Social welfare with a foreign competitor

In this paper, we consider a mixed market in which a state-owned welfare-maximizing public (domestic) firm competes against a profit-maximizing private (foreign) firm. We suppose that the domestic firm is less eflScient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Maximum-revenue tariff under Bertrand duopoly with unknown costs

This paper considers an international trade under Bertrand model with differentiated products and with unknown production costs. The home government imposes a specific import tariff per unit of imports from the foreign firm. We prove that this tariff is decreasing in the expected production costs of the foreign firm and increasing in the production costs of the home firm. Furthermore, it is increasing in the degree of product substitutability. We also show that an increase in the tariff results in both firms increasing their prices, an increase in both expected sales and expected profits for the home firm, and a decrease in both expected sales and expected profits for the foreign firm.

Signalling in an international cournot model

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We study the influences of the non-homogeneity of the goods and of the uncertainty on the production costs of the home firm in the signalling strategies by the home firm. We show that some results obtained for homogeneous goods are not robust under non-homogeneity.

Environmental policies in an international mixed duopoly

The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets. We suppose that the firm in the home country is a welfare-maximizing public firm, while the firm in the foreign country is its own profit-maximizing private firm. We find that the environmental tax can be a strategic instrument for the home government to distribute production from the foreign private firm to the home public firm. An additional effect of the home environmental tax is the reduction of the foreign private firm's output for local consumption, thereby expanding the foreign market for the home public firm.

Simultaneous decisions or leadership in an international competition

In this paper, we study an international market with demand uncertainty. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. The uncertainty is resolved between the decisions made by the home government and by the firms. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Maximum-revenue tariff with different roles in a price-setting competition

Published also at Lecture Notes in Engineering and Computer Science

Uncertainty in a mixed duopoly with quadratic costs

In this paper, we consider a mixed market with uncertain demand, involving one private firm and one public firm with quadratic costs. The model is a two-stage game in which players choose to make their output decisions either in stage 1 or stage 2. We assume that the demand is unknown until the end of the first stage. We compute the output levels at equilibrium in each possible role. We also determine ex-ante and ex-post firms’ payoff functions.

Desirable role in a price-setting international mixed duopoly

In this paper, we study the order of moves in a mixed international duopoly for differentiated goods, where firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. We discuss the desirable role of the public firm by comparing welfare among three games. We find that, in the three possible roles, the domestic public firm put a lower price, and then produces more than the foreign private firm.

Desirable role in an international duopoly model with tariffs

In this paper, we study an international market model in which the home government imposes a tariff on the imported goods. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize a function that cares about the home firm’s profit and the total revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Privatization in a mixed duopoly with environmental taxes

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and privatization in a mixed duopoly, in which the public firm aims to maximize the social welfare. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.

Licensing in an international triopoly

We study the effects of entry of two foreign firms on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the incumbent is technologically superior to the entrants. We consider two different situations: (i) the cost-reducing innovation is licensed to both entrants; (ii) the cost- reducing innovation is licensed to just one of the entrants. We analyse three kind of license: (lump- sum) fixed-fee; (per-unit) royalty; and two-part tariff, that is a combination of a fixed-fee and a royalty. We prove that a two part tariff is never an optimal licensing scheme for the incumbent. Moreover, (i) when the technology is licensed to the two entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only output royalty; and (ii) when the technology is licensed to just one of the entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only a fixed-fee.

Soil sampling design and sampling techniques for soil properties monitoring – common difficulties related to forest soils

Mathematical models and statistical analysis are key instruments in soil science scientific research as they can describe and/or predict the current state of a soil system. These tools allow us to explore the behavior of soil related processes and properties as well as to generate new hypotheses for future experimentation. A good model and analysis of soil properties variations, that permit us to extract suitable conclusions and estimating spatially correlated variables at unsampled locations, is clearly dependent on the amount and quality of data and of the robustness techniques and estimators. On the other hand, the quality of data is obviously dependent from a competent data collection procedure and from a capable laboratory analytical work. Following the standard soil sampling protocols available, soil samples should be collected according to key points such as a convenient spatial scale, landscape homogeneity (or non-homogeneity), land color, soil texture, land slope, land solar exposition. Obtaining good quality data from forest soils is predictably expensive as it is labor intensive and demands many manpower and equipment both in field work and in laboratory analysis. Also, the sampling collection scheme that should be used on a data collection procedure in forest field is not simple to design as the sampling strategies chosen are strongly dependent on soil taxonomy. In fact, a sampling grid will not be able to be followed if rocks at the predicted collecting depth are found, or no soil at all is found, or large trees bar the soil collection. Considering this, a proficient design of a soil data sampling campaign in forest field is not always a simple process and sometimes represents a truly huge challenge. In this work, we present some difficulties that have occurred during two experiments on forest soil that were conducted in order to study the spatial variation of some soil physical-chemical properties. Two different sampling protocols were considered for monitoring two types of forest soils located in NW Portugal: umbric regosol and lithosol. Two different equipments for sampling collection were also used: a manual auger and a shovel. Both scenarios were analyzed and the results achieved have allowed us to consider that monitoring forest soil in order to do some mathematical and statistical investigations needs a sampling procedure to data collection compatible to established protocols but a pre-defined grid assumption often fail when the variability of the soil property is not uniform in space. In this case, sampling grid should be conveniently adapted from one part of the landscape to another and this fact should be taken into consideration of a mathematical procedure.

