Seltsame Kaempfer der Neuzeit : Ein Essay und Hörspiel.

Annotated typescript of a radio play about Jewish history from 1492 to the 19th century; philosophers - Moses Mendelssohn and others - striving for right, justice, and humanity.

Policing expert testimony in a death investigation: Medical opinion as legal fact

Within coronial investigations, pathologists are called upon to given evidence as to cause of death. This evidence is given great weight by the coroners; after all, scientific ‘truth’ is widely deemed to be far more reliable than legal ‘opinion’. The purpose of this paper is to examine the ontological and epistemological status of that evidence, from the perspectives of both the pathologists and the coroners. As part of an Australian Research Council Linkage Grant, interviews were conducted with seven pathologists and 10 coroners from within the Queensland coronial system. Contrary to expectations, and the work of philosophers of science, such as Feyerabend (1975), pathologists did not present their findings in terms of unequivocal facts or objective truths relating to causes of death. Rather, their evidence was largely presented as ‘educated opinion’ based upon ‘the weight of evidence’. It was actually the coroners who translated that opinion into ‘medical fact’ within the proceedings of their death investigations, arguably as a consequence of the administrative necessity to reach a clear-cut finding as to cause of death, and on the basis of their own understanding of the ontology of medical knowledge. These findings support Latour’s (2010) claim that law requires a fundamentally different epistemology to science, and that science is not entirely to blame for the extravagant truth-claims made on its behalf

Mikä on ihme ja mitä ihmeistä voidaan tietää? : Keskustelu ihmeistä uusimmassa englanninkielisessä uskonnonfilosofiassa

What is a miracle and what can we know about miracles? A discussion of miracles in anglophone philosophy of religion literature since the late 1960s. The aim of this study is to systematically describe and philosophically examine the anglophone discussion on the subject of miracles since the latter half of the 1960s. The study focuses on two salient questions: firstly, what I will term the conceptual-ontological question of the extent to which we can understand miracles and, secondly, the epistemological question of what we can know about miracles. My main purpose in this study is to examine the various viewpoints that have been submitted in relation to these questions, how they have been argued and on what presuppositions these arguments have been based. In conducting the study, the most salient dimension of the various discussions was found to relate to epistemological questions. In this regard, there was a notable confrontation between those scholars who accept miracles and those who are sceptical of them. On the conceptual-ontological side I recognised several different ways of expressing the concept of miracle . I systematised the discussion by demonstrating the philosophical boundaries between these various opinions. The first and main boundary was related to ontological knowledge. On one side of this boundary I placed the views which were based on realism and objectivism. The proponents of this view assumed that miraculousness is a real property of a miraculous event regardless of how we can perceive it. On the other side I put the views which tried to define miraculousness in terms of subjectivity, contextuality and epistemicity. Another essential boundary which shed light on the conceptual-ontological discussion was drawn in relation to two main views of nature. The realistic-particularistic view regards nature as a certain part of reality. The adherents of this presupposition postulate a supernatural sphere alongside nature. Alternatively, the nominalist-universalist view understands nature without this kind of division. Nature is understood as the entire and infinite universe; the whole of reality. Other, less important boundaries which shed light on the conceptual-ontological discussion were noted in relation to views regarding the laws of nature, for example. I recognised that the most important differences between the epistemological approaches were in the different views of justification, rationality, truth and science. The epistemological discussion was divided into two sides, distinguished by their differing assumptions in relation to the need for evidence. Adherents of the first (and noticeably smaller) group did not see any epistemological need to reach a universal and common opinion about miracles. I discovered that these kinds of views, which I called non-objectivist, had subjectivist and so-called collectivist views of justification and a contextualist view of rationality. The second (and larger) group was mainly interested in discerning the grounds upon which to establish an objective and conclusive common view in relation to the epistemology of miracles. I called this kind of discussion an objectivist discussion and this kind of approach an evidentialist approach. Most of the evidentialists tried to defend miracles and the others attempted to offer evidence against miracles. Amongst both sides, there were many different variations according to emphasis and assumption over how they saw the possibilities to prove their own view. The common characteristic in all forms of evidentialism was a commitment to an objectivist notion of rationality and a universalistic notion of justification. Most evidentialists put their confidence in science in one way or another. Only a couple of philosophers represented the most moderate version of evidentialism; they tried to remove themselves from the apparent controversy and contextualised the different opinions in order to make some critical comments on them. I called this kind of approach a contextualising form of evidentialism. In the final part of the epistemological chapter, I examined the discussion about the evidential value of miracles, but nothing substantially new was discovered concerning the epistemological views of the authors.

