Imagination and diversity in the philosophy of Hobbes

This dissertation is a study of some aspects of theoretical philosophy of the early modern thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The focal point of the work is Hobbes s conception of imagination, which is discussed from both a systematic and a historical point of view, as well as in the light of contemporary scholarship. I argue that though there are significant similarities between the view of Hobbes and that of his predecessors, he gives a novel theory of imagination, which clarifies not only early modern discussions on human nature, knowledge, science, and literary criticism, but above all his own versatile philosophy. The prologue of the dissertation introduces methodological principles and gives critical remarks on the standard view of Hobbes. In Chapter II, I discuss the prominent theories of imagination before Hobbes and link them to his account. I argue that though Hobbes adopted the Aristotelian framework, his view is not reduced to it, as he borrows from various sources, for instance, from the Stoics and from Renaissance thought. Chapters III and IV form the psychological part of the work. In the Chapter III I argue that imagination, not sense, is central in the basic cognitive operations of the mind and that imagination has a decisive role in Hobbes s theory of motivation. The Chapter IV concentrates on various questions of Hobbes s philosophy of language. The chapter ends with a defence of a less naturalistic reading of Hobbes s theory of human nature. Chapters V and VI form the epistemological part of the work. I suggest, contrary to what has been recently claimed, that though Hobbes s ideas of good literary style do have a point of contact with his philosophy (e.g. the psychology of creative process), his ideas in the field are independent of his project of demonstrative political science. Instead I argue that the novelty of his major political work, Leviathan (1651), is based on a new theory of knowledge which he continued to develop in the post-Leviathan works. Chapter VII seeks to connect the more theoretical conclusions of Chapters V and VI to Hobbes's idea(l) of science as well as to his philosophical practice. On the basis of Hobbes s own writings as well as some historical examinations, I argue that method is not an apt way to conceptualise Hobbes s philosophical practice. Contemporary readings of Hobbes s theory of science are critically discussed and the chapter ends with an analysis of Hobbes s actual argumentation. In addition to the concluding remarks, the epilogue suggest three things: first, imagination is central when trying to understand Hobbes s versatile philosophy; second, that it is misleading to depict Hobbes as a simple materialist, mechanist, and empiricist; and, third, that in terms of imagination his influence on early modern thought has not been fully appreciated.

Striving for the Impossible : The Hegelian background of Judith Butler

This study analyses the Hegelian roots of the subject-theory and the political theory of Judith Butler. Butler can be seen as the author of "gender performativity". Butler claims that subject's identities are linquistic "terms". Linquistic identities are performative and normative: they produce, according to cultural rules, the identities which they just claim to describe. Butler's theory of the performativity of identities is based on her theory of identities as "ek-static" constructions. This means that there is a relation between the self and the Other in the heart of identities. It is claimed in this study that Butler's theory of the relation between the self and the Other, or, between the subject and the constitutive outside, is based on G.W.F. Hegel's theory of the dialectics of recognition in The Phenomenology of Spirit. Especially the sections dealing with the relation between "Lord" and "Bondsman" set the theoretical base for Butler's theory. Further, it is claimed that Hegel's own solution for the enslaving and instrumentalizing relation between the self and the Other, reciprocal recognition, remains an important alternative to the postmodernist conception supported by political theorists like Butler. Chapter 2, on Hegel, goes through the dialectics of recognition between the self and the Other in The Phenomenology of Spirit up until the ideal of reciprocal recognition and absolute knowledge. Chapter 3 introduces two French interpretations of Hegel, by Alexandre Kojéve and Louis Althusser. Both of these interpretations, especially the Kojevian one, have deeply influenced the contemporary understanding of Hegel as well as the contemporary thought - presented e.g. in the postmodern political thought - on the relations between the self and the Other. The Kojévian Marxist utopia with its notion of "the End of History" as well as the Althusserian theory of the Interpellative formation of subjects have influenced how Hegel's theory of the self and the Other have travelled into Butler's thought. In chapter 5 these influences are analyzed in detail. According to the analysis, Butler, like numerous other poststructuralist theorists, accepts Kojéve's interpretation as basically correct, but rejects his vision of "the End of History" as static and totalitarian. Kojéve's utopian philosophy of history is replaced by the paradoxical idea of an endless striving towards emancipation which, however, could not and should not be reached. In chapter 6 Butler's theory is linked to another postmodern political theory, that of Chantal Mouffe. It is argued that Mouffe's theory is based on a similar view of the relation of the self and the other as Butler's theory. The former, however, deals explicitly with politics. Therefore, it makes the central paradox of striving for the impossible more visible; such a theory is unable to guide political action. Hegel actually anticipated this kind of theorizing in his critique of "Unhappy Consciousness" in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Keywords: Judith Butler, G.W.F. Hegel, Chantal Mouffe, Alexandre Kojéve, Postmodernism, Politics, Identities, Performativity, Self-consciousness, Other

