Honey flows through fertile valleys : The cognitive and evolutionary foundations of paradise representations

The aim of the study is to explain how paradise beliefs are born from the viewpoint of mental functions of the human mind. The focus is on the observation that paradise beliefs across the world are mutually more similar than dissimilar. By using recent theories and results from the cognitive and evolutionary study of religion as well as from studies of environmental preferences, I suggest that this is because pan-human unconscious motivations, the architecture of mind, and the way the human mind processes information constrain the possible repertoire of paradise beliefs. The study is divided into two parts, theoretical and empirical. The arguments in the theoretical part are tested with data in the empirical part with two data sets. The first data set was collected using an Internet survey. The second data set was derived from literary sources. The first data test the assumption that intuitive conceptions of an environment of dreams generally follow the outlines set by evolved environmental preferences, but that they can be tweaked by modifying the presence of desirable elements. The second data test the assumption that familiarity is a dominant factor determining the content of paradise beliefs. The results of the study show that in addition to the widely studied belief in supernatural agents, belief in supernatural environments wells from the natural functioning of the human mind attesting the view that religious thinking and ideas are natural for human species and are produced by the same mental mechanisms as other cultural information. The results also help us to understand that the mental structures behind the belief in the supernatural have a wider scope than has been previously acknowledged.

Incarnate Subjectivity : The Constitutive Significance of Embodiment in Husserlian Phenomenology

This work offers a systematic phenomenological investigation of the constitutive significance of embodiment. It provides detailed analyses of subjectivity in relation to itself, to others, and to objective reality, and it argues that these basic structures cannot be made intelligible unless one takes into account how they are correlated with an embodied subject. The methodological and conceptual starting point of the treatise is the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. The investigation employs the phenomenological method and uses the descriptions and analyses provided by Husserl and his successors. The treatise is motivated and outlined systematically, and textual exegesis serves as a means for the systematic phenomenological investigation. The structure of the work conforms to the basic relations of subjectivity. The first part of the thesis explores the intimate relation between lived-body and selfhood, analyzes the phenomena of localization, and argues that self-awareness is necessarily and fundamentally embodied self-awareness. The second part examines the intersubjective dimensions of embodiment, investigates the corporal foundations of empathy, and unravels the bodily aspects of transcendental intersubjectivity. The third part scrutinizes the role of embodiment in the constitution of the surrounding objective reality: it focuses on the complex relationship between transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity, carefully examines the normative aspects of genetic and generative self-constitution, and argues eventually that what Husserl calls the paradox of subjectivity originates in a tension between primordial and intersubjective normativity. The work thus reinterprets the paradox of subjectivity in terms of a normative tension, and claims that the paradox is ultimately rooted in the structures of embodiment. In this manner, as a whole, the work discloses the constitutive significance of embodiment, and argues that transcendental subjectivity must be fundamentally embodied.

Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.

Questions to Artificial Nature: A Philosophical Study of Interdisciplinary Models and their Functions in Scientific Practice

This thesis presents an interdisciplinary analysis of how models and simulations function in the production of scientific knowledge. The work is informed by three scholarly traditions: studies on models and simulations in philosophy of science, so-called micro-sociological laboratory studies within science and technology studies, and cultural-historical activity theory. Methodologically, I adopt a naturalist epistemology and combine philosophical analysis with a qualitative, empirical case study of infectious-disease modelling. This study has a dual perspective throughout the analysis: it specifies the modelling practices and examines the models as objects of research. The research questions addressed in this study are: 1) How are models constructed and what functions do they have in the production of scientific knowledge? 2) What is interdisciplinarity in model construction? 3) How do models become a general research tool and why is this process problematic? The core argument is that the mediating models as investigative instruments (cf. Morgan and Morrison 1999) take questions as a starting point, and hence their construction is intentionally guided. This argument applies the interrogative model of inquiry (e.g., Sintonen 2005; Hintikka 1981), which conceives of all knowledge acquisition as process of seeking answers to questions. The first question addresses simulation models as Artificial Nature, which is manipulated in order to answer questions that initiated the model building. This account develops further the "epistemology of simulation" (cf. Winsberg 2003) by showing the interrelatedness of researchers and their objects in the process of modelling. The second question clarifies why interdisciplinary research collaboration is demanding and difficult to maintain. The nature of the impediments to disciplinary interaction are examined by introducing the idea of object-oriented interdisciplinarity, which provides an analytical framework to study the changes in the degree of interdisciplinarity, the tools and research practices developed to support the collaboration, and the mode of collaboration in relation to the historically mutable object of research. As my interest is in the models as interdisciplinary objects, the third research problem seeks to answer my question of how we might characterise these objects, what is typical for them, and what kind of changes happen in the process of modelling. Here I examine the tension between specified, question-oriented models and more general models, and suggest that the specified models form a group of their own. I call these Tailor-made models, in opposition to the process of building a simulation platform that aims at generalisability and utility for health-policy. This tension also underlines the challenge of applying research results (or methods and tools) to discuss and solve problems in decision-making processes.

