Kristallivalheita : Itsepetos filosofisen tulkinnan lähtökohtana eräissä draaman klassikoissa

The philosophical problem of self-deception focuses the relation between desire, advantage, evidence and harm. A self-deceptive person is irrational because he or she belives or wants to belive contrary to the available evidence. The study focuses on different forms of self-deception that come out in certain classical Western dramas. The first self-deception forms are: "S knows that ~p but still belives that p because he wants that ~p", "S wants that p and therefore belives that p.", "S belives that p against evidence t because he wants to belive that p.", "S belives that p if t but S would belive that p even if ~t because S wants to belive that p.", "S belives that p (even if there is t that ~p) because S is ignorant of it." and "S belives that p (even if there is t that ~p) because of ignorant of t due to an internal deception." The main sources on self-deception are the views of contemporary researchers of the subject, such as Robert Audi, Marcia Baron, Bas C. van Fraassen, Mark Johnston, Mike W. Martin, Brian MaLaughlin, Alfred Mele, Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, William Ruddick and Stephen L. White. In this study it is claimed that Shakespeare´s Othello presents self-deception as a tragic phenomenom from witch it follows deceptions and murders. Moliére´s Tartuffe deals with a phony hypocrite´s attempts at cheating. Ibsen´s Wild Duck defends the necessity of vital lies. Beckett´s Waiting for Godot deals with the self-deception witch is related to the waiting of the supernatural rescuer. Miller´s The Death of a Salesman tells about a man who, while pursuing the American myth of success, winds both himself and his family into the skeins of self-deception. They are studied with a Barthesian method that emphasizes the autonomy of literary work and its interpretation independently of the author´s personal history and social conditions. Self-deception has been regarded as an immoral way of thinking or way of action. However, vital lies show the necessity or necessity of the self-deception when it brings joy and optimism to the human being and supports his or her self-esteem and does not cause a suffering or damage, either to self or others. In the study, the processual character of self-deception is brought out.

Imagination and diversity in the philosophy of Hobbes

This dissertation is a study of some aspects of theoretical philosophy of the early modern thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The focal point of the work is Hobbes s conception of imagination, which is discussed from both a systematic and a historical point of view, as well as in the light of contemporary scholarship. I argue that though there are significant similarities between the view of Hobbes and that of his predecessors, he gives a novel theory of imagination, which clarifies not only early modern discussions on human nature, knowledge, science, and literary criticism, but above all his own versatile philosophy. The prologue of the dissertation introduces methodological principles and gives critical remarks on the standard view of Hobbes. In Chapter II, I discuss the prominent theories of imagination before Hobbes and link them to his account. I argue that though Hobbes adopted the Aristotelian framework, his view is not reduced to it, as he borrows from various sources, for instance, from the Stoics and from Renaissance thought. Chapters III and IV form the psychological part of the work. In the Chapter III I argue that imagination, not sense, is central in the basic cognitive operations of the mind and that imagination has a decisive role in Hobbes s theory of motivation. The Chapter IV concentrates on various questions of Hobbes s philosophy of language. The chapter ends with a defence of a less naturalistic reading of Hobbes s theory of human nature. Chapters V and VI form the epistemological part of the work. I suggest, contrary to what has been recently claimed, that though Hobbes s ideas of good literary style do have a point of contact with his philosophy (e.g. the psychology of creative process), his ideas in the field are independent of his project of demonstrative political science. Instead I argue that the novelty of his major political work, Leviathan (1651), is based on a new theory of knowledge which he continued to develop in the post-Leviathan works. Chapter VII seeks to connect the more theoretical conclusions of Chapters V and VI to Hobbes's idea(l) of science as well as to his philosophical practice. On the basis of Hobbes s own writings as well as some historical examinations, I argue that method is not an apt way to conceptualise Hobbes s philosophical practice. Contemporary readings of Hobbes s theory of science are critically discussed and the chapter ends with an analysis of Hobbes s actual argumentation. In addition to the concluding remarks, the epilogue suggest three things: first, imagination is central when trying to understand Hobbes s versatile philosophy; second, that it is misleading to depict Hobbes as a simple materialist, mechanist, and empiricist; and, third, that in terms of imagination his influence on early modern thought has not been fully appreciated.

