Some Notes and Comments on the Efficient use of Information in Repeated Games with Poisson Signals
| Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
|---|---|
| Data(s) |
2015
|
| Resumo |
In the present paper we characterize the optimal use of Poisson signals to establish incentives in the "bad" and "good" news models of Abreu et al. [1]. In the former, for small time intervals the signals' quality is high and we observe a "selective" use of information; otherwise there is a "mass" use. In the latter, for small time intervals the signals' quality is low and we observe a "fine" use of information; otherwise there is a "non-selective" use. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Infor- mation Characteristics. |
| Formato |
13 p. |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Publicador |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
| Relação |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-14 |
| Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
| Fonte |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
| Palavras-Chave | #Teoria de jocs #Informació, Teoria de la #Contractes -- Aspectes econòmics #33 - Economia |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