Certainty or Faith? Arendt's and Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Cartesian Foundationalism

Epistemological foundationalism has for centuries attempted to unify all scientific inquiry into the context of one grand science, the first philosophy. One of the most important tasks of this tradition has been to ground all knowledge on absolutely certain foundations. In this master s thesis I ask the following question: To what extent and under what conditions is it possible to achieve absolute certainty in the sense of the attempts of Cartesian foundationalism? By examining how the 20th century philosophers, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) interpret the epistemological methodology of René Descartes, I claim that the Cartesian achievement of absolute certainty rests on the implicit presupposition of an epistemologically prior form of faith in the world and trust (pistis) in other conscious beings. I show that knowledge is possible only within the context of a common world that is inhabited by several conscious beings that share a common linguistic system. This threefold element is shown to be the bedrock condition for any kind of philosophical inquiry. The main literature sources for this thesis are The Life of the Mind by Hannah Arendt, Le Visible et l invisible by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Meditationes de Prima Philosophiae by René Descartes and Erfahrung und Urteil by Edmund Husserl.

Kutsu kuuliaisuuteen : James I. Packerin liittonomistinen raamattukäsitys

This dissertation examines James I. Packer s view of the Bible as the book of God s revelation. However, this study could not be complete without discussion of his background ideas about God, man and the foundations of theology. The research method used in this dissertation is systematic analysis. I analyse key theological concepts in the data, such as inerrancy, God s word and the covenant of grace, and examine Packer s concepts primarily in the context of the reformed tradition that he represents. Although the dissertation presents the philosophical premises of Packer s thought, the focus is on an analysis of theological concepts. Packer claims to approach theological issues broadly and to reject legalism. However, he also considers Calvinist thinking to be best suited to theological work and emphasises the central role of law in his view of the Bible. My dissertation pays particular attention to the status of law in Packer s theology and especially in the covenant of grace. The dissertation shows that the fundamental theological structure of Packer s view of the Bible is based on Puritan covenant theology, which consists of the temporally successive covenant of works and covenant of grace. Covenant theology stresses the connection and friendship between God and man. Man s highest goal according to the Westminster Confession of Faith (1647) is to glorify the triune God and to rejoice in him for all eternity. After the fall of man, this friendship between God and man can only take place in the covenant of grace. For Packer, the covenant of grace encompasses not only the time of the Gospel, but also the time of the law before the Gospel. Consequently, the covenant of grace incorporates in its very essence the demand of obedience to God s law. Covenant theology forms the foundation for both his view of the Bible and his idea that a believer lives in a covenant of grace, the key aspects of which are God s commandments and man s works. Law and the Gospel are not considered fundamental opposites in the covenant of grace, unlike in justification. In the covenant of grace, man has become God s friend who obeys the law as the law of Christ in a way which differs from Luther s view of obedience to the faith . For Packer, covenant theology is a Puritan instrument to link predestination and sanctification. Works committed in obedience show that the believer belongs to the covenant of grace and will be among the saved. Although voluntary obedience to God s commandments is not a direct instrument to achieve salvation, it is a pivotal sign of predestination. God calls the predestined to salvation with an effectual calling, the reliable message of the Bible. In sanctification, God guides a believer living in the context of covenantal nomism. In that sense, the Bible is above all an instrument of law guided by reason. In man s obedience, God completes man s nature and restores the imago Dei in man.

Religion Explained? : A Philosophical Appraisal of the Cognitive Science of Religion

This study examines philosophically the main theories and methodological assumptions of the field known as the cognitive science of religion (CSR). The study makes a philosophically informed reconstruction of the methodological principles of the CSR, indicates problems with them, and examines possible solutions to these problems. The study focuses on several different CSR writers, namely, Scott Atran, Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer and Dan Sperber. CSR theorising is done in the intersection between cognitive sciences, anthropology and evolutionary psychology. This multidisciplinary nature makes CSR a fertile ground for philosophical considerations coming from philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. The study begins by spelling out the methodological assumptions and auxiliary theories of CSR writers by situating these theories and assumptions in the nexus of existing approaches to religion. The distinctive feature of CSR is its emphasis on information processing: CSR writers claim that contemporary cognitive sciences can inform anthropological theorising about the human mind and offer tools for producing causal explanations. Further, they claim to explain the prevalence and persistence of religion by cognitive systems that undergird religious thinking. I also examine the core theoretical contributions of the field focusing mainly on the (1) “minimally counter-intuitiveness hypothesis” and (2) the different ways in which supernatural agent representations activate our cognitive systems. Generally speaking, CSR writers argue for the naturalness of religion: religious ideas and practices are widespread and pervasive because human cognition operates in such a way that religious ideas are easy to acquire and transmit. The study raises two philosophical problems, namely, the “problem of scope” and the “problem of religious relevance”. The problem of scope is created by the insistence of several critics of the CSR that CSR explanations are mostly irrelevant for explaining religion. Most CSR writers themselves hold that cognitive explanations can answer most of our questions about religion. I argue that the problem of scope is created by differences in explanation-begging questions: the former group is interested in explaining different things than the latter group. I propose that we should not stick too rigidly to one set of methodological assumptions, but rather acknowledge that different assumptions might help us to answer different questions about religion. Instead of adhering to some robust metaphysics as some strongly naturalistic writers argue, we should adopt a pragmatic and explanatory pluralist approach which would allow different kinds of methodological presuppositions in the study of religion provided that they attempt to answer different kinds of why-questions, since religion appears to be a multi-faceted phenomenon that spans over a variety of fields of special sciences. The problem of religious relevance is created by the insistence of some writers that CSR theories show religious beliefs to be false or irrational, whereas others invoke CSR theories to defend certain religious ideas. The problem is interesting because it reveals the more general philosophical assumptions of those who make such interpretations. CSR theories can (and have been) interpreted in terms of three different philosophical frameworks: strict naturalism, broad naturalism and theism. I argue that CSR theories can be interpreted inside all three frameworks without doing violence to the theories and that these frameworks give different kinds of results regarding the religious relevance of CSR theories.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

The Philosophical Age. Almanac. Issue 36. The Northern Lights

keywords: Enlightenment, Northern countries, Finland, Russia, Scotland In the 36 th edition of the almanac "Philosophical Age" published materials of international symposium «The Northern Lights - Facets of Enlightenment Culture», (held September 25-26, 2009) in The Aleksanteri Institute the University of Helsinki. Contents: Vesa Oittinen Between Radicalism and Utilitarianism — On the Profile of the Finnish Enlightenment Tatiana Artemyeva The Status of Intellectual Values in the Russian Enlightenment Oili Pulkkinen The Cosmopolitan Experience, Theoretical Histories and the Universal Science of the Scottish Enlightenment Аlla Zlatopolskaya L’autocritique des Lumières chez Rousseau et le rousseauisme russe Johannes Remy Alexander Radishchev, Ethical Consuming, and North American Quakers Kimmo Sarje Anders Chydenius and Radical Swedish Enlightenment Johan Sten Anders Johan Lexell: A Finnish Astronomer at St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences and His European Contacts Mikhail Mikeshin A Russian Adam Smith in French Style: An Example of the Transfer of Ideas Larisa Agamalian The Library of an Enlightened Russian Landowner

The Ecologic Foundations of Stylistics in Music and in Language

This contribution suggests that it is possible to describe the transformations of musical style in an analogous way to the transformations of style in language, and also that it can be explained how the ‘musics in contact’ behave in an analogous way to the ‘languages in contact’. According to this idea, the ‘evolution’ of styles in music and in language can be identified and studied as dynamic exchanges in ecological niches. It is suggested, also, that the idiolectic-ecolectic, and acrolectic-basilectic relationships in music and language are functions of cycles in several ‘layers’ and ‘rhythms’. The presence of stylistic varieties and influences in music and in language may imply that they are part of major sign systems within a more complex ecological relationship.

A Possible and Necessary Consistency Proof

After Gödel's incompleteness theorems and the collapse of Hilbert's programme Gerhard Gentzen continued the quest for consistency proofs of Peano arithmetic. He considered a finitistic or constructive proof still possible and necessary for the foundations of mathematics. For a proof to be meaningful, the principles relied on should be considered more reliable than the doubtful elements of the theory concerned. He worked out a total of four proofs between 1934 and 1939. This thesis examines the consistency proofs for arithmetic by Gentzen from different angles. The consistency of Heyting arithmetic is shown both in a sequent calculus notation and in natural deduction. The former proof includes a cut elimination theorem for the calculus and a syntactical study of the purely arithmetical part of the system. The latter consistency proof in standard natural deduction has been an open problem since the publication of Gentzen's proofs. The solution to this problem for an intuitionistic calculus is based on a normalization proof by Howard. The proof is performed in the manner of Gentzen, by giving a reduction procedure for derivations of falsity. In contrast to Gentzen's proof, the procedure contains a vector assignment. The reduction reduces the first component of the vector and this component can be interpreted as an ordinal less than epsilon_0, thus ordering the derivations by complexity and proving termination of the process.