Religion Explained? : A Philosophical Appraisal of the Cognitive Science of Religion

This study examines philosophically the main theories and methodological assumptions of the field known as the cognitive science of religion (CSR). The study makes a philosophically informed reconstruction of the methodological principles of the CSR, indicates problems with them, and examines possible solutions to these problems. The study focuses on several different CSR writers, namely, Scott Atran, Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer and Dan Sperber. CSR theorising is done in the intersection between cognitive sciences, anthropology and evolutionary psychology. This multidisciplinary nature makes CSR a fertile ground for philosophical considerations coming from philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. The study begins by spelling out the methodological assumptions and auxiliary theories of CSR writers by situating these theories and assumptions in the nexus of existing approaches to religion. The distinctive feature of CSR is its emphasis on information processing: CSR writers claim that contemporary cognitive sciences can inform anthropological theorising about the human mind and offer tools for producing causal explanations. Further, they claim to explain the prevalence and persistence of religion by cognitive systems that undergird religious thinking. I also examine the core theoretical contributions of the field focusing mainly on the (1) “minimally counter-intuitiveness hypothesis” and (2) the different ways in which supernatural agent representations activate our cognitive systems. Generally speaking, CSR writers argue for the naturalness of religion: religious ideas and practices are widespread and pervasive because human cognition operates in such a way that religious ideas are easy to acquire and transmit. The study raises two philosophical problems, namely, the “problem of scope” and the “problem of religious relevance”. The problem of scope is created by the insistence of several critics of the CSR that CSR explanations are mostly irrelevant for explaining religion. Most CSR writers themselves hold that cognitive explanations can answer most of our questions about religion. I argue that the problem of scope is created by differences in explanation-begging questions: the former group is interested in explaining different things than the latter group. I propose that we should not stick too rigidly to one set of methodological assumptions, but rather acknowledge that different assumptions might help us to answer different questions about religion. Instead of adhering to some robust metaphysics as some strongly naturalistic writers argue, we should adopt a pragmatic and explanatory pluralist approach which would allow different kinds of methodological presuppositions in the study of religion provided that they attempt to answer different kinds of why-questions, since religion appears to be a multi-faceted phenomenon that spans over a variety of fields of special sciences. The problem of religious relevance is created by the insistence of some writers that CSR theories show religious beliefs to be false or irrational, whereas others invoke CSR theories to defend certain religious ideas. The problem is interesting because it reveals the more general philosophical assumptions of those who make such interpretations. CSR theories can (and have been) interpreted in terms of three different philosophical frameworks: strict naturalism, broad naturalism and theism. I argue that CSR theories can be interpreted inside all three frameworks without doing violence to the theories and that these frameworks give different kinds of results regarding the religious relevance of CSR theories.

Group Beliefs : Studies on the Nature and Logic of Collective Doxastic Attitudes

This thesis studies the nature and logic of collective doxastic attitudes, or what is referred to in ordinary language as "group beliefs". Beliefs and other intentional attitudes are attributed to groups and collections of people, and such attributions are used to explain and predict the actions of groups. The thesis develops an understanding of group beliefs as voluntarily adopted views or acceptances rather than as ordinary beliefs. Such an understanding can provide new answers to questions concerning collective knowledge and justification of group beliefs, and it allows developing modal logics with collective doxastic and epistemic notions. The thesis consists of six articles. The first three articles are philosophical studies concerned with the nature of group beliefs. The last three articles are logical studies that aim at developing proof-theoretical calculi for reasoning about collective doxastic attitudes.

Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.

Questions to Artificial Nature: A Philosophical Study of Interdisciplinary Models and their Functions in Scientific Practice

