The maximun and the addition of assigment games

[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc corresponent a aquesta situació, que es representa pel màxim d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del joc. En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos mercats simultàniament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent, representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, és equilibrat. A més a més, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignació coincideix amb el core del joc suma.

The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.

Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.

Evolutionary Games in Networked Populations: Models and Experiments

Cooperation and coordination are desirable behaviors that are fundamental for the harmonious development of society. People need to rely on cooperation with other individuals in many aspects of everyday life, such as teamwork and economic exchange in anonymous markets. However, cooperation may easily fall prey to exploitation by selfish individuals who only care about short- term gain. For cooperation to evolve, specific conditions and mechanisms are required, such as kinship, direct and indirect reciprocity through repeated interactions, or external interventions such as punishment. In this dissertation we investigate the effect of the network structure of the population on the evolution of cooperation and coordination. We consider several kinds of static and dynamical network topologies, such as Baraba´si-Albert, social network models and spatial networks. We perform numerical simulations and laboratory experiments using the Prisoner's Dilemma and co- ordination games in order to contrast human behavior with theoretical results. We show by numerical simulations that even a moderate amount of random noise on the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network links causes a significant loss of cooperation, to the point that cooperation almost vanishes altogether in the Prisoner's Dilemma when the noise rate is high enough. Moreover, when we consider fixed social-like networks we find that current models of social networks may allow cooperation to emerge and to be robust at least as much as in scale-free networks. In the framework of spatial networks, we investigate whether cooperation can evolve and be stable when agents move randomly or performing Le´vy flights in a continuous space. We also consider discrete space adopting purposeful mobility and binary birth-death process to dis- cover emergent cooperative patterns. The fundamental result is that cooperation may be enhanced when this migration is opportunistic or even when agents follow very simple heuristics. In the experimental laboratory, we investigate the issue of social coordination between indi- viduals located on networks of contacts. In contrast to simulations, we find that human players dynamics do not converge to the efficient outcome more often in a social-like network than in a random network. In another experiment, we study the behavior of people who play a pure co- ordination game in a spatial environment in which they can move around and when changing convention is costly. We find that each convention forms homogeneous clusters and is adopted by approximately half of the individuals. When we provide them with global information, i.e., the number of subjects currently adopting one of the conventions, global consensus is reached in most, but not all, cases. Our results allow us to extract the heuristics used by the participants and to build a numerical simulation model that agrees very well with the experiments. Our findings have important implications for policymakers intending to promote specific, desired behaviors in a mobile population. Furthermore, we carry out an experiment with human subjects playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game in a diluted grid where people are able to move around. In contrast to previous results on purposeful rewiring in relational networks, we find no noticeable effect of mobility in space on the level of cooperation. Clusters of cooperators form momentarily but in a few rounds they dissolve as cooperators at the boundaries stop tolerating being cheated upon. Our results highlight the difficulties that mobile agents have to establish a cooperative environment in a spatial setting without a device such as reputation or the possibility of retaliation. i.e. punishment. Finally, we test experimentally the evolution of cooperation in social networks taking into ac- count a setting where we allow people to make or break links at their will. In this work we give particular attention to whether information on an individual's actions is freely available to poten- tial partners or not. Studying the role of information is relevant as information on other people's actions is often not available for free: a recruiting firm may need to call a job candidate's refer- ences, a bank may need to find out about the credit history of a new client, etc. We find that people cooperate almost fully when information on their actions is freely available to their potential part- ners. Cooperation is less likely, however, if people have to pay about half of what they gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Cooperation declines even further if people have to pay a cost that is almost equivalent to the gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Thus, costly information on potential neighbors' actions can undermine the incentive to cooperate in dynamical networks.

Serious games for rehabilitation using head-mounted display and haptic devices

In the health domain, the field of rehabilitation suffers from a lack specialized staff while hospital costs only increase. Worse, almost no tools are dedicated to motivate patients or help the personnel to carry out monitoring of therapeutic exercises. This paper demonstrates the high potential that can bring the virtual reality with a platform of serious games for the rehabilitation of the legs involving a head-mounted display and haptic robot devices. We first introduce SG principles and the current context regarding rehabilitation interventions followed by the description of an original haptic device called Lambda Health System. The architecture of the model is then detailed, including communication specifications showing that lag is imperceptible for user (60Hz). Finally, four serious games for rehabilitation using haptic robots and/or HMD were tested by 33 health specialists.

