The German Military Entrepreneur Ernst von Mansfeld and His Conduct of Asymmetrical Warfare in the Thirty Years War

The dissertation examines aspects of asymmetrical warfare in the war-making of the German military entrepreneur Ernst von Mansfeld during his involvement in the Thirty Years War. Due to the nature of the inquiry, which combines history with military-political theory, the methodological approach of the dissertation is interdisciplinary. The theoretical framework used is that of asymmetrical warfare. The primary sources used in the dissertation are mostly political pamphlets and newsletters. Other sources include letters, documents, and contemporaneous chronicles. The secondary sources are divided into two categories, literature on the history of the Thirty Years War and textbooks covering the theory of asymmetrical warfare. The first category includes biographical works on Ernst von Mansfeld, as well as general histories of the Thirty Years War and seventeenth-century warfare. The second category combines military theory and political science. The structure of the dissertation consists of eight lead chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. The introduction covers the theoretical approach and aims of the dissertation, and provides a brief overlook of the sources and previous research on Ernst von Mansfeld and asymmetrical warfare in the Thirty Years War. The second chapter covers aspects of Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of operational art. The third chapter investigates the illegal and immoral aspects of Mansfeld s war-making. The fourth chapter compares the differing methods by which Mansfeld and his enemies raised and financed their armies. The fifth chapter investigates Mansfeld s involvement in indirect warfare. The sixth chapter presents Mansfeld as an object and an agent of image and information war. The seventh chapter looks into the counter-reactions, which Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare provoked from his enemies. The eighth chapter offers a conclusion of the findings. The dissertation argues that asymmetrical warfare presented itself in all the aforementioned areas of Mansfeld s conduct during the Thirty Years War. The operational asymmetry arose from the freedom of movement that Mansfeld enjoyed, while his enemies were constrained by the limits of positional warfare. As a non-state operator Mansfeld was also free to flout the rules of seventeenth-century warfare, which his enemies could not do with equal ease. The raising and financing of military forces was another source of asymmetry, because the nature of early seventeenth-century warfare favoured private military entrepreneurs rather than embryonic fiscal-military states. The dissertation also argues that other powers fought their own asymmetrical and indirect wars against the Habsburgs through Mansfeld s agency. Image and information were asymmetrical weapons, which were both aimed against Mansfeld and utilized by him. Finally, Mansfeld s asymmetrical threat forced the Habsburgs to adapt to his methods, which ultimately lead to the formation of a subcontracted Imperial Army under the management and leadership of Albrecht von Wallenstein. Therefore Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare ultimately paved way for the kind of state-monopolized, organised, and symmetrical warfare that has prevailed from 1648 onwards. The conclusion is that Mansfeld s conduct in the Thirty Years War matched the criteria for asymmetrical warfare. While traditional historiography treated Mansfeld as an anomaly in the age of European state formation, his asymmetrical warfare has begun to bear resemblance to the contemporary conflicts, where nation states no longer hold the monopoly of violence.

