81 resultados para Relation (Philosophy)
Resumo:
In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.
Resumo:
This work offers a systematic phenomenological investigation of the constitutive significance of embodiment. It provides detailed analyses of subjectivity in relation to itself, to others, and to objective reality, and it argues that these basic structures cannot be made intelligible unless one takes into account how they are correlated with an embodied subject. The methodological and conceptual starting point of the treatise is the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. The investigation employs the phenomenological method and uses the descriptions and analyses provided by Husserl and his successors. The treatise is motivated and outlined systematically, and textual exegesis serves as a means for the systematic phenomenological investigation. The structure of the work conforms to the basic relations of subjectivity. The first part of the thesis explores the intimate relation between lived-body and selfhood, analyzes the phenomena of localization, and argues that self-awareness is necessarily and fundamentally embodied self-awareness. The second part examines the intersubjective dimensions of embodiment, investigates the corporal foundations of empathy, and unravels the bodily aspects of transcendental intersubjectivity. The third part scrutinizes the role of embodiment in the constitution of the surrounding objective reality: it focuses on the complex relationship between transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity, carefully examines the normative aspects of genetic and generative self-constitution, and argues eventually that what Husserl calls the paradox of subjectivity originates in a tension between primordial and intersubjective normativity. The work thus reinterprets the paradox of subjectivity in terms of a normative tension, and claims that the paradox is ultimately rooted in the structures of embodiment. In this manner, as a whole, the work discloses the constitutive significance of embodiment, and argues that transcendental subjectivity must be fundamentally embodied.
Resumo:
One of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the relation between truth and formal proof. The position according to which the two concepts are the same is called deflationism, and the opposing viewpoint substantialism. In an important result of mathematical logic, Kurt Gödel proved in his first incompleteness theorem that all consistent formal systems containing arithmetic include sentences that can neither be proved nor disproved within that system. However, such undecidable Gödel sentences can be established to be true once we expand the formal system with Alfred Tarski s semantical theory of truth, as shown by Stewart Shapiro and Jeffrey Ketland in their semantical arguments for the substantiality of truth. According to them, in Gödel sentences we have an explicit case of true but unprovable sentences, and hence deflationism is refuted. Against that, Neil Tennant has shown that instead of Tarskian truth we can expand the formal system with a soundness principle, according to which all provable sentences are assertable, and the assertability of Gödel sentences follows. This way, the relevant question is not whether we can establish the truth of Gödel sentences, but whether Tarskian truth is a more plausible expansion than a soundness principle. In this work I will argue that this problem is best approached once we think of mathematics as the full human phenomenon, and not just consisting of formal systems. When pre-formal mathematical thinking is included in our account, we see that Tarskian truth is in fact not an expansion at all. I claim that what proof is to formal mathematics, truth is to pre-formal thinking, and the Tarskian account of semantical truth mirrors this relation accurately. However, the introduction of pre-formal mathematics is vulnerable to the deflationist counterargument that while existing in practice, pre-formal thinking could still be philosophically superfluous if it does not refer to anything objective. Against this, I argue that all truly deflationist philosophical theories lead to arbitrariness of mathematics. In all other philosophical accounts of mathematics there is room for a reference of the pre-formal mathematics, and the expansion of Tarkian truth can be made naturally. Hence, if we reject the arbitrariness of mathematics, I argue in this work, we must accept the substantiality of truth. Related subjects such as neo-Fregeanism will also be covered, and shown not to change the need for Tarskian truth. The only remaining route for the deflationist is to change the underlying logic so that our formal languages can include their own truth predicates, which Tarski showed to be impossible for classical first-order languages. With such logics we would have no need to expand the formal systems, and the above argument would fail. From the alternative approaches, in this work I focus mostly on the Independence Friendly (IF) logic of Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu. Hintikka has claimed that an IF language can include its own adequate truth predicate. I argue that while this is indeed the case, we cannot recognize the truth predicate as such within the same IF language, and the need for Tarskian truth remains. In addition to IF logic, also second-order logic and Saul Kripke s approach using Kleenean logic will be shown to fail in a similar fashion.
Resumo:
The aim of this study is to define and analyse the symbolism hidden in the gamelan music of the Central Javanese, especially in the Yogyakartanese wayang kulit shadow theatre. This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the theory, history and practice of Central Javanese shadow theatre. It also presents the tone symbol theory on which this study is based of B. Y. H. Sastrapustaka, the court servant and musician of the sultan s palace of Yogyakarta. For historical comparison, other theories and phenomena that seem to have some connections with the previously mentioned tone symbol theory are presented here as well as the equipment of the shadow theatre, its music, musical instruments and the shadow theatre in general in literature. The theoretic-methodological basis of the study is an enlarged model of research of cultural music, in which a person in the centre of the model with his/her concepts and by his/her behaviour creates a work of art and receives criticism through feedback, while the process of reciprocal action dynamically affects the whole development of the culture in question. In connection with the concepts of the work of art, the manner of approach of this study is also semiotic as the tone symbol theory gives a particular meaning to each musical note. Thus the purpose of this study is to find answers to how the tone symbol theory manifests itself in practical music making, what its origin is, if it is well known or not, and whether shadow theatre music supports this theory. The second part of this dissertation deals with material collected through interviews and observations as well as representative samples of musical pieces for shadow theatre and their analyses. In relation to this a special tool for analysing gamelan music, developed for the purpose of this study, is also presented. Sufficiently versatile material on the essence and meaning of the shadow theatre collected from many puppet masters of an older generation, many of whom are no longer with us, constitutes an important part of this study. This study proves that the tone symbol theory of Sastrapustaka is of tantristic tradition from the Hindu-Javanese period before the 16th century and before the appearance of Islam in Java. The variants of the previously mentioned theory can be found also in other fields of Javanese advanced civilization, such as architecture and dance. But it seems that knowledge about the tone symbolism connected to the shadow theatre especially has only been preserved in the sultan s palace of Yogyakarta and its intimate circles. The outsider puppet masters surely follow the theory, but they do not necessarily know its origin. As a result of the musical analysis, it is obvious that the musical pieces used for the shadow theatre bear different kinds of symbolic meanings which only an initiated person can feel and understand. These meanings are closely related to the plot of the play at the moment.
Resumo:
This thesis presents an interdisciplinary analysis of how models and simulations function in the production of scientific knowledge. The work is informed by three scholarly traditions: studies on models and simulations in philosophy of science, so-called micro-sociological laboratory studies within science and technology studies, and cultural-historical activity theory. Methodologically, I adopt a naturalist epistemology and combine philosophical analysis with a qualitative, empirical case study of infectious-disease modelling. This study has a dual perspective throughout the analysis: it specifies the modelling practices and examines the models as objects of research. The research questions addressed in this study are: 1) How are models constructed and what functions do they have in the production of scientific knowledge? 2) What is interdisciplinarity in model construction? 3) How do models become a general research tool and why is this process problematic? The core argument is that the mediating models as investigative instruments (cf. Morgan and Morrison 1999) take questions as a starting point, and hence their construction is intentionally guided. This argument applies the interrogative model of inquiry (e.g., Sintonen 2005; Hintikka 1981), which conceives of all knowledge acquisition as process of seeking answers to questions. The first question addresses simulation models as Artificial Nature, which is manipulated in order to answer questions that initiated the model building. This account develops further the "epistemology of simulation" (cf. Winsberg 2003) by showing the interrelatedness of researchers and their objects in the process of modelling. The second question clarifies why interdisciplinary research collaboration is demanding and difficult to maintain. The nature of the impediments to disciplinary interaction are examined by introducing the idea of object-oriented interdisciplinarity, which provides an analytical framework to study the changes in the degree of interdisciplinarity, the tools and research practices developed to support the collaboration, and the mode of collaboration in relation to the historically mutable object of research. As my interest is in the models as interdisciplinary objects, the third research problem seeks to answer my question of how we might characterise these objects, what is typical for them, and what kind of changes happen in the process of modelling. Here I examine the tension between specified, question-oriented models and more general models, and suggest that the specified models form a group of their own. I call these Tailor-made models, in opposition to the process of building a simulation platform that aims at generalisability and utility for health-policy. This tension also underlines the challenge of applying research results (or methods and tools) to discuss and solve problems in decision-making processes.
