Tiede ja tutkijan sosiaalinen vastuu : Joseph Ben-Davidin, Roger Sperryn ja Knut Erik Tranøyn käsitykset tieteestä ja tutkijan sosiaalisesta vastuusta

Science and the Scientist's Social Responsibility. Joseph Ben-David's, Roger Sperry's and Knut Erik Tranøy's Views of Science and the Scientist's Social Responsibility The aim of the study was to investigate, whether or not there is any connection between Jewish sociologist Joseph Ben-David's, American neuroscientist Roger Sperry's and Norwegian philosopher Knut Erik Tranøy's views of science and views of the scientist's social responsibility. The sources of information were their writings concerning this topic. Ben-David has a classical view of science. He thinks that the Mertonian norms of scientific activity, first written in 1942, are still valid in modern science. With the help of these norms Ben-David defends the view that science is morally neutral. Ben-David thinks that a scientist has a limited social responsibility. A scientist only reports on the new results, but he is not responsible for applying the results. In any case Ben-David's ideas are no longer valid. Sperry has a scientistic view of science. According to Sperry, science is the source of moral norms and also the best guide for moral action. The methods of natural sciences "show" how to solve moral problems. A scientist's personal views of science and social responsibility are not important. However Sperry's view is very problematic on the ethical side. Tranøy stresses the scientist's social responsibility. A scientist has common norms with the society from with he or she comes. This is why a scientist has the right, and also the responsibility, to discuss social and ethical questions between science and society. Tranøy's view has some ethical and practical problems, but it is valid in principle. Finally, Ben-David's, Sperry's and Tranøy's views of both science and the scientist's social responsibility have a connection: the view of science corresponds to the certain view of scientist's social responsibility. The result of this study is: Ben-David's, Sperry's and Tranøy's view of science have an ethical starting point as its fundamental presupposition, which include certain views of scientific knowledge, good and the scientist's ethical responsibilities. The connection between Ben-David's, Sperry's and Tranøy's views of science and views of the scientist's social responsibility means that their views of epistemology, meta-ethics and the scientist's ethical responsibilities have a connection to their views of the scientist's social responsibility. The results of this study can help the scientific community to organize the social responsibility of a scientist and deepen the conversation concerning the scientist's social responsibility.

The Art of Sympathy : Forms of Moral and Emotional Persuasion in Fiction

"The Art of Sympathy: Forms of Moral and Emotional Persuasion" in Fiction is an interdisciplinary study that looks closely at the ways that stories evoke sympathy, and the significance of this emotion for the development of moral attitudes and awareness. By linking readers' emotional responses to fiction with the potential impact of such responses on "the moral imagination," the study builds on empirical research conducted by literary scholars and psychologists into the emotional effects of reading fiction, as well as social psychological research into the connections between empathy/sympathy and moral development. I first investigate the dynamics of readers beliefs regarding characters in fictional narratives, and the nature of the emotions that they may experience as a result of those beliefs. The analysis demonstrates that there are important similarities between real emotions and emotions generated by fiction. Recognizing these similarities, I claim, can help us to conceptualize the nature of sympathetic responses to fictional characters. Building on these assertions, I then draw on research from social psychology and philosophy to develop a comprehensive definition of sympathy and to clarify the ways in which sympathy operates, both in people s daily lives and in readers sympathetic responses to fictional characters. Having established this definition and delineated its practical implications, I then examine how particular stories, through a variety of narrative techniques, persuade readers to feel sympathy for characters who are unsympathetic in certain ways. In order to verify my claims about the impact of these stories on readers emotions, I also review the results of tests that I conducted with nearly 200 adolescent readers. Through these tests, which were constructed and scored according to methods prevalent in social psychological research, it was determined that a majority of readers felt sympathy for the protagonists in two of the stories included in the study. These results were combined with data from an additional test, a standard measure of empathy and sympathy in the field of social psychology. The cross-tabulation of these results suggests that there was not a strong connection between readers responses and their general tendencies to feel sympathy for others. This finding would appear to support my hypotheses regarding the sympathetic persuasiveness of the stories in question. In light of these results, finally, I consider the potential contribution that fiction can make to adolescent emotional and moral development and the implications of that potential for future language arts curricula in the schools. In particular, I suggest the pedagogical importance of providing adolescents with opportunities to engage with the lives of fictional characters, and especially to experience feelings of sympathy for individuals towards whom they ordinarily might feel aversion.