The Roman Republican Navy : from the sixth century to 167 BC

Työ käsittelee Rooman laivaston kehitystä, toimintaa ja osallistumista laajenemispolitiikkaan, jossa Rooma kasvoi kaupunkivaltiosta Välimeren hallitsijaksi. Rooma on aikaisemmissa tutkimuksissa nähty maavaltiona vailla kiinnostusta merenkulkuun. On katsottu, että ainoa merkittävä merisota Rooman historiassa on ensimmäinen puunilaissota (264-241 eKr.) ja että siinäkin roomalaiset (jotka historioitsija Polybius kuvaa vasta-alkajiksi) menestyivät Karthagoa vastaan turvautumalla laskusiltoihin, joiden avulla he saattoivat muuttaa meritaistelun maataisteluksi. Polybiuksen kuvaukseen on aina tähän asti luotettu. On katsottu että Roomalla ei ollut laivastoa ennen ensimmäistä puunilaissotaa ja että Rooma kaikissa sodissaan panosti merisodankäyntiin mahdollisimman vähän. Tämä työ pyrkii kumoamaan nämä käsitykset. Laivasto oli osallisena ja ehdottoman välttämätön kaikissa Rooman laajenemispolitiikan käänteissä. Arkeologian tiedot osoittavat, että ennen ensimmäistä puunilaissotaa Rooma kehittyi ja siitä tuli merkittävä kaupunki nimenomaan kaupankäynnin ja ulkomaisten kontaktien seurauksena. Se ei siis ollut puhdas agraarivaltio. Roomalaisilla oli laivasto jo viimeistään 500-luvulta lähtien eKr. ja sitä käytettiin Rooman laajentaessa valtaansa Italiassa. Näin ollen ensimmäisessä puunilaissodassa läntisen Välimeren herruudesta kilpaili kaksi merivaltiota, Rooma ja Karthago. Toinen puunilaissota (218-201) tunnetaan yleensä Hannibalin tulosta Alppien yli Italiaan, mutta se oli myöskin merkittävä merisota ja karthagolaiset hävisivät sen nimenomaan merellä. Rooma osallistui kilpailuun itäisen Välimeren hallinnasta ja kukisti Makedonian ja Syyrian laivastot, jotka eivät olleet mitenkään Rooman laivaston veroisia. Kaikista Rooman vastustajista Karthagolla olisi ollut suurin mahdollisuus pysäyttää Rooman laivaston voittokulu toisessa puunilaissodassa. Laivastoa käytettiin moniin eri tarkoituksiin. Suuret meritaistelut eivät ole ainoa osoitus laivastojen mukanaolosta ja merkityksestä, vaan on myös otettava huomion sotalaivojen rakenne ja toimintaedellytykset. Sotalaivat oli rakennettu taisteluita varten ja niissä oli hyvin niukasti säilytystilaa. Niiden oli päästävä laskemaan maihin aina kun miehistö tarvitsi vettä, ruokaa ja lepoa. Laivastot saattoivat toimia vain niiden rannikoiden tuntumassa, joiden satamiin ja laskupaikkoihin niillä oli turvallinen pääsy. Roomalaiset olivat hyvin tietoisia tästä. Suuret merentakaiset sotaretket Afrikkaan, Espanjaan, Kreikkaan ja Vähän-Aasian rannikolle perustuivat kaikki siihen, että Rooman laivasto hallitsi purjehdusreittejä ja sopivia laskupaikkoja ja saattoi huolehtia joukkojen ja varusteiden kuljettamisesta kaukana taisteleville armeijoille. Samalla Rooman laivasto kävi itsenäistä sotaa merellä ja haastoi ja kukisti kaikki Välimeren merivaltiot. 130-luvulle eKr. tultaessa se oli lyönyt vihollisensa ja riisunut aseista liittolaisensa; Rooman laivasto hallitsi Välimerta yksin.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Community, Power, and Colonialism: The U.S. Army in Southern Arizona and New Mexico, 1866-1886

Empire is central to U.S. history. When we see the U.S. projecting its influence on a global scale in today s world it is important to understand that U.S. empire has a long history. This dissertation offers a case study of colonialism and U.S. empire by discussing the social worlds, labor regimes, and culture of the U.S. Army during the conquest of southern Arizona and New Mexico (1866-1886). It highlights some of the defining principles, mentalities, and characteristics of U.S. imperialism and shows how U.S. forces have in years past constructed their power and represented themselves, their missions, and the places and peoples that faced U.S. imperialism/colonialism. Using insights from postcolonial studies and whiteness studies, this work balances its attention between discursive representations (army stories) and social experience (army actions), pays attention to silences in the process of historical production, and focuses on collective group mentalities and identities. In the end the army experience reveals an empire in denial constructed on the rule of difference and marked by frustration. White officers, their wives, and the white enlisted men not only wanted the monopoly of violence for the U.S. regime but also colonial (mental/cultural) authority and power, and constructed their identity, authority, and power in discourse and in the social contexts of the everyday through difference. Engaged in warfare against the Apaches, they did not recognize their actions as harmful or acknowledge the U.S. invasion as the bloody colonial conquest it was. White army personnel painted themselves and the army as liberators, represented colonial peoples as racial inferiors, approached colonial terrain in terms of struggle, and claimed that the region was a terrible periphery with little value before the arrival of white civilization. Officers and wives also wanted to place themselves at the top of colonial hierarchies as the refined and respectable class who led the regeneration of the colony by example: they tried to turn army villages into islands of civilization and made journeys, leisure, and domestic life to showcase their class sensibilities and level of sophistication. Often, however, their efforts failed, resulting in frustration and bitterness. Many blamed the colony and its peoples for their failures. The army itself was divided by race and class. All soldiers were treated as laborers unfit for self-government. White enlisted men, frustrated by their failures in colonial warfare and by constant manual labor, constructed worlds of resistance, whereas indigenous soldiers sought to negotiate the effects of colonialism by working in the army. As colonized labor their position was defined by tension between integration and exclusion and between freedom and colonial control.