Moral expansiveness: Examining variability in the extension of the moral world

The nature of our moral judgments—and the extent to which we treat others with care—depend in part on the distinctions we make between entities deemed worthy or unworthy of moral consideration— our moral boundaries. Philosophers, historians, and social scientists have noted that people’s moral boundaries have expanded over the last few centuries, but the notion of moral expansiveness has received limited empirical attention in psychology. This research explores variations in the size of individuals’ moral boundaries using the psychological construct of moral expansiveness and introduces the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES), designed to capture this variation. Across 6 studies, we established the reliability, convergent validity, and predictive validity of the MES. Moral expansiveness was related (but not reducible) to existing moral constructs (moral foundations, moral identity, “moral” universalism values), predictors of moral standing (moral patiency and warmth), and other constructs associated with concern for others (empathy, identification with humanity, connectedness to nature, and social responsibility). Importantly, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to engage in prosocial intentions and behaviors at personal cost independently of these established constructs. Specifically, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to prioritize humanitarian and environmental concerns over personal and national self-interest, willingness to sacrifice one’s life to save others (ranging from human out-groups to animals and plants), and volunteering behavior. Results demonstrate that moral expansiveness is a distinct and important factor in understanding moral judgments and their consequences.

Ethics and Aesthetics : Intersections in Iris Murdoch's Philosophy

The study addresses the question concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in the philosophy of Iris Murdoch. The main argument is that Murdoch s philosophy cannot be accurately understood without an understanding of the relationship she sees between the aesthetic experience and morality. Reading Murdoch s philosophy with this relationship in mind shows that it must be considered as a relevant alternative to the main forms of aesthetic-ethical theories. The study consists of seven previously published articles and a summary. It shows that Murdoch belongs to a tradition of philosophers who seek to broaden the scope of ethics by reference to aesthetic value and aesthetic experience. She sees an attitude responsible for aesthetic experiences as relevant for morality. However, she does not collapse morality into aesthetic experience. The two meet on the level of the subject s attitude towards its object, but there is a distinction between the experiences that accompany the attitudes. Aesthetic experiences can function as a clue to morals in that they present in a pleasing manner moral truths which otherwise might be psychologically too difficult to face. Murdoch equates the aesthetic attitude with virtuous love characterized by unselfish attention to its object. The primary object of such love is in Murdoch s account another human individual in her particularity. She compares the recognition of the other person as a particular existence to the experience of the Kantian sublime and offers her own version of the true sublime which is the experience of awe in the face of the infinity of the task of understanding others. One of the most central claims in Murdoch s philosophy is that human consciousness is evaluatively structured. This claim challenges the distinction between facts and values which has had an immense influence on modern moral philosophy. One argument with which Murdoch supports her claim is the nature of great literature. According to her, the standard of greatness in literature is the authors awareness of the independent existence of individuals in the particularity of their evaluative consciousnesses. The analysis of the standard of greatness in literature is also Murdoch s only argument for the claim that the primary object of the loving unselfish attention is the other particular individual. She is convinced that great literature reveals a deep truth about the human condition with its capacity to capture the particular. Abstract philo¬sophical discourse cannot compete with this capacity but it should take truths revealed by literature seriously in its theorising. Recognising this as Murdoch s stand on the question of the relation between philosophy and literature as forms of human discourse settles whether she is part of what has been called philosophy s turn to literature. The answer is yes.

Ethical Values and the Integrity of the Climate Change Regime

This book investigates the ethical values that inform the global carbon integrity system, and reflects on alternative norms that could or should do so. The global carbon integrity system comprises the emerging international architecture being built to respond to the climate change. This architecture can be understood as an 'integrity system'- an inter-related set of institutions, governance arrangements, regulations and practices that work to ensure the system performs its role faithfully and effectively. This volume investigates the ways ethical values impact on where and how the integrity system works, where it fails, and how it can be improved. With a wide array of perspectives across many disciplines, including ethicists, philosophers, lawyers, governance experts and political theorists, the chapters seek to explore the positive values driving the global climate change processes, to offer an understanding of the motivations justifying the creation of the regime and the way that social norms impact upon the operation of the integrity system. The collection focuses on the nexus between ideal ethics and real-world implementation through institutions and laws. The book will be of interest to policy makers, climate change experts, carbon taxation regulators, academics, legal practitioners and researchers.

