68 resultados para FILOSOFIA TEOLOGICA
Resumo:
The subject of doctoral thesis is the analysis and interpretation of instrumental pieces composed by Einojuhani Rautavaara (b. 1928) that have been given angelic titles: Archangel Michael Fighting the Antichrist from the suite Icons (1955)/Before the Icons (2006), Angels and Visitations (1978), the Double Bass Concerto Angel of Dusk (1980), Playgrounds for Angels (1981)and the Seventh Symphony Angel of Light (1994). The aim of the work is to find those musical elements common to these pieces that distinguish them from Rautavaara s other works and to determine if they could be thought of as a series. I prove that behind the common elements and titles stands the same extramusical idea the figure of an angel that the composer has described in his commentaries. The thesis is divided into three parts. Since all of the compositions possess titles that refer to the spiritual symbol of an angel, the first part offers a theoretical background to demonstrate the significant role played by angels in various religions and beliefs, and the means by which music has attempted to represent this symbol throughout history. This background traces also Rautavaara s aesthetic attitude as a spiritual composer whose output can be studied with reference to his extramusical interests including literature, psychology, painting, philosophy and myths. The second part focuses on the analysis of the instrumental compositions with angelic titles, without giving consideration to their commentaries and titles. The analyses concentrate in particular on those musical features that distinguish these pieces from Rautavaara s other compositions. In the third part these musical features are interpreted as symbols of the angel through comparison with vocal and instrumental pieces which contain references to the character of an angel, structures of mythical narration, special musical expressions, use of instruments and aspects of brightness. Finally I explore the composer s interpretative codes, drawing on Rilke s cycle of poems Ten Duino Elegies and Jung s theory of archetypes, and analyze the instrumental pieces with angelic titles in the light of the theory of musical ekphrasis.
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The Uppsala school of Axel Hägerström can be said to have been the last genuinely Swedish philosophical movement. On the other hand, the Swedish analytic tradition is often said to have its roots in Hägerström s thought. This work examines the transformation from Uppsala philosophy to analytic philosophy from an actor-based historical perspective. The aim is to describe how a group of younger scholars (Ingemar Hedenius, Konrad Marc-Wogau, Anders Wedberg, Alf Ross, Herbert Tingsten, Gunnar Myrdal) colonised the legacy of Hägerström and Uppsala philosophy, and faced the challenges they met in trying to reconcile this legacy with the changing philosophical and political currents of the 1930s and 40s. Following Quentin Skinner, the texts are analysed as moves or speech acts in a particular historical context. The thesis consists of five previously published case studies and an introduction. The first study describes how the image of Hägerström as the father of the Swedish analytic tradition was created by a particular faction of younger Uppsala philosophers who (re-) presented the Hägerströmian philosophy as a parallel movement to logical empiricism. The second study examines the confrontations between Uppsala philosophy and logical empiricism in both the editorial board and in the pages of Sweden s leading philosophical journal Theoria. The third study focuses on how the younger generation redescribed Hägerströmian legal philosophical ideas (Scandinavian Legal Realism), while the fourth study discusses how they responded to the accusations of a connection between Hägerström s value nihilistic theory and totalitarianism. Finally, the fifth study examines how the Swedish social scientist and Social Democratic intellectual Gunnar Myrdal tried to reconcile value nihilism with a strong political programme for social reform. The contribution of this thesis to the field consists mainly in a re-evaluation of the role of Uppsala philosophy in the history of Swedish philosophy. From this perspective the Uppsala School was less a collection of certain definite philosophical ideas than an intellectual legacy that was the subject of fierce struggles. Its theories and ideas were redescribed in various ways by individual actors with different philosophical and political intentions.
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Luce Irigaray is a Belgian-born philosopher, psychoanalyst and linguist. Irigaray s concept of woman is crucial for understanding her own work but also for examining and developing the theoretical and methodological basis of feminist theory. This thesis argues that, ultimately, Irigaray s exploration of woman s being challenges our traditional notion of philosophy as a neutral discourse and the traditional notion of ourselves as philosophizing persons or human beings. However, despite its crucial role, Irigaray s idea of woman still lacks a comprehensive explication. This is because the discourse of sexual difference is blurred by the ideas of essentialism and biologism. --- Irigaray s concept of woman has been interpreted and criticized from the perspectives of metaphysical essentialism, strategic essentialism, realist essentialism and deconstructionism. This thesis argues that a reinterpretation is necessary to account for Irigaray s claims about the the traditional woman , mimesis, the specificity of the feminine body, feminine expression and sexual difference. Moreover, any reading should account for the differences between women and avoid giving a prescriptive function to the essence of woman. --- My thesis develops a new interpretation of Irigaray s concept of woman on the basis of the phenomenology of the body. It argues that Irigaray s discourse on woman can and must be understood by an idea of existential style. Existential style is embodied, affective and spiritual and it is constituted in relation to oneself, to others and to the world. It is temporal, it evolves and changes but preserves its open unity in its transformations. Stylistic unities, such as femininity or philosophy, are constituted in and by the singulars. -- This study discusses and analyses feminine existential style as a central theme and topic of Irigaray s works and shows how her work operates as a primary and paradigmatic example of the feminine style. These tasks are performed by studying the mimetic positions available for women and by explicating the phenomenological background of Irigaray s conceptions of the philosophical method, and the lived, expressive and affective body. The critical occupation and transformation of these mimetic positions, the inquiry into the first-person pre-discursive experience, and the cultivation of feminine expressivity open up the possibility of becoming a woman writer, a woman lover and a woman philosopher. The appearance of these new feminine figures is a precondition for the realization of sexual difference. So Irigaray opens up the possibility of sexual difference by instituting and constituting a feminine subject of love and wisdom, and by problematizing the idea of a neutral and absolute subject.
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This study is an inquiry into three related topics in Aristotle’s psychology: the perception of seeing, the perception of past perception, and the perception of sleeping. Over the past decades, Aristotle’s account of the perception of perception has been studied in numerous articles and chapters of books. However, there is no monograph that attempts to give a comprehensive analysis of this account and to assess its relation and significance to Aristotle’s psychological theory in general as well as to other theories pertaining to the topics (e.g. theories of consciousness), be they ancient, medieval, modern, or contemporary. This study intends to fill this gap and to further the research into Aristotle’s philosophy and into the philosophy of mind. The present study is based on an accurate analysis of the sources, on their Platonic background, and on later interpretations within the commentary tradition up to the present. From a methodological point of view, this study represents systematically orientated research into the history of philosophy, in which special attention is paid to the philosophical problems inherent in the sources, to the distinctions drawn, and to the arguments put forward as well as to their philosophical assessment. In addition to contributing many new findings concerning the topics under discussion, this study shows that Aristotle’s account of the perception of perception substantially differs from many later theories of consciousness. This study also suggests that Aristotle be regarded as a consistent direct realist, not only in respect of sense perception, but also in respect of memory.
