Signalling in an international cournot model


Autoria(s): Ferreira, Fernanda A.; Moreira, Humberto A.; Pinto, Alberto A.
Data(s)

27/05/2014

27/05/2014

2009

Resumo

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We study the influences of the non-homogeneity of the goods and of the uncertainty on the production costs of the home firm in the signalling strategies by the home firm. We show that some results obtained for homogeneous goods are not robust under non-homogeneity.

ESEIG/IPP, Centros de Matemática das Universidades do Minho e do Porto and the Programs POCTI and POCI by FCT and MCTES.

Identificador

978-0-7354-0709

doi: 10.1063/1.3241653

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4391

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

AIP Publishing

Relação

http://scitation.aip.org/content/aip/proceeding/aipcp/10.1063/1.3241653

Direitos

openAccess

Palavras-Chave #Game theory #Industrial organization #Cournot model #Signalization
Tipo

conferenceObject