On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games
Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
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Data(s) |
2015
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Resumo |
On the domain of cooperative transferable utility games, we investigate if there are single valued solutions that reconcile rationality, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition) properties. This paper collects some impossibility results on the combination of core selection with either complement or projected consistency, and core selection, max consistency and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results show up when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity. |
Formato |
24 p. |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
Relação |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-12 |
Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
Fonte |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
Palavras-Chave | #Jocs cooperatius #33 - Economia |
Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |