Parallel ruptures: Jews of Bessarabia and Transnistria between Romanian nationalism and Soviet communism, 1918-1940

“Parallel Ruptures: Jews of Bessarabia and Transnistria between Romanian Nationalism and Soviet Communism, 1918-1940,” explores the political and social debates that took place in Jewish communities in Romanian-held Bessarabia and the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic during the interwar era. Both had been part of the Russian Pale of Settlement until its dissolution in 1917; they were then divided by the Romanian Army’s occupation of Bessarabia in 1918 with the establishment of a well-guarded border along the Dniester River between two newly-formed states, Greater Romania and the Soviet Union. At its core, the project focuses in comparative context on the traumatic and multi-faceted confrontation with these two modernizing states: exclusion, discrimination and growing violence in Bessarabia; destruction of religious tradition, agricultural resettlement, and socialist re-education and assimilation in Soviet Transnistria. It examines also the similarities in both states’ striving to create model subjects usable by the homeland, as well as commonalities within Jewish responses on both sides of the border. Contacts between Jews on either side of the border remained significant after 1918 despite the efforts of both states to curb them, thereby necessitating a transnational view in order to examine Jewish political and social life in borderland regions. The desire among Jewish secular leaders to mold their co-religionists into modern Jews reached across state borders and ideological divides and sought to manipulate respective governments to establish these goals, however unsuccessful in the final analysis. Finally, strained relations between Jews in peripheral borderlands with those at national/imperial cores, Moscow and Bucharest, sheds light on the complex circumstances surrounding the inclusion versus exclusion debates at the heart of all interwar European states and the complicated negotiations that took place within all minority communities that responded to state policies.

Empire's Children: Soviet Childhood in the Age of Revolution

Ideas of childhood and citizenship stood at the center of the Soviet Union���s empire-building project during the 1920s and 1930s. After the 1917 Revolution the Bolsheviks were faced with the challenge of establishing a new state structure and governing a vast territory inherited from its tsarist predecessor. In the early years of the Soviet project, new leaders enlisted a cadre of professionals tasked with not only creating the norms of childhood and the everyday, but also implementing policies to modernize habits and values of the empire’s younger citizens. To understand how children became a prime focus of Soviet imperial and ethno-cultural politics, my dissertation employs discourse analysis and compares the ways in which Soviet imperial policies were implemented in two ethnically different regions: the Buddhist Republic of Kalmykia as the colonial case study and Moscow as the Metropole. The current project examines newspapers, treatises, and inspectors’ reports over the span of twenty years. It finds that the Bolsheviks’ initial values and discourses in the realm of children’s education, health, leisure and nutrition, all which were scientifically designed to transform children into ideal Soviet and modern citizens, changed over time as a result of the competing ideologies among local elites and the challenges they faced while intervening in children’s everyday lives. The most significant conclusion in this dissertation reveals that, contrary to previous scholarly arguments, the modernization projects that took place in Moscow and Kalmykia were more similar in the challenges and outcomes that local officials faced when implementing state policies.

Impediments to Cosmopolitan Engagement: Technology and Late-Modern Cosmopolitanism

What characterises late modern variety of cosmopolitanism from its classical predecessors is the inherent connection between cosmopolitanism and technology. Technology enables a vital dimension of the cosmopolitan experience – to move beyond the cosmopolitan imagination to enable active, direct engagement with other cultures. Different types of technologies contribute to cosmopolitan practice but in this paper we focus on a specific set of these enabling technologies: technologies which play a crucial role in regulating the free movement of people and populations. We briefly examine how three of the great surveillance states of the 20th century – Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and the German Democratic Republic – used hightech solutions in pursuing an anti-cosmopolitanism. We suggest that in the period from 2001 to the present, important elements of the cosmopolitan ethos are being closed down, and once again high-tech is intimately connected to this moment. The increasing (and proposed) use of identity cards, biometric identification systems, ITS and GIS all work to make the globalised world much harder to traverse and inhibit the full expression and experience of cosmopolitanism. The result of these trends may be that the type of cosmopolitan sentiment exhibited in western countries is an ersatz, emptied out variety with little political-ethical robustness.

Historical and Personal Perspectives on the Fall of the Berlin Wall, 1989: address to 20th anniversary forums.