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights : A comparative analysis of the conceptual relationship between democracy and rights in contemporary political theories

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights is a research in normative political theory, based on comparative analysis of contemporary democratic theories, classified roughly as conventional liberal, deliberative democratic and radical democratic. Its focus is on the conceptual relationship between alternative sources of democratic legitimacy: democratic inclusion and liberal rights. The relationship between rights and democracy is studied through the following questions: are rights to be seen as external constraints to democracy or as objects of democratic decision making processes? Are individual rights threatened by public participation in politics; do constitutionally protected rights limit the inclusiveness of democratic processes? Are liberal values such as individuality, autonomy and liberty; and democratic values such as equality, inclusion and popular sovereignty mutually conflictual or supportive? Analyzing feminist critique of liberal discourse, the dissertation also raises the question about Enlightenment ideals in current political debates: are the universal norms of liberal democracy inherently dependent on the rationalist grand narratives of modernity and incompatible with the ideal of diversity? Part I of the thesis introduces the sources of democratic legitimacy as presented in the alternative democratic models. Part II analyses how the relationship between rights and democracy is theorized in them. Part III contains arguments by feminists and radical democrats against the tenets of universalist liberal democratic models and responds to that critique by partly endorsing, partly rejecting it. The central argument promoted in the thesis is that while the deconstruction of modern rationalism indicates that rights are political constructions as opposed to externally given moral constraints to politics, this insight does not delegitimize the politics of universal rights as an inherent part of democratic institutions. The research indicates that democracy and universal individual rights are mutually interdependent rather than oppositional; and that democracy is more dependent on an unconditional protection of universal individual rights when it is conceived as inclusive, participatory and plural; as opposed to robust majoritarian rule. The central concepts are: liberalism, democracy, legitimacy, deliberation, inclusion, equality, diversity, conflict, public sphere, rights, individualism, universalism and contextuality. The authors discussed are e.g. John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, Iris Young, Chantal Mouffe and Stephen Holmes. The research focuses on contemporary political theory, but the more classical work of John S. Mill, Benjamin Constant, Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt is also included.

Ethics and Aesthetics : Intersections in Iris Murdoch's Philosophy

The study addresses the question concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in the philosophy of Iris Murdoch. The main argument is that Murdoch s philosophy cannot be accurately understood without an understanding of the relationship she sees between the aesthetic experience and morality. Reading Murdoch s philosophy with this relationship in mind shows that it must be considered as a relevant alternative to the main forms of aesthetic-ethical theories. The study consists of seven previously published articles and a summary. It shows that Murdoch belongs to a tradition of philosophers who seek to broaden the scope of ethics by reference to aesthetic value and aesthetic experience. She sees an attitude responsible for aesthetic experiences as relevant for morality. However, she does not collapse morality into aesthetic experience. The two meet on the level of the subject s attitude towards its object, but there is a distinction between the experiences that accompany the attitudes. Aesthetic experiences can function as a clue to morals in that they present in a pleasing manner moral truths which otherwise might be psychologically too difficult to face. Murdoch equates the aesthetic attitude with virtuous love characterized by unselfish attention to its object. The primary object of such love is in Murdoch s account another human individual in her particularity. She compares the recognition of the other person as a particular existence to the experience of the Kantian sublime and offers her own version of the true sublime which is the experience of awe in the face of the infinity of the task of understanding others. One of the most central claims in Murdoch s philosophy is that human consciousness is evaluatively structured. This claim challenges the distinction between facts and values which has had an immense influence on modern moral philosophy. One argument with which Murdoch supports her claim is the nature of great literature. According to her, the standard of greatness in literature is the authors awareness of the independent existence of individuals in the particularity of their evaluative consciousnesses. The analysis of the standard of greatness in literature is also Murdoch s only argument for the claim that the primary object of the loving unselfish attention is the other particular individual. She is convinced that great literature reveals a deep truth about the human condition with its capacity to capture the particular. Abstract philo¬sophical discourse cannot compete with this capacity but it should take truths revealed by literature seriously in its theorising. Recognising this as Murdoch s stand on the question of the relation between philosophy and literature as forms of human discourse settles whether she is part of what has been called philosophy s turn to literature. The answer is yes.

