Complex Transition to Cooperative Behavior in a Structured Population Model
Contribuinte(s) |
UNIVERSIDADE DE SÃO PAULO |
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Data(s) |
07/11/2013
07/11/2013
2012
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Resumo |
Cooperation plays an important role in the evolution of species and human societies. The understanding of the emergence and persistence of cooperation in those systems is a fascinating and fundamental question. Many mechanisms were extensively studied and proposed as supporting cooperation. The current work addresses the role of migration for the maintenance of cooperation in structured populations. This problem is investigated in an evolutionary perspective through the prisoner's dilemma game paradigm. It is found that migration and structure play an essential role in the evolution of the cooperative behavior. The possible outcomes of the model are extinction of the entire population, dominance of the cooperative strategy and coexistence between cooperators and defectors. The coexistence phase is obtained in the range of large migration rates. It is also verified the existence of a critical level of structuring beyond that cooperation is always likely. In resume, we conclude that the increase in the number of demes as well as in the migration rate favor the fixation of the cooperative behavior. Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnologico (CNPq) Fundacao de Amparo a Ciencia e Tecnologia do Estado de Pernambuco (FACEPE) |
Identificador |
PLOS ONE, SAN FRANCISCO, v. 7, n. 6, e39188, 2012 1932-6203 http://www.producao.usp.br/handle/BDPI/43327 10.1371/journal.pone.0039188 |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
PUBLIC LIBRARY SCIENCE SAN FRANCISCO |
Relação |
PLOS ONE |
Direitos |
openAccess Copyright PUBLIC LIBRARY SCIENCE |
Palavras-Chave | #PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME #SCALE-FREE NETWORKS #EVOLUTIONARY GAMES #MIGRATION #MECHANISM #DECREASE #GRAPHS #MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES |
Tipo |
article original article publishedVersion |