Evolutionary games with two timescales

We consider a two timescale model of learning by economic agents wherein active or 'ontogenetic' learning by individuals takes place on a fast scale and passive or 'phylogenetic' learning by society as a whole on a slow scale, each affecting the evolution of the other. The former is modelled by the Monte Carlo dynamics of physics, while the latter is modelled by the replicator dynamics of evolutionary biology. Various qualitative aspects of the dynamics are studied in some simple cases, both analytically and numerically, and its role as a useful modelling device is emphasized.

Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games

We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version vith complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.

Fruit and Seed Volatiles: Multiple Stage Settings, Actors and Props in an Evolutionary Play

Plants emit volatile organic compounds (VOCs) from most parts of their anatomy. Conventionally, the volatiles of leaves, flowers, fruits and seeds have been investigated separately. This review presents an integrated perspective of volatiles produced by fruits and seeds in the context of selection on the whole plant. It suggests that fruit and seed volatiles may only be understood in the light of the chemistry of the whole plant. Fleshy fruit may be viewed as an ecological arena within which several evolutionary games are being played involving fruit VOCs. Fruit odour and colour may be correlated and interact via multimodal signalling in influencing visits by frugivores. The hypothesis of volatile crypsis in the evolution of hard seeds as protection against volatile diffusion and perception by seed predators is reviewed. Current views on the role of volatiles in ant dispersal of seeds or myrmecochory are summarised, especially the suggestion that ants are being manipulated by plants in the form of a sensory trap while providing this service. Plant VOC production is presented as an emergent phenotype that could result from multiple selection pressures acting on various plant parts; the ``plant'' phenotype and VOC profile may receive significant contributions from symbionts within the plant. Viewing the plant as a holobiont would benefit an understanding of the emergent plant phenotype.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

Evolutionary approach to revising modernization theory : an introduction to the credible polity

The future global distribution of the political regimes of countries, just like that of their economic incomes, displays a surprising tendency for polarization into only two clubs of convergence at the extrema. This, in itself, is a persuasive reason to analyze afresh the logical validity of an endogenous theory for political and economic development inherent in modernization theory. I suggest how adopting a simple evolutionary game theoretic view on the subject allows an explanation for these parallel clubs of convergence in political regimes and economic income within the framework of existing research in democratization theory. I also suggest how instrumental action can be methodically introduced into such a setup using learning strategies adopted by political actors. These strategies, based on the first principles of political competition, are motivated by introducing the theoretical concept of a Credible Polity.

Emergence of Cooperation in Heterogeneous Population: A Discrete-Time Replicator Dynamics Analysis

The emergence of cooperation is analyzed in heterogeneous populations where individuals can be classified in two groups according to their phenotypic appearance. Phenotype recognition is assumed for all individuals: individuals are able to identify the type of every other individual, but fail to recognize their own type, and thus behave under partial information conditions. The interactions between individuals are described by 2 × 2 symmetric games where individuals can either cooperate or defect. The evolution of such populations is studied in the framework of evolutionary game by means of the replicator dynamics. Overlapping generations are considered, so the replicator equations are formulated in discrete-time form. The well-posedness conditions of the system are derived. Depending on the parameters of the game, a restriction may exist for the generation length. The stability analysis of the dynamical system is carried out and a detailed description of the behavior of trajectories starting from the interior of the state-space is given. We find that, provided the conditions of well-posedness are verified, the linear stability of monomorphic states in the discrete-time replicator coincides with the one of the continuous case. Specific from the discrete-time case, a relaxed restriction for the generation length is derived, for which larger time-steps can be used without compromising the well-posedness of the replicator system.

Effect of information transmission on cooperative behavior

Considering the fact, in the real world, that information is transmitted with a time delay, we study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where agents update strategies according to certain information that they have learned. In our study, the game dynamics are classified by the modes of information learning as well as game interaction, and four different combinations, i.e. the mean-field case, case I, case II and local case, are studied comparatively. It is found that the time delay in case II smoothes the phase transition from the absorbing states of C (or D) to their mixing state, and promotes cooperation for most parameter values. Our work provides insights into the temporal behavior of information and the memory of the system, and may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior induced by the time delay in social and biological systems.

The Ghost in the Machine: Inferring Machine-Based Strategies from Observed Behavior

We introduce a procedure to infer the repeated-game strategies that generate actions in experimental choice data. We apply the technique to set of experiments where human subjects play a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The technique suggests that two types of strategies underly the data.

Cooperative of Noncooperative Behavior?

In an abstract two-agent model, we show that every deterministic joint choice function compatible with the hypothesis that agents act noncooperatively is also compatible with the hypothesis that they act cooperatively. the converse is false.

A game theoretical approach to the evolution of structured communication codes

Structured meaning-signal mappings, i.e., mappings that preserve neighborhood relationships by associating similar signals with similar meanings, are advantageous in an environment where signals are corrupted by noise and sub-optimal meaning inferences are rewarded as well. The evolution of these mappings, however, cannot be explained within a traditional language evolutionary game scenario in which individuals meet randomly because the evolutionary dynamics is trapped in local maxima that do not reflect the structure of the meaning and signal spaces. Here we use a simple game theoretical model to show analytically that when individuals adopting the same communication code meet more frequently than individuals using different codes-a result of the spatial organization of the population-then advantageous linguistic innovations can spread and take over the population. In addition, we report results of simulations in which an individual can communicate only with its K nearest neighbors and show that the probability that the lineage of a mutant that uses a more efficient communication code becomes fixed decreases exponentially with increasing K. These findings support the mother tongue hypothesis that human language evolved as a communication system used among kin, especially between mothers and offspring.

Complex Transition to Cooperative Behavior in a Structured Population Model

Cooperation plays an important role in the evolution of species and human societies. The understanding of the emergence and persistence of cooperation in those systems is a fascinating and fundamental question. Many mechanisms were extensively studied and proposed as supporting cooperation. The current work addresses the role of migration for the maintenance of cooperation in structured populations. This problem is investigated in an evolutionary perspective through the prisoner's dilemma game paradigm. It is found that migration and structure play an essential role in the evolution of the cooperative behavior. The possible outcomes of the model are extinction of the entire population, dominance of the cooperative strategy and coexistence between cooperators and defectors. The coexistence phase is obtained in the range of large migration rates. It is also verified the existence of a critical level of structuring beyond that cooperation is always likely. In resume, we conclude that the increase in the number of demes as well as in the migration rate favor the fixation of the cooperative behavior.

Co-creating games: A co-evolutionary analysis

ABSTRACT. The phenomenon of consumer co-creation is often framed in terms of whether either economic market forces or socio-cultural non-market forces ultimately dominate. We propose an alternate model of consumer co-creation in terms of co-evolution between markets and non-markets. Our model is based on a recent ethnographic study of a massively multiplayer online game through its development, release and ultimate failure, and cast in terms of two explanatory models: multiple games and social network markets. We conclude that consumer co-creation is indeed complex, but in ways that relate to both emergent market expectations and the evolution of markets, not to the transcendence of markets.

Evolutionary game design

Abstract—It is easy to create new combinatorial games but more difficult to predict those that will interest human players. We examine the concept of game quality, its automated measurement through self-play simulations, and its use in the evolutionary search for new high-quality games. A general game system called Ludi is described and experiments conducted to test its ability to synthesize and evaluate new games. Results demonstrate the validity of the approach through the automated creation of novel, interesting, and publishable games. Index Terms—Aesthetics, artificial intelligence (AI), combinatorial game, evolutionary search, game design.

Part 1 MOO methods for multidisciplinary design using parallel evolutionary algorithms, game theory and hierarchical topology. (Part 1.) Theoretical aspects

Two lecture notes describe recent developments of evolutionary multi objective optimization (MO) techniques in detail and their advantages and drawbacks compared to traditional deterministic optimisers. The role of Game Strategies (GS), such as Pareto, Nash or Stackelberg games as companions or pre-conditioners of Multi objective Optimizers is presented and discussed on simple mathematical functions in Part I , as well as their implementations on simple aeronautical model optimisation problems on the computer using a friendly design framework in Part II. Real life (robust) design applications dealing with UAVs systems or Civil Aircraft and using the EAs and Game Strategies combined material of Part I & Part II are solved and discussed in Part III providing the designer new compromised solutions useful to digital aircraft design and manufacturing. Many details related to Lectures notes Part I, Part II and Part III can be found by the reader in [68].