Signalling in an international cournot model
Data(s) |
27/05/2014
27/05/2014
2009
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Resumo |
We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We study the influences of the non-homogeneity of the goods and of the uncertainty on the production costs of the home firm in the signalling strategies by the home firm. We show that some results obtained for homogeneous goods are not robust under non-homogeneity. ESEIG/IPP, Centros de Matemática das Universidades do Minho e do Porto and the Programs POCTI and POCI by FCT and MCTES. |
Identificador |
978-0-7354-0709 doi: 10.1063/1.3241653 |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
AIP Publishing |
Relação |
http://scitation.aip.org/content/aip/proceeding/aipcp/10.1063/1.3241653 |
Direitos |
openAccess |
Palavras-Chave | #Game theory #Industrial organization #Cournot model #Signalization |
Tipo |
conferenceObject |