Resumo:
The Uppsala school of Axel Hägerström can be said to have been the last genuinely Swedish philosophical movement. On the other hand, the Swedish analytic tradition is often said to have its roots in Hägerström s thought. This work examines the transformation from Uppsala philosophy to analytic philosophy from an actor-based historical perspective. The aim is to describe how a group of younger scholars (Ingemar Hedenius, Konrad Marc-Wogau, Anders Wedberg, Alf Ross, Herbert Tingsten, Gunnar Myrdal) colonised the legacy of Hägerström and Uppsala philosophy, and faced the challenges they met in trying to reconcile this legacy with the changing philosophical and political currents of the 1930s and 40s. Following Quentin Skinner, the texts are analysed as moves or speech acts in a particular historical context. The thesis consists of five previously published case studies and an introduction. The first study describes how the image of Hägerström as the father of the Swedish analytic tradition was created by a particular faction of younger Uppsala philosophers who (re-) presented the Hägerströmian philosophy as a parallel movement to logical empiricism. The second study examines the confrontations between Uppsala philosophy and logical empiricism in both the editorial board and in the pages of Sweden s leading philosophical journal Theoria. The third study focuses on how the younger generation redescribed Hägerströmian legal philosophical ideas (Scandinavian Legal Realism), while the fourth study discusses how they responded to the accusations of a connection between Hägerström s value nihilistic theory and totalitarianism. Finally, the fifth study examines how the Swedish social scientist and Social Democratic intellectual Gunnar Myrdal tried to reconcile value nihilism with a strong political programme for social reform. The contribution of this thesis to the field consists mainly in a re-evaluation of the role of Uppsala philosophy in the history of Swedish philosophy. From this perspective the Uppsala School was less a collection of certain definite philosophical ideas than an intellectual legacy that was the subject of fierce struggles. Its theories and ideas were redescribed in various ways by individual actors with different philosophical and political intentions.
Resumo:
This study is an inquiry into three related topics in Aristotle’s psychology: the perception of seeing, the perception of past perception, and the perception of sleeping. Over the past decades, Aristotle’s account of the perception of perception has been studied in numerous articles and chapters of books. However, there is no monograph that attempts to give a comprehensive analysis of this account and to assess its relation and significance to Aristotle’s psychological theory in general as well as to other theories pertaining to the topics (e.g. theories of consciousness), be they ancient, medieval, modern, or contemporary. This study intends to fill this gap and to further the research into Aristotle’s philosophy and into the philosophy of mind. The present study is based on an accurate analysis of the sources, on their Platonic background, and on later interpretations within the commentary tradition up to the present. From a methodological point of view, this study represents systematically orientated research into the history of philosophy, in which special attention is paid to the philosophical problems inherent in the sources, to the distinctions drawn, and to the arguments put forward as well as to their philosophical assessment. In addition to contributing many new findings concerning the topics under discussion, this study shows that Aristotle’s account of the perception of perception substantially differs from many later theories of consciousness. This study also suggests that Aristotle be regarded as a consistent direct realist, not only in respect of sense perception, but also in respect of memory.
Resumo:
Idyll or Reality? Albert Edelfelt, Gunnar Berndtson and the ambivalent breakthrough of modernity Albert Edelfelt (1854-1905) and Gunnar Berndtson (1854-1895) have much in common. In this dissertation, I study their paintings of local peasants and fishermen and of the gentry’s summer in the county of Uusimaa in southern Finland, in the context of Nordic history of ideas. The breakthrough of modernity, with its attention on debating social problems, provides a novel angle into the oeuvres of the two artists. My focus is on the paintings which emerge in the collision of the public discussion of social matters and the values of the artists’ manorial milieu. The artists’ relation to the public discussion is scrutinized through two of the main topics: the question of the common people and democracy, and the question of equality between men and women. My dissertation is a contextual study which is based on the analysis of the artworks of Edelfelt and Berndtson, on their letters, and on the study of drama and fiction of their time. The notion “liberté, egalité, fraternité” is linked to the breakthrough of modernity. Both artists were aware of the ideal of equality. They used the means and the themes of contemporary art in their presentations, but their pictures contain the ideal of an earlier epoch: the hardworking, but still complacent common people. This conception of the common people is also reflected in the poems of J. L. Runeberg. Women of the late 19th century challenged woman’s primary role as wife and mother. In Edelfelt’s and Berndtson’s depictions of the gentry enjoying summer, women and children have the main role. Notwithstanding the debate of the breakthrough of modernity they depicted women almost without exception as good mothers. Their paintings often depict lazy days in the sunshine, which were, in reality, rare moments for the mistress of the house. Edelfelt’s and Berndtson’s subjects from the Uusimaa countryside coincide with the topics of the breakthrough of modernity, but both the pictures of the common people and the depictions of the gentry enjoying summer, are a retouched picture of reality, often an idyll, in which the public discussion of social matters is evident only materially or not at all.
Resumo:
Music as the Art of Anxiety: A Philosophical Approach to the Existential-Ontological Meaning of Music. The present research studies music as an art of anxiety from the points of view of both Martin Heidegger s thought and phenomenological philosophy in general. In the Heideggerian perspective, anxiety is understood as a fundamental mode of being (Grundbefindlichkeit) in human existence. Taken as an existential-ontological concept, anxiety is conceived philosophically and not psychologically. The central research questions are: what is the relationship between music and existential-ontological anxiety? In what way can music be considered as an art of anxiety? In thinking of music as a channel and manifestation of anxiety, what makes it a special case? What are the possible applications of phenomenology and Heideggerian thought in musicology? The main aim of the research is to develop a theory of music as an art of existential-ontological anxiety and to apply this theory to musicologically relevant phenomena. Furthermore, the research will contribute to contemporary musicological debates and research as it aims to outline the phenomenological study of music as a field of its own; the development of a specific methodology is implicit in these aims. The main subject of the study, a theory of music as an art of anxiety, integrates Heideggerian and phenomenological philosophies with critical and cultural theories concerning violence, social sacrifice, and mimetic desire (René Girard), music, noise and society (Jacques Attali), and the affect-based charme of music (Vladimir Jankélévitch). Thus, in addition to the subjective mood (Stimmung) of emptiness and meaninglessness, the philosophical concept of anxiety also refers to a state of disorder and chaos in general; for instance, to noise in the realm of sound and total (social) violence at the level of society. In this study, music is approached as conveying the existentially crucial human compulsion for signifying i.e., organizing chaos. In music, this happens primarily at the immediate level of experience, i.e. in affectivity, and also in relation to all of the aforementioned dimensions (sound, society, consciousness, and so on). Thus, music s existential-ontological meaning in human existence, Dasein, is in its ability to reveal different orders of existence as such. Indeed, this makes music the art of anxiety: more precisely, music can be existentially significant at the level of moods. The study proceeds from outlining the relevance of phenomenology and Heidegger s philosophy in musicology to the philosophical development of a theory of music as the art of anxiety. The theory is developed further through the study of three selected specific musical phenomena: the concept of a musical work, guitar smashing in the performance tradition of rock music, and Erik Bergman s orchestral work Colori ed improvvisazioni. The first example illustrates the level of individual human-subject in music as the art of anxiety, as a means of signifying chaos, while the second example focuses on the collective need to socio-culturally channel violence. The third example, being music-analytical, studies contemporary music s ability to mirror the structures of anxiety at the level of a specific musical text. The selected examples illustrate that, in addition to the philosophical orientation, the research also contributes to music analysis, popular music studies, and the cultural-critical study of music. Key words: music, anxiety, phenomenology, Martin Heidegger, ontology, guitar smashing, Erik Bergman, musical work, affectivity, Stimmung, René Girard
Resumo:
Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003), the French writer and novelist, is one of the most important figures in post-war French literature and philosophy. The main intention of this study is to figure out his position and originality in the field of phenomenology. Since this thesis concentrates on the notion of vision in Blanchot s work, its primary context is the post-war discussion of the relation between seeing and thinking in France, and particularly the discussion of the conditions of non-violent vision and language. The focus will be on the philosophical conversation between Blanchot and his contemporary philosophers. The central premise is the following: Blanchot relates the criticism of vision to the criticism of the representative model of language. In this thesis, Blanchot s definition of literary language as the refusal to reveal anything is read as a reference pointing in two directions. First, to Hegel s idea of naming as negativity which reveals Being incrementally to man, and second, to Heidegger s idea of poetry as the simultaneity of revealing and withdrawal; the aim is to prove that eventually Blanchot opposes both Hegel s idea of naming as a gradual revelation of the totality of being and Heidegger s conception of poetry as a way of revealing the truth of Being. My other central hypothesis is that for Blanchot, the criticism of the privilege of vision is always related to the problematic of the exteriority. The principal intention is to trace how Blanchot s idea of language as infinity and exteriority challenges both the Hegelian idea of naming as conceptualizing things and Heidegger s concept of language as a way to truth (as aletheia). The intention is to show how Blanchot, with his concepts of fascination, resemblance and image, both affirms and challenges the central points of Heidegger s thinking on language. Blanchot s originality in, and contribution to, the discussion about the violence of vision and language is found in his answer to the question of how to approach the other by avoiding the worst violence . I claim that by criticizing the idea of language as naming both in Hegel and Heidegger, Blanchot generates an account of language which, since it neither negates nor creates Being, is beyond the metaphysical opposition between Being and non-Being.