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In the last thirty years, primarily feminist scholars have drawn attention to and re-evaluated the philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir (1908 1986). Her philosophical practice has been described as non-systematic, and her literary writing has been viewed as part of her non-systematic mode of philosophising. This dissertation radically deepens the question concerning Beauvoir s philosophical motivations for turning to literature as a mode to express subjectivity. It explicates the central concepts of Beauvoir s philosophy of existence, which are subjectivity, ambiguity, paradox and temporality, and their background in the modern traditions of existential philosophy and phenomenology. It also clarifies Beauvoir s main reason to turn to literature in order to express subjectivity as both singular and universal: as a specific mode of communication, literature is able to make the universality of existence manifest in the concrete, singular and temporal texture of life. In addition, the thesis gives examples of how Beauvoir s literary works contribute to an understanding of the complexity of subjectivity. I use the expression poetics of subjectivity to refer to the systematic relation between Beauvoir s existential and phenomenological notion of subjectivity and her literary works, and to her articulations of a creative mode of using language, especially in the novel. The thesis is divided into five chapters, of which the first three investigate Beauvoir s philosophy of existence at the intersection of the modern traditions of thought that began with René Descartes and Søren Kierkegaard s intuitions about subjectivity. Chapter 1 interprets Beauvoir s notion of ambiguity, as compared to paradox, and argues that both determine her notion of existence. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the phenomenological side of Beauvoir s philosophy through a study of her response to early French interpretations of transcendental subjectivity, especially in the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. My analysis shows that Edmund Husserl s distinction between different levels of subjective experience is central to Beauvoir s understanding of subjectivity and to the different ego concepts she uses. Chapter 4 is a study of Beauvoir s reflections on the expression of subjective thought, and, more specifically, her philosophical conceptions of the metaphysical novel and the autobiography as two modes of indirect communication. Chapter 5, finally, compares two modes of investigating concrete subjectivity; Beauvoir s conceptual study of femininity in Le deuxième sexe and her literary expression of subjectivity in the novel L Invitée. My analysis reveals and explicates Beauvoir s original contribution to a comprehensive understanding of the becoming and paradox of human existence: the fundamental insight that these phenomena are sexed, historically as well as imaginatively.
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The attempt to refer meaningful reality as a whole to a unifying ultimate principle - the quest for the unity of Being - was one of the basic tendencies of Western philosophy from its beginnings in ancient Greece up to Hegel's absolute idealism. However, the different trends of contemporary philosophy tend to regard such a speculative metaphysical quest for unity as obsolete. This study addresses this contemporary situation on the basis of the work of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Its methodological framework is Heidegger's phenomenological and hermeneutical approach to the history of philosophy. It seeks to understand, in terms of the metaphysical quest for unity, Heidegger's contrast between the first (Greek) beginning or "onset" (Anfang) of philosophy and another onset of thinking. This other onset is a possibility inherent in the contemporary situation in which, according to Heidegger, the metaphysical tradition has developed to its utmost limits and thereby come to an end. Part I is a detailed interpretation of the surviving fragments of the Poem of Parmenides of Elea (fl. c. 500 BC), an outstanding representative of the first philosophical beginning in Heidegger's sense. It is argued that the Poem is not a simple denial of apparent plurality and difference ("mortal acceptances," doxai) in favor of an extreme monism. Parmenides' point is rather to show in what sense the different instances of Being can be reduced to an absolute level of truth or evidence (aletheia), which is the unity of Being as such (to eon). What in prephilosophical human experience is accepted as being is referred to the source of its acceptability: intelligibility as such, the simple and undifferentiated presence to thinking that ultimately excludes unpresence and otherness. Part II interprets selected key texts from different stages in Heidegger's thinking in terms of the unity of Being. It argues that one aspect of Heidegger's sustained and gradually deepening philosophical quest was to think the unity of Being as singularity, as the instantaneous, context-specific, and differential unity of a temporally meaningful situation. In Being and Time (1927) Heidegger articulates the temporal situatedness of the human awareness of meaningful presence. His later work moves on to study the situational correlation between presence and the human awareness. Heidegger's "postmetaphysical" articulation seeks to show how presence becomes meaningful precisely as situated, in an event of differentiation from a multidimensional context of unpresence. In resigning itself to this irreducibly complicated and singular character of meaningful presence, philosophy also faces its own historically situated finitude. This resignation is an essential feature of Heidegger's "other onset" of thinking.
Resumo:
The aim of this dissertation is to provide conceptual tools for the social scientist for clarifying, evaluating and comparing explanations of social phenomena based on formal mathematical models. The focus is on relatively simple theoretical models and simulations, not statistical models. These studies apply a theory of explanation according to which explanation is about tracing objective relations of dependence, knowledge of which enables answers to contrastive why and how-questions. This theory is developed further by delineating criteria for evaluating competing explanations and by applying the theory to social scientific modelling practices and to the key concepts of equilibrium and mechanism. The dissertation is comprised of an introductory essay and six published original research articles. The main theses about model-based explanations in the social sciences argued for in the articles are the following. 1) The concept of explanatory power, often used to argue for the superiority of one explanation over another, compasses five dimensions which are partially independent and involve some systematic trade-offs. 2) All equilibrium explanations do not causally explain the obtaining of the end equilibrium state with the multiple possible initial states. Instead, they often constitutively explain the macro property of the system with the micro properties of the parts (together with their organization). 3) There is an important ambivalence in the concept mechanism used in many model-based explanations and this difference corresponds to a difference between two alternative research heuristics. 4) Whether unrealistic assumptions in a model (such as a rational choice model) are detrimental to an explanation provided by the model depends on whether the representation of the explanatory dependency in the model is itself dependent on the particular unrealistic assumptions. Thus evaluating whether a literally false assumption in a model is problematic requires specifying exactly what is supposed to be explained and by what. 5) The question of whether an explanatory relationship depends on particular false assumptions can be explored with the process of derivational robustness analysis and the importance of robustness analysis accounts for some of the puzzling features of the tradition of model-building in economics. 6) The fact that economists have been relatively reluctant to use true agent-based simulations to formulate explanations can partially be explained by the specific ideal of scientific understanding implicit in the practise of orthodox economics.
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Constructive (intuitionist, anti-realist) semantics has thus far been lacking an adequate concept of truth in infinity concerning factual (i.e., empirical, non-mathematical) sentences. One consequence of this problem is the difficulty of incorporating inductive reasoning in constructive semantics. It is not possible to formulate a notion for probable truth in infinity if there is no adequate notion of what truth in infinity is. One needs a notion of a constructive possible world based on sensory experience. Moreover, a constructive probability measure must be defined over these constructively possible empirical worlds. This study defines a particular kind of approach to the concept of truth in infinity for Rudolf Carnap's inductive logic. The new approach is based on truth in the consecutive finite domains of individuals. This concept will be given a constructive interpretation. What can be verifiably said about an empirical statement with respect to this concept of truth, will be explained, for which purpose a constructive notion of epistemic probability will be introduced. The aim of this study is also to improve Carnap's inductive logic. The study addresses the problem of justifying the use of an "inductivist" method in Carnap's lambda-continuum. A correction rule for adjusting the inductive method itself in the course of obtaining evidence will be introduced. Together with the constructive interpretation of probability, the correction rule yields positive prior probabilities for universal generalizations in infinite domains.
Resumo:
In this study I discuss G. W. Leibniz's (1646-1716) views on rational decision-making from the standpoint of both God and man. The Divine decision takes place within creation, as God freely chooses the best from an infinite number of possible worlds. While God's choice is based on absolutely certain knowledge, human decisions on practical matters are mostly based on uncertain knowledge. However, in many respects they could be regarded as analogous in more complicated situations. In addition to giving an overview of the divine decision-making and discussing critically the criteria God favours in his choice, I provide an account of Leibniz's views on human deliberation, which includes some new ideas. One of these concerns is the importance of estimating probabilities in making decisions one estimates both the goodness of the act itself and its consequences as far as the desired good is concerned. Another idea is related to the plurality of goods in complicated decisions and the competition this may provoke. Thirdly, heuristic models are used to sketch situations under deliberation in order to help in making the decision. Combining the views of Marcelo Dascal, Jaakko Hintikka and Simo Knuuttila, I argue that Leibniz applied two kinds of models of rational decision-making to practical controversies, often without explicating the details. The more simple, traditional pair of scales model is best suited to cases in which one has to decide for or against some option, or to distribute goods among parties and strive for a compromise. What may be of more help in more complicated deliberations is the novel vectorial model, which is an instance of the general mathematical doctrine of the calculus of variations. To illustrate this distinction, I discuss some cases in which he apparently applied these models in different kinds of situation. These examples support the view that the models had a systematic value in his theory of practical rationality.
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Jakke Holvas: A Critique of the Metaphysics of Economy The research problem of this dissertation is the commonly held opinion according to which everything has become a question of economy in the present day. Economy legitimates and justifies. In this study, the pattern of thinking and conceptualizing in which economy figures as the ultimate reason is called the metaphysics of economy. The defining characteristic of the metaphysics of economy is its failure to recognize non-economic rules, ethics, or ways of existence. The sources included in the study cover certain classics of philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Friedrich Nietzsche) and sociology (Karl Marx, Max Weber, Marcel Mauss), as well as the more recent French social theory (Jean Baudrillard, Michel Foucault). The research methods used are textual analysis and evaluation of concepts by means of historical comparison. The background to the study is given by the views of historians and sociologists according to whom traditional forms have ceased to exist and the market economy become established as the western system of values. The study identifies points of transition from the traditional forms to economic values. In addition, the dissertation focuses on the modern non-economic forms. The study examines the economic and ethical meanings of gift in antiquity in Homer, Plato, and Aristotle. Following Marcel Mauss, the study analyzes the forms and principles of gift exchange. The study also applies Nietzsche’s philosophy to evaluate under what conditions giving a gift becomes an act of exercising power that puts its receiver into debt. The conclusion of the study is that the classics of philosophy and sociology can rightly be interpreted in terms of the metaphysics of economy, but they also offer grounds for criticizing this metaphysics, even alternatives. One such alternative is non-economic archaic ethic. The study delineates a duality between economy and non-economy as well as creating concepts which could be used in the future to critically analyze economy from a position external to the economic system of concepts.
Resumo:
Käsilläolevan tutkielman kohteena on Martin Heideggerin (1889–1976) tulkintatyö, jonka hän varhaisessa ajattelussaan (1919–1927) kohdisti kreikkalaisen filosofian keskeiseen käsitteeseen logos: ”järki”, ”puhekyky”. Tutkielman tavoitteena on selvittää, miten Heidegger tulkitsi tätä käsitettä ja mikä merkitys Heideggerin tulkintatyöllä oli hänen pääteoksensa Sein und Zeit (1927, suom. Oleminen ja aika) kannalta. Työn keskeinen näkemys on, että Heideggerin ajattelu on nähtävä kreikkalaisen järjellisyyskäsityksen kriittisenä arviointina ja uudelleentulkintana. Heideggerin filosofia pohjautui vahvasti näkemykselle, jonka mukaan ajattelumme on hyvin perustavassa mielessä kiinni perinteessä ja sen välittämissä käsityksissä ja tulkinnoissa. Heideggerin mukaan filosofinen tutkimus ei voi koskaan täysin ennakkoluulotonta ja tämän vuoksi kaiken ajattelun on päästävä selville oman tilanteensa historiallisuudesta ja satunnaisuudesta; tieteellinen filosofia ei voi valita systemaattisen ja historiallisen lähestymistavan välillä, vaan sen on oltava olemuksellisesti molempia. Vuosina 1919–1929 Heideggerin historiallisen tulkintatyön ensisijaisena kohteena oli kreikkalainen filosofia, erityisesti Aristoteleen ajattelu. Heideggerin mukaan Aristoteles ei ollut ensimmäinen filosofista ajattelua harjoittanut henkilö, mutta Heidegger näki Aristoteleen tuotannon tiivistävän yhteen länsimaisen ajattelun keskeisimmät ennakkokäsitykset. Tutkielmassa seurataan Heideggerin pyrkimystä tulkita inhimillisen järjellisyyden ilmiötä, jonka juuret Heidegger paikansi Aristoteleen ihmismääritelmään zōon logon ekhon (”järjellinen eläin”). Aristotelesta seurannut skolastinen filosofia omaksui tämän määritelmän muodossa animal rationale, mutta Heidegger painotti, että tällä käännöksellä oli taipumus sivuuttaa se perusta, joka oli vielä ominainen kreikkalaiselle järjen käsitteelle. Sillä Aristoteleelle ja kreikkalaiselle ajattelulle logos ei merkinnyt ainoastaan haluihin ja tunteisiin rinnastuvaa mielen sisäistä kykyä vaan ennen kaikkea yhteisöllisesti jaettua tulkintaa ympäröivästä todellisuudesta. Tämä tulkinta ilmenee jokapäiväisesti keskustelun ja kommunikaation yhteydessä, mutta se on myös olennainen osa tapaamme jäsentää ympäröivää todellisuutta merkitykselliseksi. Heidegger kuitenkin argumentoi, että kreikkalainen ajattelu näki tämän kielellis-diskursiivisen käsittämisen alisteisena inhimillisen kokemuksen perustaville tavoille olla suhteessa todellisuuteen: puhtaalle aistihavainnolle (aisthēsis) sekä intuitiiviselle tajuamiselle (noein). Tutkielma koostuu neljästä luvusta sekä lyhyestä johdannosta. Ensimmäinen luku käsittelee Heideggerin filosofian kantavaa teemaa, kysymystä olemisen mielestä – sekä tämän kysymyksen perustaa kreikkalaisessa ajattelussa. Tämän jälkeen luodaan katsaus Heideggerin fenomenologiseen metodiin, sen ensisijaiseen kohdealueeseen inhimillisessä kokemuksessa sekä fenomenologisen tutkimuksen historialliseen ulottuvuuteen. Toisessa luvussa esitetään puolestaan Heideggerin tulkinta käsitteestä logos. Tulkinnan ymmärtämiseksi on välttämätöntä esittää tiivistetysti Heideggerin tulkinta kreikkalaisesta totuuden käsitteestä. Heideggerin mukaan kreikkalainen ajattelu ymmärsi totuuden monitasoisena ilmiönä, jonka perustavin käyttöyhteys on löydettävissä todellisuuden ilmiöstä. Kolmannessa luvussa pureudutaan niihin piirteisiin, joiden valossa Aristoteles Heideggerin mukaan tulkitsi kielen ja kokemuksen välistä suhdetta. Neljännessä luvussa esitetään, mitä edellä esitetyt oivallukset merkitsivät Heideggerin oman filosofisen projektin kannalta, erityisesti inhimillistä olemassaoloa (Dasein) selvittäneen fundamentaaliontologian kannalta.
Resumo:
This study addresses the following question: How to think about ethics in a technological world? The question is treated first thematically by framing central issues in the relationship between ethics and technology. This relationship has three distinct facets: i) technological advance poses new challenges for ethics, ii) traditional ethics may become poorly applicable in a technologically transformed world, and iii) the progress in science and technology has altered the concept of rationality in ways that undermine ethical thinking itself. The thematic treatment is followed by the description and analysis of three approaches to the questions framed. First, Hans Jonas s thinking on the ontology of life and the imperative of responsibility is studied. In Jonas s analysis modern culture is found to be nihilistic because it is unable to understand organic life, to find meaning in reality, and to justify morals. At the root of nihilism Jonas finds dualism, the traditional Western way of seeing consciousness as radically separate from the material world. Jonas attempts to create a metaphysical grounding for an ethic that would take the technologically increased human powers into account and make the responsibility for future generations meaningful and justified. The second approach is Albert Borgmann s philosophy of technology that mainly assesses the ways in which technological development has affected everyday life. Borgmann admits that modern technology has liberated humans from toil, disease, danger, and sickness. Furthermore, liberal democracy, possibilities for self-realization, and many of the freedoms we now enjoy would not be possible on a large scale without technology. Borgmann, however, argues that modern technology in itself does not provide a whole and meaningful life. In fact, technological conditions are often detrimental to the good life. Integrity in life, according to him, is to be sought among things and practices that evade technoscientific objectification and commodification. Larry Hickman s Deweyan philosophy of technology is the third approach under scrutiny. Central in Hickman s thinking is a broad definition of technology that is nearly equal to Deweyan inquiry. Inquiry refers to the reflective and experiential way humans adapt to their environment by modifying their habits and beliefs. In Hickman s work, technology consists of all kinds of activities that through experimentation and/or reflection aim at improving human techniques and habits. Thus, in addition to research and development, many arts and political reforms are technological for Hickman. He argues for recasting such distinctions as fact/value, poiesis/praxis/theoria, and individual/society. Finally, Hickman does not admit a categorical difference between ethics and technology: moral values and norms need to be submitted to experiential inquiry as well as all the other notions. This study mainly argues for an interdisciplinary approach to the ethics of technology. This approach should make use of the potentialities of the research traditions in applied ethics, the philosophy of technology, and the social studies on science and technology and attempt to overcome their limitations. This study also advocates an endorsement of mid-level ethics that concentrate on the practices, institutions, and policies of temporal human life. Mid-level describes the realm between the instantaneous and individualistic micro-level and the universal and global macro level.