Onko eläimillä oikeuksia? : Eläinkoelainsäädännön kehitys ja nykytila

The use of animals in scientific experiments tends to arouse strong emotional reactions among the general public, the most essential concern being the pain and suffering they cause. It is felt that suffering inflicted on other beings, including animals, is not morally acceptable. Is the function of a researcher who uses animals morally acceptable and beneficial for humans and animals? May such a researcher him/herself decide what animal experiments he/she can perform or should some outsider have the right to decide what kind of experiments a researcher can or cannot perform? The research material comprises the legislation of Finland and that of some member and non-member states of the European Union, together with European Union directives and pertinent preparatory parliamentary documents. The author has likewise studied the vast literature on animal rights, both pro and contra writings and opinions. The opinions of philosophers on the moral and legal rights of animals are markedly conflicting. Some strongly support the existence of rights, while others totally refute such an opinion, claiming that the question is only of the moral principles of man himself which imply that animals must be treated in a human manner. Speaking of animal rights only tends to muddle ideas on the one hand in philosophical considerations and in legal analyses on the other. The development of legislation in Finland and some other member states of the European Union has in principle been similar. In Finland, the positive laws on animal experiments nowadays comply with the EU directive 86/609/EEC. However, there are marked differences between member states in respect of the way they have in practice implemented the principles of the EU directive. No essential alterations have in practice been discernible in the actual performance of animal experiments during the decades when legislation has been developed in different countries. Self-regulation within the scientific community has been markedly more effectual than legislative procedures. Legal regulation has nevertheless clearly influenced the quality of breeding and life conditions of experimental laboratory animals, cages for example being nowadays larger than hitherto. EU parliament and council have now accepted in September 2010 a new directive on animal experiments which must be implemented in the national legislations by January 1, 2013.

Philosophy as a Path to Happiness : Attainment of Happiness in Arabic Peripatetic and Ismaili Philosophy

The aim of the dissertation is to explore the idea of philosophy as a path to happiness in classical Arabic philosophy. The starting point is in comparison of two distinct currents between the 10th and early 11th centuries, Peripatetic philosophy, represented by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, and Ismaili philosophy represented by al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity. They initially offer two contrasting views about philosophy in that the attitude of the Peripatetics is rationalistic and secular in spirit, whereas for the Ismailis philosophy represents the esoteric truth behind revelation. Still, they converge in their view that the ultimate purpose of philosophy lies in its ability to lead man towards happiness. Moreover, they share a common concept of happiness as a contemplative ideal of human perfection, which refers primarily to an otherworldly state of the soul s ascent to the spiritual world. For both the way to happiness consists of two parts: theory and practice. The practical part manifests itself in the idea of the purification of the rational soul from its bodily attachments in order for it to direct its attention fully to the contemplative life. Hence, there appears an ideal of philosophical life with the goal of relative detachment from the worldly life. The regulations of the religious law in this context appear as the primary means for the soul s purification, but for all but al-Kirmānī they are complemented by auxiliary philosophical practices. The ascent to happiness, however, takes place primarily through the acquisition of theoretical knowledge. The saving knowledge consists primarily of the conception of the hierarchy of physical and metaphysical reality, but all of philosophy forms a curriculum through which the soul gradually ascends towards a spiritual state of being along an order that is inverse to the Neoplatonic emanationist hierarchy of creation. For Ismaili philosophy the ascent takes place from the exoteric religious sciences towards the esoteric philosophical knowledge. For Peripatetic philosophers logic performs the function of an instrument enabling the ascent, mathematics is treated either as propaedeutic to philosophy or as a mediator between physical and metaphysical knowledge, whereas physics and metaphysics provide the core of knowledge necessary for the attainment of happiness.