Self-love and self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume

This work offers a novel interpretation of David Hume’s (1711–1776) conception of the conjectural development of civil society and artificial moral institutions. It focuses on the social elements of Hume’s Treatise of human nature (1739–40) and the necessary connection between science of man and politeness, civilised monarchies, social distance and hierarchical structure of civil society. The study incorporates aspects of intellectual history, history of philosophy and book history. In order to understand David Hume’s thinking, the intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733) needs to be accounted for. When put into a historical perspective, the moral, political and social components of Treatise of human nature can be read in the context of a philosophical tradition, in which Mandeville plays a pivotal role. A distinctive character of Mandeville and Hume’s account of human nature and moral institutions was the introduction of a simple distinction between self-love and self-liking. The symmetric passions of self-interest and pride can only be controlled by the corresponding moral institutions. This is also the way in which we can say that moral institutions are drawn from human nature. In the case of self-love or self-interest, the corresponding moral institution is justice. Respectively, concerning self-liking or pride the moral institution is politeness. There is an explicit analogy between these moral institutions. If we do not understand this analogy, we do not understand the nature of either justice or politeness. The present work is divided into two parts. In the first part, ‘Intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville’, it is argued that the relevance of the paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thinking has been missed. It draws a picture of Mandeville turning from the Hobbism of The Fable of the Bees to an original theory of civil society put forward in his later works. In order to make this change more apparent, Mandeville’s career and the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees are examined comprehensively. This interpretation, based partly on previously unknown sources, challenges F. B. Kaye’s influential decision to publish the two parts of The Fable of the Bees as a uniform work of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the ‘Intellectual development of Mandeville’ is to function as the context for the young Hume. The second part of the work, ‘David Hume and Greatness of mind’, explores in philosophical detail the social theory of the Treatise and politics and the science of man in his Essays. This part will also reveal the relevance of Greatness of mind as a general concept for David Hume’s moral and political philosophy.

A Literary Turn : Rethinking the Roles of Generalization and Theory in Anglo-American Moral Philosophy

This work investigates the role of narrative literature in late-20th century and contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy. It aims to show the trend of reading narrative literature for purposes of moral philosophy from the 1970 s and early 80 s to the present day as a part of a larger movement in Anglo-American moral philosophy, and to present a view of its significance for moral philosophy overall. Chapter 1 provides some preliminaries concerning the view of narrative literature which my discussion builds on. In chapter 2 I give an outline of how narrative literature is considered in contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy, and connect this use to the broad trend of neo-Aristotelian ethics in this context. In chapter 3 I connect the use of literature to the idea of the non-generalizability of moral perception and judgment, which is central to the neo-Aristotelian trend, as well as to a range of moral particularisms and anti-theoretical positions of late 20th century and contemporary ethics. The joint task of chapters 2 and 3 is to situate the trend of reading narrative literature for the purposes of moral philosophy in the present context of moral philosophy. In the following two chapters, 4 and 5, I move on from the particularizing power of narrative literature, which is emphasized by neo-Aristotelians and particularists alike, to a broader under-standing of the intellectual potential of narrative literature. In chapter 4 I argue that narrative literature has its own forms of generalization which are enriching for our understanding of the workings of ethical generalizations in philosophy. In chapter 5 I discuss Iris Murdoch s and Martha Nussbaum s respective ways of combining ethical generality and particularity in a philosophical framework where both systematic moral theory and narrative literature are taken seriously. In chapter 6 I analyse the controversy between contemporary anti-theoretical conceptions of ethics and Nussbaum s refutation of these. I present my suggestion for how the significance of the ethics/literature discussion for moral philosophy can be understood if one wants to overcome the limitations of both Nussbaum s theory-centred, equilibrium-seeking perspective, and the anti-theorists repudiation of theory. I call my position the inclusive approach .

Behagets betydelser : Döttrarnas edukation i det sena 1700-talets adelskultur

By the end of the 18th century the daughters of the nobility in the northern parts of Europe received a quite different kind of education from their brothers. Although the cultural aims of the upbringing of girls were similar to that of boys, the practice of the raising of girls was less influenced by tradition. The education of boys was one of classical humanistic and military training, but the girls were more freely educated. The unity and exclusiveness of the culture of nobility were of great importance to the continued influence of this elite. The importance of education became even greater, partly because of the unstable political situation, and partly because of the changes the Enlightenment had caused in the perception of the human essence. The delicate and ambitious hônnete homme was expected to constantly strive to a greater perfection as a Christian. On the other hand, the great weight given to aesthetics - etiquette and taste - made individual variation of the contents of education possible. Education consisted mainly in aesthetic studies; girls studied music, dancing, fine arts, epistolary skills and also the art of polite conversation. On the other hand, there was a demand for enlightenment, and one often finds personal political and social ambitions, which made competition in all skills necessary for the daughters as well. Literary sources for the education of girls are Madame LePrince de Beaumont, Madame d'Epinay, Madame de Genlis and Charles Rollin. Other, perhaps even more important sources are the letters between parents and children and papers originating from studies. Diaries and memoirs also tell us about the practice of education in day to day life. The approach of this study is semiotic. It can be stated that the code of the culture was well hidden from the outsider. This was achieved, for instance, by the adaptation of the foreign French language and culture. The core of the culture consisted of texts which only thorough examples stated the norms which were expressed as good taste. Another important feature of the culture was its tendency towards theatricalisation. The way of life was dictated by taste, and moral values were included in the aesthetic norms through the constant striving for modesty. Pleasant manners were also correct in an ethical perspective. Morality could thus also be taught through etiquette.

Kansakunnan parhaaksi. : Suomalaiset naisten- ja lastensairaalat 1920 1940-luvulla arkkitehtonisena, lääketieteellisenä ja yhteiskunnallisena suunnittelukohteena

This dissertation addresses the modernization process of Finnish hospital architecture between the First and Second World War, with focus on facilities explicitly designed for women and children, which as special hospitals reflect specialization, a distinct feature of the modern era. The facilities considered in the study are the Salus hospital, Dr. Länsimäki s women s hospital, the Folkhälsan in Svenska Finland association s child-care institute, the Helsinki Women s Clinic, the Viipuri Women s Hospital, the Helsinki Children s Clinic and the Children's Castle (Lastenlinna) in Helsinki. The study considers hospital architecture as an architectural, medical and social object of design. The theoretical starting point and perspective are the views of the French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault (1925 1983) concerning the relationship of bio-power and architecture. Underlying the construction of health-care facilities for women and children were not only the desire to help but also issues of population policy, social policies, training and professionalization. In this study, hospital architecture is interpreted as reflecting developments in medicine, while also producing and reinforcing discourses associated with the ideologies of the time of design and construction. The results of the present research provide new information on the field of hospital design. The design of hospitals was no longer the sole prerogative of architects. Instead, modern hospital design involved the collaboration and networking of experts in various fields. During the period studied, the pavilion system was incorporated in hospital architecture in the block system, which was regarded as a rational. Rationalization was implemented upon the conditions of medical work. This led to spatial design in accordance with medical practices, through which norms were reinforced and created. An important aspect of the material is that the requirements of light, air, openness and hygiene created architecture in glass of an x-ray character, strongly associated with the element of discipline. The alliance of hygiene and architecture became a strategy for controlling the behaviour and encounters of people, for producing pedagogical and moral hygiene, and for reinforcing class hygiene. The modern hospital building also had to meet the requirements of aesthetic hygiene. Health-care facilities designed for women and children became production-oriented machinery, instruments for producing a healthy population and for reinforcing medical discourses.

Ethics in a Technological World : Framing the Questions and Three Approaches

This study addresses the following question: How to think about ethics in a technological world? The question is treated first thematically by framing central issues in the relationship between ethics and technology. This relationship has three distinct facets: i) technological advance poses new challenges for ethics, ii) traditional ethics may become poorly applicable in a technologically transformed world, and iii) the progress in science and technology has altered the concept of rationality in ways that undermine ethical thinking itself. The thematic treatment is followed by the description and analysis of three approaches to the questions framed. First, Hans Jonas s thinking on the ontology of life and the imperative of responsibility is studied. In Jonas s analysis modern culture is found to be nihilistic because it is unable to understand organic life, to find meaning in reality, and to justify morals. At the root of nihilism Jonas finds dualism, the traditional Western way of seeing consciousness as radically separate from the material world. Jonas attempts to create a metaphysical grounding for an ethic that would take the technologically increased human powers into account and make the responsibility for future generations meaningful and justified. The second approach is Albert Borgmann s philosophy of technology that mainly assesses the ways in which technological development has affected everyday life. Borgmann admits that modern technology has liberated humans from toil, disease, danger, and sickness. Furthermore, liberal democracy, possibilities for self-realization, and many of the freedoms we now enjoy would not be possible on a large scale without technology. Borgmann, however, argues that modern technology in itself does not provide a whole and meaningful life. In fact, technological conditions are often detrimental to the good life. Integrity in life, according to him, is to be sought among things and practices that evade technoscientific objectification and commodification. Larry Hickman s Deweyan philosophy of technology is the third approach under scrutiny. Central in Hickman s thinking is a broad definition of technology that is nearly equal to Deweyan inquiry. Inquiry refers to the reflective and experiential way humans adapt to their environment by modifying their habits and beliefs. In Hickman s work, technology consists of all kinds of activities that through experimentation and/or reflection aim at improving human techniques and habits. Thus, in addition to research and development, many arts and political reforms are technological for Hickman. He argues for recasting such distinctions as fact/value, poiesis/praxis/theoria, and individual/society. Finally, Hickman does not admit a categorical difference between ethics and technology: moral values and norms need to be submitted to experiential inquiry as well as all the other notions. This study mainly argues for an interdisciplinary approach to the ethics of technology. This approach should make use of the potentialities of the research traditions in applied ethics, the philosophy of technology, and the social studies on science and technology and attempt to overcome their limitations. This study also advocates an endorsement of mid-level ethics that concentrate on the practices, institutions, and policies of temporal human life. Mid-level describes the realm between the instantaneous and individualistic micro-level and the universal and global macro level.

Tutkimusetiikka ja tutkimusympäristön normit

According to some scientists it is not useful to integrate ethics into research practices. Their claim is that only unethical persons have ethical problems and because of this we must accept ethical misbehaviour as a phenomenon typical of human society. In the present study the argument that the moral personality of scientists explains ethical problems in science is questioned; in addition, the focus is shifted from individuals to the level of the research environment. The question asked is whether the research environment somehow contributes to research ethics violations. To answer this question the focus was turned towards the research environment norms. The aim of the study was to investigate whether or not these norms are consistent with the norms of research ethics, so that it would be possible to evaluate if the research environment supports scientists in their task of meeting the ethical standards of scientific research. In the study the research environment was examined in three parts. The first deals with society especially Finnish society as a research environment. The second deals with the autonomous science institution as a research environment, while the third deals with scientific society (working according to scientific criteria) as a research environment. The conceptual analysis method was used. This means that various normative arguments were analysed, the primary assumptions behind them were recognized, and the acceptability of normative claims was evaluated according to their consistency. The results of the study do not support the claim that ethical violations in science could be satisfactorily explained by referring only to the personal qualities of scientists. The research environment can limit the freedom to follow the ethical principles of science, it can prevent scientists from handling ethical problems openly and from integrating ethical norms effectively into research practices. The norms of research environment are often implicit but nevertheless influence scientific practices. Further, the results indicate that handling ethical questions should be a part of scientific training.