Temporality of the Face-to-Face in Levinas' Ethics

This thesis focuses on a connection between temporality and ethics in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. I argue that Levinas understanding of temporality is rooted in the function of pra-impression which in its turn does not belong to the intentional consciousness but reveals a subject as being open to the Other. In the face-to-face situation with the Other the pra-impression is an essential and constitutive force: it fractures the moment of the present, questions subjectivity and generates a new meaning of temporality. As a result a responsible subject is revealed; responsibility for the Other marks a latent birth of the subject which is prior to any origin of subjectivity, it discloses a meaning of time that does not belong to the subject but is found in the Other. In this study I suggest that pra-impression finds its productive force in language, the function of the feminine, and what Levinas calls the other in the same .

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

The Restless Love of Thinking : The Concept Liebe in Hegel's Philosophy

The German philosopher G.W.F.Hegel (1770–1831) is best known for his idealistic system philosophy, his concept of spirit [Geist] and for his dictum that the existing and the rational overlap. This thesis offers a new perspective: it examines the working of the concept ‘love’ in Hegel’s philosophy by looking at the contexts and function he puts it to, from his earliest writings to the very last lectures he gave. The starting point of the inquiry is that he applied the concept Liebe to different contexts for different purposes, but each time to provide an answer to a specific philosophical problem. His formulation, reformulation and use of ‘love’ give possible solutions to problems the solving of which was crucial to the development of his thought as a whole. The study is divided into three parts, each analysing the different problems and solutions to which Hegel applied the concept of love. The first part, "Love, morality and ethical life", examines these interconnected themes in Hegel’s early work. The main questions he addressed during this period concerned how to unite Kant’s philosophy and the Greek ideal of the good life. In this context, the concept ‘love’ did three things. First, it served to formulate his grounding idea of the relation between unity and difference, or the manifold. Secondly, it was the key to his attempt to base an ideal folk religion on Christianity interpreted as a religion of love. Finally, it provided the means to criticise Kant’s moral philosophy. The question of the moral value of love helped Hegel to break away from Kant’s thought and develop his own theory about love and ethical life. The second part of the study, "Love and the political realm", considers the way 'Liebe' functions in connection with questions concerning the community and political life in Hegel’s work. In addition to questioning the universal applicability of the concept of recognition as a key to his theory of social relations, the chapters focus on gender politics and the way he conceptualised the gender category ‘woman’ through the concept ‘love’. Another line of inquiry is the way the figure of Antigone was used to conceptualise the differentiated spheres of action for men and women, and the part ‘love’ played in Hegel’s description of Antigone’s motives. Thirdly, Hegel’s analogy of the family and the state and the way ‘love’ functions in an attempt to promote understanding of the relation between citizens and the state are examined. The third and final part of the study, "Love as absolute spirit", focuses on ‘love’ within Hegel’s systemic thought and the way he continued to characterise Geist through the language of Liebe up until and including his very last works. It is shown how Liebe functions in his hierarchical organisation of the domains of art, religion and philosophy, and how both art and religion end up in similar structural positions with regard to philosophy. One recurrent theme in the third part is Hegel’s complex relation to Romantic thought. Another line of investigation is how he reconstructed Christianity as a religion of love in his mature work. In striking contrast to his early thought, in his last works Hegel introduced a new concept of love that incorporated negativity, and that could also function as the root of political action.