Ethics and Aesthetics : Intersections in Iris Murdoch's Philosophy

The study addresses the question concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in the philosophy of Iris Murdoch. The main argument is that Murdoch s philosophy cannot be accurately understood without an understanding of the relationship she sees between the aesthetic experience and morality. Reading Murdoch s philosophy with this relationship in mind shows that it must be considered as a relevant alternative to the main forms of aesthetic-ethical theories. The study consists of seven previously published articles and a summary. It shows that Murdoch belongs to a tradition of philosophers who seek to broaden the scope of ethics by reference to aesthetic value and aesthetic experience. She sees an attitude responsible for aesthetic experiences as relevant for morality. However, she does not collapse morality into aesthetic experience. The two meet on the level of the subject s attitude towards its object, but there is a distinction between the experiences that accompany the attitudes. Aesthetic experiences can function as a clue to morals in that they present in a pleasing manner moral truths which otherwise might be psychologically too difficult to face. Murdoch equates the aesthetic attitude with virtuous love characterized by unselfish attention to its object. The primary object of such love is in Murdoch s account another human individual in her particularity. She compares the recognition of the other person as a particular existence to the experience of the Kantian sublime and offers her own version of the true sublime which is the experience of awe in the face of the infinity of the task of understanding others. One of the most central claims in Murdoch s philosophy is that human consciousness is evaluatively structured. This claim challenges the distinction between facts and values which has had an immense influence on modern moral philosophy. One argument with which Murdoch supports her claim is the nature of great literature. According to her, the standard of greatness in literature is the authors awareness of the independent existence of individuals in the particularity of their evaluative consciousnesses. The analysis of the standard of greatness in literature is also Murdoch s only argument for the claim that the primary object of the loving unselfish attention is the other particular individual. She is convinced that great literature reveals a deep truth about the human condition with its capacity to capture the particular. Abstract philo¬sophical discourse cannot compete with this capacity but it should take truths revealed by literature seriously in its theorising. Recognising this as Murdoch s stand on the question of the relation between philosophy and literature as forms of human discourse settles whether she is part of what has been called philosophy s turn to literature. The answer is yes.

The Restless Love of Thinking : The Concept Liebe in Hegel's Philosophy

The German philosopher G.W.F.Hegel (1770–1831) is best known for his idealistic system philosophy, his concept of spirit [Geist] and for his dictum that the existing and the rational overlap. This thesis offers a new perspective: it examines the working of the concept ‘love’ in Hegel’s philosophy by looking at the contexts and function he puts it to, from his earliest writings to the very last lectures he gave. The starting point of the inquiry is that he applied the concept Liebe to different contexts for different purposes, but each time to provide an answer to a specific philosophical problem. His formulation, reformulation and use of ‘love’ give possible solutions to problems the solving of which was crucial to the development of his thought as a whole. The study is divided into three parts, each analysing the different problems and solutions to which Hegel applied the concept of love. The first part, "Love, morality and ethical life", examines these interconnected themes in Hegel’s early work. The main questions he addressed during this period concerned how to unite Kant’s philosophy and the Greek ideal of the good life. In this context, the concept ‘love’ did three things. First, it served to formulate his grounding idea of the relation between unity and difference, or the manifold. Secondly, it was the key to his attempt to base an ideal folk religion on Christianity interpreted as a religion of love. Finally, it provided the means to criticise Kant’s moral philosophy. The question of the moral value of love helped Hegel to break away from Kant’s thought and develop his own theory about love and ethical life. The second part of the study, "Love and the political realm", considers the way 'Liebe' functions in connection with questions concerning the community and political life in Hegel’s work. In addition to questioning the universal applicability of the concept of recognition as a key to his theory of social relations, the chapters focus on gender politics and the way he conceptualised the gender category ‘woman’ through the concept ‘love’. Another line of inquiry is the way the figure of Antigone was used to conceptualise the differentiated spheres of action for men and women, and the part ‘love’ played in Hegel’s description of Antigone’s motives. Thirdly, Hegel’s analogy of the family and the state and the way ‘love’ functions in an attempt to promote understanding of the relation between citizens and the state are examined. The third and final part of the study, "Love as absolute spirit", focuses on ‘love’ within Hegel’s systemic thought and the way he continued to characterise Geist through the language of Liebe up until and including his very last works. It is shown how Liebe functions in his hierarchical organisation of the domains of art, religion and philosophy, and how both art and religion end up in similar structural positions with regard to philosophy. One recurrent theme in the third part is Hegel’s complex relation to Romantic thought. Another line of investigation is how he reconstructed Christianity as a religion of love in his mature work. In striking contrast to his early thought, in his last works Hegel introduced a new concept of love that incorporated negativity, and that could also function as the root of political action.

"Sinunko rintasi? Ei vaan pääoman!" : Marxist-Feministerna-ryhmä ja sosialistisen feminismin mahdollisuus 1974–1978

Tutkimuksen aiheena on Helsingissä 1970-luvun puolivälissä ja loppupuolella toiminut Marxist-Feministerna-ryhmä, MF-ryhmä. Ryhmään kuului noin viisitoista naista, joista useimmat olivat ruotsinkielisiä. MF-ryhmä toimi tiedostamisryhmänä, opintopiirinä ja feministiverkoston osana. MF-ryhmää on pidetty yhtenä ensimmäisistä niin kutsutun uuden naisliikkeen ilmentymistä Suomessa. Tutkielman tavoitteena on tarkentaa kuvaa uudesta naisliikkeestä ja 1970-luvun feminismistä Suomessa sekä laajentaa käsitystä 1970-luvun sosialistisesta ajattelusta ja vasemmistosta. Tutkielmassa MF-ryhmää tarkastellaan aatehistoriallisesta näkökulmasta ja tutkitaan sen sijoittumista sosialismin ja feminismin ajattelutraditioihin. Kysymystä tutkitaan ryhmässä luetun kirjallisuuden, ryhmän työskentelytapojen ja ryhmän muihin sekä suomalaisiin että ulkomaisiin järjestöihin ja ryhmiin pitämien yhteyksien näkökulmasta. Samoin tarkastellaan, miten ryhmän käymät keskustelut ja niissä esiintyneet teoreettiset kehittelyt ja käsitteet suhteutuvat sosialismin ja feminismin piirissä käytyihin keskusteluihin. Alkuperäislähteistönä työssä ovat MF-ryhmän kokousten pöytäkirjat, kahden ryhmän jäsenen kirjoittama kirja sekä ryhmän jäsenten kirjoittamat lehtiartikkelit. Lisäksi käytetään kolmen ryhmän jäsenen haastatteluja, ryhmän toiminnasta kertovia lehtijuttuja sekä 1970-luvun naisliikettä ja vasemmistoa koskevaa tutkimus- ja muistelukirjallisuutta. MF-ryhmälle sosialismi oli itsestään selvän oloinen osa oman ajattelun pohjaa. Ryhmässä luettiin niin vanhempaa kuin uudempaakin sosialistista kirjallisuutta ja keskusteltiin naisten asemasta sosialistisen analyysin pohjalta. Ryhmässä nostettiin esiin, miten marxilaiset ajattelijat olivat olleet kyvyttömiä kunnolla ymmärtämään naisten sortoa ja etenkin analysoimaan sen yksityisempiä puolia. Ryhmälle oli kuitenkin tärkeää kehittää sosialistista ajattelua ymmärtämään myös naisten alistukseen liittyviä kysymyksiä. Erityisesti ryhmän keskusteluissa nostettiin esiin uudelle naisliikkeelle keskeisiä kysymyksiä ruumiillisuudesta, seksuaalisuudesta ja reproduktiosta, mutta ryhmässä käsiteltiin myös naisten työntekoa ja lisäksi naisten asemaa historiassa. Ryhmässä luettiinkin myös uuden naisliikkeen ulkomaista kirjallisuutta ja osallistuttiin naisliikkeen piirissä käytyihin teoreettisiin ja käytännöllisiin keskusteluihin naisten sorrosta ja siitä vapautumisesta. Toisaalta, osin marxilaisen kehyksen vaikutuksesta, ryhmässä nousivat esiin sellaiset esimerkiksi seksuaalisuuteen ja ruumiillisuuteen liittyvät kysymykset, joilla on kytköksensä talouteen. Ryhmän toiminnassa korostui oman ajattelun vapauden säilyttäminen. Vaikka ryhmä haki aktiivisesti yhteyttä muihin nais- ja vasemmistoryhmiin, sille oli tärkeää säilyttää oma riippumattomuutensa ja itsenäisyytensä.

The Problem of Implementation and its Relation to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science

According to certain arguments, computation is observer-relative either in the sense that many physical systems implement many computations (Hilary Putnam), or in the sense that almost all physical systems implement all computations (John Searle). If sound, these arguments have a potentially devastating consequence for the computational theory of mind: if arbitrary physical systems can be seen to implement arbitrary computations, the notion of computation seems to lose all explanatory power as far as brains and minds are concerned. David Chalmers and B. Jack Copeland have attempted to counter these relativist arguments by placing certain constraints on the definition of implementation. In this thesis, I examine their proposals and find both wanting in some respects. During the course of this examination, I give a formal definition of the class of combinatorial-state automata , upon which Chalmers s account of implementation is based. I show that this definition implies two theorems (one an observation due to Curtis Brown) concerning the computational power of combinatorial-state automata, theorems which speak against founding the theory of implementation upon this formalism. Toward the end of the thesis, I sketch a definition of the implementation of Turing machines in dynamical systems, and offer this as an alternative to Chalmers s and Copeland s accounts of implementation. I demonstrate that the definition does not imply Searle s claim for the universal implementation of computations. However, the definition may support claims that are weaker than Searle s, yet still troubling to the computationalist. There remains a kernel of relativity in implementation at any rate, since the interpretation of physical systems seems itself to be an observer-relative matter, to some degree at least. This observation helps clarify the role the notion of computation can play in cognitive science. Specifically, I will argue that the notion should be conceived as an instrumental rather than as a fundamental or foundational one.

Philosophy as a Path to Happiness : Attainment of Happiness in Arabic Peripatetic and Ismaili Philosophy

The aim of the dissertation is to explore the idea of philosophy as a path to happiness in classical Arabic philosophy. The starting point is in comparison of two distinct currents between the 10th and early 11th centuries, Peripatetic philosophy, represented by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, and Ismaili philosophy represented by al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity. They initially offer two contrasting views about philosophy in that the attitude of the Peripatetics is rationalistic and secular in spirit, whereas for the Ismailis philosophy represents the esoteric truth behind revelation. Still, they converge in their view that the ultimate purpose of philosophy lies in its ability to lead man towards happiness. Moreover, they share a common concept of happiness as a contemplative ideal of human perfection, which refers primarily to an otherworldly state of the soul s ascent to the spiritual world. For both the way to happiness consists of two parts: theory and practice. The practical part manifests itself in the idea of the purification of the rational soul from its bodily attachments in order for it to direct its attention fully to the contemplative life. Hence, there appears an ideal of philosophical life with the goal of relative detachment from the worldly life. The regulations of the religious law in this context appear as the primary means for the soul s purification, but for all but al-Kirmānī they are complemented by auxiliary philosophical practices. The ascent to happiness, however, takes place primarily through the acquisition of theoretical knowledge. The saving knowledge consists primarily of the conception of the hierarchy of physical and metaphysical reality, but all of philosophy forms a curriculum through which the soul gradually ascends towards a spiritual state of being along an order that is inverse to the Neoplatonic emanationist hierarchy of creation. For Ismaili philosophy the ascent takes place from the exoteric religious sciences towards the esoteric philosophical knowledge. For Peripatetic philosophers logic performs the function of an instrument enabling the ascent, mathematics is treated either as propaedeutic to philosophy or as a mediator between physical and metaphysical knowledge, whereas physics and metaphysics provide the core of knowledge necessary for the attainment of happiness.