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights : A comparative analysis of the conceptual relationship between democracy and rights in contemporary political theories

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights is a research in normative political theory, based on comparative analysis of contemporary democratic theories, classified roughly as conventional liberal, deliberative democratic and radical democratic. Its focus is on the conceptual relationship between alternative sources of democratic legitimacy: democratic inclusion and liberal rights. The relationship between rights and democracy is studied through the following questions: are rights to be seen as external constraints to democracy or as objects of democratic decision making processes? Are individual rights threatened by public participation in politics; do constitutionally protected rights limit the inclusiveness of democratic processes? Are liberal values such as individuality, autonomy and liberty; and democratic values such as equality, inclusion and popular sovereignty mutually conflictual or supportive? Analyzing feminist critique of liberal discourse, the dissertation also raises the question about Enlightenment ideals in current political debates: are the universal norms of liberal democracy inherently dependent on the rationalist grand narratives of modernity and incompatible with the ideal of diversity? Part I of the thesis introduces the sources of democratic legitimacy as presented in the alternative democratic models. Part II analyses how the relationship between rights and democracy is theorized in them. Part III contains arguments by feminists and radical democrats against the tenets of universalist liberal democratic models and responds to that critique by partly endorsing, partly rejecting it. The central argument promoted in the thesis is that while the deconstruction of modern rationalism indicates that rights are political constructions as opposed to externally given moral constraints to politics, this insight does not delegitimize the politics of universal rights as an inherent part of democratic institutions. The research indicates that democracy and universal individual rights are mutually interdependent rather than oppositional; and that democracy is more dependent on an unconditional protection of universal individual rights when it is conceived as inclusive, participatory and plural; as opposed to robust majoritarian rule. The central concepts are: liberalism, democracy, legitimacy, deliberation, inclusion, equality, diversity, conflict, public sphere, rights, individualism, universalism and contextuality. The authors discussed are e.g. John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, Iris Young, Chantal Mouffe and Stephen Holmes. The research focuses on contemporary political theory, but the more classical work of John S. Mill, Benjamin Constant, Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt is also included.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

The sources of moral motivation : studies on empathy, guilt, shame and values

The goals of this study were to analyze the forms of emotional tendencies that are likely to motivate moral behaviors, and to find correlates for these tendencies. In study 1, students narratives of their own guilt or shame experiences were analyzed. The results showed that pure shame was more likely to motivate avoidance than reparation, whereas guilt and combination of guilt and shame were likely to motivate reparation. However, all types of emotion could lead to chronic rumination if the person was not clearly responsible for the situation. In study 2, the relations of empathy with two measures of guilt were examined in a sample of 13- to 16-year-olds (N=113). Empathy was measured using Davis s IRI and guilt by Tangney s TOSCA and Hoffman s semi-projective story completion method that includes two different scenarios, guilt over cheating and guilt over inaction. Empathy correlated more strongly with both measures of guilt than the two measures correlated with each other. Hoffman s guilt over inaction was more strongly associated with empathy measures in girls than in boys, whereas for guilt over cheating the pattern was the opposite. Girls and boys who describe themselves as empathetic may emphasize different aspect of morality and feel guilty in different contexts. In study 3, cultural and gender differences in guilt and shame (TOSCA) and value priorities (the Schwartz Value Survey) were studied in samples of Finnish (N=156) and Peruvian (N=159) adolescents. Gender differences were found to be larger and more stereotypical among the Finns than among the Peruvians. Finnish girls were more prone to guilt and shame than boys were, whereas among the Peruvians there was no gender difference in guilt, and boys were more shame-prone than girls. The results support the view that psychological gender differences are largest individualistic societies. In study 4, the relations of value priorities to guilt, shame and empathy were examined in two samples, one of 15 19-year-old high school students (N = 207), and the other of military conscripts (N = 503). Guilt was, in both samples, positively related to valuing universalism, benevolence, tradition, and conformity, and negatively related to valuing power, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction. The results for empathy were similar, but the relation to the openness conservation value dimension was weaker. Shame and personal distress were weakly related to values. In sum, shame without guilt and the TOSCA shame scale are tendencies that are unlikely to motivate moral behavior in Finnish cultural context. Guilt is likely to be connected to positive social behaviors, but excessive guilt can cause psychological problems. Moral emotional tendencies are related to culture, cultural conceptions of gender and to individual value priorities.

