'Grooming' and the Sexual Abuse of Children:Institutional, Internet and Familial Dimensions

‘Grooming’ and the Sexual Abuse of Children: Institutional, Internet and Familial Dimensions critically examines the official and popular discourses on grooming, predominantly framed within the context of on-line sexual exploitation and abuse committed by strangers, and institutional child abuse committed by those in positions of trust.

Set against the broader theoretical framework of risk, security and governance, this book argues that due to the difficulties of drawing clear boundaries between innocuous and harmful motivations towards children, pre-emptive risk-based criminal law and policy are inherently limited in preventing, targeting and criminalising ‘grooming’ behaviour prior to the manifestation of actual harm. Through examination of grooming against the complexities of the onset of sexual offending against children and its actual role in this process, the author broadens existing discourses by providing a fuller, more nuanced conceptualisation of grooming, including its role in intra-familial and extra-familial contexts. There is also timely discussion of new and emerging forms of grooming, such as ‘street’ or ‘localised’ grooming, as typified by recent cases in Rochdale and Oldham, and ‘peer-to-peer’ grooming.

The first inter-disciplinary, thematic, and empirical investigation of grooming in a multi-jurisdictional context, ‘Grooming’ and the Sexual Abuse of Children draws on extensive empirical research in the form of over fifty interviews with professionals, working in the fields of sex offender risk assessment, management or treatment, as well as child protection or victim support in the four jurisdictions of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Impeccably presented and meticulously considered, this book will be of interest to criminologists and those working and studying in the field of policing and criminal justice studies, as well as policy makers and practitioners in the areas of child protection and sex offender management.

Vision and Virtuality:The Construction of Narrative Space in Film and Computer Games

This paper seeks to explore the construction of narrative space in 3D PC computer games. With reference to Stephen Heath’s theory of filmic narrative space, the paper will examine how computer games, based on the rendition of a continuous 3D, real-time interactive environment, construct a distinct mode of narrativisation. The dynamic imbrication of the manipulation of 3D objects in a virtual world and the (re)presentation of this virtual mise-en-scene constitute an interaction that affects the concept of narrative in computer games. This leads to several questions that the paper seeks to investigate: How does the construction of space in PC games contribute to the meaning-making process or the gamer’s experience of narrative? How then is this experience of narrative game-space different from that of film?

Stressed Web Environments as Strategic Games: Risk Profiles and Weltanschauung

We consider the behaviour of a set of services in a stressed web environment where performance patterns may be difficult to predict. In stressed environments the performances of some providers may degrade while the performances of others, with elastic resources, may improve. The allocation of web-based providers to users (brokering) is modelled by a strategic non-cooperative angel-daemon game with risk profiles. A risk profile specifies a bound on the number of unreliable service providers within an environment without identifying the names of these providers. Risk profiles offer a means of analysing the behaviour of broker agents which allocate service providers to users. A Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of such a game in which no user can locally improve their choice of provider – thus, a Nash equilibrium is a viable solution to the provider/user allocation problem. Angel daemon games provide a means of reasoning about stressed environments and offer the possibility of designing brokers using risk profiles and Nash equilibria.

Composition Games for Distributed Systems: the EU Grant games

We analyze ways by which people decompose into groups in distributed systems. We are interested in systems in which an agent can increase its utility by connecting to other agents, but must also pay a cost that increases with the size of the sys- tem. The right balance is achieved by the right size group of agents. We formulate and analyze three intuitive and realistic games and show how simple changes in the protocol can dras- tically improve the price of anarchy of these games. In partic- ular, we identify two important properties for a low price of anarchy: agreement in joining the system, and the possibil- ity of appealing a rejection from a system. We show that the latter property is especially important if there are some pre- existing constraints regarding who may collaborate (or com- municate) with whom.