Os Crimes fiscais: em especial, o crime de abuso de confiança (fiscal)

Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças Orientador: Professor Dr. António da Costa Oliveira

Norma contabilística e de relato financeiro 10 – custos de empréstimos obtidos

Dissertação de Mestrado submetida ao Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Auditoria Trabalho efetuado sob a orientação do Mestre Carlos Martins

Noção de Obra no Contrato de Empreitada: Contributos da Doutrina e da Jurisprudência

Dissertação de Mestrado em Solicitaria

O crime de fraude fiscal: o impacto na receita pública do Estado

Orientador: Doutor, José Domingos Silva Fernandes

Apanha-me se puderes! tradução comentada do capítulo “White-collar and Corporate Crime”, The Oxford Handbook of Criminology

Dissertação de Mestrado Apresentada ao Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Tradução e Interpretação Especializadas, sob orientação da Mestre Suzana Noronha Cunha

The impact of safety politics in the current globalization context

The globalization is a process of economical, social, cultural and political integration motivated by the needs generated by a consumption-orientated society and a set of factors that have led to its development, such as reducing transport costs, the technological advancement and the development of communication networks. However, the phenomenon of globalization has been accompanied by increasing levels of insecurity as a result of various types of threats and transnational crimes that the International Community seeks to control and minimize. Throughout this work, we examined how the globalization process has been developing and how nations are able to maintain security levels consistent with their economical status and social development, without disturbing the normal course of organizations’ economical activity and the well-being of people. From the investigation developed we concluded that, besides the confirmation that economic integration and the opening of markets have influence on internal consumption, market globalization and migrations have been causing modifications in the consumption habits. We also concluded that the security measures implemented by States or by the International Community affect international trade, but do not imply disproportionate costs or significant delays in transactions. Likewise, we concluded that the control measures implemented in international trade are sufficient to ensure the safety of the people and nations, enabling us to confirm two of the three conjectures raised in this study.

Environmental policies in an international mixed duopoly

The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets. We suppose that the firm in the home country is a welfare-maximizing public firm, while the firm in the foreign country is its own profit-maximizing private firm. We find that the environmental tax can be a strategic instrument for the home government to distribute production from the foreign private firm to the home public firm. An additional effect of the home environmental tax is the reduction of the foreign private firm's output for local consumption, thereby expanding the foreign market for the home public firm.

Privatization and government preference in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue in a Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm.

Privatization and government preferences in a mixed duopoly: Stackelberg versus Cournot

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue, by considering a (sequential) Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm. Furthermore, we compare our results with the ones previously published by an other author obtained in a (simultaneous) Cournot duopoly.

Environmental taxes in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly

We study whether privatization of a public firm improves (or deteriorates) the environment in a mixed Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that each firm can prevent pollution by undertaking abatement measures. We get that, since in the mixed market the industry output is higher than in the private market, the abatement levels are also higher in the mixed market, and, thus, environmental tax rate in the mixed duopoly is higher than that in the privatized duopoly. Furthermore, the environment is more damaged in the mixed than in the private market. The overall effect on the social welfare is that it will becomes higher in the private than in the mixed market.

Privatization in a mixed duopoly with environmental taxes

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and privatization in a mixed duopoly, in which the public firm aims to maximize the social welfare. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.

Asymmetric taxation in a competition between nonprofit and for-profit firms

This paper considers a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analize the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Branqueamento de capitais

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças, sob orientação do Doutor José Amorim