What should I think; How should I feel? : The balancing of personal experiences and social norms in the outgroup attitude formation of youth

The present study focused on the associations between the personal experiences of intergroup contact, perceived social norms and the outgroup attitudes of Finnish majority and Russian-speaking minority youth living in Finland. The theoretical background of the study was derived from Allport s (1954) theory of intergroup contact (i.e., the contact hypothesis), social psychological research on normative influences on outgroup attitudes (e.g., Rutland, 2004; Stangor and Leary, 2006) and developmental psychological research on the formation of explicit (deliberate) and implicit (automatically activated) outgroup attitudes in adolescence (e.g., Barrett, 2007; Killen, McGlothlin and Henning, 2008). The main objective of the study was to shed light on the role of perceived social norms in the formation of outgroup attitudes among adolescents. First, the study showed that perceived normative pressure to hold positive attitudes towards immigrants regulated the relationship between the explicit and implicit expression of outgroup attitudes among majority youth. Second, perceived social norms concerning outgroup attitudes (i.e., the perceived outgroup attitudes of parents and peers) affected the relationship between intergroup contact and explicit outgroup attitudes depending on gender and group status. Positive social norms seem to be especially important for majority boys, who need both pleasant contact experiences and normative support to develop outgroup attitudes that are as positive as girls attitudes. The role of social norms is accentuated also among minority youth, who, contrary to majority youth with their more powerful and independent status position, need to reflect upon their attitudes and experiences of negative intergroup encounters in relation to the experiences and attitudes of their ingroup members. Third, the results are indicative of the independent effects of social norms and intergroup anxiety on outgroup attitudes: the effect of perceived social norms on the outgroup attitudes of youth seems to be at least as strong as the effect of intergroup anxiety. Finally, it was shown that youth evaluate intergroup contact from the viewpoint of their ingroup and society as a whole, not just based on their own experiences. In conclusion, the outgroup attitudes of youth are formed in a close relationship with their social environment. On the basis of this study, the importance of perceived social norms for research on intergroup contact effects among youth cannot be overlooked. Positive normative influences have the potential to break the strong link between rare and/or negative personal contact experiences and negative outgroup attitudes, and norms also influence the relationship between implicit and explicit attitude expression.

Conflits de norms de justice distributive dans les fusions entre égaux Le cas de BioM.rieux-Pierre Fabre

Les strictes fusions entre égaux constituent un phénomène très rare. Pourtant, de nombreux dirigeants communiquent sur l’aspect égalitaire des fusions et acquisitions qu’ils conçoivent. Dans cet article, les auteurs expliquent pourquoi les dirigeants <> leurs F&A en <> ; montrent en quoi le postulat égalitaire initial accroît la probabilité de conflits entre deux normes de justice distributive pourtant compl.mentaires : l’égalité et l’équité ; et illustrent leurs propos avec un cas spectaculaire : la fusion égalitaire, puis la separation des entreprises BioMérieux et Pierre Fabre. Paradoxalement, la simple formulation en termes égalitaire des F&A favorise la diffusion de sentiments d’injustice distributive, qui nuit in fine à la performance de l’opération.