Strategic argumentation: A game theoretical investigation
Contribuinte(s) |
Radboud Winkels Anne Gardner |
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Data(s) |
01/01/2007
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Resumo |
Argumentation is modelled as a game where the payoffs are measured in terms of the probability that the claimed conclusion is, or is not, defeasibly provable, given a history of arguments that have actually been exchanged, and given the probability of the factual premises. The probability of a conclusion is calculated using a standard variant of Defeasible Logic, in combination with standard probability calculus. It is a new element of the present approach that the exchange of arguments is analysed with game theoretical tools, yielding a prescriptive and to some extent even predictive account of the actual course of play. A brief comparison with existing argument-based dialogue approaches confirms that such a prescriptive account of the actual argumentation has been almost lacking in the approaches proposed so far. |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
The Association for Computing Machinery |
Palavras-Chave | #Defeasible logic #Game theory #Normative reasoning #Argumentation #Probability #280213 Other Artificial Intelligence #230201 Probability Theory #390302 Jurisprudence and Legal Theory |
Tipo |
Conference Paper |