Hyveiden harjoittaminen : edellytykset ja esteet

In the first half of the 20th century, most moral philosophers took the concept of virtue to be secondary to moral principles or emotions, though in various and mutually conflicting ways. In the early 1960s interest in the virtues was restored by the analytic philosophers Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, the younger colleagues and friends of the late Wittgenstein. Later, Alasdair MacIntyre became a leading virtue ethicist. In 1981, MacIntyre introduced in After Virtue the concept of practices, which he based on the Aristotelian distinction between praxis and poiesis. This dissertation examines MacIntyre s characterization of the interconnectedness between practices and virtues, especially in relation to skills, education, and certain emotions. The primary position of the virtues is defended against the tendency in modern moral philosophy to overemphasize the role either of principles and rules or of emotions. The view according to which rational action and acting according to the virtues is best conceptualized as following rules or principles is criticized by arguments that are grounded by some Wittgensteinian observations, and that can be characterized as transcendental. Even if the virtues cannot be defined by, and are not based entirely on, emotions, the role of certain emotions on the learning and education of skills and virtues are studied more carefully than by MacIntyre. In the cases of resentment, indignation, and shame, the analysis of Peter Strawson is utilized, and in the case of regret, the analysis of Bernard Williams. Williams analysis of regret and moral conflict concludes in a kind of antirealism, which this study criticizes. Where education of practices and skills and the related reactive emotions are examined as conditions of learning and practicing the virtues, institutions and ideologies are examined as obstacles and threats to the virtues. This theme is studied through Karl Marx s conception of alienation and Karl Polanyi s historical and sociological research concerning the great transformation . The study includes six Finnish-published articles carrying the titles Our negative attitudes towards other persons , Authority and upbringing , Moral conflicts, regret and ethical realism , Practices and institutions , Doing justice as condition to communal action: a transcendental argument for justice as virtue , and Alienation from practices in capitalist society: Alasdair MacIntyre s Marxist Aristotelianism . The introductory essay sums up the themes of the articles and presents some central issues of virtue ethics by relating the classical Socratic questions to Aristotelian practical philosophy, as well as to current controversies in metaethics and moral psychology.

Valistus suomalaisessa kirjakulttuurissa 1700-luvulla

The dissertation discusses the history of the book and the Enlightenment in Finland by studying the reception and diffusion of eighteenth-century books and by approaching the discourse on the Enlightenment in Finnish source material. The methods used relate to historian Robert Darnton s studies on eighteenth-century print culture and his analyses of the relations between print culture and society. The study is based on diverse eighteenth-century sources: books, pamphlets and dissertations, bibliographies, book auction protocols, parliamentary documents, estate inventory deeds, newspapers, letters, lectures, memoirs and commonplace books. By the end of the eighteenth century, book production had increased and secular literature had begun to challenge the dominance of religious literature. The books of the Enlightenment belonged to the new literature that found its way into Finnish book collections previously dominated by religious literature. Enlightenment literature is not a set selection of books but rather diverse works from different genres. Thus the study introduces a variety of printed material, from philosophical tracts and textbooks to novels and pornography. In the case of books of the Enlightenment, the works of French Voltaire and German Christian Wolff were among the most widely read and circulated books in Finland. First and foremost, the Enlightenment was an era of intellectual debate. These debates carried strong criticism of the prevailing systems of thought. Enlightenment ideas challenged the Lutheran society of Sweden and especially its sense of conformity. Contemporaries saw many of the books of the Enlightenment as vessels of new ideas and criticism. Furthermore, this kind of print material was interpreted as being dangerous for uneducated readers. Belonging to a certain estate and social class had a major impact on individuals reading habits and their acquisition of books. One specific social group stands out in the Finnish source material: the officers at the Sveaborg naval fortress possessed and distributed Enlightenment books more than the members of any other social class. Other essential social groups were scholars, the nobility and the clergy, who took part in debates concerning the ideas and benefits of the Enlightenment. In the Finnish debates at the time, the concept of Enlightenment involved three primary notions. Firstly, it referred to the French philosophers, les philosophes, and to their works as well as to the social changes that took place during the French revolution. It also carried the idea of philosophical light or the light of reason, in a sense similar to Immanuel Kant s writings. Most importantly, it referred to a belief in progress and to a trust in true knowledge that would supercede ignorance and fanaticism. Hence, it is impossible to speak about the Enlightenment era in the Swedish realm without such concepts as reason, benefit or progress. These concepts likewise marked the books of the Enlightenment in eighteenth-century Finland.

