding/aipcp/10.1063/1.4825822 |
| Direitos |
openAccess |
| Palavras-Chave | #Industrial organization #Game theory #Cournot model #Environment #Privatization |
| Tipo |
conferenceObject |
