Strategic argumentation: A game theoretical investigation


Autoria(s): Roth, Bram; Riveret, Regis; Rotolo, Antonino; Governatori, Guido
Contribuinte(s)

Radboud Winkels

Anne Gardner

Data(s)

01/01/2007

Resumo

Argumentation is modelled as a game where the payoffs are measured in terms of the probability that the claimed conclusion is, or is not, defeasibly provable, given a history of arguments that have actually been exchanged, and given the probability of the factual premises. The probability of a conclusion is calculated using a standard variant of Defeasible Logic, in combination with standard probability calculus. It is a new element of the present approach that the exchange of arguments is analysed with game theoretical tools, yielding a prescriptive and to some extent even predictive account of the actual course of play. A brief comparison with existing argument-based dialogue approaches confirms that such a prescriptive account of the actual argumentation has been almost lacking in the approaches proposed so far.

Identificador

http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:13620/icail.pdf

http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:13620

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

The Association for Computing Machinery

Palavras-Chave #Defeasible logic #Game theory #Normative reasoning #Argumentation #Probability #280213 Other Artificial Intelligence #230201 Probability Theory #390302 Jurisprudence and Legal Theory
Tipo

Conference Paper