The story of the fall of the Berlin Wall was an aspect of the “imagination gap” that we had to wrestle with as journalists covering the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in Europe. It was scarcely possible to believe what you found yourself reporting, and that work became a two-track process. On one hand a mass social movement was dictating the pace and direction of events; on the other, the institutional business of politics as usual, to provide a framework for all the change that was happening, had to be managed – and reported on. In later analyseds we could see, that crisis in the Soviet Union led to the crisis over the Berlin Wall; and from the fall of the Wall, came Germany’s reunification, and with that also, formation of the European Union as it is today. The government of the Federal Republic of Germany convinced its neighbours that a reunited Germany, within an expanded EU, would be a very acceptable “European Germany” -- not the leader of a “German Europe”. It committed itself financially, supporting the new Euro currency. The former communist states of Eastern Europe demanded to join and expand the EU; in order to remove themselves from the Soviet Union, enjoy human rights, and share in Western prosperity. So today, following on from the events of 1989, the European Union is an amalgam of 27 member countries, with close to 500 million citizens and accounting for 30 % of world Gross National Product.

Striving to realise the European idea : judging the news media’s accounts of how the Berlin Wall gave impetus to a new order across Europe

The 1990 European Community was taken by surprise, by the urgency of demands from the newly-elected Eastern European governments to become member countries. Those governments were honouring the mass social movement of the streets, the year before, demanding free elections and a liberal economic system associated with “Europe”. The mass movement had actually been accompanied by much activity within institutional politics, in Western Europe, the former “satellite” states, the Soviet Union and the United States, to set up new structures – with German reunification and an expanded EC as the centre-piece. This paper draws on the writer’s doctoral dissertation on mass media in the collapse of the Eastern bloc, focused on the Berlin Wall – documenting both public protests and institutional negotiations. For example the writer as a correspondent in Europe from that time, recounts interventions of the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, at a European summit in Paris nine days after the “Wall”, and separate negotiations with the French President, Francois Mitterrand -- on the reunification, and EU monetary union after 1992. Through such processes, the “European idea” would receive fresh impetus, though the EU which eventuated, came with many altered expectations. It is argued here that as a result of the shock of 1989, a “social” Europe can be seen emerging, as a shared experience of daily life -- especially among people born during the last two decades of European consolidation. The paper draws on the author’s major research, in four parts: (1) Field observation from the strategic vantage point of a news correspondent. This includes a treatment of evidence at the time, of the wishes and intentions of the mass public (including the unexpected drive to join the European Community), and those of governments, (e.g. thoughts of a “Tienanmen Square solution” in East Berlin, versus the non-intervention policies of the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev). (2) A review of coverage of the crisis of 1989 by major news media outlets, treated as a history of the process. (3) As a comparison, and a test of accuracy and analysis; a review of conventional histories of the crisis appearing a decade later.(4) A further review, and test, provided by journalists responsible for the coverage of the time, as reflection on practice – obtained from semi-structured interviews.

Cities, culture and “Transitional Economies”: Developing cultural industries in St Petersburg

In this chapter I look at some issues around the transfer of cultural industry policy between two very different national contexts, the UK and Russia. Specifically it draws on a partnership project between Manchester and St. Petersburg financed by the European Union as part of a program to promote economic development through knowledge transfer between Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. This specific project attempted to place the cultural industries squarely within the dimension of economic development, and drew on the expertise of Manchester’s Creative Industries Development Service and other partners to effect this policy transfer

Introduction to special issue on what criminology can say about the war on terror

On 20 September 2001, the former US President, George W. Bush, declared what is now widely, and arguably infamously, known as a ‘war on terror’. In response to the fatal 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, DC, President Bush identified the US military response as having far-reaching and long-lasting consequences. It was, he argued, ‘our war on terror’ that began ‘with al Qaeda, but … it will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated’ (CNN 2001). This was to be a war that would, in the words of former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, seek to eliminate a threat that was ‘aimed at the whole democratic world’ (Blair 2001). Blair claimed that this threat is of such magnitude that unprecedented measures would need to be taken to uphold freedom and security. Blair would later admit that it was a war that ‘divided the country’ and was based on evidence ‘about Saddam having actual biological and chemical weapons, as opposed to the capability to develop them, has turned out to be wrong’ (Blair 2004). The failures of intelligence ushered in new political rhetoric in the form of ‘trust me’ because ‘instinct is no science’ (Blair 2004). The war on terror has been one of the most significant international events in the past three decades, alongside the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the end of apartheid in South Africa, the unification of Europe and the marketization of the People's Republic of China. Yet, unlike the other events, it will not be remembered for advancing democracy or sovereignty, but for the conviction politics of particular politicians who chose to dispense with international law and custom in pursuit of personal instincts that proved fatal. Since the invasions of Afghanistan in October 2001 and …

Friend or foe? The impact of the Hawke/Keating neoliberal reforms on Australian workers and the Australian public sector

Over the last three decades neoliberalism has transitioned from occupying the margins of economic policy debate to becoming the dominant approach by governments and their economic advisers, a process that has accelerated with the collapse of the former Stalinist states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This thesis adopts a Marxist framework for understanding this process, beginning as it did in the realm of relatively abstract philosophical and ideological debate to the permeation of neoliberal values throughout all capitalist institutions, including the state bureaucracy. This necessarily means a focus on the dialectical relationship between the rise of neoliberalism and the shifting balance of class forces that accompanied the success of the neoliberal project in transforming the dominant economic policy paradigm. The extent to which neoliberal reforms impacted on workers and public sector institutions, along with the success or otherwise of traditional working class institutions in defending the material interests of workers will therefore be a recurring theme throughout this body of work. The evidence borne from this research and analysis suggests a major shift in the dialectic of class struggle in favour of the power of capital over labour during the period covered, with the neoliberal age being one of defeat for a labour movement that largely failed to adopt successful strategies for defending itself.

Empire, Tourism, Nostalgia: Joseph Brodsky and Travel Writing

Joseph Brodsky, one of the most influential Russian intellectuals of the late Soviet period, was born in Leningrad in 1940, emigrated to the United States in 1972, received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1987, and died in New York City in 1996. Brodsky was one of the leading public figures of Soviet emigration in the Cold War period, and his role as a model for the constructing of Russian cultural identities in the last years of the Soviet Union was, and still is, extremely important. One of Joseph Brodsky’s great contributions to Russian culture of the latter half of the twentieth century is the wide geographical scope of his poetic and prose works. Brodsky was not a travel writer, but he was a traveling writer who wrote a considerable number of poems and essays which relate to his trips and travels in the Soviet empire and outside it. Travel writing offered for Brodsky a discursive space for negotiating his own transculturation, while it also offered him a discursive space for making powerful statements about displacement, culture, history and geography, time and space—all major themes of his poetry. In this study of Joseph Brodsky’s travel writing I focus on his travel texts in poetry and prose, which relate to his post-1972 trips to Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, and Venice. Questions of empire, tourism, and nostalgia are foregrounded in one way or another in Brodsky’s travel writing performed in emigration. I explore these concepts through the study of tropes, strategies of identity construction, and the politics of representation. The theoretical premises of my work draw on the literary and cultural criticism which has evolved around the study of travel and travel writing in recent years. These approaches have gained much from the scholarly experience provided by postcolonial critique. Shifting the focus away from the concept of exile, the traditional framework for scholarly discussions of Brodsky’s works, I propose to review Brodsky’s travel poetry and prose as a response not only to his exilic condition but to the postmodern and postcolonial landscape, which initially shaped the writing of these texts. Discussing Brodsky’s travel writing in this context offers previously unexplored perspectives for analyzing the geopolitical, philosophical, and linguistic premises of his poetic imagination. By situating Brodsky’s travel writing in the geopolitical landscape of postcolonial postmodernity, I attempt to show how Brodsky’s engagement with his contemporary cultural practices in the West was incorporated into his Russian-language travel poetry and prose and how this engagement thus contributed to these texts’ status as exceptional and unique literary events within late Soviet Russian cultural practices.

Imazhinist Mariengof : Dendi. Montazh. Ciniki.

