On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games


Autoria(s): Calleja, Pere; Llerena Garrés, Francesc
Contribuinte(s)

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública

Data(s)

2015

Resumo

On the domain of cooperative transferable utility games, we investigate if there are single valued solutions that reconcile rationality, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition) properties. This paper collects some impossibility results on the combination of core selection with either complement or projected consistency, and core selection, max consistency and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results show up when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.

Formato

24 p.

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/2072/247807

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia

Relação

Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-12

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/

Fonte

RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)

Palavras-Chave #Jocs cooperatius #33 - Economia
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper