Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games

In noncooperative cost sharing games, individually strategic agents choose resources based on how the welfare (cost or revenue) generated at each resource (which depends on the set of agents that choose the resource) is distributed. The focus is on finding distribution rules that lead to stable allocations, which is formalized by the concept of Nash equilibrium, e.g., Shapley value (budget-balanced) and marginal contribution (not budget-balanced) rules.

Recent work that seeks to characterize the space of all such rules shows that the only budget-balanced distribution rules that guarantee equilibrium existence in all welfare sharing games are generalized weighted Shapley values (GWSVs), by exhibiting a specific 'worst-case' welfare function which requires that GWSV rules be used. Our work provides an exact characterization of the space of distribution rules (not necessarily budget-balanced) for any specific local welfare functions remains, for a general class of scalable and separable games with well-known applications, e.g., facility location, routing, network formation, and coverage games.

We show that all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to GWSV rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. Therefore, it is neither the existence of some worst-case welfare function, nor the restriction of budget-balance, which limits the design to GWSVs. Also, in order to guarantee equilibrium existence, it is necessary to work within the class of potential games, since GWSVs result in (weighted) potential games.

We also provide an alternative characterization—all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to generalized weighted marginal contribution (GWMC) rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. This result is due to a deeper fundamental connection between Shapley values and marginal contributions that our proofs expose—they are equivalent given a transformation connecting their ground welfare functions. (This connection leads to novel closed-form expressions for the GWSV potential function.) Since GWMCs are more tractable than GWSVs, a designer can tradeoff budget-balance with computational tractability in deciding which rule to implement.

Voting games with incomplete information

We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over each others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting.

Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability of victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems. We find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system vary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize probability of victory.

In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals' preferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that Nash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing a Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then examine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large electorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates, there exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we find that this equilibrium is unique.

Finally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks. Our notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all games with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences between this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium and offer possible extensions of our framework.

Robust Control of Evolutionary Dynamics

The application of principles from evolutionary biology has long been used to gain new insights into the progression and clinical control of both infectious diseases and neoplasms. This iterative evolutionary process consists of expansion, diversification and selection within an adaptive landscape - species are subject to random genetic or epigenetic alterations that result in variations; genetic information is inherited through asexual reproduction and strong selective pressures such as therapeutic intervention can lead to the adaptation and expansion of resistant variants. These principles lie at the center of modern evolutionary synthesis and constitute the primary reasons for the development of resistance and therapeutic failure, but also provide a framework that allows for more effective control.

A model system for studying the evolution of resistance and control of therapeutic failure is the treatment of chronic HIV-1 infection by broadly neutralizing antibody (bNAb) therapy. A relatively recent discovery is that a minority of HIV-infected individuals can produce broadly neutralizing antibodies, that is, antibodies that inhibit infection by many strains of HIV. Passive transfer of human antibodies for the prevention and treatment of HIV-1 infection is increasingly being considered as an alternative to a conventional vaccine. However, recent evolution studies have uncovered that antibody treatment can exert selective pressure on virus that results in the rapid evolution of resistance. In certain cases, complete resistance to an antibody is conferred with a single amino acid substitution on the viral envelope of HIV.

The challenges in uncovering resistance mechanisms and designing effective combination strategies to control evolutionary processes and prevent therapeutic failure apply more broadly. We are motivated by two questions: Can we predict the evolution to resistance by characterizing genetic alterations that contribute to modified phenotypic fitness? Given an evolutionary landscape and a set of candidate therapies, can we computationally synthesize treatment strategies that control evolution to resistance?

To address the first question, we propose a mathematical framework to reason about evolutionary dynamics of HIV from computationally derived Gibbs energy fitness landscapes -- expanding the theoretical concept of an evolutionary landscape originally conceived by Sewall Wright to a computable, quantifiable, multidimensional, structurally defined fitness surface upon which to study complex HIV evolutionary outcomes.

To design combination treatment strategies that control evolution to resistance, we propose a methodology that solves for optimal combinations and concentrations of candidate therapies, and allows for the ability to quantifiably explore tradeoffs in treatment design, such as limiting the number of candidate therapies in the combination, dosage constraints and robustness to error. Our algorithm is based on the application of recent results in optimal control to an HIV evolutionary dynamics model and is constructed from experimentally derived antibody resistant phenotypes and their single antibody pharmacodynamics. This method represents a first step towards integrating principled engineering techniques with an experimentally based mathematical model in the rational design of combination treatment strategies and offers predictive understanding of the effects of combination therapies of evolutionary dynamics and resistance of HIV. Preliminary in vitro studies suggest that the combination antibody therapies predicted by our algorithm can neutralize heterogeneous viral populations despite containing resistant mutations.