Bysanttilaisten ja Akhaian ruhtinaskunnan väliset sotatoimet vuosina 1259-83 : Tapaustutkimus myöhäis-bysanttilaisesta sodankäynnistä

In my master thesis I analyse Byzantine warfare in the late period of the empire. I use military operations between Byzantines and crusader Principality of Achaia (1259–83) as a case study. Byzantine strategy was based (in “oriental manner”) on using ambushes, diplomacy, surprise attacks, deception etc. Open field battles that were risky in comparison with their benefits were usually avoided, but the Byzantines were sometimes forced to seek open encounter because their limited ability to keep strong armies in field for long periods of time. Foreign mercenaries had important place in Byzantine armies and they could simply change sides if their paymasters ran out of resources. The use of mercenaries with short contracts made it possible that the composition of an army was flexible but on the other hand heterogeneous – in result Byzantine armies were sometimes ineffective and prone to confusion. In open field battles Byzantines used formation that was made out from several lines placed one after another. This formation was especially suitable for cavalry battles. Byzantines might have also used other kinds of formations. The Byzantines were not considered equal to Latins in close combat. West-Europeans saw mainly horse archers and Latin mercenaries on Byzantine service as threats to themselves in battle. The legitimacy of rulers surrounding the Aegean sea was weak and in many cases political intrigues and personal relationships can have resolved the battles. Especially in sieges the loyalty of population was decisive. In sieges the Byzantines used plenty of siege machines and archers. This made fast conquests possible, but it was expensive. The Byzantines protected their frontiers by building castles. Military operations against the Principality of Achaia were mostly small scale raids following an intensive beginning. Byzantine raids were mostly made by privateers and mountaineers. This does not fit to the traditional picture that warfare belonged to the imperial professional army. It’s unlikely that military operations in war against the Principality of Achaia caused great demographic or economic catastrophe and some regions in the warzone might even have flourished. On the other hand people started to concentrate into villages which (with growing risks for trade) probably caused disturbance in economic development and in result birth rates might have decreased. Both sides of war sought to exchange their prisoners of war. These were treated according to conventional manners that were accepted by both sides. It was possible to sell prisoners, especially women and children, to slavery, but the scale of this trade does not seem to be great in military operations treated in this theses.

Voiko sota olla oikeutettu? : Kirkkojen maailmanneuvoston yleiskokousten kannanotot sotaan kriisien ratkaisuna

Can war be justified? Expressions of opinions by the general assemblies of the World Council of Churches on the question of war as a method of settling conflicts. The purpose of this study is to describe and analyse the expressions of opinions recorded in the documents of the general assemblies of the WCC during the Cold War period from 1948 to 1983 on the use of war as a method of settling international and national conflicts. The main sources are the official reports of the WCC´s assemblies during the years 1948 to 1983. This study divides the discussions into three periods. The first period (1949-1968) is dominated by the pressures arising from the Second World War. Experiences of the war led the assemblies of the WCC to the conclusion that modern warfare as a method of settling conflicts should be rejected. Modern war was contrary to God´s purposes and the whole meaning of creation, said the assembly. Although the WCC rejected modern war, it left open the possibility of conflict where principles of just war may be practised. The question of war was also linked to the state and its function, which led to the need to create a politically neutral doctrine for the socio-ethical thinking of churches and of the WCC itself. The doctrine was formulated using the words "responsible society". The question of war and socio-ethical thinking were on the WCC`s agenda throughout the first period. Another issue that had an influence on the first period was the increasing role of Third World countries. This new dimension also brought new aspects to the question of war and violence. The second period (1968-1975) presented greater challenges to the WCC, especially in traditional western countries. The Third World, political activity in the socialist world and ideas of revolution were discussed. The WCC`s fourth Assembly in Uppsala was challenged by these new ideas of revolution. The old doctrine of "responsible society" was seen by many participants as unsuitable in the modern world, especially for Third World countries. The situation of a world governed by armaments, causing social and economic disruption, was felt by churches to be problematic. The peace movement gathered pace and attention. There was pressure to see armed forces as an option on the way to a new world order. The idea of a just war was challenged by that of just revolution. These ideas of revolution did not receive support from the Uppsala Assembly, but they pressured the WCC to reconsider its socio-ethical thinking. Revolution was seen as a possibility, but only when it could be peaceful. In the Nairobi Assembly the theme of just, participatory and sustainable society provided yet another viewpoint, dealing with the life of the world and its problems as a whole. The third period (1975-1983) introduced a new, alternative doctrine the "JPIC Process", justice, peace and the integrity of creation for social thinking in the WCC. The WCC no longer wanted to discuss war or poverty as separate questions, but wanted to combine all aspects of life to see the impact of an arms-governed world on humankind. Thus, during the last period, discussions focused on socio-ethical questions, where war and violence were only parts of a larger problem. Through the new JPIC Process, the WCC`s Assembly in Vancouver looked for a new world, one without violence, in all aspects of life. Despite differing opinions in socio-ethical thinking, the churches in the WCC agreed that modern warfare cannot be regarded as acceptable or just. The old idea of a "just war" still had a place, but it was not seen by all as a valid principle. As a result the WCC viewed war as a final solution to be employed when all other methods had failed. Such a war would have to secure peace and justice for all. In the discussions there was a strong political east-west divide, and, during the last two decades, a north-south divide as well. The effect of the Cold War was obvious. In the background to the theological positions were two main concepts namely the idea of God´s activity in man´s history through the so-called regiments and, the concept of the Kingdom of God on Earth.