Resumo:
The study is a philosophical analysis of Israel Scheffler’s philosophy of education, focusing on three crucial conceptions in his philosophy: the conception of rationality, the conception of human nature, and the conception of reality. The interrelations of these three concepts as well as their relations to educational theorizing are analysed and elaborated. A conceptual problem concerning Scheffler’s ideal of rationality derives from Scheffler’s supposition of the strong analogy between science education and moral education in terms of the ideal of rationality. This analogy is argued to be conceptually problematic, since the interconnections of rationality, objectivity, and truth, appear to differ from each other in the realms of ethics and science, given the presuppositions of ontological realism and ethical naturalism, to which Scheffler explicitly subscribes. This study considers two philosophical alternatives for solving this problem. The first alternative relates the analogy to the normative concept of personhood deriving from the teleological understanding of human nature. Nevertheless, this position turns out to be problematic for Scheffler, since he rejects all teleological thinking in his philosophy. The problem can be solved, as it is argued, by limiting Scheffler’s rejection of teleology – in light of his philosophical outlook on the whole – in a manner that allows a modest version of a teleological conception of human nature. The second alternative, based especially on Scheffler’s later contributions, is to suggest that reality is actually more complex and manifold than it appears to be in light of a contemporary naturalist worldview. This idea of plurealism – Scheffler’s synthesis of pluralism and realism – is represented especially in Scheffler’s contributions related to his debate with Nelson Goodman dealing with both constructivism and realism. The idea of plurealism is not only related to the ethics-science-distinction, but is more widely related to the relationship between ontological realism and the incommensurable systems of description in diverse realms of human understanding. The Scheffler-Goodman debate is also analysed in relation to the contemporary constructivism-realism debate in educational philosophy. In terms of educational questions, Scheffler’s plurealism is argued as offering a fruitful perspective. Scheffler’s philosophy of education can be interpreted as searching for solutions to the problems deriving from the tension between the tradition of analytical philosophy and the complexity and multiplicity of educational reality. The complexity of reality combined with the supposition of the limitedness of human knowledge does not lead Scheffler to relativism or particularism, but, in contrast, Schefflerian formulations of rationality and objectivity preserve the possibility for critical inquiry in all realms of educational reality. In light of this study, Scheffler’s philosophy of education provides an exceptional example of combining ontological realism, epistemological fallibilism, and the defence of the ideal of rationality, combined with a wide-ranging understanding of educational reality.
Resumo:
This cross-sectional study analyzed psychological well-being at school using the Self-Determination theory as a theoretical frame-work. The study explored basic psychological needs fulfillment (BPNS), academic (SRQ-A), prosocial self-regulation (SRQ-P) and motivation, and their relationship with achievement in general, special and selective education (N=786, 444 boys, 345 girls, mean age 12 yrs 8 mths). Motivation starts behavior which becomes guided by self-regulation. The perceived locus of control (PLOC) affects how self-determined this behavior will be; in other words, to what extent it is autonomously regulated. In order learn and thus to be able to accept external goals, a student has to feel emotionally safe and have sufficient ego-flexibility—all of which builds on satisfied psychological needs. In this study those conditions were explored. In addition to traditional methods Self-organizing maps (SOM), was used in order to cluster the students according to their well-being, self-regulation, motivation and achievement scores. The main impacts of this research were: a presentation of the theory based alternative of studying psychological well-being at school and usage of both the variable and person-oriented approach. In this Finnish sample the results showed that the majority of students felt well, but the well-being varied by group. Overall about for 11–15% the basic needs were deprived depending on the educational group. Age and educational group were the most effective factors; gender was important in relation to prosocial identified behavior. Although the person-oriented SOM-approach, was in a large extent confirming what was no-ticed by using comparison of the variables: the SEN groups had lower levels of basic needs fulfillment and less autonomous self-regulation, interesting deviations of that rule appeared. Some of the SEL- and GEN-group members ended up in the more unfavorable SOM-clusters, and not all SEN-group members belonged to the poorest clusters (although not to the best either). This evidence refines the well-being and self-regulation picture, and may re-direct intervention plans, and turn our focus also on students who might otherwise remain unnoticed. On the other hand, these results imply simultaneously that in special education groups the average is not the whole truth. On the basis of theoretical and empirical considerations an intervention model was sug-gested. The aim of the model was to shift amotivation or external motivation in a more intrinsic direction. According to the theoretical and empirical evidence this can be achieved first by studying the self-concept a student has, and then trying to affect both inner and environmental factors—including a consideration of the basic psychological needs. Keywords: academic self-regulation, prosocial self-regulation, basic psychological needs, moti-vation, achievement
