On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

A Theoretical Comparison Between Integrated and Realized Volatilies

In this paper, we provide both qualitative and quantitative measures of the cost of measuring the integrated volatility by the realized volatility when the frequency of observation is fixed. We start by characterizing for a general diffusion the difference between the realized and the integrated volatilities for a given frequency of observations. Then, we compute the mean and variance of this noise and the correlation between the noise and the integrated volatility in the Eigenfunction Stochastic Volatility model of Meddahi (2001a). This model has, as special examples, log-normal, affine, and GARCH diffusion models. Using some previous empirical works, we show that the standard deviation of the noise is not negligible with respect to the mean and the standard deviation of the integrated volatility, even if one considers returns at five minutes. We also propose a simple approach to capture the information about the integrated volatility contained in the returns through the leverage effect.

An Eigenfunction Approach for Volatility Modeling.

In this paper, we introduce a new approach for volatility modeling in discrete and continuous time. We follow the stochastic volatility literature by assuming that the variance is a function of a state variable. However, instead of assuming that the loading function is ad hoc (e.g., exponential or affine), we assume that it is a linear combination of the eigenfunctions of the conditional expectation (resp. infinitesimal generator) operator associated to the state variable in discrete (resp. continuous) time. Special examples are the popular log-normal and square-root models where the eigenfunctions are the Hermite and Laguerre polynomials respectively. The eigenfunction approach has at least six advantages: i) it is general since any square integrable function may be written as a linear combination of the eigenfunctions; ii) the orthogonality of the eigenfunctions leads to the traditional interpretations of the linear principal components analysis; iii) the implied dynamics of the variance and squared return processes are ARMA and, hence, simple for forecasting and inference purposes; (iv) more importantly, this generates fat tails for the variance and returns processes; v) in contrast to popular models, the variance of the variance is a flexible function of the variance; vi) these models are closed under temporal aggregation.

Nonparametric Instrumental Regression

The focus of the paper is the nonparametric estimation of an instrumental regression function P defined by conditional moment restrictions stemming from a structural econometric model : E[Y-P(Z)|W]=0 and involving endogenous variables Y and Z and instruments W. The function P is the solution of an ill-posed inverse problem and we propose an estimation procedure based on Tikhonov regularization. The paper analyses identification and overidentification of this model and presents asymptotic properties of the estimated nonparametric instrumental regression function.

Similarity of Options and the Measurement of Diversity

This paper analyzes the measurement of the diversity of sets based on the dissimilarity of the objects contained in the set. We discuss axiomatic approaches to diversity measurement and examine the considerations underlying the application of specific measures. Our focus is on descriptive issues: rather than assuming a specific ethical position or restricting attention to properties that are appealing in specific applications, we address the foundations of the measurement issue as such in the context of diversity.

The FCLT with Dependent Errors: an Helicopter Tour of the Quality of the Approximation

This note investigates the adequacy of the finite-sample approximation provided by the Functional Central Limit Theorem (FCLT) when the errors are allowed to be dependent. We compare the distribution of the scaled partial sums of some data with the distribution of the Wiener process to which it converges. Our setup is purposely very simple in that it considers data generated from an ARMA(1,1) process. Yet, this is sufficient to bring out interesting conclusions about the particular elements which cause the approximations to be inadequate in even quite large sample sizes.

Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules

We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the original problem. We prove that strictly coherent linear cost-sharing rules must be simple random-order rules.

Population Ethics and the Value of Life

Public policies often involve choices of alternatives in which the size and the composition of the population may vary. Examples are the allocation of resources to prenatal care and the design of aid packages to developing countries. In order to assess the corresponding feasible choices on normative grounds, criteria for social evaluation that are capable of performing variable-population comparisons are required. We review several important axioms for welfarist population principles and discuss the link between individual well-being and the desirability of adding a new person to a given society.

Aversion Analysis

In this paper : a) the consumer’s problem is studied over two periods, the second one involving S states, and the consumer being endowed with S+1 incomes and having access to N financial assets; b) the consumer is then representable by a continuously differentiable system of demands, commodity demands, asset demands and desirabilities of incomes (the S+1 Lagrange multiplier of the S+1 constraints); c) the multipliers can be transformed into subjective Arrow prices; d) the effects of the various incomes on these Arrow prices decompose into a compensation effect (an Antonelli matrix) and a wealth effect; e) the Antonelli matrix has rank S-N, the dimension of incompleteness, if the consumer can financially adjust himself when facing income shocks; f) the matrix has rank S, if not; g) in the first case, the matrix represents a residual aversion; in the second case, a fundamental aversion; the difference between them is an aversion to illiquidity; this last relation corresponds to the Drèze-Modigliani decomposition (1972); h) the fundamental aversion decomposes also into an aversion to impatience and a risk aversion; i) the above decompositions span a third decomposition; if there exists a sure asset (to be defined, the usual definition being too specific), the fundamental aversion admits a three-component decomposition, an aversion to impatience, a residual aversion and an aversion to the illiquidity of risky assets; j) the formulas of the corresponding financial premiums are also presented.

The Alberta Dilemma: Optimal Sharing of a Water Resource by an Agricultural and an Oil Sector

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the optimal time paths of production and water usage by an agricultural and an oil sector that have to share a limited water resource. We show that for any given water stock, if the oil stock is sufficiently large, it will become optimal to have a phase during which the agricultural sector is inactive. This may mean having an initial phase during which the two sectors are active, then a phase during which the water is reserved for the oil sector and the agricultural sector is inactive, followed by a phase during which both sectors are active again. The agricultural sector will always be active in the end as the oil stock is depleted and the demand for water from the oil sector decreases. In the case where agriculture is not constrained by the given natural inflow of water once there is no more oil, we show that oil extraction will always end with a phase during which oil production follows a pure Hotelling path, with the implicit price of oil net of extraction cost growing at the rate of interest. If the natural inflow of water does constitute a constraint for agriculture, then oil production never follows a pure Hotelling path, because its full marginal cost must always reflect not only the imputed rent on the finite oil stock, but also the positive opportunity cost of water.

Les fils RSS en bibliothèques : pourquoi et comment?

Présentation donnée le 10 novembre 2006 dans le cadre du Programme de formation continue de la Corporation des bibliothécaires professionnels du Québec (CBPQ).

Les fils RSS en bibliothèque de droit

Présentation donnée le 1er mars 2007 à l'Association des bibliothèques de droit de Montréal (ABDM) / Montreal Association of Law Libraries (MALL).

Les fils RSS en droit: un outil à découvrir

Présentation donnée le 17 mai 2007 aux professeurs de la Faculté de droit de l'Université de Montréal.

Le fonctionnement du régime de preuve libre dans un système non-expert : le traitement symptomatique des preuves par la Section de la protection des réfugiés

Un résumé en anglais est également disponible.

Les contrats de cyberconsommation sont presque tous illégaux !

Le présent document est une retranscription écrite d’une conférence donnée le 08 octobre 2004 dans le cadre des Entretiens Jacques Cartier. Le style revendicatif et parlé utilisé lors de la présentation a été partiellement maintenu. Cette conférence est le fruit d’une étude subventionnée par le CRSH (programme INÉ) sur le « Contrat de cyberconsommation ».