A new methodology for analyzing distributed systems modeled by petri nets

Distributed computing systems can be modeled adequately by Petri nets. The computation of invariants of Petri nets becomes necessary for proving the properties of modeled systems. This paper presents a two-phase, bottom-up approach for invariant computation and analysis of Petri nets. In the first phase, a newly defined subnet, called the RP-subnet, with an invariant is chosen. In the second phase, the selected RP-subnet is analyzed. Our methodology is illustrated with two examples viz., the dining philosophers' problem and the connection-disconnection phase of a transport protocol. We believe that this new method, which is computationally no worse than the existing techniques, would simplify the analysis of many practical distributed systems.

Impossibilità di pensare Dio non esistente : il Proslogion di Anselmo d'Aosta come applicazione implicita dei moderni procedimenti di logica aletica

Resumen: La vera intenzione teologica di Anselmo d’Aosta nello scrivere il Proslogion e il vero significato del suo celebre unum argumentum vanno visti nella funzione che la ragione svolge necessariamente all’interno della vita di fede del cristiano. Anselmo, come Tommaso d’Aquino, non sostiene che l’esistenza di Dio sia un “articulus fidei” ma piuttosto uno dei “praeambula fidei”. La ragione naturale ha la certezza che Dio esiste, ancora prima della dimostrazione metafisica, e questo non fa che confermare l’assurdità di pensare che non esista il fondamento reale di tutte le cose esistenti.

El principio energía

Resumen: El autor declara que la concepción de la energía, tal como ha arribado a nuestro tiempo, tiene sus orígenes en la Antigua Grecia , pero la noción contemporánea de energía incluye muchas dificultades como para ser aceptada sin crítica . De hecho, los físicos y filósofos discrepan con sus alcances en el mundo natural, y, además, con su naturaleza entitativa. En este artículo se discuten las opiniones de varios fisicomatemáticos y filósofos. No obstante, e n la conclusión final se expresa la necesidad de retornar a la teoría aristotélico-tomista que identifica la energía con el acto de ser, ya de cada cosa mundana, ya de las substancias separadas, porque el acto propio de Dios, que es su misma esencia, no es nada diferente de la energía concebida como el acto puro de la metafísica de Aristóteles y de Santo Tomás de Aquino.

Filosofando en medio del caos : Agustín de Hipona y sus enseñanzas sobre la verdad y la justicia

Resumen: Este artículo tiene por objeto a uno de los filósofos medievales más importantes del pensamiento occidental: nos referimos a Agustín de Hipona. En este escrito intentaremos examinar y analizar, primero, el contexto biográfico, social y político de su época, ya que no podemos pretender comprender el pensamiento de un filósofo fuera de las circunstancias en que dicho pensamiento se gestó; luego de analizar el contexto histórico intentaremos justificar la postura que sostiene que San Agustín fue realmente un pensador medieval, a pesar de que no se sitúe dentro de los límites temporales que señala la tradición para la Edad Media. En segundo lugar, intentaremos poner de manifiesto sus enseñanzas acerca de la verdad y de la justicia; y, finalmente, intentaremos ubicarlas dentro de los esquemas clasificatorios de Jorge Saltor y Nicasio Barrera.

Del sueño cartesiano a la muerte encefálica

Resumen: Entre el sueño y la muerte hay “sólo una distancia”. El dormir encierra un misterio que se aviva con los sueños y, al parecer, habrían prefigurado al mismo método científico moderno. Descartes pensó que en sus sueños se transmitía el espíritu de la verdad. El alma soñadora e inmortal adquirió notoriedad en su dualismo, al tiempo que dejó de asociársela con la muerte. Tres siglos después, la medicina permitió identificar individuos que estaban muertos, aunque pareciesen dormidos (coma dépassé). Así reapareció la asociación sueño-muerte, pero ahora con médicos provistos del “diagnóstico anátomo-clínico” que, por su herencia cartesiana, demandará evidencias. La duda metódica integrada al pensamiento científico, aportaría incertidumbre a las formulaciones cerebrales de la muerte. Este trabajo repasa el valor de los sueños para el pensamiento occidental, busca al “hombre-máquina” dentro de los criterios neurológicos del fallecido y, con la ayuda de la Filosofía, intenta comprender algunas objeciones en torno a la licitud del diagnóstico de “muerte encefálica”. Se propone una revisión sucinta de la obra del filósofo francés y su reflejo en aspectos del debate ofrecido por la literatura médica.