Positive self-image and incentives in organizations

This paper investigates the implications of individuals’ mistaken beliefs of their abilities on incentives in organizations using the principal-agent model of moral hazard. The paper shows that if effort is observable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability are always favorable to the principal. However, if effort is unobservable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability can be either favorable or unfavorable to the principal. The paper provides conditions under which an agent’s over estimation about own ability is favorable to the principal when effort is unobservable. Finally, the paper shows that workers’ mistaken beliefs about their coworkers’ abilities make interdependent incentive schemes more attractive to firms than individualistic incentive schemes.

Positive self-image in tournaments

This paper analyzes the implications of worker overestimation of productivity for firms in which incentives take the form of tournaments. Each worker overestimates his productivity but is aware of the bias in his opponent’s self-assessment. The manager of the firm, on the other hand, correctly assesses workers’ productivities and self-beliefs when setting tournament prizes. The paper shows that, under a variety of circumstances, firms make higher profits when workers have positive self-image than if workers do not. By contrast, workers’ welfare declines due to their own misguided choices.

Forecasts of relative performance in tournaments: Evidence from the field

This paper uses a field experiment to investigate the quality of individuals’ forecasts of relative performance in tournaments. We ask players in luck-based (poker) and skill-based (chess) tournaments to make point forecasts of rank. The main finding of the paper is that players’ forecasts in both types of tournaments are biased towards overestimation of relative performance. However, the size of the biases found is not as large as the ones often reported in the psychology literature. We also find support for the “unskilled and unaware hypothesis” in chess: high skilled chess players make better forecasts than low skilled chess players. Finally, we find that chess players’ forecasts of relative performance are not efficient.

Collusion and reciprocity in infinitely repeated games

This paper extends the standard industrial organization models of repeated interaction between firms by incorporating preferences for reciprocity. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The main finding of the paper is that, for plausible perceptions of fairness, preferences for reciprocity facilitate collusion in infinitely repeated market games, that is, the critical discount rate at wish collusion can be sustained tends to be lower when firms have preferences for reciprocity than when firms are selfish. The paper also finds that the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with reciprocal firms is worse for consumers than the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with selfish firms.

Majoritarian delays

This paper illustrates how delayed debt stabilizations can arise in a society without any emerging conflict of interests among its members. We argue that, under a majority voting rule, the economy may generate excessive levels of government spending and larger debts over time, and that this delay is increasing in income inequality. The intuition for this result is simple: a majority of citizens may find in delaying stabilizations a way to increase government expenditures, transferring in this way resources from the richest to the poorest citizens in the economy. This process may explain the upward trend and the difficulty to reduce public expenditures, the so called "ratchet effect."

Opening Pousada da Serra da Estrela in Covilhã: A two-way impact analysis - Interacting with public agents

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Promoting Portuguese exports to Germany: An export promotion plan for the machinery & equipment sector

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

In what extent can toy premiums promote healthy eating habits?: A study with school-age children

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

RingDings market analysis

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Internationalization Plan - How can UniPlaces improve its customer acquisition strategy in the London market?

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The internationalization of Vila Galé to the South of Brazil

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Drivers of participation in collaborative consumption ventures

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Corporate social responsibility: How internal and external CSR perceptions influence employee outcomes

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Marketing plan for Educational Center "The Unknow Islands" Russia

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Marketing plan for Le Coq Sportif Russia

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics