Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science - And the Evolution of the Popperian Worlds

This doctoral thesis in theoretical philosophy is a systematic analysis of Karl Popper's philosophy of science and its relation to his theory of three worlds. The general aim is to study Popper's philosophy of science and to show that Popper's theory of three worlds was a restatement of his earlier positions. As a result, a new reading of Popper's philosophy and development is offered and the theory of three worlds is analysed in a new manner. It is suggested that the theory of three worlds is not purely an ontological theory, but has a profound epistemological motivation. In Part One, Popper's epistemology and philosophy of science is analysed. It is claimed that Popper's thinking was bifurcated: he held two profound positions without noticing the tension between them. Popper adopted the position called the theorist around 1930 and focused on the logical structure of scientific theories. In Logik der Forschung (1935), he attempted to build a logic of science on the grounds that scientific theories may be regarded as universal statements which are not verifiable but can be falsified. Later, Popper emphasized another position, called here the processionalist. Popper focused on the study of science as a process and held that a) philosophy of science should study the growth of knowledge and that b) all cognitive processes are constitutive. Moreover, the constitutive idea that we see the world in the searchlight of our theories was combined with the biological insight that knowledge grows by trial and error. In Part Two, the theory of three worlds is analysed systematically. The theory is discussed as a cluster of theories which originate from Popper's attempt to solve some internal problems in his thinking. Popper adhered to realism and wished to reconcile the theorist and the processionalist. He also stressed the real and active nature of the human mind, and the possibility of objective knowledge. Finally, he wished to create a scientific world view.

Self-love and self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume

This work offers a novel interpretation of David Hume’s (1711–1776) conception of the conjectural development of civil society and artificial moral institutions. It focuses on the social elements of Hume’s Treatise of human nature (1739–40) and the necessary connection between science of man and politeness, civilised monarchies, social distance and hierarchical structure of civil society. The study incorporates aspects of intellectual history, history of philosophy and book history. In order to understand David Hume’s thinking, the intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733) needs to be accounted for. When put into a historical perspective, the moral, political and social components of Treatise of human nature can be read in the context of a philosophical tradition, in which Mandeville plays a pivotal role. A distinctive character of Mandeville and Hume’s account of human nature and moral institutions was the introduction of a simple distinction between self-love and self-liking. The symmetric passions of self-interest and pride can only be controlled by the corresponding moral institutions. This is also the way in which we can say that moral institutions are drawn from human nature. In the case of self-love or self-interest, the corresponding moral institution is justice. Respectively, concerning self-liking or pride the moral institution is politeness. There is an explicit analogy between these moral institutions. If we do not understand this analogy, we do not understand the nature of either justice or politeness. The present work is divided into two parts. In the first part, ‘Intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville’, it is argued that the relevance of the paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thinking has been missed. It draws a picture of Mandeville turning from the Hobbism of The Fable of the Bees to an original theory of civil society put forward in his later works. In order to make this change more apparent, Mandeville’s career and the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees are examined comprehensively. This interpretation, based partly on previously unknown sources, challenges F. B. Kaye’s influential decision to publish the two parts of The Fable of the Bees as a uniform work of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the ‘Intellectual development of Mandeville’ is to function as the context for the young Hume. The second part of the work, ‘David Hume and Greatness of mind’, explores in philosophical detail the social theory of the Treatise and politics and the science of man in his Essays. This part will also reveal the relevance of Greatness of mind as a general concept for David Hume’s moral and political philosophy.

Huellas de Eros y Thánatos en la narrativa de Diamela Eltit : La palabra en movimiento en el juego entre tropos, metáforas y deconstrucciones lingüísticas

Väitöskirja analysoi espanjan kielen dekonstruktioita ruumiin metaforista ja troopeista koostuvassa aineistossa chileläisen kirjailijan Diamela Eltitin (1949 -) neljässä romaanissa: Lumpérica (1983), Vaca sagrada (1991), El infarto del alma (1994) ja Los trabajadores de la muerte (1998). Näkökulma on kielen muutoksessa Eltitin proosassa 1980- ja 1990-luvuilla alkaen kokeellisesta huippuvaiheesta 1983, jolloin hän julkaisi esikoisromaaninsa Lumpérica. Tutkimus korostaa Eltitin romaanien historiallista arvoa, kirjallisuuden tapaa murtaa kielen rakenteita ja sitä miten tämä murros kytkeytyy taideteoreettiseen muutokseen kulttuuridiskursseissa. Tutkimus tarkastelee Eltitin kehityskaarta kenraali Augusto Pinochetin sotilasvallankaappauksesta 1973 halki sotilashallituksen kauden (1973-1990) aina kansalaisyhteiskunnan vahvistumiseen ja vuoteen 1998. Tutkimus analysoi ruumiin troopeista ja metaforista koostuvaa tutkimusaineistoa lingvistiikan, kirjallisuustieteen, historian ja sukupuolen tutkimuksen monitieteisessä viitekehyksessä. Sen vuoksi väitöskirja liittyy espanjalaisen filologian, yleisen kirjallisuustieteen, Latinalaisen Amerikan tutkimuksen ja naistutkimuksen oppiaineisiin. Kolme tärkeintä oppiteoreettista runkoa ovat lingvistinen strukturalismi, dekonstruktio ja feministiset kirjallisuusteoriat. Dekonstruktiivinen lähestymistapa tekstiin korostaa kielen merkityksen muodostumisen filosofista perustaa. Se pyrkii selvittämään, miten merkitys muodostuu kirjoittajan, tekstin ja lukijan välillä. Tekstikritiikki koostuu semanttisesta ja dekonstruktiivisesta tekstianalyysistä, jonka metodologisen mallin perusta on tanskalaisen kielitieteilijän Louis Hjelmslevin (1899-1965) kielitieteellinen malli. Väitös ei käytä mallia suoraan, vaan soveltaa sitä kaunokirjallisuuden tutkimukseen. Oppiteoreettisen viitekehyksen osalta tutkimus sijoittuu strukturalismin ja poststrukturalismin murrokseen. Tutkimus korostaa Eltitin radikaalia muotokieltä ja teatraalisuutta, hänen kielensä visuaalisuutta ja ruumiin metaforien eroottista jännitettä, mikä ilmenee mm. falloksen metaforaksi tulkitun hehkuvan valon kuvissa romaanissa Lumpérica. Vanhat kreikkalaiset myytit Éros ja Thánatos kasvavat esille länsimaisen taidehistorian perinteestä ja kontekstualisoituvat uusiksi kielikuviksi Chilen kirjallisessa maaperässä. Ne muodostavat Eltitin taiteellisen tuotannon pysyvän aihepiirin ja luovat teoksiin synkkää ja karua virettä sekä tummia ja eroottisia sävyjä. Tutkimus osoittaa, että Eltit dekonstruoi kieltä, mutta dekonstruktiot eivät ole jatkuvia eivätkä samanlaisia kaikissa romaaneissa. Kielellisten dekonstruktioiden variaatio on laaja eikä Eltit murra kielen syntaktisia ja morfologisia rakenteita kaikissa teksteissään. Tutkimuksen perusteella väitän, että Eltitin kirjoituksesta puhuttaessa useat tutkijat käyttävät epämääräisesti dekonstruktio-termiä. Useiden tutkijoiden toteamus dekonstruktiosta Diamela Eltitin kirjallisessa tuotannossa pysyvänä piirteenä on epätäsmällinen. Sen sijaan dekonstruktiivinen kirjoitus tarkoittaa Eltitillä laajasti vaihtelevaa lähestymistapaa kieleen, mikä ilmenee kehityslinjana hänen tuotannossaan ja eri tavoin jokaisessa teoksessa.

Tyhjä taivas : Georges Bataille ja uskonnon kysymys

Empty Heavens. Georges Bataille and the Question of Religion. The dissertation explores the question of religion in the texts of Georges Bataille (1897 1962), the controversial French avant-garde writer and philosopher. Passionate about religion throughout his life, Bataille devoted to it both critical analyses and personal meditations. In this study, Bataille s multifaceted relationship to religion is interpreted as expressing a passion for radical otherness. Bataille is approached as a characteristically modern thinker who, nevertheless, questions some landmarks of modernity insofar as modernity is interpreted as a triumph of secularization. The dissertation is situated at the intersection of comparative religion and philosophy of religion. Methodologically, the study resorts to theoretical contextualization and concept analysis. Acknowledging that Bataille s writings challenge the assumptions about coherent meaning taken for granted in traditional philosophical analysis, the study also pays attention to the literary means and, in general, the performative level of Bataille s texts. The study constructs three theoretical contexts for Bataille s question of religion first of all, the interpretation of Hegel in the mid-20th century French philosophy. In the first section of the study, Bataille s uneasy relationship with Hegel as mediated by Alexandre Kojève is explored. The motivation of his question of radical otherness is argued to arise from his struggle with the Hegelian Kojèvean notion of negativity. The second context is the dialogue with the Christian mystical tradition. Starting from the analysis of two Bataillean notions, dramatization and contestation , it is argued that, firstly, Bataille s approach to radical otherness is analogous to certain procedures of mystical texts while, secondly, the function of otherness providing no firm foundation in Bataille s texts differs from its function in mystical texts. In the third section of the study, Bataille s quest for otherness is concretized by analyzing his views on otherness of other person, on violence, and on death themes that are brought together in Bataille s lasting interest in sacrifice. Bataille s understanding of sacrifice is proportioned to social scientific and philosophical discussions on sacrifice. It is argued that the commitment to the idea of sacrifice accounts for a partial failure in the Bataillean approach to otherness, the otherness of other person remaining its (at least half) blind spot. The study presents an overview of Bataille s thought on religion. It brings out Bataille s view of the paradoxical fundamental yet impossible role of otherness in the construction of human world, as well as his understanding of religious representations as both covering over and indicating this otherness. It describes Bataille s atheological mysticism as a peculiar modern form of religiosity, as an ambivalent mourning for and exaltation of fundamental loss.

The Art of Sympathy : Forms of Moral and Emotional Persuasion in Fiction

"The Art of Sympathy: Forms of Moral and Emotional Persuasion" in Fiction is an interdisciplinary study that looks closely at the ways that stories evoke sympathy, and the significance of this emotion for the development of moral attitudes and awareness. By linking readers' emotional responses to fiction with the potential impact of such responses on "the moral imagination," the study builds on empirical research conducted by literary scholars and psychologists into the emotional effects of reading fiction, as well as social psychological research into the connections between empathy/sympathy and moral development. I first investigate the dynamics of readers beliefs regarding characters in fictional narratives, and the nature of the emotions that they may experience as a result of those beliefs. The analysis demonstrates that there are important similarities between real emotions and emotions generated by fiction. Recognizing these similarities, I claim, can help us to conceptualize the nature of sympathetic responses to fictional characters. Building on these assertions, I then draw on research from social psychology and philosophy to develop a comprehensive definition of sympathy and to clarify the ways in which sympathy operates, both in people s daily lives and in readers sympathetic responses to fictional characters. Having established this definition and delineated its practical implications, I then examine how particular stories, through a variety of narrative techniques, persuade readers to feel sympathy for characters who are unsympathetic in certain ways. In order to verify my claims about the impact of these stories on readers emotions, I also review the results of tests that I conducted with nearly 200 adolescent readers. Through these tests, which were constructed and scored according to methods prevalent in social psychological research, it was determined that a majority of readers felt sympathy for the protagonists in two of the stories included in the study. These results were combined with data from an additional test, a standard measure of empathy and sympathy in the field of social psychology. The cross-tabulation of these results suggests that there was not a strong connection between readers responses and their general tendencies to feel sympathy for others. This finding would appear to support my hypotheses regarding the sympathetic persuasiveness of the stories in question. In light of these results, finally, I consider the potential contribution that fiction can make to adolescent emotional and moral development and the implications of that potential for future language arts curricula in the schools. In particular, I suggest the pedagogical importance of providing adolescents with opportunities to engage with the lives of fictional characters, and especially to experience feelings of sympathy for individuals towards whom they ordinarily might feel aversion.

At the Limits of Presentation : Coming-into-Presence and its Aesthetic Relevance in Jean-Luc Nancy's Philosophy

This study investigates the significance of art in Jean-Luc Nancy s philosophy. I argue that the notion of art contributes to some of Nancy s central ontological ideas. Therefore, I consider art s importance in its own right whether art does have ontological significance, and if so, how one should describe this with respect to the theme of presentation. According to my central argument, with his thinking on art Nancy attempts to give one viewpoint to what is called the metaphysics of presence and to its deconstruction. On which grounds, as I propose, may one say that art is not reducible to philosophy? The thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part, Presentation as a Philosophical Theme, is a historical genesis of the central concepts associated with the birth of presentation in Nancy s philosophy. I examine this from the viewpoint of the differentiation between the ontological notions of presentation and representation by concentrating on the influence of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida, as well as of Hegel and Kant. I give an overview of the way in which being or sense for Nancy is to be described as a coming-into-presence or presentation . Therefore, being takes place in its singular plurality. I argue that Nancy redevelops Heidegger s account of being in two principal ways: first, in rethinking the ontico-ontological difference, and secondly, by striving to radicalize the Heideggerian concept of Mitsein, being-with . I equally wish to show the importance of Derrida s notion of différance and its inherence in Nancy s questioning of being that rests on the unfoundedness of existence. The second part, From Ontology to Art, draws on the importance of art and the aesthetic. If, in Nancy, the question of art touches upon its own limit as the limit of nothingness, how is art able to open its own strangeness and our exposure to this strangeness? My aim is to investigate how Nancy s thinking on art finds its place within the conceptual realm of its inherent difference and interval. My central concern is the thought of originary ungroundedness and the plurality of art and of the arts. As for the question of the difference between art and philosophy, I wish to show that what differentiates art from thought is the fact that art exposes what is obvious but not apparent, if apparent is understood in the sense of givenness. As for art s ability to deconstruct Nancy s ontological notions, I suggest that in question in art is its original heterogeneity and diversity. Art is a matter of differing art occurs singularly, as a local difference. With this in mind, I point out that in reflecting on art in terms of spacing and interval, as a thinker of difference Nancy comes closer to Derrida and his idea of différance than to the structure of Heidegger s ontological difference.

Space in Musical Semiosis : An Abductive Theory of the Musical Composition Process

Space in musical semiosis is a study of musical meaning, spatiality and composition. Earlier studies on musical composition have not adequately treated the problems of musical signification. Here, composition is considered an epitomic process of musical signification. Hence the core problems of composition theory are core problems of musical semiotics. The study employs a framework of naturalist pragmatism, based on C. S. Peirce’s philosophy. It operates on concepts such as subject, experience, mind and inquiry, and incorporates relevant ideas of Aristotle, Peirce and John Dewey into a synthetic view of esthetic, practic, and semiotic for the benefit of grasping musical signification process as a case of semiosis in general. Based on expert accounts, music is depicted as real, communicative, representational, useful, embodied and non-arbitrary. These describe how music and the musical composition process are mental processes. Peirce’s theories are combined with current morphological theories of cognition into a view of mind, in which space is central. This requires an analysis of space, and the acceptance of a relativist understanding of spatiality. This approach to signification suggests that mental processes are spatially embodied, by virtue of hard facts of the world, literal representations of objects, as well as primary and complex metaphors each sharing identities of spatial structures. Consequently, music and the musical composition process are spatially embodied. Composing music appears as a process of constructing metaphors—as a praxis of shaping and reshaping features of sound, representable from simple quality dimensions to complex domains. In principle, any conceptual space, metaphorical or literal, may set off and steer elaboration, depending on the practical bearings on the habits of feeling, thinking and action, induced in musical communication. In this sense, it is evident that music helps us to reorganize our habits of feeling, thinking, and action. These habits, in turn, constitute our existence. The combination of Peirce and morphological approaches to cognition serves well for understanding musical and general signification. It appears both possible and worthwhile to address a variety of issues central to musicological inquiry in the framework of naturalist pragmatism. The study may also contribute to the development of Peircean semiotics.

Encounters with the Virtual : The Experience of Art In Gilles Deleuze's Philosophy