Vigilância activa de eventos após vacinação

A vigilância de efeitos indesejáveis após a vacinação é complexa. Existem vários actores de confundimento que podem dar origem a associações espúrias, meramente temporais mas que podem provocar uma percepção do risco alterada e uma consequente desconfiança generalizada acerca do uso das vacinas. Com efeito as vacinas são medicamentos complexos com características únicas cuja vigilância necessita de abordagens metodológicas desenvolvidas para esse propósito. Do exposto se entende que, desde o desenvolvimento da farmacovigilância se tem procurado desenvolver novas metodologias que sejam concomitantes aos Sistemas de Notificação Espontânea que já existem. Neste trabalho propusemo-nos a desenvolver e testar um modelo de vigilância de reacções adversas a vacinas, baseado na auto-declaração pelo utente de eventos ocorridos após a vacinação e testar a capacidade de gerar sinais aplicando cálculos de desproporção a datamining. Para esse efeito foi constituída uma coorte não controlada de utentes vacinados em Centros de Saúde que foram seguidos durante quinze dias. A recolha de eventos adversos a vacinas foi efectuada pelos próprios utentes através de um diário de registo. Os dados recolhidos foram objecto de análise descritiva e análise de data-mining utilizando os cálculos Proportional Reporting Ratio e o Information Component. A metodologia utilizada permitiu gerar um corpo de evidência suficiente para a geração de sinais. Tendo sido gerados quatro sinais. No âmbito do data-mining a utilização do Information Component como método de geração de sinais parece aumentar a eficiência científica ao permitir reduzir o número de ocorrências até detecção de sinal. A informação reportada pelos utentes parece válida como indicador de sinais de reacções adversas não graves, o que permitiu o registo de eventos sem incluir o viés da avaliação da relação causal pelo notificador. Os principais eventos reportados foram eventos adversos locais (62,7%) e febre (31,4%).------------------------------------------ABSTRACT: The monitoring of undesirable effects following vaccination is complex. There are several confounding factors that can lead to merely temporal but spurious associations that can cause a change in the risk perception and a consequent generalized distrust about the safe use of vaccines. Indeed, vaccines are complex drugs with unique characteristics so that its monitoring requires specifically designed methodological approaches. From the above-cited it is understandable that since the development of Pharmacovigilance there has been a drive for the development of new methodologies that are concomitant with Spontaneous Reporting Systems already in place. We proposed to develop and test a new model for vaccine adverse reaction monitoring, based on self-report by users of events following vaccination and to test its capability to generate disproportionality signals applying quantitative methods of signal generation to data-mining. For that effect we set up an uncontrolled cohort of users vaccinated in Healthcare Centers,with a follow-up period of fifteen days. Adverse vaccine events we registered by the users themselves in a paper diary The data was analyzed using descriptive statistics and two quantitative methods of signal generation: Proportional Reporting Ratio and Information Component. themselves in a paper diary The data was analyzed using descriptive statistics and two quantitative methods of signal generation: Proportional Reporting Ratio and Information Component. The methodology we used allowed for the generation of a sufficient body of evidence for signal generation. Four signals were generated. Regarding the data-mining, the use of Information Component as a method for generating disproportionality signals seems to increase scientific efficiency by reducing the number of events needed to signal detection. The information reported by users seems valid as an indicator of non serious adverse vaccine reactions, allowing for the registry of events without the bias of the evaluation of the casual relation by the reporter. The main adverse events reported were injection site reactions (62,7%) and fever (31,4%).

Software languages engineering: experimental evaluation

Dissertação apresentada na Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Informática

Privatization in an international mixed duopoly with environmental taxes

We study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international duopoly serving two countries, with pollution abatement. This analysis is done in both mixed and privatized markets. The model has two stages: First, governments choose environmental taxes and import tariffs, simultaneously; then, the firms compete in the market by choosing output levels for the domestic market and to export and also abatement levels.