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Tutkielmassa selvitetään, miten Luther käyttää kategoriaoppia oppaana Jumalan olemuksen ilmaisuun. Päälähteenä on Genesis-kommentaari (1535-1545) mutta muitakin Lutherin tekstejä käytetään soveltuvin osin käsitteiden ja ajatusrakenteiden selventäjinä. Tutkielma jakautuu johdannon jälkeen taustalukuun ja kolmeen analyysilukuun ja loppukatsaukseen, jossa esitetään tutkimuksen tulokset. Taustaluvussa luodaan katsaus filosofisen kategoriaopin sisältöön ja historiaan uskonpuhdistukseen saakka. Aristoteleen luoma olemista määrittävä kategoriaoppi substansseista ja niiden satunnaisista ominaispiirteistä, aksidensseista, tulkitaan aina uudelleen jokaisessa filosofianhistoriallisessa kontekstissa. Länsimaisen teologian ja Lutherin ajattelun kannalta merkittävimmät kategoriaopin tulkisijat ovat Augustinus ja Tuomas Akvinolainen. Luvussa kolme selvitetään Lutherin suhdetta filosofiaan yleensä ja hänen kategoriaopin käyttöään. Luther yhtyy Augustinukseen siinä, että Jumalaa olemuksessaan ei voida tavoittaa kategorioiden avulla, mutta niitä voidaan käyttää oppaana sen ilmaisussa. Lutherin kritisoi skolastista kategoriaoppia, jossa kaikki muut kategoriat predikoidaan ensimmäisistä substansseista, ja käyttää itse Quintilianuksen tapaa, jossa mikä tahansa asia voidaan ottaa tarkasteluun kaikissa siihen soveltuvissa kategorioissa sen ymmärtämiseksi paremmin kokonaisuutena. Neljännessä luvussa analysoidaan substanssi-käsitettä ja substanssin kategoriaa ja viidennessä relaatiota ja relaation kategoriaa Lutherin jumalakäsityksessä ottaen huomioon myös skolastinen tausta. Substanssin Luther ymmärtää sekä raamatullisesti, että filosofisesti. Kategoriaopissa on kysymys filosofisesta substanssi-käsitteestä kokonaisyhteyden ollessa kuitenkin teologinen. Jumala substanssin kategoriassa on tavoittamaton ja absoluuttinen filosofian Jumala, johon ei liity Jumalan ristinteologista ja vastakohtiinsa kätkeytyvää ilmoitusta itsestään.Tällä tavalla ymmärretty Jumala ei ole tekemisissä ihmisten kanssa ja hänen tuntemisensa tavoitteleminen tällaisena on ihmisen omista lähtökohdista tapahtuvaa kunnian teologiaa. Relaation käsitteessä Luther liittyy Aristoteleen määritelmään: Relatiivit ovat subjektissaan ja suhteessa toisiinsa. Relationaalisuus kuuluu Lutherin teologiaan, sekä luotuisuuden että uskon relaationa. Jumalan ja ihmisen suhteessa on kaksi reaalista relaatiota, Jumalan relaatio ihmiseen ja ihmisen relaatio Jumalaan. Edellistä Luther kutsuu ilmoitukseksi ja jälkimmäistä uskoksi tai jumalanpalvelukseksi. Luther hyödyntää myös relatiivien käänteisyyttä ja yhtä aikaa olemassa olemista teologiassaan: Ihmisen käänteisjäsenenä voi olla vain hänelle ilmoitettu Jumala, joka antaa osallisuuden omasta ikuisesta elämästään ja itsestään tässä relaatiossa. Näin relaatiolla on myös ontologinen sisältö. Se tulee näkyviin myös jumalanpalveluksen nimityksessä ”Herran nimen avuksi huutamisena”, sillä Jumalan on nimessään olemuksellisesti läsnä. Tutkielman johdannossa esitetty hypoteesi filosofisen terminologian käytöstä teologisesti osoittautuu oikeaksi: Luther pysyy alkuperäisissä Aristoteleen kategorioiden määritelmissä ja merkityksissä ja käyttää niitä teologiansa ilmaisuvälineenä viittaussuhteenaan teologinen totuus. Kategoriaoppiaan esittäessään Lutherin varsinainen vastustaja ei ole Aristoteles vaan skolastinen teologia, jossa aristoteelinen filosofia on saanut ylivallan ja sivuuttanut Jumalan oman ilmoituksen itsestään. Summa summarum: Luther asettaa Jumalan relaation kategoriaan ilmaistakseen Jumalan olemuksen ristinteologisen itseilmoituksen ihmisille. Avainsanat: aristotelismi - Jumala - kategoriat – Luther-tutkimus - relaatio – skolastiikka –ontologia
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How did Søren Kierkegaard (1813 1855) situate the human subject into historical and social actuality? How did he take into consideration his own situatedness? As key for understanding these questions the research takes the ideal of living poetically that Kierkegaard outlined in his dissertation. In The Concept of Irony (1841) Kierkegaard took up this ideal of the Romantic ironists and made it into an ethical-religious ideal. For him the ideal of living poetically came to mean 1) becoming brought up by God, while 2) assuming ethical-religiously one s role and place in the historical actuality. Through an exegesis of Kierkegaard s texts from 1843 to 1851 it is shown how this ideal governed Kierkegaard s thought and action throughout his work. The analysis of Kierkegaard s ideal of living poetically not only a) shows how the Kierkegaardian subject is situated in its historical context. It also b) sheds light on Kierkegaard s social and political thought, c) helps to understand Kierkegaard s character as a religious thinker, and d) pits his ethical-religious orientation in life against its scientific and commonsense alternatives. The research evaluates the rationality of the way of life championed by Kierkegaard by comparing it with ways of life dominated by reflection and reasoning. It uses Kierkegaard s ideal of living poetically in trying to understand the tensions between religious and unreligious ways of life.
Resumo:
In What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon formulated a new version of the ethical theory called contractualism. This theory took reasons considerations that count in favour of judgment-sensitive attitudes to be the fundamental normative notion. It then used normative reasons to first account for evaluative properties. For an object to be valuable, on this view, is for it to have properties that provide reasons to have favourable attitudes towards the bearer of value. Scanlon also used reasons to account for moral wrongness. His contractualism claims that an act is morally wrong if it is forbidden by any set of moral principles that no one could reasonably reject. My thesis consists of five previously published articles which attempt to clarify Scanlon s theory and to defend it against its critics. The first article defends the idea that normative reason-relations are fundamental against Joshua Gert. Gert argues that rationality is a more basic notion than reasons and that reasons can be analysed in terms of their rationally requiring and justifying dimensions. The second article explores the relationship between value and reasons. It defends Scanlon s view according to which reasons are the more basic than value against those who think that reasons are based on the evaluative realm. The last three articles defend Scanlon s views about moral wrongness. The first one of them discusses a classic objection to contractualist theories. This objection is that principles which no one could reasonably reject are redundant in accounting for wrongness. This is because we need a prior notion of wrongness to select those principles and because such principles are not required to make actions wrong or to provide reasons against wrong actions. The fourth article explores the distinctive reasons which contractualists claim there are for avoiding the wrong actions. The last article argues against the critics of contractualism who claim that contractualism has implausible normative consequences for situations related to the treatment of different-sized groups of people.