Strategic argumentation: A game theoretical investigation

Argumentation is modelled as a game where the payoffs are measured in terms of the probability that the claimed conclusion is, or is not, defeasibly provable, given a history of arguments that have actually been exchanged, and given the probability of the factual premises. The probability of a conclusion is calculated using a standard variant of Defeasible Logic, in combination with standard probability calculus. It is a new element of the present approach that the exchange of arguments is analysed with game theoretical tools, yielding a prescriptive and to some extent even predictive account of the actual course of play. A brief comparison with existing argument-based dialogue approaches confirms that such a prescriptive account of the actual argumentation has been almost lacking in the approaches proposed so far.

The Modified Card Sorting Test: Test-retest stability and relationships with demographic variables in a healthy older adult sample

Objectives. To investigate the test-retest stability of a standardized version of Nelson's (1976) Modified Card Sorting Test (MCST) and its relationships with demographic variables in a sample of healthy older adults. Design. A standard card order and administration were devised for the MCST and administered to participants at an initial assessment, and again at a second session conducted a minimum of six months later in order to examine its test-retest stability. Participants were also administered the WAIS-R at initial assessment in order to provide a measure of psychometric intelligence. Methods. Thirty-six (24 female, 12 male) healthy older adults aged 52 to 77 years with mean education 12.42 years (SD = 3.53) completed the MCST on two occasions approximately 7.5 months (SD = 1.61) apart. Stability coefficients and test-retest differences were calculated for the range of scores. The effect of gender on MCST performance was examined. Correlations between MCST scores and age, education and WAIS-R IQs were also determined. Results. Stability coefficients ranged from .26 for the percent perseverative errors measure to .49 for the failure to maintain set measure. Several measures were significantly correlated with age, education and WAIS-R IQs, although no effect of gender on MCST performance was found. Conclusions. None of the stability coefficients reached the level required for clinical decision making. The results indicate that participants' age, education, and intelligence need to be considered when interpreting MCST performance. Normative studies of MCST performance as well as further studies with patients with executive dysfunction are needed.

Inter-subband redundancy prediction using neural network for video coding

High performance video codec is mandatory for multimedia applications such as video-on-demand and video conferencing. Recent research has proposed numerous video coding techniques to meet the requirement in bandwidth, delay, loss and Quality-of-Service (QoS). In this paper, we present our investigations on inter-subband self-similarity within the wavelet-decomposed video frames using neural networks, and study the performance of applying the spatial network model to all video frames over time. The goal of our proposed method is to restore the highest perceptual quality for video transmitted over a highly congested network. Our contributions in this paper are: (1) A new coding model with neural network based, inter-subband redundancy (ISR) prediction for video coding using wavelet (2) The performance of 1D and 2D ISR prediction, including multiple levels of wavelet decompositions. Our result shows a short-term quality enhancement may be obtained using both 1D and 2D ISR prediction.

The game to play: expanding the co-opetition proposal through the strategic games matrix

Purpose - Using Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s 1995 co-opetition model as a reference, the purpose of this paper is to seek to develop a tool that, based on the tenets of classical game theory, would enable scholars and managers to identify which games may be played in response to the different conflict of interest situations faced by companies in their business environments. Design/methodology/approach - The literature on game theory and business strategy are reviewed and a conceptual model, the strategic games matrix (SGM), is developed. Two novel games are described and modeled. Findings - The co-opetition model is not sufficient to realistically represent most of the conflict of interest situations faced by companies. It seeks to address this problem through development of the SGM, which expands upon Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s model by providing a broader perspective, through incorporation of an additional dimension (power ratio between players) and three novel, respectively, (rival, individualistic, and associative). Practical implications - This proposed model, based on the concepts of game theory, should be used to train decision- and policy-makers to better understand, interpret and formulate conflict management strategies. Originality/value - A practical and original tool to use game models in conflict of interest situations is generated. Basic classical games, such as Nash, Stackelberg, Pareto, and Minimax, are mapped on the SGM to suggest in which situations they Could be useful. Two innovative games are described to fit four different types of conflict situations that so far have no corresponding game in the literature. A test application of the SGM to a classic Intel Corporation strategic management case, in the complex personal computer industry, shows that the proposed method is able to describe, to interpret, to analyze, and to prescribe optimal competitive and/or cooperative strategies for each conflict of interest situation.