This thesis presents an interdisciplinary analysis of how models and simulations function in the production of scientific knowledge. The work is informed by three scholarly traditions: studies on models and simulations in philosophy of science, so-called micro-sociological laboratory studies within science and technology studies, and cultural-historical activity theory. Methodologically, I adopt a naturalist epistemology and combine philosophical analysis with a qualitative, empirical case study of infectious-disease modelling. This study has a dual perspective throughout the analysis: it specifies the modelling practices and examines the models as objects of research. The research questions addressed in this study are: 1) How are models constructed and what functions do they have in the production of scientific knowledge? 2) What is interdisciplinarity in model construction? 3) How do models become a general research tool and why is this process problematic? The core argument is that the mediating models as investigative instruments (cf. Morgan and Morrison 1999) take questions as a starting point, and hence their construction is intentionally guided. This argument applies the interrogative model of inquiry (e.g., Sintonen 2005; Hintikka 1981), which conceives of all knowledge acquisition as process of seeking answers to questions. The first question addresses simulation models as Artificial Nature, which is manipulated in order to answer questions that initiated the model building. This account develops further the "epistemology of simulation" (cf. Winsberg 2003) by showing the interrelatedness of researchers and their objects in the process of modelling. The second question clarifies why interdisciplinary research collaboration is demanding and difficult to maintain. The nature of the impediments to disciplinary interaction are examined by introducing the idea of object-oriented interdisciplinarity, which provides an analytical framework to study the changes in the degree of interdisciplinarity, the tools and research practices developed to support the collaboration, and the mode of collaboration in relation to the historically mutable object of research. As my interest is in the models as interdisciplinary objects, the third research problem seeks to answer my question of how we might characterise these objects, what is typical for them, and what kind of changes happen in the process of modelling. Here I examine the tension between specified, question-oriented models and more general models, and suggest that the specified models form a group of their own. I call these Tailor-made models, in opposition to the process of building a simulation platform that aims at generalisability and utility for health-policy. This tension also underlines the challenge of applying research results (or methods and tools) to discuss and solve problems in decision-making processes.

Everyday beliefs about food and health

The series of studies addresses several everyday beliefs about food and health from the perspective of everyday thinking and paranormal beliefs. They are "you are what you eat" beliefs, attitudes towards genetically modified and organic foods, and belief in alternative medicine. The survey studies included from 239 to 3261 Finnish participants. It was found that food consumption can have far-stretching consequences for the impressions of the eater in a "you are what you eat" manner. The results also demonstrated that belief in alternative medicine was related to belief in the paranormal, as were to a lesser degree attitudes towards genetically modified and organic foods. The study also addressed paranormal beliefs and belief in alternative medicine from the perspective of category observance. Paranormal believers as well as believers in alternative medicine were much more liberal than skeptics in violating categorical boundaries and attributed, for example, intentionality (mental) to body growth (biological) and life (biological) to energy (physical). In addition, the study addressed the relation of these attitudes and beliefs with preferred thinking style. The results demonstrated that belief in alternative medicine was especially appealing to intuitive thinkers, while rational thinking was unrelated to it. The same pattern was demonstrated for negative attitudes towards genetically modified food and positive attitudes towards organic food. In addition, it was demonstrated, however, that such unscientific notions may exist not instead of but parallel with "better knowledge". In sum, the present thesis contributes to the understanding of superstitious elements in various everyday attitudes and beliefs, and investigates their relationship with general inclinations towards belief in the paranormal. It appears that some very common everyday beliefs and attitudes about food and health contain elements of a superstitious nature. Involving conceptual enmeshment they go beyond mere associations, and can coincide with scientifically valid views on the same topic.

Paranormal, superstitious, magical, and religious beliefs

A lack of conceptual clarity and multivariate studies has impeded research on paranormal, superstitious, and magical beliefs. In this series of studies a new conceptual framework of these beliefs was presented. A general belief in the paranormal was shown to lead to specific paranormal, superstitious, and magical beliefs. The beliefs were defined equally as category mistakes where the core attributes of psychological, physical, and biological phenomena are confused with each other. This definition was supported by an empirical examination: Paranormal believers confused more core knowledge than skeptics. A multivariate study revealed that the best predictors of paranormal beliefs were intuitive thinking and a humanistic world view, while low analytical thinking was a less important predictor. Another study showed that women s greater belief in the paranormal compared to men was partially explained by women s higher intuitive and lower analytical thinking. Additionally, it was shown that university students were originally more skeptical than vocational school students, but university studies did not increase skepticism. The finding that paranormal beliefs mainly arise from an intuitive system, instead of a malfunctioning analytical system, explains why the beliefs do not vanish with the increase of education, scientific knowledge, and rational thinking. Religious and paranormal beliefs share important qualities and generally, they were positively related. The most religious people, however, abandoned paranormal beliefs. Religious people and paranormal believers differed from the skeptics similarly by being more intuitive, having experienced more mystical phenomena, and having peers and parents with more positive attitudes toward the supernatural. Religious people had, however, higher conservation and benevolence values than paranormal believers. The new conceptual framework presented in this series of studies integrates research on paranormal, superstitious, magical, and religious beliefs. Hopefully it will enable researchers to develop more elaborated hypotheses and theoretical statements about paranormal beliefs in the future.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

Men´s health behaviour, health beliefs and need for health counselling : A study amongst 40-year-old males from one Helsinki City region

Tavoitteena oli tutkia 40-vuotiaiden miesten terveyskäyttäytymistä, terveysuskomuksia ja miesten saamaa terveysneuvontaa Helsingissä. 273 miestä vastasi kyselyyn ja osallistui terveystutkimuksiin. Terveydentilan perusteella miehet arvioitiin matalan (n=145) ja korkean (n=128) riskin ryhmiin. Khin neliö-testillä tutkittiin elämäntapa- ja riskitekijöitä koetun terveyden (hyvä, keskinkertainen/huono) luokissa ja verrattiin matalan ja korkean riskin ryhmiä em. tekijöiden osalta. Askeltavalla logistisella regressiomallilla analysoitiin tulosmuuttujia taustatekijöiden, terveyskäyttäytymisen, terveysuskomusten ja kliinisten riskitekijöiden avulla sekä arvioitiin oireiden ja vaivojen suhdetta koettuun terveydentilaan. Korkeassa riskissä olevien terveyttä seurattiin vuosina 2001–2004 analysoimalla mini-intervention vaikutusta terveysriskeihin ja elintapoihin varianssianalyysin avulla (ANOVA) (n=46). Matalasta vastausprosentista johtuen (39.6%), ei-vastanneiden aineistoa kerättiin käyttämällä syvähaastattelua (n=28) sekä puhelinkyselyä (n=40). Lopullinen aineisto koostui 341 miehestä. Tulokset osoittivat, että miehillä oli sydän- ja verisuonitautiriskejä. Kaksi kolmesta osallistuneista oli ylipainoisia tai lihavia, yli kolmanneksella vyötärönympärys oli ≥100 cm, ja yli 40%:llä oli diastolinen verenpaine ≥90 mmHg. Yli puolet tupakoi päivittäin ja 40% käytti alkoholia runsaasti. Ristiriitaisuutta ilmensi se, että huolimatta riskitekijöistä noin puolet miehistä koki terveydentilansa hyväksi. Sairauden tai vamman puute, hyvä suun terveydentila ja normaali vyötärönympärys olivat yhteydessä hyväksi koettuun terveydentilaan. Suora yhteys voitiin havaita omaisten tarjoaman neuvonnan ja vähäisen alkoholin käytön välillä. Masennus ja unettomuus olivat voimakkaasti yhteydessä loppuun palamiseen. Miehillä oli erilaisia fyysisiä ja psyykkisiä oireita, jotka korreloivat voimakkaasti masennuksen kanssa. Pieni määrä miehistä koki saaneensa terveysneuvontaa hoitohenkilökunnalta verrattuna perheenjäseniltä saatuun ohjaukseen. Korkeariskisten miesten (n=46) arvot parantuivat merkitsevästi lyhyellä aikavälillä. Kolesteroliarvoja lukuunottamatta ne palautuivat kolmen vuoden kuluttua alkumittausarvoja kohti. Laadullinen tutkimus osoitti, että “ei-vastanneet“ eivät osallistuneet projektiin, sillä he olivat oireettomia tai kiireisiä. Heillä todettiin samoja terveysriskejä kuin projektiin osallistuneilla. Syvähaastattelussa miehet toivat esille kokemuksiaan huolista, vihan tunteista, peloista ja yksinäisyydestä. Hoidonantajien on tärkeää ymmärtää ristiriidat miesten subjektiivisen ja objektiivisen terveydentilan välillä, mikä auttaa havaitsemaan esteitä terveyskäyttäytymiselle. Yhä enemmän tarvitaan yhteistyötä yksityisen ja julkisen terveydenhuollon välillä varmistamaan terveystottumusten jatkuminen miesten keskuudessa.

Just say no? The influence of personal goals, beliefs, psychosocial adjustment, and parental relationships in drug use by adolescents

The study in its entirety focused on factors related to adolescents decisions concerning drug use. The term drug use is taken here to include the use of tobacco products, alcohol, narcotics, and other addictive substances. First, the reasons given for drug use (attributions) were investigated. Secondly, the influence of personal goals, the beliefs involved in decision making, psychosocial adjustment including body image and involvement with peers, and parental relationships on drug use were studied. Two cohorts participated in the study. In 1984, a questionnaire on reasons for drug use was administered to a sample of adolescents aged 14-16 (N=396). A further questionnaire was administered to another sample of adolescents aged 14-16 (N=488) in 1999. The results for both cohorts were analyzed in Articles I and II. In Articles III and IV further analysis was carried out on the second cohort (N=488). The research report presented here provides a synthesis of all four articles, together with material from a further analysis. In a comparison of the two cohorts it was found that the attributions for drug use had changed considerably over the intervening fifteen-year period. In relation to alcohol and narcotics use an increase was found in reasons involving inner subjective experiences, with mention of the good feeling and fun resulting from alcohol and narcotics use. In addition, the goals of alcohol consumption were increasingly perceived as drinking to get drunk, and for its own sake. The attributions for the adolescents own smoking behavior were quite different from the attributions for smoking by others. The attributions were only weakly influenced by the participants gender or by their smoking habits, either in 1984 or 1999. In relation to participants own smoking, the later questionnaire elicited more mention of inner subjective experiences involving "good feeling. In relation to the perceived reasons for other people s smoking, it elicited more responses connected with the notion of "belonging. In the second sample, the results indicated that the levels of body satisfaction among adolescent girls are lower than those among adolescent boys. Overall, dissatisfaction with one's physical appearance seemed to relate to drug use. Girls were also found to engage in more discussions than boys; this applied to (i) discussion with peers (concerning both intimate and general matters), and (ii) discussion with parents (concerning general matters). However, more than a quarter of the boys (out of the entire population) reported only low intimacy with both parents and peers. If both drinking and smoking were considered, it seemed that girls in particular who reported drinking and smoking also reported high intimacy with parents and peers. Boys who reported drinking and smoking reported only medium intimacy with parents and peers. In addition, having an intimate relationship with one's peers was associated with a greater tendency to drink purely in order to get drunk. Overall, the results seemed to suggest that drug use is connected with a close relationship with peers and (surprisingly) with a close relationship with parents. Nevertheless, there were also indications that to some extent peer relationships can also protect adolescents from smoking and alcohol use. The results, which underline the complexity of adolescent drug use, are taken up in the Discussion section. It may be that body image and/or other identity factors play a more prominent role in all drug use than has previously been acknowledged. It does appear that in the course of planning support campaigns for adolescents at risk of drug use, we should focus more closely on individuals and their inner world. More research on this field is clearly needed, and therefore some ideas for future research are also presented.

Knowledge through Discussion : An Interpretation of Epistemology in Plato's Meno

According to Meno s paradox we cannot inquire into what we do not know because we do not know what we are inquiring into. There are many ways to interpret the paradox but the central issue about our ability to reach truth is a profound one. In the dialogue Meno, Plato presents the paradox and an outline of a solution which enables us to reach knowledge (epistēmē) through philosophical discussion. During the last century Meno has often been considered transitional between Socratic thinking and Plato s own philosophy, and thus the dialogue has not been adequately interpreted as an integrated whole. Therefore the distinctive epistemology of the dialogue has not gained due notice. In this thesis the dialogue is analysed as an integrated whole and the philosophical interpretation also takes into account its dramatic features. The thesis emphasises the role of language and definitions in acquiring knowledge. Among the results concerning these subjects is a new interpretation of Socrates s defintion of shape (schēma). The theory of anamnēsis all learning is recollection in the Meno is argued to answer the paradox philosophically although Plato s presentation also contains playful and ironic elements. The background of the way Plato presents his case is that he appreciated the fact that no argument can plausibly demonstrate that argumentation is able to reach truth. In the Meno, Plato makes the earliest explicit distinction between knowledge and true belief in the history of Western philosophy. He also gives a definition of knowledge which is the basis of the so called classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief. In the Meno, true beliefs become knowledge when someone ties them down by reasoning about the explanation. The analysis of the epistemology of the dialogue from this perspective gives an interpretation which integrates the central concepts of the epistemology in the dialogue elenchos, anamnēsis and hypothetical inquiry into a unified whole which contains a plausible argument according to which the ignorant can reach knowledge through discussion. The conception that emerges by such an analysis is interesting both from the point of view of current interests and that of the history of philosophy. The method of knowledge acquisition in the Meno can, for example, be seen as a predecessor of modern scientific methods. The Meno is the earliest Greek mathematical text that has survived in its original form. The analysis presented in the thesis of the geometric passages in the dialogue provides new results both concerning Socrates s geometry lesson with the slave and the example presenting the hypothetical method. Concerning the latter, a new interpretation is presented. Keywords: anamnēsis, epistēmē, knowledge, Meno s paradox, Plato

Luottamus koulussa : Tutkimus yhdeksännen luokan oppilaiden luottamus- ja epäluottamuskertomuksista ja niiden merkityksestä oppilaiden kouluarjessa

The aim of this study is to explore trust at school and its meaning for 9th grade students. The intent is to investigate students views about trust and mistrust in school relationships. Three research questions are posed: 1) what meanings do students give to their experiences of trust and mistrust at school and how do they evaluate connection of these experiences to their well-being and enjoyment in the classroom? 2) what and how important, is the teacher s role according to the students writings, and 3) what might the different pedagogical and administrative structures of schools reveal about trust and mistrust in a particular school culture? The data consists of 134 writings of 9th grade students (secondary school) from three schools in one of the biggest cities in Finland. The schools differ from others in terms of their pedagogical or structural backgrounds. The study is restricted to the micro-level of, disposition of Educational Sociology, focusing on trust in schools relationships. The theoretical framework of the study is trust, as a part of social capital; however trust is also approached from the sociological, the psychological and philosophical perspective. The methodological approach is narrative research concerning school practice . Analysis of narrative consist mostly content analysis, but also some elements of holistic-content reading, thematic reading and categorical content. The analysis found three main themes: 1) individual stories of trust, 2) the teachers role in making trust possible in the classroom, and 3) school as a community of trust. According to the study trust at school (1) is a complex phenomenon consisting of people s ability to work together and to recognize the demands that different situations present. Trust at school is often taken for granted. In the students experiences trust is strongly connected to friendship, and the teacher s ability to connect with students. Students experiences of mistrust stem from bulling, school violence, lack of respect as well as teachers lacking basic professional behavior. School relationships are important for some students as source of enjoyment, but some feel that it is difficult to evaluate the connection between trust and enjoyment. The study found that students trust of teachers (2) is linked to the teacher s professional role as a teacher, a caring human being open to dialogue. In other words, the students describe teachers abilities to create a sense of trust in terms of three expectations: the teacher was better, the same or worse than expected. Better than expected, means the teacher engender a high degree of trust and has excellent communication skills. Same as expected means the teacher comes across as familiar and secure, while lower than expected means the teacher creates no trust and has poor communication skills. Finally, it was shown that trust at school (3) should not only exist between some individuals, but between (all) members of the school community. In other words, according to the study there is some evidence that trust is strongly committed to school culture. Further, trust seems to depend on (school-) cultural background, values, beliefs, expectations, norms as well as staff behaviour. The basic elements of an optimum level of trust at school are favourable school structure and pedagogical background; however, good relationships between teachers and students as well as high professional skills are also needed. Trust at school is built by good communication, working together and getting to know each other.

The Philosophical Age. Almanac. Issue 36. The Northern Lights

keywords: Enlightenment, Northern countries, Finland, Russia, Scotland In the 36 th edition of the almanac "Philosophical Age" published materials of international symposium «The Northern Lights - Facets of Enlightenment Culture», (held September 25-26, 2009) in The Aleksanteri Institute the University of Helsinki. Contents: Vesa Oittinen Between Radicalism and Utilitarianism — On the Profile of the Finnish Enlightenment Tatiana Artemyeva The Status of Intellectual Values in the Russian Enlightenment Oili Pulkkinen The Cosmopolitan Experience, Theoretical Histories and the Universal Science of the Scottish Enlightenment Аlla Zlatopolskaya L’autocritique des Lumières chez Rousseau et le rousseauisme russe Johannes Remy Alexander Radishchev, Ethical Consuming, and North American Quakers Kimmo Sarje Anders Chydenius and Radical Swedish Enlightenment Johan Sten Anders Johan Lexell: A Finnish Astronomer at St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences and His European Contacts Mikhail Mikeshin A Russian Adam Smith in French Style: An Example of the Transfer of Ideas Larisa Agamalian The Library of an Enlightened Russian Landowner