Hyveiden harjoittaminen : edellytykset ja esteet

In the first half of the 20th century, most moral philosophers took the concept of virtue to be secondary to moral principles or emotions, though in various and mutually conflicting ways. In the early 1960s interest in the virtues was restored by the analytic philosophers Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, the younger colleagues and friends of the late Wittgenstein. Later, Alasdair MacIntyre became a leading virtue ethicist. In 1981, MacIntyre introduced in After Virtue the concept of practices, which he based on the Aristotelian distinction between praxis and poiesis. This dissertation examines MacIntyre s characterization of the interconnectedness between practices and virtues, especially in relation to skills, education, and certain emotions. The primary position of the virtues is defended against the tendency in modern moral philosophy to overemphasize the role either of principles and rules or of emotions. The view according to which rational action and acting according to the virtues is best conceptualized as following rules or principles is criticized by arguments that are grounded by some Wittgensteinian observations, and that can be characterized as transcendental. Even if the virtues cannot be defined by, and are not based entirely on, emotions, the role of certain emotions on the learning and education of skills and virtues are studied more carefully than by MacIntyre. In the cases of resentment, indignation, and shame, the analysis of Peter Strawson is utilized, and in the case of regret, the analysis of Bernard Williams. Williams analysis of regret and moral conflict concludes in a kind of antirealism, which this study criticizes. Where education of practices and skills and the related reactive emotions are examined as conditions of learning and practicing the virtues, institutions and ideologies are examined as obstacles and threats to the virtues. This theme is studied through Karl Marx s conception of alienation and Karl Polanyi s historical and sociological research concerning the great transformation . The study includes six Finnish-published articles carrying the titles Our negative attitudes towards other persons , Authority and upbringing , Moral conflicts, regret and ethical realism , Practices and institutions , Doing justice as condition to communal action: a transcendental argument for justice as virtue , and Alienation from practices in capitalist society: Alasdair MacIntyre s Marxist Aristotelianism . The introductory essay sums up the themes of the articles and presents some central issues of virtue ethics by relating the classical Socratic questions to Aristotelian practical philosophy, as well as to current controversies in metaethics and moral psychology.

Poetics of the Nameless Middle : Japan and the West in Philosophy and Music of the Twentieth Century

This study investigates the affinities between philosophy, aesthetics, and music of Japan and the West. The research is based on the structuralist notion (specifically, on that found in the narratology of Algirdas Julius Greimas), that the universal grammar functions as an abstract principle, underlying all kinds of discourse. The study thus aims to demonstrate how this grammar is manifested in philosophical, aesthetic, and musical texts and how the semiotic homogeneity of these texts can be explained on this basis. Totality and belongingness are the key philosophical concepts presented herein. As distinct from logocentrism manifested as substantializations of the world of ideas , god or mind, which was characteristic of previous Western paradigms, totality was defined as the coexistence of opposites. Thus Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Dōgen, and Nishida often illustrated it by identifying fundamental polarities, such as being and nothing, seer and seen, truth and illusion, etc. Accordingly, totality was schematically presented as an all-encompassing middle of the semiotic square. Similar values can be found in aesthetics and arts. Instead of dialectic syntagms, differentiated unity is considered as paradigmatic and the study demonstrates how this is manifested in traditional Japanese and Heideggerian aesthetics, as well as in the aspects of music of Claude Debussy and Tōru Takemitsu.

Proofs, Paradoxes, and Probabilities : The Logical Turn of Philosophy in Finland

This monograph describes the emergence of independent research on logic in Finland. The emphasis is placed on three well-known students of Eino Kaila: Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003), Erik Stenius (1911-1990), and Oiva Ketonen (1913-2000), and their research between the early 1930s and the early 1950s. The early academic work of these scholars laid the foundations for today's strong tradition in logic in Finland and also became internationally recognized. However, due attention has not been given to these works later, nor have they been comprehensively presented together. Each chapter of the book focuses on the life and work of one of Kaila's aforementioned students, with a fourth chapter discussing works on logic by authors who would later become known within other disciplines. Through an extensive use of correspondence and other archived material, some insight has been gained into the persons behind the academic personae. Unique and unpublished biographical material has been available for this task. The chapter on Oiva Ketonen focuses primarily on his work on what is today known as proof theory, especially on his proof theoretical system with invertible rules that permits a terminating root-first proof search. The independency of the parallel postulate is proved as an example of the strength of root-first proof search. Ketonen was to our knowledge Gerhard Gentzen's (the 'father' of proof theory) only student. Correspondence and a hitherto unavailable autobiographic manuscript, in addition to an unpublished article on the relationship between logic and epistemology, is presented. The chapter on Erik Stenius discusses his work on paradoxes and set theory, more specifically on how a rigid theory of definitions is employed to avoid these paradoxes. A presentation by Paul Bernays on Stenius' attempt at a proof of the consistency of arithmetic is reconstructed based on Bernays' lecture notes. Stenius correspondence with Paul Bernays, Evert Beth, and Georg Kreisel is discussed. The chapter on Georg Henrik von Wright presents his early work on probability and epistemology, along with his later work on modal logic that made him internationally famous. Correspondence from various archives (especially with Kaila and Charlie Dunbar Broad) further discusses his academic achievements and his experiences during the challenging circumstances of the 1940s.