Group Beliefs : Studies on the Nature and Logic of Collective Doxastic Attitudes

This thesis studies the nature and logic of collective doxastic attitudes, or what is referred to in ordinary language as "group beliefs". Beliefs and other intentional attitudes are attributed to groups and collections of people, and such attributions are used to explain and predict the actions of groups. The thesis develops an understanding of group beliefs as voluntarily adopted views or acceptances rather than as ordinary beliefs. Such an understanding can provide new answers to questions concerning collective knowledge and justification of group beliefs, and it allows developing modal logics with collective doxastic and epistemic notions. The thesis consists of six articles. The first three articles are philosophical studies concerned with the nature of group beliefs. The last three articles are logical studies that aim at developing proof-theoretical calculi for reasoning about collective doxastic attitudes.

Knowledge through Discussion : An Interpretation of Epistemology in Plato's Meno

According to Meno s paradox we cannot inquire into what we do not know because we do not know what we are inquiring into. There are many ways to interpret the paradox but the central issue about our ability to reach truth is a profound one. In the dialogue Meno, Plato presents the paradox and an outline of a solution which enables us to reach knowledge (epistēmē) through philosophical discussion. During the last century Meno has often been considered transitional between Socratic thinking and Plato s own philosophy, and thus the dialogue has not been adequately interpreted as an integrated whole. Therefore the distinctive epistemology of the dialogue has not gained due notice. In this thesis the dialogue is analysed as an integrated whole and the philosophical interpretation also takes into account its dramatic features. The thesis emphasises the role of language and definitions in acquiring knowledge. Among the results concerning these subjects is a new interpretation of Socrates s defintion of shape (schēma). The theory of anamnēsis all learning is recollection in the Meno is argued to answer the paradox philosophically although Plato s presentation also contains playful and ironic elements. The background of the way Plato presents his case is that he appreciated the fact that no argument can plausibly demonstrate that argumentation is able to reach truth. In the Meno, Plato makes the earliest explicit distinction between knowledge and true belief in the history of Western philosophy. He also gives a definition of knowledge which is the basis of the so called classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief. In the Meno, true beliefs become knowledge when someone ties them down by reasoning about the explanation. The analysis of the epistemology of the dialogue from this perspective gives an interpretation which integrates the central concepts of the epistemology in the dialogue elenchos, anamnēsis and hypothetical inquiry into a unified whole which contains a plausible argument according to which the ignorant can reach knowledge through discussion. The conception that emerges by such an analysis is interesting both from the point of view of current interests and that of the history of philosophy. The method of knowledge acquisition in the Meno can, for example, be seen as a predecessor of modern scientific methods. The Meno is the earliest Greek mathematical text that has survived in its original form. The analysis presented in the thesis of the geometric passages in the dialogue provides new results both concerning Socrates s geometry lesson with the slave and the example presenting the hypothetical method. Concerning the latter, a new interpretation is presented. Keywords: anamnēsis, epistēmē, knowledge, Meno s paradox, Plato

Etiikan tutkimuksen funktio Aristoteleella ja Nikomakhoksen etiikan tulkintaperinteet

