Mathematical study of complex networks : brain, internet, and power grid

The dissertation is concerned with the mathematical study of various network problems. First, three real-world networks are considered: (i) the human brain network (ii) communication networks, (iii) electric power networks. Although these networks perform very different tasks, they share similar mathematical foundations. The high-level goal is to analyze and/or synthesis each of these systems from a “control and optimization” point of view. After studying these three real-world networks, two abstract network problems are also explored, which are motivated by power systems. The first one is “flow optimization over a flow network” and the second one is “nonlinear optimization over a generalized weighted graph”. The results derived in this dissertation are summarized below.

Brain Networks: Neuroimaging data reveals the coordinated activity of spatially distinct brain regions, which may be represented mathematically as a network of nodes (brain regions) and links (interdependencies). To obtain the brain connectivity network, the graphs associated with the correlation matrix and the inverse covariance matrix—describing marginal and conditional dependencies between brain regions—have been proposed in the literature. A question arises as to whether any of these graphs provides useful information about the brain connectivity. Due to the electrical properties of the brain, this problem will be investigated in the context of electrical circuits. First, we consider an electric circuit model and show that the inverse covariance matrix of the node voltages reveals the topology of the circuit. Second, we study the problem of finding the topology of the circuit based on only measurement. In this case, by assuming that the circuit is hidden inside a black box and only the nodal signals are available for measurement, the aim is to find the topology of the circuit when a limited number of samples are available. For this purpose, we deploy the graphical lasso technique to estimate a sparse inverse covariance matrix. It is shown that the graphical lasso may find most of the circuit topology if the exact covariance matrix is well-conditioned. However, it may fail to work well when this matrix is ill-conditioned. To deal with ill-conditioned matrices, we propose a small modification to the graphical lasso algorithm and demonstrate its performance. Finally, the technique developed in this work will be applied to the resting-state fMRI data of a number of healthy subjects.

Communication Networks: Congestion control techniques aim to adjust the transmission rates of competing users in the Internet in such a way that the network resources are shared efficiently. Despite the progress in the analysis and synthesis of the Internet congestion control, almost all existing fluid models of congestion control assume that every link in the path of a flow observes the original source rate. To address this issue, a more accurate model is derived in this work for the behavior of the network under an arbitrary congestion controller, which takes into account of the effect of buffering (queueing) on data flows. Using this model, it is proved that the well-known Internet congestion control algorithms may no longer be stable for the common pricing schemes, unless a sufficient condition is satisfied. It is also shown that these algorithms are guaranteed to be stable if a new pricing mechanism is used.

Electrical Power Networks: Optimal power flow (OPF) has been one of the most studied problems for power systems since its introduction by Carpentier in 1962. This problem is concerned with finding an optimal operating point of a power network minimizing the total power generation cost subject to network and physical constraints. It is well known that OPF is computationally hard to solve due to the nonlinear interrelation among the optimization variables. The objective is to identify a large class of networks over which every OPF problem can be solved in polynomial time. To this end, a convex relaxation is proposed, which solves the OPF problem exactly for every radial network and every meshed network with a sufficient number of phase shifters, provided power over-delivery is allowed. The concept of “power over-delivery” is equivalent to relaxing the power balance equations to inequality constraints.

Flow Networks: In this part of the dissertation, the minimum-cost flow problem over an arbitrary flow network is considered. In this problem, each node is associated with some possibly unknown injection, each line has two unknown flows at its ends related to each other via a nonlinear function, and all injections and flows need to satisfy certain box constraints. This problem, named generalized network flow (GNF), is highly non-convex due to its nonlinear equality constraints. Under the assumption of monotonicity and convexity of the flow and cost functions, a convex relaxation is proposed, which always finds the optimal injections. A primary application of this work is in the OPF problem. The results of this work on GNF prove that the relaxation on power balance equations (i.e., load over-delivery) is not needed in practice under a very mild angle assumption.

Generalized Weighted Graphs: Motivated by power optimizations, this part aims to find a global optimization technique for a nonlinear optimization defined over a generalized weighted graph. Every edge of this type of graph is associated with a weight set corresponding to the known parameters of the optimization (e.g., the coefficients). The motivation behind this problem is to investigate how the (hidden) structure of a given real/complex valued optimization makes the problem easy to solve, and indeed the generalized weighted graph is introduced to capture the structure of an optimization. Various sufficient conditions are derived, which relate the polynomial-time solvability of different classes of optimization problems to weak properties of the generalized weighted graph such as its topology and the sign definiteness of its weight sets. As an application, it is proved that a broad class of real and complex optimizations over power networks are polynomial-time solvable due to the passivity of transmission lines and transformers.

Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games

In noncooperative cost sharing games, individually strategic agents choose resources based on how the welfare (cost or revenue) generated at each resource (which depends on the set of agents that choose the resource) is distributed. The focus is on finding distribution rules that lead to stable allocations, which is formalized by the concept of Nash equilibrium, e.g., Shapley value (budget-balanced) and marginal contribution (not budget-balanced) rules.

Recent work that seeks to characterize the space of all such rules shows that the only budget-balanced distribution rules that guarantee equilibrium existence in all welfare sharing games are generalized weighted Shapley values (GWSVs), by exhibiting a specific 'worst-case' welfare function which requires that GWSV rules be used. Our work provides an exact characterization of the space of distribution rules (not necessarily budget-balanced) for any specific local welfare functions remains, for a general class of scalable and separable games with well-known applications, e.g., facility location, routing, network formation, and coverage games.

We show that all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to GWSV rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. Therefore, it is neither the existence of some worst-case welfare function, nor the restriction of budget-balance, which limits the design to GWSVs. Also, in order to guarantee equilibrium existence, it is necessary to work within the class of potential games, since GWSVs result in (weighted) potential games.

We also provide an alternative characterization—all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to generalized weighted marginal contribution (GWMC) rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. This result is due to a deeper fundamental connection between Shapley values and marginal contributions that our proofs expose—they are equivalent given a transformation connecting their ground welfare functions. (This connection leads to novel closed-form expressions for the GWSV potential function.) Since GWMCs are more tractable than GWSVs, a designer can tradeoff budget-balance with computational tractability in deciding which rule to implement.

Voting games with incomplete information

We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over each others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting.

Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability of victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems. We find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system vary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize probability of victory.

In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals' preferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that Nash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing a Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then examine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large electorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates, there exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we find that this equilibrium is unique.

Finally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks. Our notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all games with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences between this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium and offer possible extensions of our framework.