The study is dedicated to the Russian poet and prose writer Anatolii Borisovich Mariengof (1897–1962). Mariengof – “the last dandy of the Republic” – was one of the leaders and main theoreticians in the poetic group of the Russian Imaginists. For his contemporaries, he was an Imaginist par excellence. His Imaginist principles – in theory and practice – are applied to the study of his first fictional novel, Cynics (1928), which served as an epilogue for his Imaginist period (1918–1928). The novel was not published in the Soviet Union until 1988. The method used in the study is a conceptual and literary historical reading, making use of the contemporary semiotic understanding of cultural mechanisms and of intertextual analysis. There are three main concepts used throughout the study: dandy, montage and catachresis. In the first chapter, the history, practice and theory of the Russian Imaginism are analyzed from the point of view of dandyism. The Imaginist theatricalisation of life is juxtaposed with the thematic analysis of their poetry, and Imaginist dandyism appears as a catachrestic category in culture. The second chapter examines the Imaginist poetic theory. It is discussed in the context of the montage principle, defining the post-revolutionary culture in Soviet Russia. The Imaginist montage can be divided into three main theoretical paradigms: S. Yesenin’s “technical montage” (reminiscent of Dadaist collage), V. Shershenevich’s “nominative montage” (catalogues of images) and Anatolii Mariengof’s “catachrestic montage”. The final chapter deals with Mariengof’s first fictional novel, Cynics. The study begins with the complex history of publication of the novel, as well as its relation to the Imaginist poetic principles and to the history of the poetic movement. Cynics is, essentially, an Imaginist montage novel. The fragmentary play of the fictional and the documentary material follows the Imaginist montage principle. The chapter concludes in a thematic analysis of the novel, concentrating on the description of the October Revolution in Cynics.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Meillä ei ole ikuisia ystäviä eikä ikuisia vihollisia. Ikuisia ovat meidän omat etumme. : Suomen suhteet Kiinan kansantasavaltaan 1949 - 1989

"We have neither Eternal Friends nor Eternal Enemies. We have only Eternal Interests .Finland's Relations with China 1949-1989 The study focuses on the relations between Finland and the People s Republic of China from 1949-1989 and examines how a small country became embroiled in international politics, and how, at the same time, international politics affected Finnish-Chinese relations and Finland s China policy formulation. The study can be divided into three sections: relations during the early years, 1949-1960, before the Chinese and Soviet rift became public; the relations during the passive period during the 1960s and 1970s; and the impact of China s Open Door policy on Finland s China policy from 1978-1989. The diplomatically challenging events around Tiananmen Square and the reactions which followed in Finland bring the study to a close. Finland was among the first Western countries to recognise the People s Republic and to establish diplomatic relations with her, thereby giving Finland an excellent position from which to further develop good relations. Finland was also the first Western country to sign a trade agreement with China. These two factors meant that Finland was able to enjoy a special status with China during the 1950s. The special status was further strengthened by the systematic support of the government of Finland for China's UN membership. The solid reputation earned in the 1950s had to carry Finland all the way through to the 1980s. For the two decades in between, during the passive policy period of the 1960s and 1970s, relations between Finland and the Soviet Union also determined the state of foreign relations with China. Interestingly, however, it appeared that President Urho Kekkonen was encouraged by Ambassador Joel Toivola to envisage a more proactive policy towards China, but the Cultural Revolution cut short any such plan for nearly twenty years. Because of the Soviet Union, Finland held on to her passive China policy, even though no such message was ever received from the Soviet Union. In fact, closer relationships between Finland and China were encouraged through diplomatic channels. It was not until the presidency of Mauno Koivisto that the first high-level ministerial visit was made to China when, in 1984, Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen visited the People s Republic. Finnish-Chinese relations were lifted to a new level. Foreign Minister Väyrynen, however, was forced to remove the prejudices of the Chinese. In 1985, when the Speaker of the Finnish Parliament, Erkki Pystynen visited China he also discovered that Finland s passive China policy had caused misunderstandings amongst the Chinese politicians. The number of exchanges escalated in the wake of the ground-breaking visit by Foreign Minister Väyrynen: Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa visited China in 1986 and President Koivisto did so in 1988. President Koivisto stuck to practical, China-friendly policies: his correspondence with Li Peng, the attitude taken by the Finnish government after the Tiananmen Square events and the subsequent choices made by his administration all pointed to a new era in relations with China.

Salaiset aseveljet : Suomen ja Saksan turvallisuuspoliisiyhteistyö 1933-1944

Salaiset aseveljet deals with the relations and co-operation between Finnish and German security police authorities, the Finnish valtiollinen poliisi and the German Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) and its predecessors. The timeframe for the research stretches from the Nazi seizure of power in 1933 to the end of German-Finnish co-belligerency in 1944. The Finnish Security Police was founded in 1919 to protect the young Finnish Republic from the Communists both in Finland and in Soviet Russia. Professional ties to German colleagues were maintained during the 1920 s, and quickly re-established after the Nazis rose to power in Germany. Typical forms of co-operation concentrated on the fight against both domestic and international Communism, a concern particularly acute in Finland because of her exposed position as a neighbour to the Soviet Union. The common enemy proved to be a powerful unifying concept. During the 1930 s the forms of co-operation developed from regular and routine exchanges of information into personal acquaintancies between the Finnish Security Police top personnel and the highest SS-leadership. The critical period of German-Finnish security police co-operation began in 1941, as Finland joined the German assault on the Soviet Union. Together with the Finnish Security Police, the RSHA set up a previously unknown special unit, the Einsatzkommando Finnland, entrusted with the destruction of the perceived ideological and racial enemies on the northernmost part of the German Eastern Front. Joint actions in northern Finland led also members of the Finnish Security Police to become participants in mass murders of Communists and Jews. Post-war criminal investigations into war crimes cases involving former security police personnel were invariably stymied because of the absence of usually both the suspects and the evidence. In my research I have sought to combine the evidence gathered through an exhaustive study of Finnish Security Police archival material with a wide selection of foreign sources. Important new evidence has been gathered from archives in Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden and the United States. Piece by piece, it has become possible to draw a comprehensive picture of the ultimately fateful relationship of the Finnish Security Police to its mighty German colleague.

Ranskan rooli ja asema läntisessä liittoutumassa neljännen ja viidennen tasavallan vaihtumakohdassa 1956-1958

The study discusses the position of France as the United States’ ally in NATO in 1956-1958. The concrete position of France and the role that it was envisioned to have are being treated from the point of view of three participants of the Cold War: France, the United States and the Soviet Union. How did these different parties perceive the question and did these views change when the French Fourth Republic turned into the Fifth in 1958? The study is based on published French and American documents of Foreign Affairs. Because of problems with accessibility to the Soviet archival sources, the study uses reports on France-NATO relations of Pravda newspaper, the official organ of the Communist Party of the USSR, to provide information about how the Soviet side saw the question. Due to the nature and use of source material, and the chronological structure of the work, the study belongs methodologically to the research field of History of International Relations. As distinct from political scientists’ field of research, more prone to theorize, the study is characteristically a historical research, a work based on qualitative method and original sources that aims at creating a coherent narrative of the views expressed during the period covered by the study. France’s road to a full membership of NATO is being treated on the basis of research literature, after which discussions about France’s position in the Western Alliance are being chronologically traced for the period of last years of the Fourth Republic and the immediate months of coming back to power of Charles de Gaulle. Right from the spring of 1956 there can be seen aspirations of France, on one hand, to maintain her freedom of action inside the Western Alliance and, on the other, to widen the dialogue between the allies. The decision on France’s own nuclear deterrent was made already during the Fourth Republic, when it was thought to become part of NATO’s common defence. This was to change with de Gaulle. The USA felt that France still fancied herself as a great power and that she could not participate in full in NATO’s common defence because of her colonies. The Soviet Union saw the concrete position of France in the Alliance as in complete dependence on the USA, but her desired role was expressed largely in “Gaullist” terms. The expressions used by the General and the Soviet propaganda were close to each other, but the Soviet Union could not support de Gaulle without endangering the position of the French Communist Party. Between the Fourth and Fifth Republics no great rupture in content took place concerning the views of France’s role and position in the Western Alliance. The questions posed by de Gaulle had been expressed during the whole period of Fourth Republic’s existence. Instead, along with the General the weight and rhetoric of these questions saw a great change. Already in the early phase the Americans saw it possible that with de Gaulle, France would try to change her role. The rupture took place in the form of expression, rather than in its content.

U.S. Asylum Policy and the New World Order

"In the new world order, differences in political ideology have given way to differences in economic conditions between nation states as the prompting force for the outflow of would-be refugees and asylum seekers. In part, these pressures are associated with the political disintegration of the poorer republics of the former Soviet Union and its former satellite nations into ethnic enclaves. But the most endemic of the new contributory pressures are emanating from North-South economic differences between the "have" and "have-not" nations."