A note on the multiple partners assignment game


Autoria(s): FAGEBAUME, Alexis; GALE, David; SOTOMAYOR, Marilda
Contribuinte(s)

UNIVERSIDADE DE SÃO PAULO

Data(s)

19/10/2012

19/10/2012

2010

Resumo

In the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1972. The assignment game. I. The core, International journal of Game Theory 1, 11-130] agents are allowed to form one partnership at most. That paper proves that, in the context of firms and workers, given two stable payoffs for the firms there is a stable payoff which gives each firm the larger of the two amounts and also one which gives each of them the smaller amount. Analogous result applies to the workers. Sotomayor [Sotomayor, M., 1992. The multiple partners game. In: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Dynamics and Equilibrium: Essays in Honor to D. Gale. Mcmillian, pp. 322-336] extends this analysis to the case where both types of agents may form more than one partnership and an agent`s payoff is multi-dimensional. Instead, this note concentrates in the total payoff of the agents. It is then proved the rather unexpected result that again the maximum of any pair of stable payoffs for the firms is stable but the minimum need not be, even if we restrict the multiplicity of partnerships to one of the sides. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

CNPq Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnologico, Brazil

Identificador

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, v.46, n.4, p.388-392, 2010

0304-4068

http://producao.usp.br/handle/BDPI/20485

10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.014

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.014

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA

Relação

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Direitos

restrictedAccess

Copyright ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA

Palavras-Chave #Assignment #Matching #Stability #Stable payoff #Stable imputation #Lattice #Economics #Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications #Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods
Tipo

article

original article

publishedVersion