Allelopathic effects of filamentous cyanobacteria on phytoplankton in the Baltic Sea

Eutrophication and enhanced internal nutrient loading of the Baltic Sea are most clearly reflected by increased late-summer cyanobacterial blooms, which often are toxic. In addition to their toxicity to animals, phytoplankton species can be allelopathic, which means that they produce chemicals that inhibit competing phytoplankton species. Such interspecific chemical warfare may lead to the formation of harmful phytoplankton blooms and the spread of exotic species into new habitats. This is the first report on allelopathic effects in brackish-water cyanobacteria. The experimental studies presented in this thesis showed that the filamentous cyanobacteria Anabaena sp., Aphanizomenon flos-aquae and Nodularia spumigena are capable of decreasing the growth of other phytoplankton species, especially cryptophytes, but also diatoms. The detected allelopathic effects are rather transitory, and some co-occurring species show tolerance to them. The allelochemicals are excreted during active growth and they decrease cell numbers, chlorophyll a content and carbon uptake of the target species. Although the more specific modes of action or chemical structures of the allelochemicals remain to be studied, the results clearly indicate that the allelopathic effects are not caused by the hepatotoxin, nodularin. On the other hand, cyanobacteria stimulated the growth of bacteria, other cyanobacteria, chlorophytes and flagellates in a natural phytoplankton community. In a long-term data analysis of phytoplankton abundances and hydrography of the northern Baltic Sea, a clear change was observed in phytoplankton community structure, together with a transition in environmental factors, between the late 1970s and early 2000s. Surface water salinity decreased, whereas water temperature and the concentration of dissolved inorganic nitrogen increased. In the phytoplankton community, the biomass of cyanobacteria, chrysophytes and chlorophytes significantly increased, and the late-summer phytoplankton community became increasingly cyanobacteria-dominated. In contrast, the biomass of cryptophytes decreased. The increased temperature and nutrient concentrations probably explain most of the changes in phytoplankton, but my results suggest that the possible effect of chemically mediated biological interactions should also be considered. Cyanobacterial allelochemicals can cause additional stress to other phytoplankton in the nutrient-depleted late-summer environment and thus contribute to the formation and persistence of long-lasting cyanobacterial mass occurrences. On the other hand, cyanobacterial blooms may either directly or indirectly promote the growth of some phytoplankton species. Therefore, a further increase in cyanobacteria will probably shape the late-summer pelagic phytoplankton community by stimulating some species, but inhibiting others.