Käytännöllisen filosofian historian alaan kuuluva Pro Gradu -tutkielmani pyrkii vastaamaan kysymykseen, mikä on etiikan tutkimuksen funktio Aristoteleen Nikomakhoksen etiikassa. Tarkastelen Nikomakhoksen etiikan tulkintaperinteitä ja erityisesti Aristoteleen etiikan egoistisesta perusluonteesta käytyä keskustelua. Tutkimuksessa kyysenalaistan oletuksen, että etiikan teorian funktio Aristoteleella olisi ollut sama kuin mikä se modernissa etiikassa on. Tutkimuksessani totean antiikin etiikan ja modernin moraalikäsityksen erot ja tuon esiin sen, kuinka helposti modernit Aristoteles-kommentaattorit lankeavat anakronismiin. Tämä tulee esiin egoismi-keskustelussa ja siinä, millaisia asioita keskustelun osapuolet vaativat Aristoteleen etiikalta tai olettavat etiikan teorian sisältävän. Keskustelu Aristoteleen etiikan egoismista toimii esimerkkinä, jonka kautta valoitetaan modernien tulkintaperinteiden ongelmia. Tutkimuksessa päädytään kumoamaan ongelmallisena tulkintaperinne, jonka mukaan Aristoteleen eettinen naturalismi voisi tarjota rationaalisen perustan etiikalle. Myös perinteinen käsitys Aristoteleen etiikan teorian funktiosta hylätään ja päädytään esittämään että Aristoteleen etiikka on perusluonteeltaan erottamatonta politiikasta ja antiikin kreikan kaupunkivaltion poliittisesta rakenteesta. Tämän johdosta kyseenalaistetaan vakavasti mahdollisuus soveltaa Aristoteleen etiikkaa moderniin maailmaan. Johtopäätöksenä on, että Nikomakhoksen etiikka on enemmänkin lainsäätäjille/valtiomiehille (tai sellaiseksi aikoville) suunnattua asiantuntijakirjallisuutta kuin yksityiselle ihmiselle hänen omassa elämässään vastauksia tarjoava opas. Etiikan teorian tarkoituksena on näyttää lainsäätäjille kokonaiskuva, mihin suuntaan heidän tulisi lainsäädännöllään kansalaisia ohjata.

Kantin käsitys ystävyydestä ja rakkaudesta

Tässä tutkielmassa tarkastellaan Immanuel Kantin käsitystä ideaalista ystävyydestä. Tarkoituksena oli ratkaista sen olemassa olo rakkauden vastavuoroisuuden perusteella. Ystävyys on ollut antiikista lähtien filosofialle merkittävä ongelma. Immanuel Kant käsittelee ystävyyttä kahdessa teoksessaan The Metaphysics of Morals ja Lectures on Ethics. Kantin ystävyyskäsitys sisältää neljä erilaista ystävyyden lajia. Ne ovat tarveystävyys, esteettinen ystävyys, intiimiystävyys ja ideaali ystävyys. Tarveystävyys perustuu hyödyn tavoittelulle. Esteettisellä ystävyydellä tarkoitetaan nautintoja hakevaa ystävyyttä. Intiimiystävyys on luonteen ystävyyttä. Ideaali ystävyys on Kantin käsitys täydellisestä ystävyydestä. Ideaalissa ystävyydessä niin kuin intiimiystävyydessä tärkeintä on keskusteleminen. Rakkauden tasapainon selvittämiseksi tutustuttiin Kantin käsityksiin rakkaudesta. Rakkauden lajeja Kantilta esittelin viisi. Niiden lisäksi onnellisuus oli tunne, joka vaikutti ystävyyden muodostumiseen. Rakkauden lajeja ovat itserakkaus, eros, agape, philia ja amor benevolentiae. Itserakkaus on itsensä rakastamista. Eros on intohimoa korostava rakkauden laji. Se kuuluu avioliittoon, ei ystävyyteen. Agape tunnetaan lähimmäisenrakkautena. Philia eroaa agapesta siten, että se on kiinnostunut joistain rakastettavista piirteistä toisessa yksilössä. Amor benevolentiae on hyväntahtoisuuden osoittamista. Rakkaus, joka ystävien välillä ilmeni vastavuoroisena, vahvistui lajiltaan philiaksi. Vastavuoroisuus ystävien kesken vaatii ajan ja paikan. Vastavuoroisuutta vaikeuttaa epävarmuus siitä. Vastavuoroisuudesta on saatava runsaasti todisteita. Todisteita saadaan tavoilla, jotka ystävät ymmärtävät. Ymmärtäminen edellyttää yhteisiä viestintäkeinoja. Kun tarpeeksi toisiinsa luottavat ystävät keskustelevat keskenään, he myös muovaavat toistensa persoonia. Silloin he tekevät toisistaan rakastettavampia. Tutkimukseni perusteella ideaali ystävyys on mahdollinen. Vastavuoroisuus rakkaudessa onnistuu, jos ystävät muokkaavat toisiaan. Ideaali ystävyys on molemminpuolisen kehittymisen tulos, jolloin ystävät tekevät toisistaan itsensä kaltaisia ja pystyvät rakastamaan toista kuin itseään.