A note on the multiple partners assignment game

In the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1972. The assignment game. I. The core, International journal of Game Theory 1, 11-130] agents are allowed to form one partnership at most. That paper proves that, in the context of firms and workers, given two stable payoffs for the firms there is a stable payoff which gives each firm the larger of the two amounts and also one which gives each of them the smaller amount. Analogous result applies to the workers. Sotomayor [Sotomayor, M., 1992. The multiple partners game. In: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Dynamics and Equilibrium: Essays in Honor to D. Gale. Mcmillian, pp. 322-336] extends this analysis to the case where both types of agents may form more than one partnership and an agent`s payoff is multi-dimensional. Instead, this note concentrates in the total payoff of the agents. It is then proved the rather unexpected result that again the maximum of any pair of stable payoffs for the firms is stable but the minimum need not be, even if we restrict the multiplicity of partnerships to one of the sides. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game

Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the excess demand and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which set of sellers should those transfers be made is the key issue in the description of the algorithm. We assume additively separable utilities and introduce a novel distinction by considering multiple sellers owing multiple identical objects and multiple buyers with an exogenously defined quota, consuming more than one object but at most one unit of a seller`s good and having multi-dimensional payoffs. This distinction induces a necessarily more complicated construction of the over-demanded sets than the constructions of these sets for the other assignment games. For this approach, our mechanism yields the buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff, which equals the buyer-optimal stable payoff. The symmetry of the model allows to getting the seller-optimal stable payoff and the seller-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff can then be also derived.

Prospective randomized trial of EUS versus ERCP-guided common bile duct stone removal: an interim report (with video)

Background: EUS is being increasingly utilized for the diagnosis of choledocholithiasis and microlithiasis, especially in patients with biliary colic. Simultaneously, there is also a rising interest in the use of EUS for therapeutic interventions. Objectives: Our goal was to assess the effectiveness of EUS-directed common bile duct (CBD) stone removal to compare its safety and effectiveness with ERCP-directed intervention. Design: interim results of a prospective, randomized, single-center blinded clinical trial. Setting: A single tertiary care referral center. Patients: Fifty-two patients with uncomplicated CBD stones were prospectively randomized to CBD cannulation and stone removal under EUS or ERCP guidance. Main Outcome Measurements and Interventions: Primary outcome measure was the rate of successful cannulation of the CBD. Secondary Outcome measures included Successful removal of stones and overall complication rates. Results: CBD cannulation followed by stone extraction was successful in 23 of 26 patients (88.5%) in the EUS group (1) versus 25 of 26 patients (96.2%) in the ERCP group (11) (95% CI, -27.65%, 9.88%). Overall, there were 3 complications in the EUS group and 4 complications in the ERCP group. Limitation: The current study is an interim report from a single center report and performed by a single operator. Conclusions: Our preliminary analysis indicates that Outcomes following EUS-guided CBD stone retrieval are equivalent to those following ERCP EUS-related adverse events are similar to those following ERCP. ERCP and EUS-guided stone retrieval appears to be equally effective for therapeutic interventions of the bile duct. Additional studies are required to validate these preliminary results and to determine predictors of success of EUS-guided stone removal. (Gastrointest Endosc 2009;69:238-43.)

Executive dysfunction in children and adolescents with temporal lobe epilepsy: Is the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test enough?

The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) is the gold standard in the evaluation of executive dysfunction (ED) in patients with temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE). We evaluated 35 children with TLE and 25 healthy controls with the WCST and with a more comprehensive battery. Among the children with TLE, 77.14% showed impairment on the WCST. On other tests (Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Digit Forward, Matching Familiar Figures Test, Trail Making Test, Word Fluency, Finger Windows, and Number-Letter Memory), impairment was demonstrated in 94.29%. The authors concluded that the WCST is a good paradigm to measure executive impairment in children with TLE: however, it may be not enough. Evaluation performed only with the WCST not only underestimated the number of patients with ED, but also missed relevant information regarding the type of ED. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.