O direito de livre revogação nos contratos celebrados à distância e fora do estabelecimento comercial

Dissertação de mestrado em Direito dos Contratos e da Empresa

A invalidade na coligação de contratos de crédito e venda para consumo

Dissertação de mestrado em Direito dos Contratos e da Empresa

A proteção cumulativa do design pelo Direito de Autor e pelo Direito da Propriedade Industrial: o caso especial do contrato de trabalho

Dissertação de mestrado em Direito dos Contratos e das Empresas

A celebração do contrato de seguro à distância

Dissertação de mestrado em Direito dos Contratos e da Empresa

A despesa pública nas autarquias locais e o controlo do Tribunal de Contas, em especial os contratos públicos

Dissertação de mestrado em Direito Tributário e Fiscal

DNA barcodes de peixes marinhos da Europa: compilação de uma biblioteca de referência validada e investigação de padrões de divergência genética

Dissertação de mestrado em Ecologia

Modelo de gestão integrada dos contratos públicos eletrónicos orientados ao valor público

Tese de Doutoramento em Tecnologias e Sistemas de Informação.

As condições de financiamento das PPP em Portugal

Mestrado em Finanças

A review of the development of regional sludge treatment centres and a baseline characterisation of Irish sewage sludges

This Study assessed the development of sludge treatment and reuse policy since the original 1993 National Sludge Strategy Report (Weston-FTA, 1993). A review of the 48 sludge treatment centres, current wastewater treatment systems and current or planned sludge treatment and reuse systems was carried out Sludges from all Regional Sludge Treatment Centres (areas) were characterised through analysis of selected parameters. There have been many changes to the original policy, as a result of boundary reviews, delays in developing sludge management plans, development in technology and changes in tendering policy, most notably a move to design-build-operate (DBO) projects. As a result, there are now 35 designated Hub Centres. Only 5 of the Hub Centres are producing Class A Biosolids. These are Ringsend, Killamey, Carlow, Navan and Osberstown. Ringsend is the only Hub Centre that is fully operational, treating sludge from surrounding regions by Thermal Drying. Killamey is producing Class A Biosolids using Autothermal Thermophilic Aerobic Digestion (ATAD) but is not, as yet, treating imported sludge. The remaining three plants are producing Class A Biosolids using Alkaline Stabilisation. Anaerobic Digestion with post pasteurisation is the most common form of sludge treatment, with 11 Hub Centres proposing to use it. One plant is using ATAD, two intend to use Alkaline Stabilisation, seven have selected Thermal Drying and three have selected Composting. While the remaining plants have not decided which sludge treatment to select, this is because of incomplete Sludge Management Plans and on DBO contracts. Analysis of sludges from the Hub Centres showed that all Irish sewage sludge is safe for agricultural reuse as defined by the Waste Management Regulations {Use of Sewage Sludge in Agriculture) (S.I. 267/2001), providing that a nutrient management plan is taken into consideration and that the soil limits of the 1998 (S.I. 148/1998) Waste Management Regulations are not exceeded.

Befristete Arbeitsverträge : Ein praxisorientierter Leitfaden

This master thesis explains fixed-term contracts in practice. To illustrate this point, examples are provided for better understanding. It will be discussed at both the fixed-term with an objective reason and without objective reason. The second variant is also called moderate Expiration Calendar. Not only the benefits and advantages for the employer are enumerated, but also the special challenges and problems that may arise. Particularly with regard to the prohibition of previous employment.This thesis presents the interests fo employers and companies. The central research question is: What are the possibilities of limitation and there is the prohibition of previous employment unconstitutional? A special attention is given to the contractual formulation examples of limited contracts. It deals exclusively with applicable German and European law. A comparison with previous case-law does not take place in this master thesis.

The Cost of ownership in the governance of interfirm collaborations

This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs arguments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimension of going from “contracts” to “hierarchies” has been ignored in the past and with it the so called “costs of ownership”. The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which participate Spanish firms, indicate that the cost of ownership may offset the benefits of hierarchical controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two.

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

Sequencing lifeline repairs after an earthquake: an economic approach

Recoveries after recent earthquakes in the U.S. and Japan have shown that large welfare gains can be achieved by reshaping current emergency plans as incentive-compatible contracts. We apply tools from the mechanisms design literature to show ways to integrate economic incentives into the management of natural disasters and discuss issues related to the application to seismic event recovery. The focus is on restoring lifeline services such as the water, gas, transportation, and electric power networks. We put forward decisional procedures that an uninformed planner could employ to set repair priorities and help to coordinate lifeline firms in the post-earthquake reconstruction.

Venture capital meets contract theory: risky claims or formal control?

This paper develops a theory of the joint allocation of formal control and cash-flow rights in venture capital deals. We argue that when the need for investor support calls for very high-powered outside claims, entrepreneurs should optimally retain formal control in order to avoid excessive interference. Hence, we predict that risky claims should be be negatively correlated to control rights, both along the life of a start-up and across deals. This challenges the idea that risky claims should a ways be associated to more formal control, and is in line with contractual terms increasingly used in venture capital, in corporate venturing and in partnership deals between biotech start-ups and large drug companies. The paper provides a theoretical explanation to some puzzling evidence documented in Gompers (1997) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2000), namely the inclusion in venture capital contracts of contingencies that trigger both a reduction in VC control and the conversion! of her preferred stocks into common stocks.

Inequity version and team incentives

We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A "selfish" employer can profitably exploit such preferences among its employees by offering contracts which create inequity off-equilibrium and thus, they would leave employees feeling envy or guilt when they do not meet the employer's demands. Such contracts resemble team and relative performance contracts, and thus we derive conditions under which it may be beneficial to form work teams of employees with distributional concerns who were previously working individually. Similar results are obtained for status-seeking and efficiency concerns preferences.