Challenges and Opportunities of Online Entertainment. Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics. Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, 9-10 July, 2012.

El VIII Congrés Internacional Internet, Dret i Política (IDP 2012) que s'ha dut a terme a Barcelona els dies 9 i 10 de juliol de 2012 sota el títol genèric de "Reptes i oportunitats de l'entreteniment en línia", ha abordat alguns dels principals reptes als que s'enfronta la societat de la informació des de la perspectiva jurídica i politològica. Concretament, els temes centrals han estat el debat sobre l'entreteniment a la xarxa, així com altres qüestions relacionades amb Internet i els drets de propietat intel·lectual, la privacitat, la seguretat o la llibertat d'expressió.

On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games

On the domain of cooperative transferable utility games, we investigate if there are single valued solutions that reconcile rationality, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition) properties. This paper collects some impossibility results on the combination of core selection with either complement or projected consistency, and core selection, max consistency and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results show up when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.

Parallel characterizations of a generalized shapley value and a generalized banzhaf value for cooperative games with level structure of cooperation

We present parallel characterizations of two different values in the framework of restricted cooperation games. The restrictions are introduced as a finite sequence of partitions defined on the player set, each of them being coarser than the previous one, hence forming a structure of different levels of a priori unions. On the one hand, we consider a value first introduced in Ref. [18], which extends the Shapley value to games with different levels of a priori unions. On the other hand, we introduce another solution for the same type of games, which extends the Banzhaf value in the same manner. We characterize these two values using logically comparable properties.

Some Notes and Comments on the Efficient use of Information in Repeated Games with Poisson Signals

In the present paper we characterize the optimal use of Poisson signals to establish incentives in the "bad" and "good" news models of Abreu et al. [1]. In the former, for small time intervals the signals' quality is high and we observe a "selective" use of information; otherwise there is a "mass" use. In the latter, for small time intervals the signals' quality is low and we observe a "fine" use of information; otherwise there is a "non-selective" use. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Infor- mation Characteristics.

Utilizar los juegos para aprender a resolver conflictos = Using games to learn and resolve conflicts

The characteristics of games make them excellent tools for multiple learning situations in the area of Physical Education, aswell as learning those necessary skills that allow students to handle social situations and especially conflicts. Understandingthat a conflict may be considered from a constructive perspective and that it may represent an excellent learningopportunity is a fundamental point. Games can help us in this task but it is important that the teacher knows theircharacteristics and which may be the most convenient in each educational moment

Matemáticas y juego = Mathematics and games

In this article we try to look at the learning of mathematics through games in the first years of schooling. The use of game resources in the class should not be carried out in a uniquely intuitive way but rather in a manner that contains some preliminary reflections such as, what do we understand by games? Why use games as a resource in the Mathematics classroom? And what does its use imply?

Learning through role-playing games: an approach for active learning and teaching

This study evaluates the use of role-playing games (RPGs) as a methodological approach for teaching cellular biology, assessing student satisfaction, learning outcomes, and retention of acquired knowledge. First-year undergraduate medical students at two Brazilian public universities attended either an RPG-based class (RPG group) or a lecture (lecture-based group) on topics related to cellular biology. Pre- and post-RPG-based class questionnaires were compared to scores in regular exams and in an unannounced test one year later to assess students' attitudes and learning. From the 230 students that attended the RPG classes, 78.4% responded that the RPG-based classes were an effective tool for learning; 55.4% thought that such classes were better than lectures but did not replace them; and 81% responded that they would use this method. The lecture-based group achieved a higher grade in 1 of 14 regular exam questions. In the medium-term evaluation (one year later), the RPG group scored higher in 2 of 12 questions. RPG classes are thus quantitatively as effective as formal lectures, are well accepted by students, and may serve as educational tools, giving students the chance to learn actively and potentially retain the acquired knowledge more efficiently.

Helsinki and the 1940 olympic games

kuv., 12 x 21 cm