Elämän jatkumo Leibnizillä

Leeuwenhoekin kokeilut mikroskoopilla 1600-luvun lopulla olivat G. W. Leibnizille suuri innoituksen lähde. Monadologia-teoksessaan Leibniz hehkutti keksinnön merkitystä ja antoi ymmärtää, että sillä löydetyt pikkuruiset eliöt todistivat hänen metafyysisen pluralisminsa oikeaksi. Hänen mukaansa "huomataan, että pienimmässäkin osasessa ainetta on kokonainen elävien olioiden, eläinten, entelekhioiden ja sielujen maailma." Näin Leibnizin ajatus elämän jatkumosta sai uutta pontta. Keksinnön vaikutus näkyy myös Leibnizin teoksessa Uusia esseitä inhimillisestä ymmärryksestä, jossa hän esittelee pienet perseptiot, joita voidaan pitää tietoteoreettisena vastineena pieneliöille. Tarkastelen esitelmässäni Leibnizin reaktioita mikroskooppiin ja sen antamaan uuteen kuvaan elämästä ja keskustelen joistakin Leibnizin filosofian piirteistä, joissa voidaan huomata uuden keksinnön vaikutusta.

Topeliaaninen usko : Kirjailija Sakari Topelius uskontokasvattajana

ABSTRACT The author Zacharias Topelius as a religious educator The present study concerns the author Zacharias Topelius (1818-98) as a religious educator. The study´s main questions are as follows: What is the theological and pedagogical content of Topelius books and how is his religious instruction linked with the history of his time. The primary sources are his educational books Naturens bok (The Book of the Nature, 1856), Boken om vårt land (The Book of our Land, 1875) and Evangelium för Barnen (Gospel for Children, 1893), as well as his storybooks Läsning för barn I-VIII (Reading for Children I-VIII, 1865-96). The dissertation concerns the his-tory of religious education. Its primary method is background-based systematic analy-sis. In Topelius children s books the view of God is characterised both as an omnipresent spirit and as Providence, who guides world history according to his plan. In addition to Lutheranism this view is also influenced by Nationalism and Romanticism. The theological content of the books emphasises instruction in Christian life that is natural to normative children s books. Topelius strongly expresses the importance of a personal relationship to God, an idealistic Christian view of one s fellow man and of one s own nation as well as the value of nature conservation. The books of Topelius were some of the first educational works on nature preservation in Finland. The didactic quality of Topelius children s books was high for 19th century Finland. Their main emphasis in terms of educational goals is on civilisation (Bildung), self-awareness, national solidarity and living idealism. The pedagogical argumentation is mostly based on theological, historical, social and rational reasoning. The primary principles in Topelius teaching are Christian nationalism, idealistic harmony and the agrarian bourgeois. Christian nationalism is the main element of Topelius religious education. He considers the fatherland as a God-given project and the taking care of it as a part of holy service. Idealistic harmony is seen as the comprehensive development of one s character in the sense of romantic idealism. The agrarian bourgeois principle combines the Finnish peasant tradition with the values of 19th century modern bourgeois culture. I have named Topelius vision of religious education the Christian national project of civilisation (Bildung). Its main theses are home, religion and fatherland. The author himself strongly believed in this vision and never questioned it despite its national chauvinism and theological inconsistency. The religious ideology represented in Topelius educational works and storybooks was popular among pedagogues during the whole era of the Finnish folk school. It fit per-fectly with the Christian national discourse stemming from 19th century ideological ten-dencies. Due to their appropriate content combined with their practical language and pedagogical methods, the books were popular both at school and in the home for a long period of time. Therefore the books of Topelius aptly symbolise the religious education of their time and manifest their author s pedagogical talent as a national religious educator and as a populariser of Christian nationalism. Topelius books have had a lasting influence on Finnish religiosity. Key words: Topelius, theology, religion, education, nationalism and national project