My thesis concerns the notion of existence as an encounter, as developed in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (1925 1995). What this denotes is a critical stance towards a major current in Western philosophical tradition which Deleuze nominates as representational thinking. Such thinking strives to provide a stable ground for identities by appealing to transcendent structures behind the apparent reality and explaining the manifest diversity of the given by such notions as essence, idea, God, or totality of the world. In contrast to this, Deleuze states that abstractions such as these do not explain anything, but rather that they need to be explained. Yet, Deleuze does not appeal merely to the given. He sees that one must posit a genetic element that accounts for experience, and this element must not be naïvely traced from the empirical. Deleuze nominates his philosophy as transcendental empiricism and he seeks to bring together the approaches of both empiricism and transcendental philosophy. In chapter one I look into the motivations of Deleuze s transcendental empiricism and analyse it as an encounter between Deleuze s readings of David Hume and Immanuel Kant. This encounter regards, first of all, the question of subjectivity and results in a conception of identity as non-essential process. A pre-given concept of identity does not explain the nature of things, but the concept itself must be explained. From this point of view, the process of individualisation must become the central concern. In chapter two I discuss Deleuze s concept of the affect as the basis of identity and his affiliation with the theories of Gilbert Simondon and Jakob von Uexküll. From this basis develops a morphogenetic theory of individuation-as-process. In analysing such a process of individuation, the modal category of the virtual becomes of great value, being an open, indeterminate charge of potentiality. As the virtual concerns becoming or the continuous process of actualisation, then time, rather than space, will be the privileged field of consideration. Chapter three is devoted to the discussion of the temporal aspect of the virtual and difference-without-identity. The essentially temporal process of subjectification results in a conception of the subject as composition: an assemblage of heterogeneous elements. Therefore art and aesthetic experience is valued by Deleuze because they disclose the construct-like nature of subjectivity in the sensations they produce. Through the domain of the aesthetic the subject is immersed in the network of affectivity that is the material diversity of the world. Chapter four addresses a phenomenon displaying this diversified indentity: the simulacrum an identity that is not grounded in an essence. Developed on the basis of the simulacrum, a theory of identity as assemblage emerges in chapter five. As the problematic of simulacra concerns perhaps foremost the artistic presentation, I shall look into the identity of a work of art as assemblage. To take an example of a concrete artistic practice and to remain within the problematic of the simulacrum, I shall finally address the question of reproduction particularly in the case recorded music and its identity regarding the work of art. In conclusion, I propose that by overturning its initial representational schema, phonographic music addresses its own medium and turns it into an inscription of difference, exposing the listener to an encounter with the virtual.

A Literary Turn : Rethinking the Roles of Generalization and Theory in Anglo-American Moral Philosophy

This work investigates the role of narrative literature in late-20th century and contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy. It aims to show the trend of reading narrative literature for purposes of moral philosophy from the 1970 s and early 80 s to the present day as a part of a larger movement in Anglo-American moral philosophy, and to present a view of its significance for moral philosophy overall. Chapter 1 provides some preliminaries concerning the view of narrative literature which my discussion builds on. In chapter 2 I give an outline of how narrative literature is considered in contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy, and connect this use to the broad trend of neo-Aristotelian ethics in this context. In chapter 3 I connect the use of literature to the idea of the non-generalizability of moral perception and judgment, which is central to the neo-Aristotelian trend, as well as to a range of moral particularisms and anti-theoretical positions of late 20th century and contemporary ethics. The joint task of chapters 2 and 3 is to situate the trend of reading narrative literature for the purposes of moral philosophy in the present context of moral philosophy. In the following two chapters, 4 and 5, I move on from the particularizing power of narrative literature, which is emphasized by neo-Aristotelians and particularists alike, to a broader under-standing of the intellectual potential of narrative literature. In chapter 4 I argue that narrative literature has its own forms of generalization which are enriching for our understanding of the workings of ethical generalizations in philosophy. In chapter 5 I discuss Iris Murdoch s and Martha Nussbaum s respective ways of combining ethical generality and particularity in a philosophical framework where both systematic moral theory and narrative literature are taken seriously. In chapter 6 I analyse the controversy between contemporary anti-theoretical conceptions of ethics and Nussbaum s refutation of these. I present my suggestion for how the significance of the ethics/literature discussion for moral philosophy can be understood if one wants to overcome the limitations of both Nussbaum s theory-centred, equilibrium-seeking perspective, and the anti-theorists repudiation of theory. I call my position the inclusive approach .