Bear Shields of Plains Indians : Motifs and Meanings

The study is the outcome of two research projects on the North American Indian traditions: the role of the shields within the Plains Indians traditional culture and religion, and the bear ceremonialism of the Native North America, especially the significance of the bear among the Plains Indians. This article-based dissertation includes seven separately published scholar papers, forming Chapters 6 12. The introduction formulates the objectives and frame of reference of the study and the conclusions pulls together its results. The study reconsiders the role of the Plains Indian shields with bear motifs. Such shields are found in rock art, in the Plains Indian s paintings and drawings, and in various collections, the main source material being the shields in European and North American museums. The aim is not only to study shields with bear power motifs and the meanings of the bear, but also to discuss appropriate methods for studying these subjects. There are three major aims of the study: to consider methodical questions in studying Plains Indian shields, to examine the complexity of the Plains Indian shields with the bear power motifs, and to offer new interpretations for the basic meanings of the bear among the Plains Indians and the interrelationship between individualism and collectivism in the Plains Indians visionary art that show bear power motifs on the shields. The study constructs a view on the bear shields taking account of all sources of information available and analysing the shields both as physical artefacts and religious objects from different perspectives, studying them as a part of the ensemble of Plains culture and religious traditions. The bear motifs represented the superhuman power that medicine men and warriors could exploit through visions. For the Plains Indians, the bear was a wise animal from which medicine men could get power for healing but also a dangerous animal from which warriors could get power for warfare. The shields with bear motifs represented the bear powers of the owners of the shields. The bear shield was made to represent the vision, and the principal interpretation of the symbolism was based on the individual experience of spiritual world and its powers. The study argues that the bear shield as personal medicine object is based on wider tribal traditions, and the basic meaning is derived from the collective tradition. This means that the bear seen in vision represented particular affairs and it was represented on the shield surface using conventional ways of traditional artistry. In consequence of this, the bear shields reflect not only the individual experiences of bear power but whole field of tribal traditions that legitimated the experiences and offered acceptable interpretations and conventional modes for the bear symbols.

Juoksuhaudoista yhteiskuntaan : Vuosien 1965-1975 sotilaallista maanpuolustusta ja puolustusvoimia koskevan joukkotiedotuksen diskursiivinen tarkastelu

The Finnish society developed rapidly in the 1960´s and 1970´s. This was result of international trends. Development of education, urbanization and wide organization of society increased discontent towards prevailing social structure and towards the power elite. Development of technology created possibility to present radical perspectives in mass media. This caused widely spread discussions dividing opinions. The purpose of this thesis was to complement research on national defence and the Finnish Defence Forces especially between years 1965 and 1975. The task of research was to clarify how changes in society and how the significance of this change was interpreted in public discussion about national defence and development of the Defence Forces. The most essential points for this thesis turned out to be discourses structured from public discussion. Main research material consisted of approximately 35000 news, editorials, articles and opinions presented in mass media supplemented by literature, committee reports and other archival sources. Frame of reference for this thesis is based on relativistic worldview. According to this, social reality is relative and there is no single truth. Environment has significant influence on the issue how knowledge and truth are formed. Data analysis was based on critical discourse. The key objective was to clarify the effects of broad changes in society using discursive methods. One essential goal was to form order of discourse using linguistic analysis and also connect discourses to wider sociocultural custom. On this thesis I came to the conclusion that on the review period there were five significant ensembles of discourse. They consisted of several discussions focused on different themes. The discourse of official security policy aimed to define national defence and the position of the Defence Forces as parts of foreign policy. Foreign policy is often perceived as the most significant part of security policy. Historical memory, geographical position of Finland and also the state contracts, changes in international warfare, tasks of the Defence Forces and increasing critic of national defence and the difference in thinking between generations formed the discourse of security policy. In the discourse of the liability to military service, the issue was about individual responsibility to society and national defence. Resisters and unarmed defence demands, encouraged by international examples were the themes. The discourse pointed out how mass media is used to influence and forced the Defence Forces to develop the practices in public information. The discourses of democracy and politics were closer to internal development of the Defence Forces to integrate more into society. The discourse of democracy focused in changing power relationships of the Defence Forces that were known as authoritarian. Issues like conscript and personnel union activity had lot of similarities to general social development. The discourse of politics presented how the Defence Forces were pushed towards parliamentary decision making. The personnel was granted the same rights as other population. Themes related to the discourse on the will to national defence were development of mental national defence, increasing education on national defence and creation of more open public information culture. According to discourses presented above I can state, that the position of the Defence Forces in society was changed between years 1965-1975. This change was advanced by the Defence Forces reformed attitude towards mass media and public information in general. Active participation in public information important became important instead of only answering topics. This positive development created an atmosphere, that was easier for the public to understand and create own pictures of the armed forces. Due to this, I can describe that the defenders and supporters of the armed forces were stuck in their trenches, until discussions presented in discourses and themes developed the Defence Forces to be better fitting part of society. Key words; society, national defence, Defence Forces, discourse, mass media, security policy, liability to military service, conscription, democracy