On the Origin of Ideas : An Abductivist Approach to Discovery

The purpose of this study is to analyze and develop various forms of abduction as a means of conceptualizing processes of discovery. Abduction was originally presented by Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) as a "weak", third main mode of inference -- besides deduction and induction -- one which, he proposed, is closely related to many kinds of cognitive processes, such as instincts, perception, practices and mediated activity in general. Both abduction and discovery are controversial issues in philosophy of science. It is often claimed that discovery cannot be a proper subject area for conceptual analysis and, accordingly, abduction cannot serve as a "logic of discovery". I argue, however, that abduction gives essential means for understanding processes of discovery although it cannot give rise to a manual or algorithm for making discoveries. In the first part of the study, I briefly present how the main trend in philosophy of science has, for a long time, been critical towards a systematic account of discovery. Various models have, however, been suggested. I outline a short history of abduction; first Peirce's evolving forms of his theory, and then later developments. Although abduction has not been a major area of research until quite recently, I review some critiques of it and look at the ways it has been analyzed, developed and used in various fields of research. Peirce's own writings and later developments, I argue, leave room for various subsequent interpretations of abduction. The second part of the study consists of six research articles. First I treat "classical" arguments against abduction as a logic of discovery. I show that by developing strategic aspects of abductive inference these arguments can be countered. Nowadays the term 'abduction' is often used as a synonym for the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) model. I argue, however, that it is useful to distinguish between IBE ("Harmanian abduction") and "Hansonian abduction"; the latter concentrating on analyzing processes of discovery. The distinctions between loveliness and likeliness, and between potential and actual explanations are more fruitful within Hansonian abduction. I clarify the nature of abduction by using Peirce's distinction between three areas of "semeiotic": grammar, critic, and methodeutic. Grammar (emphasizing "Firstnesses" and iconicity) and methodeutic (i.e., a processual approach) especially, give new means for understanding abduction. Peirce himself held a controversial view that new abductive ideas are products of an instinct and an inference at the same time. I maintain that it is beneficial to make a clear distinction between abductive inference and abductive instinct, on the basis of which both can be developed further. Besides these, I analyze abduction as a part of distributed cognition which emphasizes a long-term interaction with the material, social and cultural environment as a source for abductive ideas. This approach suggests a "trialogical" model in which inquirers are fundamentally connected both to other inquirers and to the objects of inquiry. As for the classical Meno paradox about discovery, I show that abduction provides more than one answer. As my main example of abductive methodology, I analyze the process of Ignaz Semmelweis' research on childbed fever. A central basis for abduction is the claim that discovery is not a sequence of events governed only by processes of chance. Abduction treats those processes which both constrain and instigate the search for new ideas; starting from the use of clues as a starting point for discovery, but continuing in considerations like elegance and 'loveliness'. The study then continues a Peircean-Hansonian research programme by developing abduction as a way of analyzing processes of discovery.

Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.

Pathet : Musiikin symboliikka jaavalaisessa varjoteatterissa

The aim of this study is to define and analyse the symbolism hidden in the gamelan music of the Central Javanese, especially in the Yogyakartanese wayang kulit shadow theatre. This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the theory, history and practice of Central Javanese shadow theatre. It also presents the tone symbol theory on which this study is based of B. Y. H. Sastrapustaka, the court servant and musician of the sultan s palace of Yogyakarta. For historical comparison, other theories and phenomena that seem to have some connections with the previously mentioned tone symbol theory are presented here as well as the equipment of the shadow theatre, its music, musical instruments and the shadow theatre in general in literature. The theoretic-methodological basis of the study is an enlarged model of research of cultural music, in which a person in the centre of the model with his/her concepts and by his/her behaviour creates a work of art and receives criticism through feedback, while the process of reciprocal action dynamically affects the whole development of the culture in question. In connection with the concepts of the work of art, the manner of approach of this study is also semiotic as the tone symbol theory gives a particular meaning to each musical note. Thus the purpose of this study is to find answers to how the tone symbol theory manifests itself in practical music making, what its origin is, if it is well known or not, and whether shadow theatre music supports this theory. The second part of this dissertation deals with material collected through interviews and observations as well as representative samples of musical pieces for shadow theatre and their analyses. In relation to this a special tool for analysing gamelan music, developed for the purpose of this study, is also presented. Sufficiently versatile material on the essence and meaning of the shadow theatre collected from many puppet masters of an older generation, many of whom are no longer with us, constitutes an important part of this study. This study proves that the tone symbol theory of Sastrapustaka is of tantristic tradition from the Hindu-Javanese period before the 16th century and before the appearance of Islam in Java. The variants of the previously mentioned theory can be found also in other fields of Javanese advanced civilization, such as architecture and dance. But it seems that knowledge about the tone symbolism connected to the shadow theatre especially has only been preserved in the sultan s palace of Yogyakarta and its intimate circles. The outsider puppet masters surely follow the theory, but they do not necessarily know its origin. As a result of the musical analysis, it is obvious that the musical pieces used for the shadow theatre bear different kinds of symbolic meanings which only an initiated person can feel and understand. These meanings are closely related to the plot of the play at the moment.